Advice for the peacelorn
I get some interesting questions from readers. Here are a few with my attempt at answers:
1. What does Dr. Peacefare make of Zaid al-Ali, a former legal adviser to the United Nations in Iraq and the author of a book on Iraq’s future. He said the American insistence on inclusive politics is misguided. Iraq’s recent governments have included representatives from all the major sects, he noted, “But this is not a solution — it has never translated into the trickle-down politics that everyone assumed it would.”
What does Ali mean here? What alternative is there to an inclusive government (besides some kind of military victory)?
A: I’m not sure what Ali intends, but he is certainly correct that recent governments have included Kurdish and Sunni representation, as does the Iraqi parliament. But representation has not meant real sharing of power, which accumulated in the hands of Prime Minister Maliki. He bypassed the parliament in appointing military officers, including those whose troops fled when the Islamic State attacked. He gained what appeared to be undue influence over constitutional court decisions. He acquired direct command over counterterrorism forces. He undermined the influence of independent institutions like the central bank.
And above all he failed to keep commitments he made to Kurdistan to settle outstanding issues and encouraged the arrest of major Sunni politicians. His declared intent after winning the April election was to form a “majoritarian” government that would have relied even less on Sunni and Kurdish votes than his previous government.
Inclusion should not just mean tokenism. Nor should it be personality-based. What Kurdistan and many Sunnis are asking for is institutionalization of their control over resources and governance in a fashion that Baghdad can’t interfere with. That goes far beyond anything Maliki was willing to offer. We’ll see if Haider al Abadi is willing to deal.
2. Given the abject, massive fraud in the Afghanistan election, how does Dr. Peacefare see the way forward? Yes, the West wants it over with and that means acquiescing in Ghani’s victory. But how nasty is the stench from the fraud? How deep is the divisiveness? Abdullah and company will get over it in time … with an “inclusive government,” the terms of which Kerry already brokered. But Ghani is apparently now hedging, no? Or is scar tissue developing here among Tajiks and other non-Pashtuns? Any impact at all on White House or Obama’s thinking? Or is the President adamant to seal his legacy as the man who (pick one):
“ended the war in Afghanistan”
“withdrew American forces in Afghanistan while war continued, and possibly intensified.”
A: You are indicating more than I know about fraud in the Afghanistan election. I’m still waiting to see the results, after the Election Complaints Commission finishes its work. Some people I’ve talked to think Ghani won, if not fair and square at least by a margin larger than the fraud. The deal the Secretary of State brokered makes sense to me. Ghani and Abdullah are both capable candidates and to my knowledge relatively uncorrupted individuals. I know a lot of countries that would be privileged to have the likes of either one of them as president. If they can figure out how to govern together–which won’t be easy–that will likely be the best for Afghanistan, which is going to face enormous challenges as the Americans withdraw.
The President seems adamant to me, and what has happened in Iraq has likely strengthened his resolve. He may well need to redeploy American forces to Iraq and Syria, should he decide to not only contain but defeat the IS. That said, there are still more than two years before withdrawal is supposed to be complete. A new president in Kabul who appeals for help while making it clear that Afghans will carry the bulk of the burden might get a better hearing than President Karzai, who chose to blow his relationship with the Americans in an apparent (and fruitless) effort to reach a negotiated settlement with the Taliban.
3. Another reader asked in a comment: As an interested layman I can’t understand why the Syrian government, which counts on the support of allies such as Iran, Hezbollah and Russia, among others, and is not loath to use the full might of its military, and has local knowledge, is unable to defeat the Islamic State in Syria? I replied:
A. It’s not trying. The Syrian government has seen the IS as a counterweight to the more moderate armed forces and has not generally attacked it. The government prefers to use IS as the boogeyman that strikes fear into regime supporters and helps to justify attacks on the moderates.
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