The West turns a blind eye
On Thursday, the Center for Strategic & International Studies hosted a discussion on “Domestic and External Threats to the Euromaidan Revolutionaries in Ukraine.” Taras Kuzio, Senior Research Associate at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at University of Alberta as well as a non-resident Fellow at SAIS’s Center for Transatlantic Relations, gave a presentation centered on his new book, Ukraine: Democratization, Corruption, and the New Russian Imperialism. The discussion was moderated by Jeffrey Mankoff, acting director and senior fellow at CSIS’s Russia and Eurasia Program.
As Russia has expanded its intervention in Syria, Western attention to the conflict in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region has waned. Kuzio’s book presents an in-depth analysis of economic, governance, and rule of law issues in Ukraine grounded in historical perspective concerning the country’s relationship with Russia. Kuzio starts with Stalin’s death in 1953, traces socialization of new Ukrainian elites in the 60s-80s, and describes the disappointments of the late 80s, which would lead to independence in 1991. There are many marked continuities over the past 20 years between the 2013/14 Euromaidan demonstrations, the Orange Revolution of 2004, and independence.
The Euromaidan revolutionaries’ face serious challenges:
- Rotating elites have dominated the government for the past 20 years (current president Poroshenko included);
- Disgruntled masses use anti-elite populist rhetoric;
- There are no real political parties;
- The judicial system rewards criminal activity;
- Oligarchs rule the slow-growing economy;
- The middle class is small;
- The shadow economy is large – up to 50% of Ukraine’s GDP.
These factors hamper reform. US and EU efforts to promote it have not been focused on the right things. The disgruntled public supports only some of the necessary economic, fiscal, and energy reforms because they would also lead, for example, to higher utilities bills for citizens.
The issue of oligarchs, corruption, and static elites is central. President Poroshenko himself has been a significant business figure, and oligarchs in general have many ties to power, including owning large television channels that often guide political support and mobilization. What is needed are strong messages in favor of judicial and anti-corruption reform. Oligarchs and corrupt officials should go to prison for their crimes, but the route to this cannot be internal. The current Prosecutor’s Office is one of the most significant sources of corruption in Ukraine today. It protects elites. The fact that Poroshenko – and other leaders before him – not only has not disbanded it, but appointed two incompetent heads, is worrying. Western European countries have often been a safe haven for oligarchs, financially and sometimes politically.
The recent conflict has helped shape Ukrainians’ attitudes toward the EU and NATO, with a majority now viewing them positively and wish to join. However, there is little support for this in Western Europe, and Ukraine – having received less funding from the EU than Eastern Europe did – is slow to implement real reforms. This makes it near impossible for integration to occur.
Since 2007 a tide of extreme nationalism and xenophobia has been rising in Russia, exemplified in Putin, which the West long ignored. It claims Ukraine as its own and Ukrainians as “little Russians.” Russian policy denies Ukrainians self-determination and would institute a semi-colonial state in Ukraine. Condescending or xenophobic Russian attitudes toward Ukrainians have a deep history: while Russia has long sought to claim it, Ukrainian dissenters as far back as 1918 have been accused of collaborating with or being funded by the West, Zionists, the CIA, etc.
Ukraine’s biggest plus is its strong civil society and healthy tradition of dissent. As a pluralist society, Ukraine will not be prone to either ethnic nationalism or authoritarianism. Local elections approach at the end of the month. Democratization will progress. But Kuzio nevertheless finds Ukraine in a difficult position – reforms would have been easier in 2005 before the crash, just after the Orange Revolution, but the elites continually put them off, leading to Euromaidan.
The West has too long turned a blind eye toward both corruption in Ukraine and the worrying development of ethnic nationalism and xenophobia in Russia.
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