Month: July 2016
- Vitality, diversity, and diplomacy in Chinese contemporary art | Tuesday, August 2nd | 10:00 am -12:00 pm | Brookings | Click HERE to RSVP | China’s “reform and opening up” period has witnessed a booming Chinese contemporary art scene, which has steadily adopted artistic genres and techniques from the West. But heavy foreign influence has not led artists to abandon the distinctive features of Chinese art; rather, it has inspired a revival of its unique characteristics. Xu Bing, Fan Di’an, and other leading Chinese artists of the day have immersed themselves in multicultural environments throughout their careers, infusing their artwork with related themes. Xu Bing has experimented with innovative methods of expression that reflect his personal philosophical journey, his exposure to diverse viewpoints, and his pursuit of common bonds across cultures. Fan Di’an has advanced global recognition of Chinese avant-garde artists in various regions and across different styles. Together, these two artists have greatly enriched international understanding of this rapidly changing country. On August 2, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings will host these two distinguished pioneers of Chinese contemporary art for a discussion on how global and local forces influence artwork in China and how art reflects the views and ideas of Chinese society. Following presentations by Xu and Fan, Jan Stuart, who has worked with both artists at the British Museum and is currently the curator of Asian art at the Freer and Sackler Museums, will provide a commentary on their remarks. Cheng Li, director and senior fellow of the China Center, will then moderate a conversation with the group and take questions from the audience.
- Madaya: Portrait of a Syrian Town Under Siege| Wednesday, August 3rd | 12:00 -1:30 pm | Middle East Institute | Click HERE to RSVP | July marked one year since the beginning of the siege of the town of Madaya in southern Syria. The town’s 40,000 residents have been surrounded by landmines, checkpoints, and snipers, and forced to survive on meager supplies. Halted aid deliveries, denial of humanitarian evacuations, and unmet healthcare needs have already led to dozens of preventable deaths. The Middle East Institute, Syrian American Medical Society, and Physicians for Human Rights are pleased to host Dr. Ammar Ghanem (SAMS) and Elise Baker (PHR) for the release of a new report, Madaya: Portrait of a Syrian Town Under Siege. The report examines the public heath effects of the siege and puts forth recommendations about best practices in humanitarian assistance to besieged areas.
- A Multi-Pronged Analysis of the Causes and Effects of the Coup in Turkey | Thursday, August 4th | 4:00pm | The Institute of World Politics | Click HERE to RSVP | Today’s talk by Mr. Khlgatyan will focus on the recent coup attempt in Turkey: a discursion on its causes, immediate and long term effects, and implications for regional security and geopolitics. Vilen Khlgatyan is the founder and president of Global Research Center (GRC). He specializes in the geopolitics of energy, non-kinetic warfare, and the post-Soviet region with an emphasis on the Caucasus.
Of all the TV hours devoted to the Republican and Democratic National Conventions, these six minutes from immigrant Khizr Khan stand out. He is the father of US Army Captain Humayun Khan, killed in combat in Iraq:
There has been no response to my knowledge from the Trump campaign, which has doubled down on the pledge to block Muslims from entering the US.
PS, July 30: Trump has responded, saying:
I’d like to hear his wife say something.
I think I’ve made a lot of sacrifices. I work very, very hard. I’ve created thousands and thousands of jobs.
Judging from where most the merchandise he puts his name on is made and his applications to import foreign workers at relatively low wages, it is doubtful many of the beneficiaries are American. Nor has he sacrificed anything remotely comparable to the Khans.
Yesterday, Moscow and Damascus proposed to open humanitarian corridors into Aleppo. But their corridors aren’t intended to let humanitarian aid in. What they want to do is let Aleppans leave the besieged city.
Why would they want to do that?
There are two good reasons:
- The Syrian army and its militia allies are stretched thin. A block-to-block fight in the opposition-controlled eastern part of the city will take a big toll. Reducing number of opposition fighters will reduce the hit Assad’s forces take.
- The 300,000 or so people left in the east after more than five years of fighting are diehard opposition supporters. President Assad doesn’t want them staying, as they will no doubt continue to oppose his rule.
So what we’ve got here from the Russians and Syrians is a proposal to cleanse Aleppo of its opposition population, who are mostly Sunni. No doubt Assad intends to replace them with loyalists, in due course. He has caused so much destruction, and has so little money with which to rebuild, the eastern part of the city is likely to remain deserted for some time to come, or be populated by only the most desperate of the down and out.
What we are seeing is a purposeful effort to re-engineer the demography of Syria, now divided among areas controlled by the regime, the opposition, the Kurds, the Islamic State and other extremists, to simplify things a bit. Assad has no intention of welcoming home the more than four million people who have fled the country. Nor does he want another seven million who are internally displaced to go automatically back to where they came from. What he wants is to determine who goes where, consolidating those who support his rule in what he terms “useful Syria” (the Damascus/Aleppo axis and the west) and dispersing to other less attractive areas those who don’t.
The US has characterized the Russian/Syrian proposal as a “demand for surrender.” The UN has said it doesn’t respond to humanitarian needs, which are for pauses in the fighting and free access for UN aid going in and for people who want to leave, via any route they choose.
I see the Russian/Syrian proposition as an effort to weaponize the concept of humanitarian corridors, using them to achieve objectives that would otherwise require the application of military force. I can’t however rule out that the US will fall for the idea, in one form or another. Washington has shown no interest in the dire situation in Aleppo. It is entirely focused on fighting the Islamic State.
That is a mistake. Allowing Assad to conquer Aleppo and cleanse it of his opponents will help extremist recruitment and extend the growing international insurgency they are indulging in. He has made it absolutely clear he has no intention of governing in a way that would be sufficiently inclusive to counter the extremists.
Some of my friends are wondering whether allowing Assad to stay in place might calm things enough to allow for a transition to take place in due course. I’d have to see the details of such a proposition before commenting, but what indication is there that Assad will ever give up power unless he is forced to do so? The cynicism of weaponizing the idea of humanitarian corridors should remind us all that we are dealing, in both Russia and Syria, with people determined to have their way by any means, foul or fair.
Maria-Alexandra Martin, a SAIS Conflict Management graduate active in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, contributed this post. A native of Romania, she previously served as an Operations Officer with the European Union in Georgia.
A year ago I was in Kiev’s railway station embarking on a train to Dnipropetrovsk. That was the closest to the frontline in Eastern Ukraine I could safely get. I had thought of other options, such as getting a press ID to enable me to go to the contact line to observe the war. But I quickly changed my mind when I realized I would put myself in danger, my family and friends under tremendous pressure and risk diplomatic turmoil for my country.
The train was packed with an array of colors and nuanced military uniforms, men and women of all ages, exchanging salutes, smiles and hopes. I sat quietly, trying to identify each badge and catch bits and pieces of their conversation with my poor Russian. I admired the Ukrainians’ patriotic drive.
I reached Dnipropetrovsk five hours later and found a noisy train station, hundreds of people coming and going. The faces were tired and somber, yet hiding a smile of hope, the smile of someone who will see loved ones again. The day I arrived, a massive rotation of one of Ukraine’s territorial battalions had taken place.
Since the beginning of conflict in Eastern Ukraine around 10,000 people have lost their lives. More than three million are in need of humanitarian assistance. The plethora of international organizations present in the country work continuously to improve the life of the people affected by war. But as in every conflict and post-conflict setting, planning is one thing, while the reality is different. Regardless of how well one plans, how much money and personnel one allocates, the resources will always be too scarce to cover all needs. The permanent threat of violence is a variable with tremendous implications for the way any organization carries out its business.
The largest international field presence in the country is the OSCE monitoring mission (OSCE SMM). These unarmed civilians were deployed at the Ukrainian’s government request after the Russian annexation of Crimea. The mandate of the mission is to
gather information on the situation in Ukraine in an impartial and transparent manner, to document incidents as well as violations of OSCE principles and commitments, and to report on its observations on a daily basis.
The SMM is further charged with monitoring the ceasefire agreements and the withdrawal of heavy weapons, as well as observing the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, military equipment and mercenaries from Ukraine. Due to access restrictions and the often volatile security situation, the SMM can only monitor withdrawal on a limited basis.
Like any other international mission abroad, the OSCE SMM has a framework for operational purposes (its mandate), agreed in advance by all OSCE members, including Ukraine and Russia. The mandate of a mission represents its core, the source of international legitimization and basic guidelines for doing or not doing something in the field.
But the situation in Eastern Ukraine remains volatile, active fighting is gaining periodic momentum and jeopardizes the fragile ceasefire in place. The few hundred scattered OSCE monitors, unarmed and limited in their freedom of movement, try to perform their obligations according to the agreed mandate. But they perform under threats at gun point, shelling, and detentions, with no means of protection.
When things go south, international organizations get blamed for not being able to prevent it. Yesterday, this already familiar story came again to the surface. The New York Times published Andrew Kramer’s “Keeping Bankers’ Hours, European Observers Miss Most of Ukraine War”. He notes the monitors are patrolling only during daytime for security reasons, while the heavy fighting occurs at night. If unarmed civilians were to patrol during nighttime when shelling occurs, they would clearly be at risk.
Even during daytime, the OSCE SMM lacks freedom of movement and faces serious obstructions that hinder its patrols. These events are reported on a daily basis, but the political negotiations are not done by OSCE monitors. The people in the field are one component of a larger negotiation agenda, agreed at much higher levels, and based on a multitude of national interests. Blaming people on the ground for not doing more connotes a skewed understanding of how the work of international personnel is actually carried out. It also deepens resentments and prolongs conflict.
I am a fierce promoter of better rules of engagement, improved effectiveness and greater capabilities for international missions abroad. Many faults and misbehavior mar the conduct and credibility of global and regional organizations. But too little is said and published about the good things these missions do. They have given millions of people around the world a chance to live, resettle, access basic services like healthcare, education and justice, and regain their dignity. Things would be much worse without the international missions we are so quick to criticize.
I’ve got a piece in the Washington Post this morning: The right target for the U.S. in Syria: Hezbollah. It starts like this:
The military situation in Syria has turned against the U.S.-supported opposition over the past year, due mainly to Russian intervention. Now, the failed coup in Turkey and subsequent crackdown there stand to reduce the capabilities of a key U.S. ally. Without some rebalancing now in favor of the opposition to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, the prospects for a satisfactory negotiated political transition are dim.
In a dissenting internal memo last month, 51 State Department diplomats advocated attacks on Syrian government forces to end their aggression against the country’s civilian population, alter the military balance and bring about a negotiated political solution. President Obama has focused instead on fighting terrorism in Syria, but U.S. targets are limited to Sunni extremists such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates.
There is also a Shiite terrorist organization in Syria: Lebanon-based Hezbollah. It should not be immune.
That’s all I can reproduce without getting into trouble with the guardians of intellectual property. Go to the link above for the rest.
I don’t advocate an ultimatum backed with the threat of force lightly. But I also don’t see how allowing the Syrian wars to continue can be justified. Doing nothing is also doing something. It has consequences.
The US proposal to cooperate with Russia in attacking Jabhat al Nusra as well as the Islamic State makes the Hizbollah question even more urgent. If implemented, the US/Russia agreement will further weaken the opposition to Bashar al Assad, which relies–like it or not–heavily on Jabhat al Nusra capabilities. While the Americans are proposing as part of the agreement that the Syrian air force be grounded, no restraint on its ground forces (or those of Hezbollah) is proposed. Nor would it be possible to enforce.
So Faysal Itani is correct when he suggests that implementation of the agreement will make things even worse for the Syrian opposition than they’ve been to date, which is pretty bad for the past year. Aleppo is under siege and will likely fall, sooner or later. Idlib is at risk. Barack Obama, who doesn’t think US national security interests are at risk in the fight against Assad, could leave office presiding over mass atrocities the US has pledged to prevent and further undermining prospects for the negotiated settlement the US says it wants.
I am however sympathetic to the Administration’s aversion to taking up the cudgels against Russia, Iran and even the Syrian regime, as it lacks Congressional authorization for that kind of state-on-state fight. But I doubt any Congressional authorization is needed for the fight against a non-state actor like Hezbollah that has killed many Americans. The existing Authorization to Use Military Force, passed to bless the war against Al Qaeda, has already been stretched to cover the Islamic State and Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra, both Sunni extremist organizations. Why won’t it stretch to cover Shia Hezbollah as well?
The main purpose of an ultimatum to Hezbollah would not be to widen the Syrian war. It would be intended to get Hezbollah to withdraw to Lebanon and end its participation in the Russian/Iranian coalition supporting Bashar al Assad, thereby encouraging him to get serious about the UN-sponsored peace talks. Washington would of course continue to have a problem with Hezbollah even in Lebanon, where for decades it has weakened the Lebanese state, distorted Lebanese politics and planned the murder of innocent civilians in half a dozen countries.
I signed on to this letter to President Obama written and published today by the fine Project on Middle East Democracy.
As you consider the legacy of your presidency, we urge you to make an official visit to Tunisia, to demonstrate concretely the commitment you made during President Essebsi’s visit in May 2015 that “the United States believes in Tunisia, is invested in its success, and will work as a steady partner for years to come.” Your visit to Tunisia would energize and reassure Tunisia’s citizens and political leaders, sending a powerful signal of American support as the country struggles with the enormous challenges of building accountable institutions and a democratic society.
In 2009 in Cairo, you inspired citizens across the Middle East and North Africa by declaring a commitment to “common principles — principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings.” In the Arab world today, Tunisia stands alone as the one country where those principles of justice, progress, and tolerance have prevailed against all odds over the past five years.
Your Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes said in January that you would seek to consolidate your foreign policy legacy this year by traveling widely and by working with allies to combat extremism and foster the rise of emerging democracies. There is no more important example of an emerging democracy in the world today than Tunisia, which has achieved historic progress through compromise and consensus-building. It is impossible to overstate the value that a successful transition to democracy in Tunisia could have for the entire region.
In addition, Tunisia is both the newest major non-NATO U.S. ally and an important partner in the counter-ISIL coalition that, with U.S. support, is demonstrating increasing effectiveness at fighting extremism at home and across its borders. A visit to Tunisia would allow you to highlight a rare example of progress in countering extremism in a region too often defined by rising extremism and violent conflict.
Finally, Tunisia presents a unique opportunity in a difficult election-year climate here at home, as a positive story that enjoys bipartisan support in Congress and as a North African country where both the government and the people want greater U.S. engagement. We strongly urge you to travel to Tunisia to demonstrate the depth of U.S. support for its historic democratic transition and to underscore your administration’s commitment to its success as a model in the Arab world.
The letter has a lot of more distinguished names than mine attached to it (121 in all), so I suppose someone in the White House will read it.
I am less than sanguine about a presidential visit materializing. First there is the practical point: the schedule for the rest of the year should already be in the can. Squeezing in a stop in Tunis might be doable: it is on the way to almost anyplace in the Middle East or Central Asia and an easy hop from more or less anywhere in Europe.
More important is the equivocal character of what has happened in Tunisia. It is the only one of the Arab uprising countries to maintain a clear path towards democracy, rather than falling back into autocracy or civil war. But it has also generated an unusually high number of recruits to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, as well as several horrendous terrorist incidents. President Obama is unlikely to risk an appearance in Tunis to say nice things about its government before the American election.
The two months or less (considering the holidays) remaining on his mandate after November 8 might accommodate a stop in Tunis. But there will be a big clamor for his attention in many countries towards the end of the year, when he plans to attend an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Peru. I won’t be surprised if he decides on visits to American troops in Iraq, Turkey or elsewhere around the holidays.
Another possibility is a Biden visit to Tunisia. That would not have the same visibility worldwide, but I’m pretty sure the Tunisians would appreciate it. The Vice President met with Tunisian President Essebsi in Washington in May.
There are lots of other ways Washington could try to signal support for Tunisia and its continuation on the path towards democracy and reform: visits from John Kerry, Susan Rice or Samantha Power, a high-level “Codel” (Congressional delegation), close consultations on Libya. The point is to somehow make it clear that the US continues to support democratic ambitions in those Middle Eastern countries where they survive. Is that too much to ask?