Day: September 13, 2013
Force and diplomacy aren’t antithetical
I’ve had a number of people ask in the past 48 hours whether proceeding on the diplomatic track to collect Syria’s chemical weapons will strengthen Bashar al Asad.
The answer in the short term is “yes.” Whenever the international community negotiates with a ruler whose legitimacy is in question, it shores up his hold on power. Especially so in this instance, as Bashar will soon be responsible for declaring, collecting and turning over Syria’s chemical weapons, making him appear indispensable to a process Russia and the United States have dubbed A number 1 priority.
Neither will want him pushed aside while this process is ongoing. If he were to disappear suddenly, the process would at best come to a halt and at worst disintegrate, making accountability for the chemical weapons difficult if not impossible. Even the Geneva 2 formula–full delegation of executive authority to a government agreed by both the regime and the opposition–might be a bridge too far so long as the chemical weapons are not fully under international control.
This of course means that Bashar, whether he intends to use the chemical weapons again or not, will want to prolong the process as much as possible. The opportunities for footdragging are many. He is already demanding that the US give up the threat to use force as a condition for his turning over the chemical weapons. He can delay his accounting for the weapons and their locations for a month under the convention he has said he will sign. He can stall the deployment of weapons inspectors. He can claim that security conditions make collecting the weapons, said to be distributed to 50 or so sites, impossible. He can make working conditions for the inspectors hellish.
It will be Moscow’s responsibility to deliver Bashar and ensure he performs. I really have no doubt about Russia’s ability to do this. Syria depends on Russian arms and financing. Even a slight delay in deliveries of either would put Damascus in a bind. But Moscow too will have reasons to delay and prevaricate. The Americans, if they are to get anything like full implementation of a serious agreement on chemical weapons, will need to keep alive a credible threat to use force if Bashar fails to meet expectations.
This push and shove between the diplomacy and force is the rule, not the exception. It went on for more than two years after the UN Security Council authorized the use of force in Bosnia. It went on for months in the prelude to the Kosovo bombing, with several diplomatic failures to end the ethnic cleansing of Albanians from Kosovo preceding the eventual use of force. Even in Afghanistan, the Taliban were given an opportunity to deliver Al Qaeda into the hands of the Americans. Force was used only after diplomacy had failed. President Bush’s supporters would claim this was also true for Iraq.
The problem in Syria is that the issues there go far beyond chemical weapons. In addition to the mass atrocities committed with conventional weapons, there are two vital US interests at stake: regional stability and blocking an extremist (Sunni or Shia-aligned) succession in Syria. Secretary Kerry is trying hard to keep the door to a Geneva 2 negotiation open, because only a negotiated political transition has much of a chance of avoiding state collapse, which will threaten regional stability, and extremist takeover.
Russia and the United States share these interests in a negotiated political transition, but so far Moscow has remained wedded to Bashar al Asad, no matter how many times Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov claim they are not committed to him personally. What Kerry needs to do is convince the Russians that Bashar remaining in power is a real and serious threat to Russia, as it will encourage jihadi extremists to extend their fight to the Caucasus and cause state structures in the Levant to fragment.
The military balance will be an important part of Russia’s calculations. While President Obama has stayed largely silent on support for the Syrian opposition, frustrating Senator McCain and other Republicans who have wanted to see intervention, there are lots of indications that he is ratcheting up a military supply and training chain that moved slowly over the summer. The faster the Syrian opposition can pose a serious military threat to the regime, the sooner Russia will be inclined to reexamine its support for Bashar and its hesistancy about Geneva 2.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Anything but Syria
Danya Greenfield, moderator of Thursday’s Atlantic Council event on Yemen, joked that it is nice to discuss something other than Syria. Panelists at the Rafik Hariri Center and Project on Middle East Democracy event included:
- Peter Salisbury from the Chatham House Yemen Forum,
- Christopher Jennings from USAID, and
- Fatima al Asrar, an independent policy analyst.
The discussion focused on the political and economic changes in Yemen since the mass protests of 2011 and the removal of Ali Abdullah Saleh from power in 2012 as well as the international community’s assistance role.
The ousted president, Salisbury said, used patronage to keep local authorities under his influence, resolve conflicts and maintain unity in a traditionally decentralized country. He allowed only those who pledged their allegiance to him access to businesses. Even after liberalization of the economy in the 1990s, only his allies could have businesses with access to foreign markets. Abdullah Saleh built a loyal political and economic elite.
This system left no money for infrastructure and development and most of the population in extreme poverty. Inequality became an issue when the opposition fielded an opponent in the 2006 presidential elections. But it was only after the 2011 uprising that the international community, concerned with security issues, got engaged.
Current President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi has removed top military officials and elites, destabilizing the country and putting more power in the hands of tribal militias. The opposition Islah Party and the ruling General People’s Congress have been unable to cooperate. The transition in Yemen will take years and even decades, with a real possibility of return to the old system of elite rule that existed under Abdullah Saleh.
Jennings discussed what USAID has been doing in Yemen to maintain security in the country. The 2011 protests brought real potential for change and reform. There is a real commitment to have an inclusive and transparent National Dialogue, which has been unique among the Arab transitions, and to democracy. USAID has attempted to move away from a “check-box” approach. It has focused on expansion of the political process to ensure the inclusion of groups such as women and youth. USAID programs are not just targeting the old elites under Abdullah Saleh but also working with local and district officials and civil society organizations, which however sometimes pursue the objectives of donors rather than their target constituents. Yemen’s stability depends on governance and economic reforms and the eventual writing of a constitution. Radicals hinder that process, but USAID is committed to maintaining the momentum of reform and completing the transition process.
Al Asrar sees a real opportunity for reform in Yemen. With Abdullah Saleh removed from power, the barriers to foreign aid are gone and the Friends of Yemen have promised $8 billion in aid, in accordance with a “mutual accountability” framework. Before the protests of 2011, Yemen was facing many economic challenges, which have exacerbated during the transition period. Al Asrar argues that the Yemeni government needs to take the lead and steer donors to its needs. Political and economic processes need to merge. The Yemeni government does not see its partnerships with the international community as being reliable because donors pull their aid at any sign of instability, leaving many Yemenis without essential resources. Yemen is a fragile state, but foreign governments need to find ways to give predictable aid.
Greenfield concluded that there is a consensus Yemen needs a long-term approach. There is reason for optimism – Yemen has not fallen to divisions and civil war like Syria. Yet, the transition period has still not met the demands of the youth that protested and demanded participation of all Yemenis in the political process.
RSS - Posts
