Doing good is a powerful motive
Below you’ll find my commentary about the second ten of the Senate Committee findings on the CIA interrogation program. These comments are admittedly off the cuff, like my comments on the first ten.
But before proceeding I offer you this from NPR on the question of the effectiveness of the Enhanced Intelligence Techniques (EIT) program:
I am afraid it is true in the public discourse (including statements from Senator Feinstein) that the Senate report is being portrayed as denying any intelligence benefit from the program.
But as I pointed out two days ago, that is not actually what the report says. It says the program was not effective. An ineffective program may still produce some benefits. I assume the intel professionals claiming it did are correct. But the available evidence suggests not nearly enough to justify the methods used (even ignoring the moral issue). That is presumably what CIA Director Brennan meant when he classified the benefits as “unknowable.”
To round out your day, here is a 25-minute interview with the alleged designer of the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques program. Note his emotional crumble at the end. Doing good is a powerful motive for doing bad:
#11:The CIA was unprepared as it began operating its Detention and Interrogation Program more than six months after being granted detention authorities.
The Agency has pretty much agreed with this finding.
#12: The CIA’s management and operation of its Detention and Interrogation Program was deeply flawed throughout the program‘s duration, particularly so in 2002 and early 2003.
While it doesn’t plead guilty to the “deeply flawed” label, CIA in its 2013 response certainly agreed about some of the specific management and operation mistakes.
#13: Two contract psychologists devised the CIA‘s enhanced interrogation techniques and played a central role in the operation, assessments, and management of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. By 2005, the CIA had overwhelmingly outsourced operations related
to the program.
The Agency actually goes further in admitting fault on this point, saying it
allowed a conflict of interest to exist wherein the contractors who helped design and employ the enhanced interrogation techniques also were involved in assessing the fitness of detainees to be subjected to such techniques and the effectiveness of those same techniques;
#14: CIA detainees were subjected to coercive interrogation techniques that had not been approved by the Department of Justice or had not been authorized by CIA Headquarters.
The former CIA higher ups disagree with this and say everything was approved. This is a factual question that closer examination should elucidate. They have Vice President Cheney on their side. He has said he and the President knew about the details and approved them.
#15: The CIA did not conduct a comprehensive or accurate accounting of the
number of individuals it detained, and held individuals who did not meet the legal standard for detention. The CIA’s claims about the number of detainees held and subjected to its enhanced Interrogation techniques were inaccurate.
The allegation is 26 “wrongfully held.” But for the rest we are getting into the weeds. Sure they should have known precisely how many people they were holding, but that is nowhere near the worst that was done.
#16: The CIA failed to adequately evaluate the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques.
I haven’t heard anyone dispute this.
#17: The CIA rarely reprimanded or held personnel accountable for serious and significant violations, inappropriate activities, and systemic and individual management failures.
You are not going to get people to do the stuff that was done if you come down hard on them. And if the program had proper authorization, it would be better to focus where that decision was made.
#18: The CIA marginalized and ignored numerous internal critiques, criticisms, and objections concerning the operationand management of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
More credit to those officers who spoke up.
#19: The CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program was inherently unsustainable and had effectively ended by 2006 due to unauthorized press disclosures, reduced cooperation from other nations, and legal and oversight
concerns.
More credit again, this time to the press, other nations and whatever those oversight concerns were. Would defenders of the program want to argue that we are at significantly greater risk for the past eight years because this program ended?
#20: The CIA‘s Detention and Interrogation Program damaged the United States‘ standing in the world, and resulted in other significant monetary and
non-monetary costs.
Defenders of the program might argue that it is the Senate report revelations that have really damaged US standing, but that would be fallacious. Anyone pursuing a classified program of this sort should be taking into account the risk that it will some day become public. That is inevitable, and it is an eventuality any classified program should take into account before embarking.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Tags : United States
RSS - Posts
