Pompeo midway to failure
Secretary Pompeo in testimony todaycited the Administration’s foreign policy priorities:
- Countering Russia and China,
- Denuclearization of North Korea,
- Venezuela,
- Iran,
- and supporting allies and partners.
So how are they doing?
The only serious effort to counter Russia has come from the Congress, which has levied several layers of sanctions on Moscow for interference in the 2016 US election, and from the State Department, for Moscow’s murder of a defector in the United Kingdom. President Trump has still not said an unkind word about President Putin and continues to cite him as more reliable than the American intelligence community, without acknowledging Russian electoral interference.
On China, the Administration has been walking on eggshells, since it needs Beijing’s cooperation both on North Korea and on trade. There is little to no sign of a serious strategy to contain or compete with China (in anything but trade). China continues its buildup of military bases in the South China Sea, where it has also escalated its challenges to US naval vessels.
The North Korea talks are at a standstill after the failure in February of the second Kim/Trump summit in Vietnam. Trump is demanding immediate denuclearization in one step while the Pyongyang has maintained its vague commitment to a phased process whose endpoint is unclear. All those promises of Trump-like hotels are not going to convince Kim Jong-un that he should abandon his regime’s only real guarantee: its nuclear arsenal and ballistic missiles.
Venezuela is grinding to a stalemate, with the Russians deploying troops there and no sign of the military defections required to seat President Guaido’ in President Maduro’s chair. A US military intervention would have to be massive and long-term. Nothing short of that seems to be working. Venezuelans are voting with their feet by leaving the country, but that does not help bring down Maduro.
Sanctions on Iran have so far had little visible impact, other than giving the Europeans an incentive to find a way to continue to expand trade with Tehran. China and Russia will also find the ways and means. The Iranian economy is a mess, not only because of sanctions. The Administration hopes to compel the Iranians back to the negotiating table or to precipitate regime change. Neither outcome is visible on the horizon. In the meanwhile, hardliners have gained strength and continue to pursue regional interventions.
Support for allies and partners is a lot easier than dealing with adversaries, but the Trump Administration has been selective about it. The ultranationalists who govern Hungary and Poland and the Brexiteers in the UK get Trump’s blessing. France, Germany and the European Union get kicked hard. Israel gets endorsement of whatever it wants (so far, recognition of Jerusalem as its capital and of the annexation of the Golan Heights, not to mention a green light for killing Gaza demonstrators), leaving crumbs for the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia gets American top cover for Mohammed bin Salman against charges that he was implicated in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.
To add insult to injury, Pompeo said this about the State Department, whose budget the President has proposed to cut back by 23%:
And I take it as a personal mission to make sure that our world-class diplomatic personnel have the resources they need to execute America’s diplomacy in the 21st century.
Trump’s cuts target especially the State Department’s cooperation with the military in stabilizing conflict situations like Syria and Afghanistan, which is a required prelude to the withdrawals he has rashly announced.
I suppose I need to give Pompeo an incomplete rather than an F, since it is possible the next 22 months will provide better results than the last 26. Real diplomacy does take time. But there is precious little sign of real diplomacy on the priorities Pompeo identifies.
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The world is watching
I received this letter last week from Kosovo Assembly members Xhelal Sveçla and Driton Selmanaj. I’m pleased to take up their suggestion that I make this case more widely known as the one year anniversary of the events investigated approaches on Friday. I hasten to add that Kosovo is a young democracy that deserves credit for this investigation as well as any steps it takes to correct the issues revealed. I also hasten to add that I know little more about this case than I have read in the attached documents. Anyone who would like to exercise the privilege of a reply should let me know.
We write to you in our capacity as Chair and Vice-Chair of the Parliamentary Investigative Committee established last year to elucidate the matter of the expulsion of six Turkish nationals from the territory of the Republic of Kosovo on 29 March 2018.
We would like to let you know that the committee has completed its work. We have uncovered a total of 31 legal violations during the whole course of the expulsion process, a number of them committed by high-ranking state officials of the Republic of Kosovo.
The details of the committee’s work are summarized in the following four documents:
- A list of the 26 witnesses interviewed by the committee;
- A brief timeline of events relating to the expulsion;
- A detailed report with recommendations prepared by a US human rights expert, engaged by the committee for the purpose of fact-finding and legal evaluation of the case;
- A list of the 31 legal violations uncovered by the committee, indexed to the report.
This is the first time in the Republic of Kosovo’s brief history that a parliamentary committee has thoroughly investigated allegations of serious human rights abuses. We have now submitted all of the above materials to the Special Prosecution of the Republic of Kosovo for further investigation, focused on possible crimes committed during the expulsion process.
However, due to the culture of impunity that still plagues Kosovo institutions, we do not believe that state prosecutors will conduct a meaningful investigation and bring high-ranking perpetrators to justice without significant international support. Indeed, it is in large part due to the international concern surrounding this case that the Assembly agreed to establish our committee in the first place.
Surely, even more international encouragement will be required to ensure both that the prosecutors handling the case conduct a thorough criminal investigation, and that the Assembly institute the necessary legislative safeguards to prevent similar human rights violations from ever happening again. Putting these safeguards into place has become even more urgent in recent days, given that Turkey continues to insist that last year’s expulsions were completely legal; and according to recent reports, Turkish authorities are already laying the groundwork for a second round of expulsions.
The Embassies of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany in Prishtina have already released statements in support of the committee’s work (see the U.S. Embassy’s statement).
In conclusion, we firmly believe that the expulsion of the six Turkish nationals would not have happened if state officials knew that the world was watching. And we just as firmly believe that, in order to bring this case to a successful conclusion, it is absolutely essential that the Special Prosecution Office and the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo be made aware that the world is still watching — and waiting for them to fulfill their legal and institutional responsibilities to the fullest extent possible.
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Religion as power
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a panel discussion March 19 about religious authority in the Middle East and its implications for US policy. The panel included Courtney Freer, Research Fellow at Middle East Center, Annele Sheline, Zwan Postdoctoral Fellow, Sharan Grewal, Fellow at Center for Middle East Policy, andYusuf Sarfati, Director of the Middle Eastern and South Asian Minor Program.
The following cases are a synopsis of studies showing the magnitude of religious authority in different Middle Eastern countries.
Turkey
Sarfati pointed out that though a layman, President Erdogan some Turks see him as commanding religious authority. His authority comes from a combination of his public performance of piety, charisma and his status as a graduate of an Islamic school, in addition to being leader of an Islamist party. At the same time, there is a wide segment of the society that does not trust him as a religious authority. There are many other outstanding religious figures who are not as well ranked as Erdogan but have gained trust as religious authorities such as Mehmet Gomez and Hayrettin Karaman, among others. Fethullah Gulen and Abu-Bakar Al Baghdadi are the least trusted and generally viewed negatively in Turkey. Unlike many other Muslim countries, religious authority in Turkey is confined to its borders and not influenced by religious authorities in Arab countries. Many Turks don’t approve religious leaders and show skepticism of religious authority. Official Islam and political Islam overlap. People believe in Islamism and support a state religion as two sides of the same coin.
Tunisia
Founded by Sheik Rachid Ghannouschi, Grewal argues that the Islamic party the Ennahda (Renaissance) has been the primary Islamic political party in Tunisia. It became a dominant political player after 2011, performing well in elections, but it is not widely seen as an authority in religious matters. Despite their linkage with and dependence on the Tunisian state, traditional religious authorities like the grand mufti and Imam of Zaytuna mosque have substantial popularity. Surprisingly, the Islamic State continues to wield considerable religious authority in Tunisia, even while domestic Salafi-Jihadis groups like Ansar-al Sharia do not.
Morocco
Sheline stated that the King Mohammed VI is considered the highest religious authority. This status reflects a taboo against questioning his authority as the Commander of Faithful. He has succeeded in establishing his religious credentials through state messaging. The King’s authority goes beyond the religious sphere. He bolsters Morocco´s soft power and strengthens strategic relationships with key allies. In the context of the war on terror, a demonstrable heritage of moderate Islam is a valuable commodity. Following 9/11 the government supported Sufism in hopes that it could serve as a counterbalance to extremist forms of Salafism. The palace’s promotion of moderation contributes to its liberalizing image while maintaining security and stability, making it an ideal partner in the eyes of the US and EU. The US should support the King’s initiative to promote moderate Islam without making it public, as that could undermine his religious standing.
Saudi Arabia
Freer asserted the most trusted religious leaders are among the official religious establishment. Shaykh Saad Bin Nasser Al-Shethri, who serves as advisor to the Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman is the most trusted. Also, Abdullah Al-Sheikh, the head of the Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Issuing Fatwas, enjoys wide religious authority. Consensus exists among nationals and non-nationals due in part to the official state religious narrative. It holds considerable sway in the religious sector and society more broadly. The more institutionalized indigenous religious influence is, the more likely constituents are to adhere to their authority. While in other Middle East states, religious groups have mobilized support through their provision of social services, the Saudis do not, because of the welfare system in place. The wealthy rentier status of Saudi Arabia negates the effects of income levels on opinions about religion and religious authority.
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Remote war
New America hosted a panel discussion March 21 about twenty-first century proxy warfare with Candace Rondeaux, Senior Fellow at New America’s International Security Program and C. Anthony Pfaff, Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute at Army War College.
Rondeaux gave an overview of the strategic and tactical changes in twenty-first century proxy war. Proxy warfare is moving away from both Cold War bipolarity and also uni-polarity. The reason for this shift is the proliferation of standoff, remote targeting capabilities, mainly in the Middle East region. Iran and other states in the region have standoff capacity, which means limited war has expanded beyond the great powers. States can limit their direct engagement. There is also the rise of transnational movements and the weakening of nation-states. The decay of multilateral institutions and their power to exert influence over conflict, such as the UN and increasingly NATO, has also become quite remarkable. The situation in Syria would be different without the log jam among the permanent members of the Security Council, with Russia always objecting to resolutions that seek to contain conflict.
At the tactical level, Rondeaux argues the nation-states that are struggling internally with their own domestic order often look to conflict beyond their borders as a means to signal cohesion at the national level. That is quite apparent in Iranian support to Hizballah, which helps to contain domestic challenges. Also, there is an increasing appetite within autocracies, particularly Russia, for a “military sugar rush” of instant victory on the battlefield, even if it causes big diplomatic trouble. It has been hard to make the Minsk agreement for Ukraine work so far. The last tactical concern is the way in which communication technology has connected social networks in ways never seen before. The rapid transit of ideas and national, ethnic and political identities in Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen has been a big factor in the availability of proxies.
Pfaff stated that proxies not only are not well understood but also under-regulated. The world is becoming multi-polar with state actors who can serve as benefactors and proxies and also a proliferation of non-state actors who can do the same thing. This comes with increasingly fragmented and contested sovereignty, which changes the security calculations of all actors as well as the options they have for pursuing their security goals. According to Pfaff, the inclusion of benefactors won’t make an unjust cause just, or illegitimate authority legitimate, but their involvement can make the disproportionate proportionate, and alternatives to fighting less appealing. Work still needs to be done in terms of international law to hold benefactors responsible for the illegal actions of their proxies .
Pfaff argues that international law does not address proxies. There are no norms in this situation. There isn’t any problem with having a proxy relationship, but the question is whether this relationship is stabilizing or destabilizing. States should be held responsible for the acts they sponsor remotely.
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Peace Picks March 25-29
1.The Contours of global security: Border line, critical security | Tuesday, March 26, 2019 | 1:30 am – 3:45pm | The Wilson Center | 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Washington, DC 20004-3027| Register Here |
As debate rages in Washington over President Trump’s characterization of the situation at the southern U.S. border as a national security emergency, the risks and stakes in several hot-spot regions around the world are far less open to question.
Agenda
1:30-2:30 pm: Borders as a National Security Crisis
Laura Dawson, Director of Canada Institute at Wilson Center
Rachel Schmidtke, Program Associate, Migration Policy, Mexico Institute, Wilson Center
Duncan Wood, Director, Mexico Institute, Wilson Center
Moderator:
The Honorable Earl Anthony Wayne,Public Policy Fellow; Advisory Board Co-chair, Mexico Institute, Wilson Center
2:45-3:45 pm: Hot-Spot Security Round-Up
Venezuela: Cynthia J. Arnson, Director, Latin American Program, Wilson Center
North Korea: Jean H. Lee,Director, Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy, Wilson Center
Iran and Syria: Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow
Moderator: John Milewski, Director of Digital Programming, Wilson Center
2. Constraining Iran’s nuclear and Missile capabilities| Thursday, March 28, 2019 | 2:00 am – 3:30pm | Brooking Institute |1775 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here|
The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure campaign” is putting Iran under great stress, but it is unlikely to compel Tehran to accept its far-reaching demands. The United States needs a new strategy for constraining Iran’s future nuclear capabilities as well as its missile program. Two new Brookings monographs—“Constraining Iran’s Future Nuclear Capabilities” by Robert Einhorn and Richard Nephew, and “Constraining Iran’s Missile Program” by Robert Einhorn and Vann Van Diepen—provide recommendations for addressing the challenges to regional and international security posed by Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.
Agenda
Speakers
Vann H. Van Diepen, Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Richard Nephew, Nonresident Senior Fellow at Center for 21st Century
Discussant
Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow – Center for Middle East Policy
Moderator
Robert Einhorn, Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy,Center for 21st Century
3. The MENA Region: from Transition to Transformation | Thursday, March 28, 2019 | 4:00 am – 5:30pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace|1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036-2103| Register Here |
Eight years after the Arab Spring and the collapse of commodity prices, full stabilization in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region remains elusive. Many countries have yet to enact the deep structural reforms deemed necessary to achieve economic transformation that yields sustainable, inclusive growth and employment opportunities.
Through its updated MENA strategy, the World Bank Group aims to pursue a two-pronged approach to promote peace and stability through economic and social inclusion. This approach builds on the four pillars of the World Bank’s 2015 MENA strategy, which includes renewing the social contract, strengthening resilience to shocks, supporting regional cooperation, and supporting recovery and reconstruction in conflict-affected countries.
Speakers
The vice president for the Middle East and North Africa at the World Bank Group.
Maha Yahya, Director of the Carnegie Middle East Center.
Rabah Arezki, Chief economist for the Middle East and North Africa at the World Bank.
4. A New Parliament in Iraq | Friday, March 29, 2019 | 11:30 am – 12:30pm | United States Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037
| Register Here |
As Iraq’s new parliament and government come to power, the country has seen significant political, social, and economic pressures. While challenges remain, fresh leadership presents Iraq with the opportunity to overcome these obstacles and make progress by developing its economy, increasing security, and strengthening governance and social services. Speaker al-Halbousi, who will be meeting with senior Trump administration officials and Congressional leaders during his visit to Washington, will lead the Council of Representatives as it grapples with all of these issues and navigates the many challenges of Iraq’s democratic process.
Speakers
Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace
His Excellency Mr. Mohammed Al-Halbousi, Council of Representatives, Republic of Iraq
5. The Outlook for Europe after EU elections| Tuesday, March 26, 2019 | 2:30 pm – 3:30pm | The Heritage Foundation |214 Massachusetts Ave NE Washington, DC 20002 | Register Here |
Europe remains in flux. The implications of populism, political fragmentation, and the upending of traditional political paradigms in many countries are not yet fully understood. The United Kingdom is leaving the European Union, and the continent continues to grapple with the repercussions of large-scale migration and the return of great power competition. Threats from Russia and terrorism remain potent, while Europe has only begun to grapple with rising Chinese assertiveness and economic investments. Upcoming European Parliamentary elections in May could be a defining moment. Join us as our panelists assess how EU elections could affect the future of Europe. How are shifting political dynamics in the EU influencing competing visions for Europe’s future? How will the role of the nation state in Europe likely evolve? What do changes to Europe’s political makeup mean for transatlantic relations? What areas of synergy should U.S. policymakers focus on for maximum impact?
A panel discussion featuring
Zsolt Németh, Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee Parliament of Hungary
Nile Gardiner, Director, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom
Peter Rough, Fellow, The Hudson Institute
Hosted by
James Jay Carafano, Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy
6.The Case for US Foreign Assistance | Thursday, March 26, 2019 | 1:30 am – 3:00pm | Center for Strategic and International Study | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036| Register Here|
The Marshall Plan and other initiatives that followed (such as the Alliance for Progress and USAID) were created in the context of great power competition. We are perhaps returning to an age of renewed great power competition. The developing world today is much richer, freer, and has more options. In this context, American foreign assistance is still needed, but in a radically changed world.
Foreign assistance in the United States has always operated in the context of enlightened self-interest. In Senator Vandenberg’s time there were significant critics of assistance who doubted the effectiveness of foreign aid just as there are today. How do we make the case for American foreign assistance in this new era? What are the major global challenges and opportunities that we might take advantage of by investing U.S. foreign assistance dollars?
Speakers
Senator Thomas A. Daschle, Former U.S. Senator (D-SD)
Senator Norm Coleman, Former U.S. Senator (R-MN)
Daniel F. Runde, Senior Vice President; William A. Schreyer Chair and Director, Project on Prosperity and Development
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Not indictable is the new white
The President is not indictable for obstruction of justice because his guilt cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor did the Special Counsel find evidence of Trump campaign collusion with Russia. President Trump and his fans are touting these claims of his recently appointed Attorney General as proof that media coverage has been biased and even that the investigation itself was illegal. There is far less evidence of either of those claims than the conclusions the Attorney General came to.
Trump’s signal accomplishment in American life is to lower standards in many different spheres. Elected as a member of the political party that always claimed to want to rein in government spending, Trump has accelerated the accumulation of US debt to over $1 trillion per year. His deregulation of many industries amounts to lowering standards for everything from cars and power plants to light bulbs. His refusal to make his tax returns public and his hesitation to fire abusive cabinet members has lowered ethical standards throughout the US government. In the military sphere, the lowering of criteria for the use of drones has led to a marked increase in collateral deaths of civilians, causing the Administration to end announcement of casualty figures.
We should have expected this. Trump did the same in his business and private life. He has notoriously low standards for his treatment of women: he not only brags about his physical abuse of them but pays hush money to conceal his flings. None of his three marriages have been successful. His commercial products and real estate developments are more glitzy than quality. As a casino magnate, he became more expert in bankruptcy than in enterprise. He falsified financial statements to get loans and insurance reimbursements. He used a charitable foundation for his own private purposes. He refused to rent apartments to black people, imported immigrants rather than higher US citizens, and allowed undocumented workers to staff his golf clubs.
In foreign policy, Trump has befriended unreliable dictators and scorned well-tested allies. He withdrew from the Iran deal that imposed tight restrictions on Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and accepted a watered-down version of a denuclearization pledge from North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. Trump has accepted Russian President Putin’s simple denial of interference in the US election over the ample evidence the US intelligence and law enforcement communities have produced. He likewise prefers to believe unsubstantiated Saudi denials of Mohammed bin Salman’s involvement in ordering the murder of Jamal Khashoggi rather than the intelligence community’s conclusions. On climate change, the President prefers the advice of ideologues to that of serious scientists.
The flim-flam extends also to Special Counsel Mueller’s report. Attorney General Barr is stalling on publishing its contents, hoping that the interval will provide enough time and opportunity for him and the White House to convince Americans that their version of the report is accurate. This will certainly work with Republicans, who remain not only loyal but enthusiastic about a president who lies blatantly every day. It won’t work with Democrats, who are determined to rid the country of the flim-flam man as soon as they can. The key question is independent voters: will they tire of this embarrassment, or will they decide we need to do better?
The issue is likely to be decided only on November 3, 2020, when Americans again go to the polls. Impeachment isn’t likely unless some new malfeasance appears on the political horizon. Trump will run again, because once out of office he will be subject to criminal prosecution in New York for his financial abuses. The Democrats will need to produce not only a sterling candidate, but one who can win by more than the 3 million votes Hillary Clinton beat Trump by, because his support is ideally distributed to gain votes in the Electoral College even if he loses the popular vote. The big factor in determining the popular vote margin will be the economy: if it is still expanding, even more slowly, in November next year Trump has far better chances than if, as most economists are anticipating, the economy falls into recession.
In the meanwhile, we’ll need to live with lowered standards. Trump’s 40% support is solid. Non-indictable is the new white.
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