What happens in Syria doesn’t stay in Syria
These are the speaking notes I used yesterday at USIP’s event on “Amidst Iraq’s Turmoil: What Can We Do?” The Q and A afterwards focused on whether Iraq really is a constitutional democracy (former Ambassador James Jeffrey made that claim, not me), how Prime Minister Maliki might be constrained from his worst instincts, the impact of his recent agreement with Kurdistan President Barzani, Maliki’s capacity to conduct dialogue and the significance of non-military cooperation in US relations with Iraq.
I’ve been asked to look at Syria and what it means for Iraq. What I see is not a single picture, but at least a triple one: Maliki’s, which is widely shared in the Shia community, Barzani’s view from Erbil and a Sunni perspective. There is an important common thread: all see Syria and Iraq as a single theater of political and military operations and are prepared to act accordingly. What happens in Syria doesn’t stay in Syria!
1. Maliki sees in Syria an extremist-led Sunni rebellion that could be a serious threat to Iraq if it succeeds in Syria. Even if he had not spent years in Damascus as an exile, Maliki would see in Bashar al Assad someone with whom he shares an interest in beating back Sunni challengers. It therefore is not surprising that Baghdad allows Iranian overflights, but it is also not all that important, as the survival of the Assad regime does not depend on materiel delivered by air.
Maliki’s main concern is with what comes after Assad. He imagines that the most likely outcome is a Sunni Islamist-led government that views Iraq’s Shia as enemies and is prepared to support the Sunni protests and insurgency against it. This concern with the “after Assad” puts him in good company: Washington and Moscow, each in its own way, is also concerned.
2. The Iraqi Kurds, especially President Barzani, see in Syria an opportunity and a risk. The opportunity is to get for the Syrian Kurds something like the federal arrangement that the Iraqi Kurds achieved after the fall of Saddam Hussein. This is difficult, because the Syrian Kurds are much less concentrated geographically than the Iraqi Kurds. But that may change with the massive population movements now occurring inside Syria.
The risk is that Iraqi Kurdish support for the Syrian Kurds may offend the Turks. They are fine with a federal arrangement that lines their border with a secular Kurdish buffer zone against the Shia world, but will not want things to go further in the direction of independence for either Iraqi Kurdistan, a future Syrian Kurdistan or some combination of the two.
3. Sunnis inside Iraq are hoping for a clear opposition victory in Syria. Some would see that as a counterbalance to the Shia-led regime in Iraq. Others might hope that a Sunni Islamist regime in Syria will support Sunni protests and even rebellion in Iraq.
Sunni jihadis have as a goal restoration of the caliphate. If this means anything, it means the destruction of the state structures in the Levant, whose borders were drawn by European colonialists. The border between Iraq and Syria is already dissolving, with arms and people flowing in both directions.
There are real risks in the Levant of maelstrom: a powerful downward vortex that ends in chaos. Avoiding this will require far more and better communication among Iraqis and between Iraqis and the surrounding countries than we have seen so far.
Some believe The United States should play a leading role in making this happen. Ryan Crocker, for example. I don’t. The primary responsibility lies with the Iraqis, along with Syrians, Turks, Lebanese and Jordanians. But I do believe we should play a strong supporting role. It is time for all concerned to look into the abyss, as they did in 2006/7, and take a step backwards.
The single most important factor in holding Iraq together is oil. My informants tell me northern Iraq could today be bringing in another $40 billion in oil revenue. The existing pipeline to Turkey could export an additional 1.2 million barrels per day. But to do this Kurds, Shia and Sunni have to sit down and decide to enlarge the pie.
That doesn’t seem so hard to me. But it is definitely hard for them. That’s where the Americans can play a role: in improving communications and helping the Iraqis to see the better future they can forge by focusing on getting their natural resources out of the ground and out of Iraq, especially to the north and west. That would tie Iraq closer to Europe and the West. As goes oil, so goes Iraq.
PS: Here is the video of the event:
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Dan,
Excellent comment about the failure to grow their pie by $40 billion a year in revenues or roughly $110 million per day by optimizing the existing export channel through Turkey. Iraqi Shia, Sunni and Kurds would benefit. Turkey would benefit from increased toll fees.
Who would be the loser?
Until the Iraqi leaders decide to enlarge their pie, the neighbors to the south will continue to supply that oil to the world markets and enjoy the benefits from the $110 million per day going to them rather than Iraq.
Gary