Day: May 5, 2011

Two state shuffle

Following on the signing of a “unity” agreement between Fatah (which controls the West Bank) and Hamas (which controls Gaza), Hamas leader Khaled Meshal said in Cairo yesterday that his organization is now committed to seeking a two-state solution for (Israel and Palestine).  According to the New York Times, he said he was prepared to accept a common Palestinian platform that includes:

a Palestinian state in the 1967 lines with Jerusalem as its capital, without any settlements or settlers, not an inch of land swaps and respecting the right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel itself.

At the same time, Ziad abu Zayyad, editor of the Palestine-Israel Journal, was at the Middle East Institute in Washington at an event presided over by Ambassador Phil Wilcox, now president of the Foundation for Middle East Peace.  Abu Zayyad claimed that Hamas has evolved away from its own political platform, as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) did.  Hamas today is acting as “frontier guards” for Israel, preventing more radical groups from launching rocket attacks and other unproductive forms of resistance.  Hamas accepts a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank with its capital in East Jerusalem.

Abu Zayyad was at pains to recall that the “unity” agreement was originally an Egyptian proposal accepted by Fatah in 2009, when Hamas rejected it. Saying that its earlier rejection was due to people influenced by Israel and the United States [sic], Hamas has now accepted it without changes (abu Zayyad did not mention annexes added by Hamas, according to the New York Times).  The agreement lacks programmatic details, in particular a clear agreement on security forces.  It is not clear what will happen on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza, but at least there will be a joint mechanism in which issues can be discussed and resolved.  Hamas has come around now because of the Arab spring, which has increased Egyptian pressure and made Hamas uncertain of continued Syrian support and anxious for international legitimacy.  The demonstrations in Gaza he thought of relatively minor importance.

The agreement is important, abu Zayyad thought, because it enables the Palestinians to offer a partner for peace, which Israel has complained is lacking.  Israel has exploited the period of Palestinian division to intensify settlement activity without facing serious international pushback.  It continues to focus on occupying more land, which is making a two-state solution more difficult.  Unity will be helpful in the Palestinian effort to gain UN membership in September.  If that effort fails, the Palestinians will be better off because neither Hamas nor Fatah will be able to blame the other.  Unity will help to make Israel pay a higher cost for continued occupation.

Asked if the U.S. should put forward a detailed proposal, abu Zayyad said the Palestinians no longer trust Washington, because of its veto of a recent UN Security Council resolution on settlements that was consistent with U.S. policy.

Let’s not get our hopes up:  Meshal’s version of the two-state solution is far from what Israel would want, both on land swaps and refugee returns, and even in abu Zayyad’s milder version there was no indication that Hamas would give up violence or opposition in principle to the Jewish state.  But something does seem to be shifting within Hamas.  Let’s hope Israel can also find ways to shift in the direction of a two state solution.

PS:  While I was at abu Zayyad’s talk, he did not address the statement of Gaza (Hamas) Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, who said the operation to kill Osama bin Laden was “the continuation of the American oppression and shedding of blood of Muslims and Arabs.”  He did claim that Hamas is anxious to distinguish itself from the extreme religious “salafis,” which Haniyeh’s statement definitely did not do.  I understand that after I left abu Zayyad expressed his own amazement at Haniyeh’s statement.

PS:  Apologies for an earlier version of this post, which misspelled abu Zayyad’s name.

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Better to jaw-jaw than to war-war

This could be said of many places of course, but it occurred to me today after a discussion with Sudan’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) negotiators Abdullahi Osman el Tom, Mahmoud Abbeker Suleiman and Tahir el Faki over at the now well-located offices of the Public International Law and Policy Group. I’ve often accused the head of that distinguished organization, American University law professor Paul Williams, of never having seen a territory so small he didn’t want to help it gain independence.

That would not be fair in this instance.  The JEM folks made it clear that they prefer a negotiated political solution that would leave Darfur within Sudan.  But failing that, they were also clear that they would seek independence by military means and confederation with Southern Sudan, which will become independent in July, hoping eventually that Southern Sudan would itself join Khartoum in a confederation (fat chance of that).  There was no sign that they had the military capability to achieve independence, but they thought they could prevent Khartoum from winning a decisive military victory.  Sudanese soldiers, they thought, had no reason to fight vigorously for President Bashir.

The problem is that the mediation in Doha, conducted by the African Union, is not going well.  The JEM negotiators have been given 10 days to react to a proposal they say was prepared without their participation and falls far short of what they would need in order to sign.  They are spending their time at PILPG preparing a markup of the mediator’s proposal, one that would make it more specific, enable displaced people to return safely to their homes, provide for return of property and accountability for crimes, and ensure that assistance money (Qatar has promised $2 billion) is spent to benefit Darfurians.  This would require a much more comprehensive and detailed agreement, subject to extensive verification, than the one the mediator has proposed.  They have nonetheless been told that failure to come to agreement by May 23 would lead to an end to the mediation.

That would trigger Khartoum’s “domestication” plan, which the JEM folks see as an effort to eradicate their movement (and other rebels), push the internationals out of Darfur, force repatriation of displaced people whether conditions are adequate or not, and impose Khartoum’s authority.  It would also divide Darfur along ethnic lines, something they oppose, and it would allow janjaweed, the army and intelligence forces free rein, leaving the drivers of conflict unresolved.

What are those?  In the view of the JEM people, the drivers of conflict are national, not Darfurian.  President Bashir has made it clear that with Southern Sudan’s secession he will govern what remains as an Arab and Islamic state, further marginalizing the peripheral regions.  JEM does not define itself in ethnic and religious terms, and most of its adherents are neither Arab nor Muslim.  They want a secular, democratic state, the New Sudan of John Garang being their ideal.  They welcomed the Arab spring but underlined that nonviolence would not work in Sudan and that they are committed to keeping their military option open.

JEM would like the other Darfurian rebels to join in a united negotiating front, but that seems unlikely.  They would like the U.S. to make an effort to unify the rebels, but blamed the international community for “recognizing” different groups and thereby promoting fragmentation.

I have my doubts that the May 23 deadline is really a firm one.  If there are signs of progress, I’d be surprised if the Qataris and Khartoum did not want to continue the effort.  It really is better, as Winston Churchill said, to jaw-jaw rather than to war-war.

 

 

 

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