peacefare.net

The EU is still a powerful magnet

My friends at tacno.net, where Milan Marinkovic has landed, have published this interview today in Serbian:

In a recent interview for „Anadolia“ (AA) news agency, you said that even „armed conflict cannot be ruled out“ following Belgrade’s platform for „normalizaion of relations with Kosovo“. If such a conflict really occurred, on what scale and of what intensity would you expect it to be, and what implications could it have for the rest of the region?

– It is difficult to talk about the possibility of armed conflict without readers thinking you are advocating it. I am not. But when a country claims territory it does not rightfully control, and refuses to recognize the authorities who do have a right to control it, that is a situation that can obviously lead to armed conflict. As KFOR is drawn down, Pristina and Belgrade need to make diplomatic arrangements that give both confidence no armed incursion will occur. Otherwise, they need to both make defensive military preparations, which would be excessively expensive and potentially destabilizing.

I don’t think a big war is possible in the Balkans any longer: no one has the force and sustainment capability any longer. Nor would it benefit any country in the Balkans to initiate hostilities. But bad things do happen, and war in the Balkans has always been more about violence against civilians than against other armed forces. We should not forget the 1990s.

Serbian Prime minister Ivica Dačić has warned on several occasions in the past couple of weeks that the police will remove, using force if necessary, a monument built in the south Serbian town of Preševo by the municipal Albanian-majority government in honor of fallen combatants from the former LAPBM, should the Albanians fail to remove it themselves by January 17. Local Albanians have so far rejected Dačić’s ultimatum, ignoring at the same time a compromising proposal by Western ambassadors to Serbia that the monument be moved from the town centre to another location. If the monument remains in its place after the deadline set by Dačić, he will find himself under considerable pressure from Serbian nationalists, including his own supporters, to fulfill the promise and remove the monument. Do you see any possibility that a middle groung could be found between Belgrade and local Albanians within these few days, which would help to relieve the tension?

– It is clearly preferable that this issue be resolved by compromise. I don’t know the situation well enough to judge whether the Western ambassadors’ proposal is one that will work. But it would make no sense for Serbia to destroy a monument to people whose comrades in arms were amnestied 10 years ago, thus reigniting a conflict that has largely died down. At the same time, Albanians have to appreciate that Serb lives were lost as well. I would note that in Sarajevo recently the government has decided to put up a monument to Serbs killed by Bosniak forces during the war. These problems are not insoluble.

Last November, during the celebration of the Albanian national holiday, the Day of Flag, Albanian and Kosovo prime ministers, Sali Berisha and Hashim Thaci respectively, hinted at the desire of Albanians who live across the region to unify into a single nation state. This raised some eyebrows in neighbor countries, especially Serbia. Although this type of rhetoric is not unusual in the Balkans on such occasions, Ilir Deda, a prominent expert from Kosovo, said that it should be taken seriously. Mr Deda warned that the idea is likely to gain ground over the coming years if Kosovo remains in limbo in terms of European integration and UN membership. There is a palpable fear that Serbian nationalists would use it as a perfect excuse in their attempts to revive the project of greater Serbia, primarily through secession of RS from Bosnia. If the idea of pan-Albanian unification became part of Albanian leaders’ official agenda at some point, what position would Washington be likely to take on the issue?

– Washington will oppose pan-Albanian unification, just as it opposed pan-Serbian unification. It regards the current borders in the Balkans as fixed. The next phase is EU membership. Once the Balkans states join the EU, borders won’t matter much. I’d be surprised if Albanians from Albania preferred pan-Albanian unification to EU accession. I doubt Serbs from Serbia would prefer pan-Serbian unification to EU accession. And let’s be clear: changing borders in the Balkans would lead to violence.

Let’s now move to Bosnia. In addition to enduring divisions along ethnic lines, the overall socio-economic situation is steadily deteriorating, not to mention people’s growing dissatisfaction with high levels of corruption, street crime and violence of various sorts. The EU, for its part, has managed to preserve the status quo in the sense that the country has not broken apart, but will it be enough to prevent destablization internally, given domestic politicians’ obvious inability to carry out meaningful reforms that would improve people’s lives in the foreseeable future?

– Bosnia and Herzegovina has a democratic system. It is up to its citizens to vote to fix what ails it. The EU and the U.S. have been extraordinarily generous. The incentives are there. And the EU will keep its door ajar for when the Bosnians decide to do the right things. Until then, they will have to live with the governments they elect.

A general assumption is that most important for stability of the Western Balkans is that Serbia and Croatia, as two major regional players, maintain good relationship. Serbian president Tomislav Nikolić has given a few undiplomatic statements since he assumed the office, provoking a negative reaction on the part of Zagreb. Meanwhile, Prime minister Dačić has been looking to arrange a meeting with his Croatian counterpart Zoran Milanović in order to sort things out, but some analysts are warning that Croatia’s looming accession to the EU might make the country become less interested in its future relationship with Belgrade. What is your view? How will Croatia’s EU membership affect Zagreb’s policy toward neighbors, especially Serbia?

– My general impression is that EU membership has improved relations between new member states and their neighbors. Certainly Slovenia has played a very positive role in the Balkans generally over the past 20 years or so. Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria have also been more part of the solution than part of the problem. There are historical problems between Croatia and Serbia, but so far as I know relatively few big current issues. Croatia’s economic benefits from the EU will echo throughout the Balkans.

All former communist states of eastern and southern Europe are either already members of or aspirants to membership in NATO. The only exception is Serbia, and the reason is well known: most Serbs refuse to even consider joining NATO, largely because of the air campaign against Serbia in 1999. While some analysts believe that NATO membership would have no particular effect on Serbia’s EU prospects, arguing that these are two completely separate processes, others claim that it could be of great importance, helping Belgrade look more credible among its Western partners. Which argument is closer to your line of reasoning and why?

– I’m not sure Serbia’s hesitation about NATO is caused only by the 1999 bombing. Some in Serbia are attached to its friendship with Russia and nostalgic for its non-aligned status during the Cold War. It also knows it cannot become a member of NATO without changing its attitude on Kosovo.

Partly for these reasons, no one in NATO is campaigning for Serbian membership. Belgrade has a good deal of credibility in the West, but if it wants to become a full-fledged Western state it will need to adjust its foreign policy. This is not just a matter of “good neighborly relations” or “normalizing relations.” NATO is not going to bring the Kosovo issue into its membership. It has to be solved, completely, first. There is no use in pretending otherwise.

Contrary to a widespread belief of local conspiracy theorists, the Balkans are nowhere among U.S. foreign policy priorities. The ongoing economic crisis, which is becoming increasingly political, has caused EU membership to lose some of its attractiveness in the eyes of people both in EU member states and aspiring countries, which could make it more difficult for Brussels to keep us dedicated to the eurointegration process. If the crisis in Europe continues to deepen, leading eventually to resurgence of aggressive nationalism in the Balkans as a serious threat to already fragile peace, what is the breaking point at which Washington would begin to consider a stronger engagement in our troubled region?

– There are triggers that would motivate stronger engagement: widespread violence against minorities or interstate conflict, for example. But it is very difficult to picture anything that would precipitate the kind of heavy military intervention we saw in the 1990s.

Even in its current weakened state, the EU is a powerful magnet. And the financial crisis in Europe will not last forever. Anyone who doubts the attractiveness EU membership should just visit one of the nearby members and compare the standard of living. Skip Greece, as its crisis is profound, but self-induced.

After all, should we hope that ex-Yugoslavian countries could begin to view one another as major strategic partners rather than rivals any time soon, apart from mere rhetoric aimed at satisfying Brussels’ demand for good neighborly relations?

– I think you already see Slovenia taking that attitude, and I sometimes hear it also from Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia. It will be hard for some of those who are lagging in the EU regatta to see the advantages of improved relations with their neighbors, but with time I think it will happen.