Month: March 2014

Is Syria like the Balkans?

I have long resisted parallels between the Balkans, in particular Bosnia, and Syria. Here are the notes on the subject I prepared for a recent presentation on the subject:

1. Context counts. One sense in which the context is similar is that the Balkans and Syria were once part of the Ottoman Empire. Their populations were not homogenized into nation states. They preserve distinct ethnic and sectarian characteristics to a far greater extent than in Western Europe.

2. But otherwise the context really is different

• Ethnic nationalism was a cause of the war in Bosnia, among the most important of them. Heightened sectarian and ethnic feeling is a consequence of the war in Syria.

• In Bosnia, the neighbors were actively trying to divide the territory. In Syria, the neighbors are supporting proxies but still trying to avoid getting too involved and fearing division of the territory.

• Russia is supplying and financing the regime in Syria. It was not playing nearly so active role in supporting the Serbs in Bosnia.

• Russia was Yeltsin’s, not Putin’s: it was retreating from the world stage, not trying to force its way on.

• The United States in the 1990s was at the peak of its unipolar moment. Today it faces serious challenges throughout the Middle East and in Asia and war fatigue at home.

3. The Dayton negotiations produced a territorial division of Bosnia along ethnic lines and saved the Serbs from defeat.

• Milosevic came to Dayton suing for peace, because he feared a mass exodus of Serbs from Bosnia along the lines of what had happened a few months before in Croatia.

• The Americans compelled President Izetbegovic to agree to a settlement he regarded as unjust.

• Almost 20 years of effort has not reversed the ethnic cleansing and separation caused by the war, whose territorial dimension is a major barrier to peace implementation.

4. If there is a parallel to Syria in the Balkans, it is Kosovo, not Bosnia.

• There Milosevic was trying to assert control over territory that belonged to Serbia.

• He violated even minimal standards of decency by attacking civilian populations, chasing people from their homes and rendering something like half the population refugees.

• The US took advantage of the unipolar moment to launch a war without UN Security Council approval. Milosevic was indicted at The Hague Tribunal during the war.

• The outcome in Kosovo was not ethnoterritorial, except for a small portion in the north that is now being reintegrated with the rest of the territory.

• Ethnoterritorial separation may look desirable to end a war, but it creates conditions in which a real peace process is difficult if not impossible to implement within the context of a single sovereign state.

5. The military intervention against Yugoslavia was a vital prelude to the Kosovo settlement.

• Serbia became concerned that damage to its infrastructure from NATO bombing would be irreversible, making it difficult for Milosevic to remain in power.

• The Serbian army withdrew from Kosovo, Belgrade lost all control of the situation there, and the refugees returned en masse.

• Though defeated militarily, Milosevic remained in power for another year or so, until his own people brought him down at the polls.

• He fell at an election, having allowed local observers and vote counting at the polling places.

6. Nothing like these conditions exist today in Syria.

• Assad is winning, not losing. From the opposition perspective, leaving him in power is not an option. From the regime perspective, removing him is not an option.

• Military intervention by Iran and Russia continues. Any definitive military intervention on behalf of the opposition seems far off.

• An election in Syria today would unquestionably produce an outcome favorable to Assad, with many people not voting and the polling far from free and far.

7. (only if needed) A quick word also about Crimea.

• President Putin’s playbook there is not borrowed from the Americans in Kosovo, as he sometimes implies.

• The US did not in Kosovo unilaterally occupy and annex a province. There was no quicky referendum, but rather a well-coordinated declaration of independence after eight years of UN administration and several years of UN-led negotiation.

• Kosovo is now recognized by over 100 sovereign states.

• Putin’s playbook is copied from Milosevic, who used military force claiming to protect co-nationals and re-establish full control over territory he regarded as rightfully his own.

 

 

 

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Peace Picks March 31 – April 4

1. Ground Truth Briefing: The U.S.-Saudi Relationship: Too Big To Fail?

Monday, March 31 | 9 – 10am

Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW

REGISTER TO ATTEND

In the wake of President Obama’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia, please join us as three veteran observers and analysts of the Saudi and Washington scenes assess the state of relations between the two countries and prospects for the future.

What ails the U.S.-Saudi relationship? Can it be fixed? Or are we witnessing the weakening of one of America’s special relationships in the region?

SPEAKERS
David Ottaway, Senior Scholar
Middle East Specialist and Former Washington Post Correspondent

Abdulaziz Sager
Chairman, Gulf Research Center, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia

Jim Smith
Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (2009-2013) and USAF Brigadier General, retired

Jane Harman; Director, President and CEO

Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives and Distinguished Scholar
Historian, analyst, negotiator, and former advisor to Republican and Democratic Secretaries of State on Arab-Israeli negotiations, 1978-2003

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Libya adrift

Wednesday’s lunchtime assessment of Libya sponsored by the Middle East Institute was one of those rare events:  excellent, if gloomy, analysis by Charles Dunne (who moderated), Karim “the light at the end of the tunnel is a train coming this way” Mezran on politics, and militiaman Fred Wehrey on security, followed by an equally excellent but wonderfully judicious set of policy recommendations for the US Government from David Mack.

The facts speak for themselves.  Libya has been unable to establish the state’s monopoly on the legitimate means of violence, its parliament has been reduced to an Islamist rump, the elections for its constitution drafting committee saw minimal turnout and election of only 47 out of 60 members, its government was sacked after being unable to prevent export of pirated oil, the population lacks confidence in the institutions and the institutions lack legitimacy.  What else could go wrong?

Karim Mezran managed a moment of sunshine with mention of the national dialogue, whose preparatory committee is now traveling around the country holding town hall meetings.  It is searching for the missing link:  a serious political compact.  But its funding for the next phase is not guaranteed.  Another ray of sunshine is last summer’s National Democratic Institute poll.  Libyans want democracy.  They just don’t know how to get there from here.

The obvious barrier is the militias, which were vital to fighting Qaddafi but have now taken on criminal and political roles.  Fred Wehrey noted the Catch 22 security dilemma:  the militias can’t be gotten rid of because the politicians are afraid doing so will leave them exposed, so other politicians up the ante, which makes the situation worse.  The political institutions are bankrupt and state capacity at the national level is lacking.  At the local level there are effective social contracts, mainly negotiated by the tribes, but this makes the situation even more complicated.  Libya is many problems, not one.

Even the General Purpose Force of up to 28,000 troops now being trained by internationals is a problem.  It is intended to protect the government, but politicians, militias and people are all frightened it will be used against them.  The initial recruits were not properly vetted, there are problems of regional representation, and a political compact governing its use has not been reached.  Many fear that General Sisi’s example in Egypt will be followed in Libya, returning the country to autocracy.

While acknowledging all these issues, David Mack soberly noted that Libya is not a big factor in world energy markets but rather a regional player with potential to become a major oil and gas producer to Europe, replacing Russian gas.  Even in the Middle East, Washington is more concerned with the Israel/Palestine negotiations, the war Syria, and Egypt’s revolution gone awry, not to mention Ukraine and other issues farther afield.  Libya has the potential to be a Somalia on the Mediterranean, but it can also be a prosperous country with a serious commitment to human rights.  It has the resources to rebuild.  What it needs is a bit of help getting on the right track.

The US needs to help where it can, David suggested, but keep a low profile and stay out of internal Libyan politics.  Leading from behind is not a four letter word.  In this situation, it is better to put good ideas through the UN than to offer them up wrapped in an American flag.  Libyan backlash against foreign intervention, especially from the US, could be dramatic.

Still, the US has things it can and should offer.  David favors private sector assistance, including an Overseas Private Investment Corporation agreement and strong Foreign Commercial Service representation.  He also wants to see expanded educational collaboration with US universities, and possibly contractor help in building the Libyan armed forces and police.  All this requires consular services in Tripoli for both Americans and Libyans.

David considers some additional options for fuller governmental engagement, especially on the security and counter-terrorism fronts, as well as an option for deferring to the Europeans.  These he allows to fall away, leaving US policy largely in the hands of private sector actors for implementation.  Some of us familiar with the difficulties of US contractors in other non-permissive environments may have our doubts that this is sufficient, but it is a rare and precious diplomat who so consciously and assiduously seeks to limit commitments to a country he has followed for decades, for our sake as well as theirs.

Libya is adrift.  I might opt for one of David’s more forward-leaning options, but only keeping his warnings in mind.

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I call Macedonia Macedonia

A loyal reader writes:  “Mr. Serwer is being quoted as the USA should pressure Greece in regards to fyrom ascension to NATO.  I would really appreciate him to post something on his blog so we can discuss it.”  This presumably refers to remarks I made by Skype Tuesday to a class on Macedonia at University College ISPE in Pristina.  Here are my notes on the name question and NATO for that lecture, which was observed by a Macedonian journalist:

Macedonia’s external problem remains what it has been since independence: Greece’s unwillingness to accept its name.

Let me admit that I am not neutral on this subject. I advocated American recognition of Macedonia by its constitutional name (Republic of Macedonia) well before Washington did it.

I think any country has a right to call itself what it wants, so long as it does not harbor irredentist designs on its neighbors. This applies to the United States of Mexico, and to the US state of New Mexico, as much as it does to Macedonia and Greece.

In fact, Macedonia has already changed its constitution and flag to accommodate Greek concerns.

I am convinced that Macedonia does not have irredentist designs on Greece. Greek preoccupation with this issue is rooted in Athens’ own attitude towards minorities within Greece, as it denies they exist, and concern about Greek identity.

While claiming continuity with ancient Greece, Greek identity is much more clearly rooted in the early 19th century.

But whatever the origins, the result is a pernicious one. Greece’s current prime minister has gone as far as to say that he wants to see the dissolution of Macedonia and the formation of a Greater Albania, rather than accept a solution to the “name” issue.

This would be nothing more than comedic except for one thing: Greece’s attitude on the name issue is blocking Macedonian membership in NATO and holding up its progress towards negotiating EU membership.

The EU has been clever and invented a “high-level dialogue” that in essence substitutes for the EU accession negotiations, which in any event won’t be concluded during this decade.

The NATO issue is more urgent. Albanians in Macedonia regard NATO membership as vital to their own security, a kind of guarantee that the Macedonian state will continue in the direction of treating them properly.

Macedonia has met NATO’s criteria for membership. Its army has even fought under US command in Afghanistan and still protects NATO headquarters there.

I’ve spoken with the Vermont National Guard commander who integrated Macedonian troops with his own fighting in Afghanistan. He told me he relied on them as he would on American troops.

But Greece shows no sign of easing its veto on membership by the time of the next NATO summit in Cardiff, Wales in September.

Washington has unfortunately said that NATO membership for Macedonia depends on its resolving its problems with Greece, a position that essentially turns American leverage over to Athens.

This in my view is a serious mistake, but so far at least I’ve been unable to convince my American colleagues that they should take a more proactive role.

My own preference would be that Washington seek to end the UN mediation, which has produced nothing in almost 20 years of effort, and tell Athens that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will become a member of NATO in Cardiff, along with Montenegro, in the fall.

At the same time, Brussels should make clear to Skopje that it will need to reach a mutually acceptable accommodation with Greece before it can become an EU member.

Athens can of course still veto Macedonia’s membership in NATO, where decisions are taken by consensus.

But that would be a serious mistake if Brussels and Washington are prepared to press the issue at the highest levels. Cash-strapped Greece is in no position to annoy, much less anger, the Americans, Germans and other Europeans.

Nor is it wise for Greece to continue to ignore the 2011 decision of the International Court of Justice, which found by a 15 to 1 margin that Athens has breached the Interim Accord and rejected its allegations against the Skopje government.

While Greeks continue to claim that the Court failed to adopt any remedies, the decision was clearly a binding one that the ICJ expected Athens to implement.  The court in fact has no power to enforce its decisions.

Let me be clear: the Macedonian government, while held not to have violated the Interim Accord, is not entirely without its own responsibility in this matter, especially in recent years.

Prime Minister Gruevski has played to his own constituency by emphasizing connections to ancient Macedonia that are even more far-fetched than those of Prime Minister Samaras, which is saying something.

What we’ve got here are two democratically elected leaders who each feed the beast of ethnic nationalism in ways that are destabilizing and dangerous.

There is a real risk that they have unleashed sentiments that will be difficult to put back in Pandora’s box, which is an appropriate label given the context.

Neither Greece nor Macedonia can cause the kind of military damage that Milosevic’s Serbia did, but they can certainly cause political instability, especially if their dispute unleashes a third ethnic nationalism: the Albanian one.

I inserted as well a few remarks based on my experience in Italy, where I met only one person (in 10 years of living there) who claimed descent from the ancient Romans.  Italians know that the Romans were conquered by various “barbarians”–Goths, Vandals, and the like–so that modern-day Italians are thoroughly mixed genetically.  Rome at one point had a population of only 85,000 people (at the peak of the Empire and today it has more like 3 million).  How could any but a handful of Italians claim genetic descent from ancient Rome?  How much better, or worse, is the Greek claim to descent from the ancient Greeks? 

Even in the US we claim descent from Greco-Roman culture.  Washington DC was designed to be the “New Rome.”  Such claims deprive Italy and Greece of nothing.  Pride in one’s heritage should mean pride in seeing others attach themselves to it.

 

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90 miles from you know where

Politico Magazine yesterday published my piece based on a visit to Cuba last week under the heading “The Dangers of Collapse in Cuba.”  Here is the lead paragraph:

Cuba’s 1950s cars and Havana’s crumbling facades have long been its iconic symbols in the American imagination. They don’t disappoint, as I discovered on a trip to Cuba last week. But I didn’t expect zippy Hyundais with Miami FM on their radios or a private collection of contemporary Cuban art, installed floor to 20-foot ceiling in a fabulous apartment with a terrace overlooking the Gulf of Mexico. Both the apartment and the art would put many wealthy New Yorkers to shame.

You’ll have to go to the  Politico Magazine website for more. 
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Peace Picks March 24 – 28

Very late (we usually publish by Sunday), and entirely my fault:

1. Iran Through a European Lens

Monday, March 24 | 10am

Atlantic Council, 12th Floor (West Tower); 1030 15th Street, NW

REGISTER TO ATTEND

The Atlantic Council’s Iran Task Force invites you to a conversation with Marietje Schaake, member of the European Parliament and expert on Internet freedom, human rights, and Iran. Schaake recently visited Iran with a European Parliament delegation to address critical issues including the nuclear program and human rights concerns. Schaake will share insights from her visit and provide a European perspective on diplomacy with Iran.

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