Iran options
As the complexity of the attack on Saudi oil facilities becomes apparent, the odds that it was state-sponsored go up. Iran is the prime suspect. So if convincing evidence is provided, what would an appropriate response be? Here are some options:
- Military
An attack on Iranian oil-producing facilities would be the obvious, proportional response. But Iran already is unable to export all the oil is producing, so the immediate additional damage to Tehran’s finances would be minimal. A US attack would increase the price for what oil it is able to sell, helping Iran’s finances rather than hurting them while alienating oil importing countries.
The US could skip the niceities and proceed directly to an attack on Iran’s nuclear program. That would give Iran an incentive to move as quickly as possible to build a nuclear weapon, requiring repeated American attacks to prevent the crash program from achieving success. In the meanwhile, Iran would certainly retaliate against US assets in the Middle East and perhaps also in the US, where Hizbollah is thought to maintain a network of sleeper cells. Iran would also retaliate against Israel, perhaps using the same sophisticated cruise missiles used against the Saudi oil facilities.
Neither of these options is appealing. There are others: the US could attack, overtly or covertly, Iranians in Syria or Iranian proxies in many countries, it could mount a massive cyber attack, and it could combine those options with the above. All these lead in the direction of long-term instability in the Middle East.
2. Diplomatic
The US could take its evidence of Iranian origins of the attack to the Security Council to seek a condemnation of Iran and renewed multilateral sanctions. The condemnation Washington should be able to get if the evidence is good. But neither the Russians nor the Chinese are likely to go along with multilateral sanctions in the absence of a US move back to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA aka nuclear deal) and loosening of American unilateral sanctions.
President Trump, while begging for Iran to come back to the negotiating table, has been unwilling to loosen or suspend unilateral sanctions that are causing serious damage to the Iranian economy. Doing so would be a major concession. We know how he would feel about that. If ever Iran is to get weakening of the sanctions, it will need to provide Trump with a TV moment, which the Supreme Leader has been loathe to do.
3. Political
Washington could resort to regime change efforts, likely clandestine, to try to collapse the Islamic Republic from within. This would entail extensive efforts to promote alternatives other than the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), the exile group that John Bolton and Rudy Giuliani favor. The MEK is entirely lacking in support inside Iran. In addition to padding Bolton and Giuliani’s bank accounts, it may be useful for economic sabotage and assassinations but does not have the traction with the Iranian people (not least due to its terrorist history) that would be required to topple the Supreme Leader.
The US could also promote minority political movements within Iran willing to challenge Tehran’s authority. There are Kurds, Baloch, Arabs, and others who would be useful in such an effort. A bare majority of Iranians are Persians. But ethnic civil war risks causing even more instability in the region than currently exists, which is saying something.
4. Economic
There are basically two ways to go on sanctions: tighten up the unilateral ones, or loosen them in an effort to get others to impose multilateral sanctions. Iran is feeling the pain of unilateral sanctions, but their response is clear: escalate to cause damage to the world economy so long as Iran is suffering. I suppose it is possible they will throw in the towel one day, but there is no telling when that day might come.
Getting others to go along with multilateral sanctions will be a hard sell for an Administration that pulled the plug on the JCPOA, which the Europeans, Russians, Chinese, and others liked. While it is conceivable that if they are convinced the attacks were Iranian that they would go along with multilateral sanctions without the US back in the JCPOA, it isn’t likely.
Bottom line: If the US wants multilateral sanctions, which look like the best option, and return of Iran to the negotiating table, President Trump is going to have to swallow a bitter pill: get the US back into the JCPOA. Otherwise, we can expect continued escalation from the Iranians. Better to reverse course now rather than after the next round of attacks. But it is unlikely Trump will do that.
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Stevenson’s army, September 18
– NYT details the analysis of the attack on Saudi oil facilities. DOD is preparing a report — but how much can be revealed without divulging intelligence sources and methods?
– David Sanger notes that Trump faces a credibility gap with much of the rest of the world.
– It’s significant that many Senate Republicans urge caution and diplomacy, not military action. Except for Lindsey Graham, who now has a tweet war with Trump.
– I like what I see in new CFR report on how to maintain our technological edge.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Today is a rainy day
This tidbit from the Washington Post about the weekend attack on Saudi oil facilities is both telling and appalling:
U.S. officials are working under the assumption that the strikes did not emanate from Yemen and do not believe they were launched from Iraq, either…
While I am open to believing that the attacks came from Iran once evidence to that effect is published and thoroughly analyzed, there should be no assumptions in the investigation at this early stage, especially as Yemen’s Houthis have claimed responsibility. Nor should a US response be up to the Saudis, as President Trump suggested in a foolish “locked and loaded” tweet in which he said he was waiting to take military action for the Saudi assessment of responsibility.
Certainly the attack is consistent with what the Iranians have said they would do: respond to US sanctions by interfering with global energy supplies. Most of us, including me, believed this referred to stopping shipping through the strait of Hormuz, but that is just because we lack imagination. Taking down half of Saudi production capacity with a few missiles is much more clever: it doesn’t bring Iran directly into conflict with the US or block a passageway that Tehran uses as much as its Gulf neighbors. It is entirely possible that Iran, perhaps acting through the Houthis, was responsible.
But there is a long history of American wars starting or escalating with blame that was mis-assigned, too often intentionally:
- the explosion of the Maine that precipitated the Spanish-American war,
- the Gulf of Tonkin attack on the US Navy and the escalation of the Vietnam war,
- the claim that Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons that led the US into a decade of disastrous engagement in Iraq.
Especially with a president facing the threat of impeachment at home and with few friends abroad, we need to be exigent about assignment of responsibility.
We also need to ask what will happen after an attack on Iran. Will the US be better off, or will the Islamic Republic gain? Its road to nuclear weapons is now short, less than a year, due to Trump’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Do we really want to risk pushing Tehran to a crash nuclear weapons program with a calibrated attack? What kind of military intervention would be required to prevent that course of action?
Regardless of who initiated the attack on Saudi Arabia, Washington should also be asking how it was allowed to happen. Is it possible that the hundreds of billions of dollars in military equipment the US has sold to Saudi Arabia is incapable of preventing such an attack? Or were the Saudis asleep at the switch? Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is, among many other things, Minister of Defense. We know however how reluctant Trump is to assign responsibility for any failures to him.
Fortunately, the US has time to respond: if oil prices spike, I trust we’ll draw down on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), which will limit the spike and provide time to evaluate and repair the damage in Saudi Arabia. Those who have advocated selling oil from the SPR at low prices should note: best to save it for a rainy day. That’s today.
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Stevenson’s army, September 16
– WSJ says North Korea is making billions of dollars by its cyber activities.
– Joshua Rovner says cyber conflict should be viewed as an intelligence contest, not a military one.
– WaPo says risks of Venezuela-Colombia war is growing because of aid to FARC fighters and discussions about invoking Rio Treaty.
– WSJ reports numerous efforts to revise trade section 232 allowing national security tariffs. [Note: this will be an issue in next week’s exercise.]
– Heather Hurlburt says Bolton left the NSC system in tatters.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Peace Picks September 16-22
1.Israeli Elections and Minority Communities|September 17, 2019|10:00 AM-11:30AM|Middle East Institute|1763 N Street NW, Washington District of Columbia 20036|Register Here
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to present a panel hosted in partnership with the Foundation for Middle East Peace and the New Israel Fund to discuss how minority rights have factored into Israeli parliamentary elections in 2019, both the first election in April and the snap elections taking place on September 17th. Like the first election, this second round of votes again systematically ignored issues facing Israel’s minority communities, including Palestinian citizens of Israel and Bedouin communities living in the Negev. This panel will discuss those issues and examine how Israel’s major political parties and its leaders have treated minority communities on the campaign trail.
This event is part of the George and Rhonda Salem Family Foundation Lecture Series.
Co-sponsor:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to sponsor this event in conjunction with the Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP).
Featuring:
Ayesha Ziadna is the Director of Sabeel Leadership Institute of the Arab-Jewish Center for Empowerment, Equality, and Cooperation Negev Institute for Strategies of Peace and Economic Development (AJEEC NISPED)
Tal Avrech joined the Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality (NCF) in 2018 and is currently responsible for international relations and NCF’s head researcher
Harry Reis is the Director for Policy and Strategy at the New Israel Fund
Lara Friedman (moderator) is the President of the Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP)
2.Future Projections for the Middle East: Game Changers for 2030 and Beyond|September 19, 2019|9:00 AM-2:15 PM|Middle East Institute|1763 N Street NW, Washington District of Columbia 20036|Register Here
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a conference on future projections for the Middle East, assessing projected trends, drives, policy responses, and future challenges for the MENA region in 2030 and beyond.
Agenda
9:00–9:15 AM | Welcoming Remarks and Overview of the Day
Paul Salem President, MEI
Amb. Gerald Feierstein Senior vice president, MEI
9:15-9:45AM | Keynote Address: Trends in Tech, Cyber, Security and their Repercussions in the Middle East
Richard A. Clarke Chairman, MEI Board of Governors
9:45AM-10:55AM | Panel I: The MENA Region in 2030: Trends and Trajectories
This interactive panel will examine the forces over the next 10-15 years that will cause/drive the greatest change in the region. How do we foresee some of these forces influencing each other, accelerating, slowing, and shaping change? What projections can we make of things likely to be significantly different in the region in 2030?
Elhum Haghighat Professor and chair, Department of Political Science, City University of New York
Amal Kandeel Director, Climate Change and Environment Program, MEI
Josh Kerbel Research faculty, National Intelligence University
Paul Salem President, MEI
Steven Kenney (moderator) Founder and principal, Foresight Vector LLC
10:55AM-11:15AM | Coffee Break
11:15AM-11:45AM | Remarks:
His Excellency Dr. Thani Ahmed Al Zeyoudi Minister of Climate Change and Environment, United Arab Emirates
11:45AM-12:55PM | Panel II: Policy Responses to Future Challenges
This discussion will focus on policy areas that will reflect the greatest change in 2030 relative to today. What social-cultural, technological, or other forces will force enable major changes in policies affecting/governing the region? How will policymaking/policymakers address the interrelationships between issue areas?
Ferid Belhaj Vice president, Middle East and North Africa, World Bank
Laila Iskandar Former Minister of Environment, Egypt
Ruba Husari Scholar, MEI
Michael Nagata Former director of Strategic Operational Planning, National Counterterrorism Center
Ambassador (ret.) Gerald Feierstein Senior Vice President, MEI
Patrick Tucker (moderator) Technology editor, Defense One
12:55-1:30 | Lunch Buffet
3.Washington Humanitarian Forum|September 19, 2019|8:30 AM-3:30 PM|Center for Strategic and International Studies| 1616 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036|Register Here
The CSIS Humanitarian Agenda is hosting the first annual Washington Humanitarian Forum on September 19th, 2019. This full-day conference will focus on humanitarian challenges that sit at the intersection of United States national security and foreign policy priorities. This year’s theme is Unlocking Humanitarian Access – Opportunities for U.S. Leadership.
The Washington Humanitarian Forum will include the launch of a report produced by the CSIS Task Force on Humanitarian Access. The Task Force, co-chaired by Senator Todd Young (R-IN) and Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ), looked at ways in which denial, delay, and diversion prevents humanitarian assistance from reaching the most vulnerable populations, and vice versa, in conflict-affected areas. The Task Force report analyzes challenges in priority countries for the United States and includes recommendations for how United States leadership can mitigate the most pressing access challenges.
AGENDA
8:00 a.m. – 8:30 a.m. | Check-in and Coffee Networking
8:30 a.m. – 9:15 a.m. | Opening Plenary
- Video Address: Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ) and Senator Todd Young (R-IN)
- Introductions: J. Stephen Morrison, Senior Vice President and Director, Global Health Policy Center, CSIS
- Opening Keynote: Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- Moderator: Kimberly Flowers, Director, Humanitarian Agenda & Global Food Security Projects, CSIS
9:15 a.m. – 10:15 a.m. | Task Force Report Launch
- Ambassador Ertharin Cousin, former Executive Director, UN World Food Programme
- Patricia McIlreavy, Vice President for Policy and Practice, InterAction
- Dr. Paul B. Spiegel, Director, Center for Humanitarian Health, Johns Hopkins University
- Anne Witkowsky, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense
- Moderator: Kimberly Flowers, Director, Humanitarian Agenda and Global Food Security Project, CSIS
10:15 a.m. – 10:30 a.m. | Networking Coffee Break
10:30 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. | Morning Breakout Panels
The Humanitarian Implications of Cyber Conflict
- Colonel Gary Corn, Director and Adjunct Professor, Washington College of Law, American University
- Shanthi Kalathil, Senior Director, International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for Democracy
- Moderator: James Andrew Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director, Technology Policy Program, CSIS
- Dr. Aisha Jumaan, Founder and President, Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation
- Peter Salisbury, Consulting Senior Analyst on Yemen, International Crisis Group
- Sheba Crocker, Vice President for Humanitarian Policy and Practice, CARE
- Moderator: Jon Alterman, Senior Vice President, Zbiegniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program, CSIS
Access in the Hot Zone: Navigating the DRC Ebola Outbreak
- Admiral Tim Ziemer, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID
- Ella Watson-Stryker, Humanitarian Representative, Médecins Sans Frontières
- Jeremy Konyndyk, Senior Policy Fellow, Center for Global Development
- Moderator: J. Stephen Morrison, Senior Vice President and Director, Global Health Policy Center, CSIS
12:00 p.m. – 1:00 p.m. | Lunch
1:00 p.m. – 2:30 p.m. | Afternoon Breakout Panels
The Growing Humanitarian Access Challenge in Eastern Ukraine
- Alexander Hug, Former Deputy Chief Monitor, Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
- Melinda Haring, Editor, UkraineAlert, Atlantic Council
- Margot Ellis, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Europe and Eurasia, USAID
- Moderator: Heather Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic; and Director, Europe Program, CSIS
Rethinking Nigeria’s Response to the Boko Haram Crisis
- Brandon Kendhammer, Associate Professor of Political Science, Ohio University
- Fati Abubakar, Documentary photographer and Public Health Worker
- Ambassador Alex Laskaris, former Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Engagement, U.S. Africa Command
- Dafna Hochman Rand, Vice President for Policy and Research, Mercy Corps
- Moderator: Judd Devermont, Director, Africa Program, CSIS
A New Age of Humanitarian Reporting?
- Heba Aly, Director, The New Humanitarian
- Arwa Damon, Senior International Correspondent, CNN
- Sherine Tadros, Head of New York Office & UN Representative, Amnesty International
- Moderator: Jacob Kurtzer, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Humanitarian Agenda, CSIS
2:30 p.m. – 2:45 p.m. | Networking Coffee Break
2:45 p.m. – 3:30 p.m. | Closing Remarks
- Closing Keynote: Jan Egeland, Secretary General, Norwegian Refugee Council
- Moderator: Kimberly Flowers, Director, Humanitarian Agenda & Global Food Security Project, CSIS
4. Competitive Security Dynamics in Southern Asia: Conflicts, Challenges, and Choices|September 19, 2019|9:00AM-11:30AM| The Stimson Center|1211 Connecticut Ave, NW, 8th Floor Washington, DC 20036|Register Here
The past six months have seen major disruptions in stability across southern Asia. As tensions in Kashmir continue to simmer, a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan is up for debate, and nationalist discourses gain traction in the region, all eyes are on the strategic dynamics in Southern Asia. This year–the 20th anniversary of the Kargil crisis between India and Pakistan–provides a natural point for reflection, particularly in light of the ripple effects of the February 2019 Balakot airstrikes. What lessons can we learn from the history of southern Asian crises and how are emerging regional dynamics likely to shape future scenarios going forward?
Featuring:
Lt. General (ret.) Waheed Arshad, Former Chief of General Staff, Pakistan Army
Suhasini Haidar, Diplomatic Editor, The Hindu Newspaper
Nasim Zehra, author of From Kargil to the Coup: Events that Shook Pakistan
Vice Admiral (ret.) Vijay Shankar, Distinguished Fellow, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
Rabia Akhtar, Assistant Professor and Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research, University of Lahore
5. What’s Next for Libya|September 19, 2019 9:00AM-10:30AM|Brookings Institution|Falk Auditorium, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington DC, 20036|Register Here
The past year has seen no end to the turbulence plaguing Libya since the ouster of Moammar al-Gadhafi in 2011, with armed factions vying for control of the country’s strategic assets and United Nations-facilitated negotiations leading nowhere. While the self-styled Libyan National Army of General Khalifa Haftar continues, unsuccessfully, to try to take over the country militarily, the internationally-recognized government of Prime Minister Fayez Serraj in Tripoli, propped up by militias opposed to Haftar, retains control over major institutions and sources of national wealth. Weapons of increasing sophistication and lethality are flowing to the opposing sides, in violation of U.N. sanctions and pitting foreign powers against each other, with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt (with French support) backing Haftar, and Turkey and Qatar backing Serraj.
Meanwhile, facing a stagnant economy and constant threats to infrastructure, the Libyan people are caught in the crossfire of this protracted jockeying. Unchecked migration and the threat of extremist groups taking hold in the country’s contested spaces likewise make Libya’s internal situation a security concern for Europe and the United States. Solving the civil war in Libya would restore needed stability to a strategically vital part of northern Africa while laying the groundwork for the prosperity of the Libyan people.
On September 19, the Brookings Institution will hold an event on the state of affairs in Libya. Questions from the audience will follow the panelists’ conversation.
Featuring
- Michael E. O’Hanlon, Brookings Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy
- Jeffrey Feltman, Brookings John C. Whitehead Visiting Fellow in International Diplomacy
- Frederic Wehrey, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Fellow, Middle East Program
- Giovanna de Maio, Center on the United States and Europe Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy
- Karim Mezran, The Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East
6. Red Sea Rivalries: Middle East Competition in the Horn of Africa|September 20, 2019|10:30AM-12:00PM|United States Institute of Peace|2301 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20037|Register Here
A new geopolitical paradigm is emerging in the Horn of Africa: Middle Eastern states are playing an increasingly assertive role throughout the region. As Sudan and Ethiopia undergo their most significant political transitions since the Cold War—affecting the future of nearly 150 million people—the jostling for dominance among the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and Turkey and Qatar, on the other, is fueling instability and insecurity in an already fractious region.
As part of the U.S. Institute of Peace’s ongoing “Red Sea Rising” multi-track initiative, please join us for the release of the International Crisis Group’s forthcoming report unpacking the regional goals, motivations, and often conflicting aims of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.
The report, based on conversations with senior officials on both sides of the Red Sea, examines how outside forces are jockeying to build political influence and carve out pivotal positions in the Horn of Africa’s emerging economy. At this historic juncture for the region, Crisis Group researchers will present the report’s main findings, followed by a panel discussion with experts from the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. Join the conversation with #RedSeaRisingUSIP.
Speakers
Amb. Johnnie Carson, opening remarks, Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace
Robert Malley, opening remarks, President and CEO, International Crisis Group
Elizabeth Dickinson, presenter, Senior Analyst for the Arabian Peninsula, International Crisis Group
Dino Mahtani, presenter, Deputy Director, Africa Program, International Crisis Group
Payton Knopf, moderator, Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace
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Confrontation intensifies
On September 12, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) hosted a panel discussion entitled, “As Maximum Pressure and Maximum Resistance Max Out, Where’s the Confrontation with Iran Headed?”. The panel consisted of Ali Alfoneh, Senior Fellow at AGSIW, Dina Esfandiary, International Security Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, and Kirsten Fontenrose, Director for Regional Security, Middle East at the Atlantic Council. The discussion was moderated by Hussein Ibish, Senior Resident Scholar at AGSIW.
Since President Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, Washington has pursued a strategy of “maximum pressure,” largely through intensifying economic sanctions. Iran has responded with “maximum resistance,” mostly with low-intensity, and sometimes deniable, military provocations. Signs are growing that both strategies have maxed out and further escalation could lead to consequences unwanted by either side. Where do both parties go from here and can these strategies work?
Fontenrose argued that theoretically, the US policy of maximum pressure can work. The rationale beyond this is that every country has a finite amount of resources to dedicate to defense and domestic needs. The use of sanctions squeezes Iran and forces them to make difficult decisions. The US has a limited number of coercive tools. By maxing out sanctions, the Washington avoids using kinetic activities that could escalate potential conflict. Alfoneh and Esfandiary agreed that the US has not set clear goals for their use of sanctions. If the US established clear goals, Iran might respond in kind.
President Trump will benefit electorally if he is able to have a summit with Supreme Leader Khamenei. Alfoneh predicted that Trump will use increased tensions with Tehran to negotiate a deal that mirrors the JCPOA. By doing so, Trump would signal to his supporters that he can resolve global conflict. Esfandiary responded that Iran has no reason to trust the US. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Iran was abiding by the JCPOA, but the Trump Administration tore it up. Fontenrose agreed that trust building will be required before acceptable concessions can be made by either side.
Iran has few choices aside from continuing its low-level provocations. Alfoneh brought up an article published in an Iranian economic newspaper a month after the US left the JCPOA. The Supreme National Security Council outlined its strategy to counteract US sanctions. First, the impact of the sanctions will not be palpable because of trade deals with European countries and China. Second, Iran will limit the level of their obligations in the JCPOA. Third, if nothing works and Iran’s economy continues to fail, Tehran will provoke a crisis in the Persian Gulf. Iran clearly and publicly announced its plans and has followed through with the strategy.
The panel discussed the significance of John Bolton’s dismissal as the national security adviser. Fontenrose said that the Republicans will not allow Trump to choose someone who will threaten the election. Bolton’s hawkish tendencies could scare off voters. Brian Hook, the State Department’s point man on Iran, is on the short list of potential replacements. Hook is a known as a hawk in the international community and his appointment would signal to Iran that the US will continue to squeeze its economy.
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