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A year on in North Africa

I enjoyed a fine event yesterday at an undisclosed location discussing north Africa from the Mediterranean littoral to northern Nigeria.  Arab Spring was the overall theme, but with very explicit recognition that it has manifested itself differently in different national contexts.  The event was not for attribution, so I can’t offer you the names of the distinguished folks involved, but here is a quick summary:

Tunisia:  Still looking like the best of the lot, with a glass half full and continuing to fill.  The mostly conscript army refused to fire on civilians, the old order has been willing to yield its positions and there have been Islamist moderates (Ennahda) on the rebel side.  There could still be splits that would endanger moderation and the elections may not be held before October 23, as planned.  Big issues include whether to have a presidential or a parliamentary constitutional system and whether Islamists will insist on implementing legislation for sharia.  This was a political rather a social revolution, but so far a successful one.  The U.S. should encourage trade and investment with Tunisia and leave ownership of the revolution with the Tunisians.

Libya:  The National Transitional Council has had the advantages of uniting the opposition under reasonably good leadership and with decent planning, but it now faces serious challenges from people who are feeling excluded:

1. Youth, who are particularly resentful of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) plans on which they were not consulted;
2. Tribes:  some of them resent the failure to investigate the assassination of General Younis;
3. Women:  they get only lip service;
4. Those seeking redress for mistreatment by revolutionary forces, especially the population of Tuarga, a town whose population the Misratans have vengefully displaced.

Power post-war is increasingly coming to depend on weapons, capture of high-value regime personalities,  and a claimed role in the fighting, rather than on programmatic proposals for the future. Islam could become a source of division in Libya, but so far there is little debate because most Libyans agree it has a central role in their society.  Still, there is a risk that Salafist elements, who have attacked Sufi shrines, may ignite tribal and sectarian tensions.

The NTC has been in a hurry, more concerned with speed than the quality of the transition process.  The U.S. should focus not on the constitutional framework per se but on broad principles:  participation of women, protection of minorities, and a broadly representative system of governance.

Egypt:  Islamists of one sort or another have captured about 75% of the parliament.  In Egyptian eyes, they stand for rule of law, an end to corruption, cultural authenticity and an end to foreign interference.  For virtually all Egyptians, sharia simply means justice.

The economy is in free fall, with tourism hit hard, currency reserves plummeting, government bonds selling only at high interest rates and credit to business drying up.

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) wants immunity from prosecution and continued control over large portions of the economy.  It is cracking down hard on protests.

So far as U.S. interests are concerned, the picture is mixed.  Egypt does not appear to be breeding violent extremists.  Anti-Americanism is more overt, but military to military cooperation is so far not much affected.  Egypt will not support U.S. military action as readily as it did at times in the past, but a U.S. aid cutoff seems unlikely.

On Israel, Egyptians are concerned with the below market sale of their natural gas but they are unlikely to support abrogation of the Camp David peace.  They will be more vocal and critical of U.S. support for Israeli settlements, attacks on Gaza and a possible attack on Iran.

The U.S. will do well to accept the election results, not ask the Egyptians to like Israelis, and practice strategic patience.  The responsibilities of power will moderate Islamist forces in Egypt and restore balance to its relationship with Israel.

Morocco:  The King has successfully taken the initiative and coopted the push for a constitutional monarchy, preserving his absolute powers behind the smokescreen of the new constitution he proposed.  Social protests are continuing, but there is no serious political challenge to the monarchy.  The legislature is weak.  Security is a problem, one the relatively weak state may not be able to manage effectively.  An uprising is not impossible but unlikely due the regime’s skillful maneuvers and the lack of an effective political opposition.

Algeria:  There are lots of reasons why there should be a revolution:  mass discontent, especially among the young and more educated, deep and wide corruption, lack of transparency and the state’s contempt for its citizens, widespread disillusion with the political system, social inequities, dependence on oil and gas, the demonstration effect of other north African rebellions, wide availability of social media.

But it isn’t happening.  Algeria in many respects already has a democratic political culture, with frequent strikes and relative media freedom.  It has used its oil and gas revenue effectively to appease the population, which disdains the state but shows little sign of despising the political leadership, in particular President Bouteflika.  The military coup and civil war of the early 1990s have left many Algerians unwilling to risk a challenge to the established order.

Still, something might happen.  A presidential succession looms, as do legislative elections (May 10).  The political leadership is aging and it is not clear who will inherit.

The Sahel:  The presentations focused on particular issues.  First was Al Qaeda in the Maghreb, the Algerian terrorist group that has been largely defeated inside Algeria and has now turned to crime:  smuggling, human trafficking, drug trade, kidnapping.  It is making lots of money.  The second was northern Nigeria, where Boko Haram  is tying down the Nigerian security forces.  That, the situation in the Delta and contestation between Christians and Muslims in central Nigeria are making it difficult for the Nigerians to play a major role in meeting the Sahelian challenge.

I focused on possible approaches to security in the Sahel, based on experience elsewhere.  My personal conclusion is that the Sahel today does not today present a serious security challenge to the United States, but some preventive effort there–especially regional cooperation on community-level development, tracking terrorist financing and border controls–would be appropriate.