Saleh channels Mubarak
Ali Abdullah Saleh, President of Yemen, announced to parliament today that he will not run again in 2013. He was at least more eloquent than his mentor: “No extension, no inheritance, no resetting the clock,” he said (this from someone who has made and broken the promise not to run previously). This blatant copying of Egyptian President Mubarak’s approach to deflating protests is intended to fend off protests scheduled for tomorrow (why don’t Yemenis prefer Friday for protests?). Saleh is also reported to be helping pro-regime elements get to the capital for the occasion.
There had been contradictory reports from Yemen on whether demonstrations there were serious or not. The Washington Post reported that democracy activists are divided from political opposition, and the regime handles both with skill and occasional brutality. The demands of the political opposition have been relatively mild: electoral and other reforms rather than the immediate departure of the president.
But if objective indicators mean anything, Yemen is still ripe for trouble, more likely of the state collapse than the revolutionary sort. Here’s the short list of what ails it:
- Water: lacking and declining rapidly.
- Oil: also declining rapidly.
- Rebellion: in the north and the south.
- Poverty: big time.
- Drugs: qat, every day.
- Autocrat: Ali Abdullah Saleh, in power longer than Mubarak.
- Role in the war on terror: front line against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
- Dependence on the U.S.: increasing.
I can’t think of any countries that come close to this litany of ailments, apart from Somalia (an instructive analogue, and just across the Bab el Mandeb). Yemen may not have enough of a middle class to generate the kind of revolution of rising expectations that chased Ben Ali from Tunisia, and the population’s addiction to qat may make any revolution (or state collapse) more psychedelic than monochrome. President Saleh has been trying hard to ease tensions by raising salaries, lowering taxes, promising not to steal another term, and asserting boldly that Yemen is not Tunisia.
It has been more than a year since a real expert on Yemen predicted:
If left unaddressed, Yemen’s problems could potentially destabilize Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. The inability of the Yemeni central government to fully control its territory will create space for violent extremists to regroup and launch attacks against domestic and international targets. The international community must be realistic about the limitations of intervention in Yemen. In the near term, however, inaction is not an option.
It may not be an option in the think-tank world, but it is pretty much what we’ve done. I certainly don’t think Christopher Boucek’s recommendations have been fully implemented, though U.S. assistance is increasing rapidly:
* Yemen must build local capacity in law enforcement and its legal and judicial systems by enacting counterterrorism legislation, passing terror finance laws, improving police training, and professionalizing the prison service.
* The Gulf states should make Yemen’s membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council contingent on tough steps, including progress on curbing government subsidies, addressing corruption, and enacting measures to curtail security concerns.
* U.S. aid to Yemen is disproportionately small given its importance to U.S. national security. Development assistance, education and technical cooperation, capacity building, institution strengthening, and direct financial assistance can better address the interconnected challenges facing Yemen than military and security aid.
So are we living on borrowed time in Yemen, or can President Saleh succeed using Mubarak’s tricks?
PS: See also Unhappy Yemen: a White House view.
PPS: See also from the February 4 New York Times. The headline is misleading. She thinks he is safe for six months, maybe not more.
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