Ukraine: civilian instruments fall short, again

The presidential election May 25 will be decisive for Ukraine. The main presidential candidates are Petro Poroshenko, a chocolate magnate with high-level government experience, and Yulia Tymoshenko, a heroine of the Orange Revolution and former prime minister with a reputation for corruption and extreme pragmatism, including cooperation with Vladimir Putin.  Poroshenko is believed to be in the lead.

The outcome of the presidential election that day is not as important as whether the election occurs in the eastern and southern provinces where pro-Russian paramilitaries have taken over government facilities.  Two oblasts (Donetsk and Luhansk) supposedly voted May 11 in referenda on autonomy, but both the opaque (and illegal) process and vague referendum proposition cast doubt on their significance.  A decent election May 25 would confer at least a veneer of legitimacy on the government in Kiev, which was installed after the president fled and parliament took over in February.

The prospects are not good.  A successful election would at least temporarily hinder Russia’s ambitions in the eastern and southern provinces and provide an opportunity for Kiev to negotiate an accommodation with at least some of the political leadership there.  Few doubt that decentralization and strengthening of local and provincial governance is part of the solution in Ukraine.  But getting there from the current tense and polarized standoff between a government in Kiev anxious to assert its authority and Russian-speaking rebels in eastern Ukraine will not be easy.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is supporting a national dialogue process led by former Presidents Kuchma and Kravchuk that had a rough start yesterday.  OSCE has also deployed 230 human rights monitors (with authorization to more than double that number) as well as 100 election monitors, with more on their way.  Russia, which is an OSCE member, could conceivably exploit its presence to try to ensure correct treatment of the Russian speakers in Ukraine and end the current crisis.

I’m not holding my breath for that.  While President Putin has turned down the rhetoric in the last week or so, his objective is all too clearly to make eastern and southern Ukraine come under Moscow’s umbrella, even if they remain formally outside of Russian sovereignty.  He has not moved Russian troops away from the border with Ukraine.  Many of the rebels in Ukraine appear to be getting Russian support and encouragement sub rosa.  Some are Russian officials.  Putin’s maneuvers may be reactions to a rapidly evolving situation, but Russia’s 2013 foreign policy concept makes it clear Ukraine was slated for a key role in reviving Moscow’s influence in the former Soviet states.

European and American sanctions have already done some damage to the Russian stock market, currency and investment flows.  Moscow will hesitate to do anything overt to disrupt the election in order to stave off tightening and broadening of the still finely targeted sanctions.  But so long as it can plausibly deny a hand in any disruption of the May 25 election, it can bank on European hesitation to bite the hand that sends money and natural gas west.

NATO is rightly not prepared to go to war to defend non-member Ukraine.  The best it has been able to do is forward deploy some minimal forces to Poland, the Baltics and other concerned member states to signal determination to protect the Alliance, should it become necessary.  This is one more crisis where military means simply do not fit the bill.  The civilian means required look to be beyond current capabilities.  The number of monitors required in a country with a population of 46 million is easily ten times the number currently authorized.  OSCE is stepping up as best it can, but it will be no surprise if its best falls short.  The lesson here is clear:  we need to strengthen the available civilian instruments, not only in Europe but elsewhere as well.

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11 thoughts on “Ukraine: civilian instruments fall short, again”

  1. One Ukrainian official has said that the areas directly controlled by the rebels /”pro-Russian demonstrators” account for only 5% of the total voting-age population, and if there’s no vote there, they can simply be written off. Putin wouldn’t accept the resulting vote, of course, but it might be enough for more sympathetically inclined governments. Better would be if their forces could take control of the voting locations, whether people dare to turn out or not. While there’s a lot of talk about 90% approval of the referenda, that was 90% of the vote, and pro-Ukrainians stayed home that day. The Ministry of Defense is sounding hopeful about some new commanders who have had experience in providing protection for Iraqi elections as part of an international force and who are prepared to act more assertively than previous military leaders have in the past. The ambush and murder of 6 of their troops by these well-armed demonstrators may have helped to stiffen some spines.

    Poroshenko seems at this point to be comfortably in the lead, while Tymoshenko is sounding slightly hysterical. If she’s not elected, she says, there’ll be another revolution, because everybody else is corrupt, and she’s the only one who knows how to handle them. There was a reason Western leaders welcomed her back after her release from prison and then suggested she spend a long time recuperating outside the country.

    As for Putin’s big plans for a Eurasian Union to compete with the EU, that seems to be running into problems. There was supposed to be a triumphal signing ceremony recently, but Lykashenko is now saying there’s no reason to make hasty decisions. Not everybody’s memories of the Soviet Union as a rosy as Putin’s.

  2. I heard of recent suggestions by Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Brzezinski basically saying that a “Finlandization” of Ukraine is what would settle the crisis. I agree with the two great minds. Among realistic solutions, that one is the best – or the least bad, if you will – for all sides, including Ukraine itself. Unfortunately, even then the deep social, political and ethnic divisions of Ukraine would remain in place, but at least the country would be saved from definitive dissolution. I just hope it’s not already too late.

    1. ‘Finlandization’ – meaning, in the EU but not NATO? The West could live with that, if that’s what the Ukrainians want.

      I’m not sure Putin would go for it, though, not if it means the end of his Euroasiatic Union and a thriving democratic Ukraine on his border, providing a constant reminder to Russians of what they don’t have. For most, perhaps, democracy is a suspect term and the important thing is a stable income. (As in the recent poll discussed in B92.) Enough money, and the absence of freedom for the people you’ve been taught to despise, of course. But once stability comes to be taken for granted, people begin to want more. Even in China it’s happening, the reason the government spends even more on internal security than national defense.

      1. Putin (Moscow) doesn’t care whether Ukraine is democratic or autocratic, prosperous or poor. What he wants to make sure is that Ukraine never becomes anti-Russian in terms of foreign policy. And in Putin’s view, not being anti-Russian for a country bordering Russia means not being part of any Western alliance system, either EU or, especially, NATO. Putin will use any means available to prevent Ukraine from entering either bloc, no matter what a majority of ordinary Ukrainian residents want (and at this point, we don’t know for sure what they really want, except to get rid of a corrupt political elite – the same that people in many other countries want, too).

        P.S: Do you really believe that Ukraine would become “thriving and democratic” merely by entering the EU? It may become more democratic than now, but hardly thriving. Just take a look at Bulgaria, Romania or, most recently, Croatia (to say nothing of older members, like Greece or Spain).

        1. What do Ukrainians want? A poll was recently done – there’s a report here: http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/12/world/europe/ukraine-cnn-poll/ . Even in the East, union with Russia is not a desired, and while joining the EU is vastly more popular in the west of the country, even in the east there are more in favor of neutrality, not joining either block, than in favor of joining Russia. (Looking at the lack of economic benefit from Putin’s Customs Union so far – http://kommersant.ru/doc/2474260 – even enthusiasts may be having second thoughts about closer economic ties.)

          A thriving and democratic Ukraine is not guaranteed by merely joining the EU, of course, but there are reasons to expect, or maybe hope, that it will follow the example of Poland rather than of Bulgaria and Romania. Long-time rule by the Ottomans seems to have had deleterious effects that persist today, and the geographical location of the Balkans remains what it always was, making arguing from their example risky. But Western Ukraine was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the countries emerging from Hapsburg rule have in general done better than those that were under the Ottomans. (I wouldn’t be in such a hurry to write off Croatia, by the way – they are not where they want to be, but are still doing better than Serbia, for example.)

          Ukraine has agricultural resources that position it well for the future, it could be independent in energy, it has factories that produce world-class military equipment (another reason Putin doesn’t want to lose the country to the West), and what may be the rarest resource in Europe these days, an optimistic population (according to that poll mentioned above).

          Putin may be very unhappy about Ukraine’s drift west, but he is the ruler of Russia, not the Soviet Union, and he may have enough problems digesting Crimea to think twice about trying to take on another chunk of mainland Ukraine.

          1. Quote: “Long-time rule by the Ottomans seems to have had deleterious effects that persist today, and the geographical location of the Balkans remains what it always was, making arguing from their example risky. But Western Ukraine was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the countries emerging from Hapsburg rule have in general done better than those that were under the Ottomans”.

            Here I agree with you absolutely. Nevertheless, when it comes to Ukraine’s integration with the West, the problem remains of how to convince Putin (i.e. Moscow) that he should let a country of vital national security importance for Russia detach itself from the Russian sphere of influence. I fear that the only solution for pro-Western Ukrainians is to simply wait until Russia weakens internally to the point that it will no longer be able to project power into Ukraine and other neighbors. While Russia’s decline will inevitably take place over the next decade or two, there is also the question of what is going to happen with the EU in the meantime.

            Quote: “I wouldn’t be in such a hurry to write off Croatia, by the way – they are not where they want to be, but are still doing better than Serbia, for example”.

            Croatia is certainly doing better than Serbia, there’s no doubt about that. But I was talking in the context of Croatia’s EU membership. Based on what I have since been hearing from my Croatian friends, they have not seen any improvement either in their personal lives or regarding the country’s overall situation.

            Quote: “Putin may be very unhappy about Ukraine’s drift west, but he is the ruler of Russia, not the Soviet Union, and he may have enough problems digesting Crimea to think twice about trying to take on another chunk of mainland Ukraine”.

            Putin does not plan to invade any more of Ukraine beyond Crimea (which is already a fait accompli), though he will continue to keep such a possibility open just in case, as he has a variety of cheaper tools with which to shape Kiev’s policies even if the latter is nominally pro-Western. But even if Putin – in an extreme-case scenario – was to invade Ukraine in the (hypothetical) absence of better options, no Western power, including the United States, would step in to defend the country militarily. Putin knows that very well, as do the Ukrainians.

            Of course, we can easily condemn Putin’s actions on moral or legal grounds, but that will not help resolve the ongoing crisis, much less change his behavior.

  3. It’s not only civilian instruments that are falling short – the Russian leader of the rebel forces in the East has released a nearly 10-min appeal for more support from the locals. The video and an interview with a Russian political analyst on its implications are at http://gordonua.com/news/separatism/Nemcov-Sudya-po-video-Strelkova-u-separatistov-otchayannoe-polozhenie-23138.html. [Title: “Judging by Strelkov’s video, the separatists are in a desperate situation”] The rebels appear to be running out of cash for weapons and to hire mercenaries, is the analyst’s take. He also says the video’s actual audience may be the Russian government, or perhaps the brutal Chechen leader who is such a Putin supporter (since he could not keep his job without massive Russian support). This may mean, I imagine, that it’s Yanukovych who’s been financing the movement so far – his resources are great, but not on the scale of Putin’s.

    “Whoever thought there wouldn’t be 1000 men to fight for their country,” Strelkov [“Shooter”] laments – people are content to sit comfortably at home and watch it all on TV. He talks about having to open up the ranks to women, perhaps having in mind the Babushka Brigades that have certainly been aggressive enough when interviewed by mild-mannered Danish TV-journalists.

    Strelkov also worries about the volunteers who pick up the offered weapons and then use the weapons for their own purposes, “banditism” and common criminality. (A farmer who had let the Ukrainian army have some food was shot in front of his family in the past few days, not a way to earn the agricultural vote.)

    When the government in Kiev opened up recruiting stations, they had to tell the “healthy young men” Strelkov says aren’t appearing at the insurgents’ camps to come back later when they’d caught up with the paperwork. Whether the enthusiasm has held up I haven’t heard, but there are steady reports of training and new units showing up to fight for a united Ukraine. The incidents of torture and sexual assaults in the UN report on human rights abuses in East Ukraine certainly aren’t doing anything to improve enthusiasm among the kind of people Strelkov is appealing to.

    This may in fact give Putin a way out of the mess he’s gotten himself into – the population was cowardly and criminal, not worth Russian support. Milosevic used similar arguments of the Croatian Serbs’ failure to fight as an excuse not to send the Serbian Army in to take on the Croatians, and he survived long enough to fight in Kosovo.

  4. Getting back to the number of outside observers – Gordonua (http://gordonua.com/news/election2014/Grazhdanskaya-set-Opora-Bolee-170-tysyach-ukraincev-izmenili-mesto-golosovaniya-23498.html) reports that the Central Election Commission has registered 2784 foreign observers so far, with the largest number – 1056 – coming from the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE. The Commission is working overtime trying to handle all the requests for change of address from people who have left the east of the country recently, and border guard forces are planning to speed up procedures for people wanting to travel out of Crimea to vote elsewhere that day.

  5. I do not think that these elections will succeed more than lead to the next elections with a new constitution that would increase presence of the eastern regions in the government and/or local levels of government. That said, having Crimea in mind, while drawing that constitution an eye ought to be kept on preventing possibility of the country’s division. Whatever one’s intentions might be, to have a country split between, in that case, an authoritarian country and the EU would be nothing short of cases from the shameful common history. A precedent no one wants to see realised in Ukraine, or anywhere else for that matter. Handled properly it could again bring Russia to the path of emancipated liberal democracies of developed countries.

  6. Hello again, Milan!

    “… But even if Putin – in an extreme-case scenario – was to invade Ukraine in the (hypothetical) absence of better options, no Western power, including the United States, would step in to defend the country militarily. Putin knows that very well, as do the Ukrainians.”

    This is why God gave us sanctions – for times when you really don’t want to send in the Marines.

    One of many possibilities – the Russian financial system runs on American software. With no maintenance by the companies the software is licensed from, the banking system could become a disaster zone. In one specific example, MasterCard and Visa have so far only stopped supporting the couple of banks initially sanctioned. Putin and Medvedev immediately said they would develop their own payment system, with a stylish card logo all their own. But it soon came out that the cards and the software and chips are only licensed from the two companies, and while the Russians could set up some kind of program within the country,in a year or so, the cards would be useless outside Russia, meaning no more foreign vacations without carrying wads of cash around. (The government’s already backtracked, but the Duma is patriotically lobbing grenades threatening this and that at the two companies.) Considering how little money they make out of Russia, the companies say it would make more sense just to close up shop and leave the Russians to their own devices.

    As for Croatia, you have the advantage over me there if you have friends in the country. What Croatia has gained from the EU is the processes they went through to obtain membership, not – yet – the actual change in legal status. It takes time – countries that have joined seem to have benefited in proportion to the length of time they’ve been members. At one time, Ukraine was better off economically than Poland. Now, Poland is helping to bail them out, with cash and advice. So,if the EU can just hang together long enough for its advantages to become obvious again, before the nationalists everywhere cooperate to destroy it, your friends may live to see some actual improvements in their standard of living.

    1. Let’s hope so. I would be happy to see things play out that way.

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