Tag: European Union
Good news, finally, but unlikely to last
Bits of good news all around. The US House of Representatives, after months of allowing a small number of dissenting Republicans to block vital expanded aid to Ukraine (as well as infusions for Israel and Taiwan), has now approved it. Israel has retaliated against Iran for last weekend’s massive barrage of missiles and drones. It managed to do so without provoking any further escalation. And on a much lesser scale of geopolitics, the Council of Europe appears to be readying itself to admit Kosovo as a member.
Better late than never
All of this is good news, even if much delayed.
The Congress should never have allowed its Russophile right-wingers to put Ukraine’s existence at risk. It is appalling that someone could become Speaker who required months of cajoling to recognize the importance of getting more assistance to Kyiv. Last year’s Russian dominance in the war of attrition has done real damage, not only to Ukrainian morale.
We can hope that the US will now send Ukraine everything it needs. The aim should be not only to resist Russian advances but also to roll back Moscow’s recent gains and the threat they now poses to Kharkiv. Ukrainian F-16s should arrive this summer. A big Ukrainian push with the right weapons could force Russian retreats in Donbas, the south, and even Crimea.
Israel needs to do more
Israel has been rampaging in Gaza as if it had nothing to fear. The Iranian attack, though a failure, is hopefully a reminder to Jerusalem that self-restraint and diplomacy can be virtues, not weaknesses. The Israelis need now to resuscitate the talks with Hamas and reach an agreement, however unsatisfactory, for the release of at least the civilian hostages.
They also need to get rid of Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has repeatedly endangered Israeli security. His encouragement of US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, his financial and political support for Hamas, his opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state, and the deplorable intelligence and military failures of October 7 qualify him as the worst Israeli prime minister, not just the longest-serving.
Serbia’s spite is shameful
The Council of Europe has dawdled far too long in approving Kosovo for membership. It is far more qualified than its principal opponent, Serbia. And allowing Kosovo in will give Serbs who live there a new and potentially fruitful avenue to pursue complaints, through the European Court of Human Rights.
The spitefulness of Belgrade’s opposition, which directly contradicts an agreement the European Union claims Serbia adhered to in February, may be expected, but it is still deplorable. Kosovo is demonstrably better qualified for CoE membership than Serbia.
Can we hope for more?
Good news is particularly welcome when it is a harbinger of more. Some may hope that the voting in Congress augurs a less polarized political atmosphere in which moderate Democrats and Republicans can cooperate to neutralize the nutty MAGAites. But I see little hope of that. Speaker Johnson will now face an effort to remove him. If he wins, the MAGAites will be embittered and he will be more cautious in the future. If he loses, we could face a truly dire situation, as then he would have to be replaced with an even more convinced MAGAite.
In the Middle East, Netanyahu still seems firmly in power. Though his margin in the Knesset is narrow, his allies stand no chance of remaining in power if he falls. He himself could end up in prison on corruption charges. Netanyahu is not going to be easy to displace. Let’s hope the civilians in Rafah won’t pay the price of keeping him in the prime ministry.
In the Balkans, Belgrade may lose the battle to keep Pristina out of the Council of Europe. But that is a minor skirmish in Kosovo’s effort to gain full international recognition. There is no sign of progress on UN membership. EU membership is far off. NATO will have to be the next major battle. Fortunately that excludes Serbia from having a veto or even a vote. But Hungary and now Slovakia will more than likely be prepared to do Belgrade’s dirty work.
A long road ahead
Those of us looking for a Ukrainian military victory, a Palestinian state that will live in peace with Israel, and UN membership for Kosovo still have a long wait ahead. But every step in the right direction today is one that doesn’t have to be taken tomorrow.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Double down on success, not failure
The US Ambassador in Belgrade has vaunted cooperation with the Serbian Army even as the President of Serbia makes clear his intention to invade Kosovo at a time of his choosing. How can both be true?
No big puzzle
It’s really not hard to figure this out. Serbia cooperates with US and NATO exercises for two reasons. First, they provide good training, which the Russians are unable to equal. The performance of the Russian Army in Ukraine has improved, but its losses are simply colossal. No one would want to emulate them. Second, NATO exercises provide excellent opportunities to gather intelligence. That will serve well in any Serbian military action against NATO-led forces in Kosovo. Belgrade no doubt also feeds that intelligence back to Moscow.
Only marginally harder to understand is the reference to the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) as the KLA (or Kosovo Liberation Army). The KLA was demobilized after the 1999 war. The KSF that exists today is the creation of US and British training and equipping several generations of organization and personnel removed from the KLA. The US Ambassador in Belgrade knows that perfectly well. His reference to the KLA is intended to signal that he agrees with the Serbian government that the KSF is illegitimate.
Toadying hasn’t worked
This toadying to Vucic has become the default behavior in Belgrade. The question is why it is tolerated in Washington. I suppose there are reasons. But they are unlikely to be good ones. No amount of lickspittle will change Belgrade’s decision to align with Russia. Vucic has made clear that he intends to try to take back a piece of Kosovo whenever he gets an opportunity. Any agreement in Ukraine to surrender territory to Russia will provide that opportunity.
Washington needs to reconsider its long effort to court Vucic. That effort has failed. It has also encouraged his irredentist ambitions, not only in Kosovo but also in Montenegro and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The “Serbian world” he aims for is strictly analogous to the “Russian world” President Putin is trying to create in Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, and most ambitiously Ukraine. The West should be countering Russian and Serbian ethnoterritorial ambitions, not encouraging them. Instead, Washington is doubling down on a policy that has failed to produce anything more than minor results.
A better policy would not be hard to find
A re-evaluation is long overdue. The current Trumpian affection for ethnonationalism and irredentism is inconsistent with the liberal democratic pretensions of the Biden Administration. Tony Blinken, bless is hard-traveling body and no doubt preoccupied mind, needs to say to State Department Assistant Secretary Jim O’Brien: we have failed to get Vucic on side. Let’s try tough love.
That would mean reading him the riot act on many things. First would be prioritizing justice, preferably in Kosovo, for the organizers and perpetrators of the September 24 terrorist incident that Belgrade sponsored inside Kosovo. Second would be ensuring that Pristina gets the support it requires not only for membership in the Council of Europe and relief from outdated and counterproductive EU “consequences” but also for opening of negotiations on NATO membership. Third would be readiness to denounce any cheating in preparation for the upcoming rerun of Belgrade elections.
I could go on, but you get the point. US policy needs to return to favoring its friends in the Balkans and countering its enemies. That should not be too hard to do. Double down on success, not failure.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
C+ is not a good grade
C+ is what I would give as a grade for implementation of the year-old “Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia.” Koha asked for an interview on this subject but then did not call at the appointed time. So I wrote this piece instead. It’s a B or B+ for Pristina and a C for Belgrade.
Let’s break it down article by article:
Good neighborly relations:
Certainly not in general, but there has been some limited progress on mutual recognition of their respective documents and national symbols, including passports, diplomas, license plates, and customs stamps. Pristina was never the problem. Belgrade has moved on this. B or B+ I guess.
Respect for the UN Charter:
Serbia fails (that’s an F) miserably on respect for “the sovereign equality of all States, respect for their independence, autonomy and territorial integrity.” Kosovo gets a B+, marked down due to continued shortcomings in protection of human rights and non-discrimination. Things are improving in those departments, but problems remain.
Peaceful settlement of disputes:
Serbia fails (F) on settlement of disputes exclusively by peaceful means and refraining from the threat or use of force. Belgrade sponsored the September 24 attempted uprising intended to create a pretext for the use of force, which it threatened by mobilizing its forces on Kosovo’s borders. Belgrade had also already kidnapped two Kosovo police from Kosovo territory and organized a mob that attacked NATO-led peacekeepers. Kosovo has no real option for use of force, but nevertheless gets an A for the police handling of the September 24 incident.
International representation:
Serbia (D) continues to oppose Kosovo’s membership in international organizations. Kosovo (A) has not to my knowledge objected to Serbia’s membership in them.
EU path:
Serbia (D) is no longer in transition to democracy and does not align with EU foreign policy, especially but not only on Ukraine and Russia. Kosovo (B+) is moving in the right direction on democracy and does respect EU foreign policy.
Dialogue process:
Neither Belgrade nor Pristina is much engaged, the former because it objects to the basic premises and the latter because it has gotten little benefit. C+ for both.
Treatment of the Serbian community in Kosovo:
Kosovo has conceded little on “self-management” but is resolving one important issue concerning Serbian Orthodox Church property at Decan/i. Pristina has muddied the waters on financial support from Belgrade by insisting on use of the euro but there is really no bar to direct communication for the Serbian community with the Kosovo government. B for Pristina, but no better than a C+ for Belgrade, which insists on violating Kosovo law in transferring finances opaquely and in dinars.
EU and others’ support package:
I really don’t know. Has it been created? Is anything happening on this front?
Joint Committee on implementation:
Is this just the Dialogue writ small, or has such a thing been created?
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The best president Russia never had
I don’t often watch two-hour videos. But a couple of years ago I did watch this one. It helps to explain today’s news that Alexei Navalny died in a Russian prison. May his memory be a blessing. Radek Sikorski, once again Poland’s Foreign Minister, said it well on NPR this morning: Navalny will be remembered as the best president Russia never had.
The relevance of Boris Godunov
I also enjoyed, so to speak, a performance of Mussorsky’s Boris Godunov at the Bolshoi opera about 10 years ago. In it, Godunov is elected Tsar after murdering the rightful heir. That may be historically accurate or not. But it is hard not to see in this most Russian of Russian operas parallels to Putin. That too tells you something about Navalny’s death.
As with Godunov, it really doesn’t matter whether Putin ordered Navalny murdered. It is possible Navalny succumbed to the harsh conditions in a Siberian prison. He should not have been there. A classical political prisoner, Navalny challenged Putin’s legitimacy and might have competed in a fair election to displace him from power. That was enough to earn him a decades-long sentence and eventual death.
How the West should react
There is little the US and Europe can do to respond directly to Navalny’s death. A few sanctions maybe on prison and security officials? A week or two of badmouthing Putin?
Putin won’t care about any of that. What he cares about is Ukraine. And what he understands is power. He has enjoyed for months now watching Washington twist itself into knots over military assistance for Kyiv. The time has come to straighten that out. One way or another, the House needs to take an up or down vote on the aid package. There is no doubt now that it will pass if the Speaker allows it to be voted on.
But that should not be the end of the story. The US needs to remove the qualitative limits on what it ships to Ukraine. Washington should be supplying whatever weapons Kyiv needs to win the war this year. Nothing short of that will bring about a quick end to a war that has already gone on far too long. Russian defeat is a sine qua non for peace.
What should Russians do?
His own guilt and a pretender combine to bring down the operatic Godunov. That isn’t a likely outcome for Putin. The presidential election there is but a month off (March 15-17). Putin has already eliminated any serious rivals, but there is always ballot destruction or I suppose write-ins that could at least embarrass him.
Another possibility is a palace coup. AP has identified a few possible replacements if Putin were to disappear. But that isn’t likely either. If nothing else, Putin has made sure that he faces no serious rival or risk of rebellion, including among people close to him. .
Putin is 71. That is already above the life expectancy at birth of the average Russian male. Of course he has lived a privileged existence as a KGB officer and politician. But that may not lengthen his years. Holding power seems to keep people alive more often than it kills them.
More than likely…
So more than likely we’ll have to put up with Putin for a while yet. But we shouldn’t put up with jackasses in the US who support his geopolitical objectives, his invasion of Ukraine, or his claim that life is better in Russia than in the West. Donald Trump, Tucker Carlson, and others in this category need to be shown the exit.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, February 15
– The House intelligence committee has notified the chamber that members can see a highly classified report about an emerging Russian threat, reportedly a nuclear space-based anti-satellite weapon. Jake Sullivan is set to brief the Gang of 8 today.
– WSJ analyzes the deteriorating Biden-Netanyahu relationship
– DOD has some smart graphics defending Ukrainian aid
– Defense One notes how slow European artillery production is
– I don’t know House rules very well, so I was intrigued by Punchbowl News’ article noting that the Previous Question motion can be used to defeat a House rule resolution, thereby opening it to amendment — a possible way to get House consideration of the foreign aid package that passed the Senate, and much easier politically than a discharge petition.
—
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Difficult is better than the alternatives
All three of these fine commentators agree: stabilization requires a recognized Palestinian state and international forces in Gaza. The international forces are needed at a minimum to monitor the ceasefire, protect civilians, preside over unification of the West Bank and Gaza, and organize Palestinian elections or some other means of validating legitimate authority. Gershon Baskin wants an Arab-led force for only two years. Sultan Barakat wants the international presence for two or three years to be non-Arab and mentions South Africa, Belgium, and Finland. Any deployment of that sort is likely to last far longer.
But all three are vague about how this international presence would be constituted and organized. We have learned a good deal from the past almost 35 years of such interventions. How should we apply this experience in Gaza?
The international intervention
First things first: the mandate. A strong, detailed, and comprehensive mandate is vital. For Gaza, that likely means a UN Security Council mandate voted unanimously. That will be difficult. The US has consistently prevented any resolution that the Israelis object to. A resolution that assigns them responsibility for the destruction of Gaza, no matter how objective or restrained, will attract a US veto. Any resolution that doesn’t condemn what the Israelis have done and provide for their complete withdrawal will arouse Russian, Chinese, and other objections.
What we know beyond that is not scientifically validated but derived from the 20 or so international interventions over more than three decades, starting in 1990. Jim Dobbins summarized his conclusions about a hypothetical country of 5 million in this table:
Illustrative Costs of Nation-Building
| Sector | Personnel | Cost(millions of US$) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Local | Int’l | ||
| Light peacekeeping | |||
| Military | 8,000 | 360 | |
| 15,000 | 50 | ||
| Police | 1,000 | 170 | |
| 11,000 | 18 | ||
| Rule of law | 18 | ||
| Humanitarian | 170 | ||
| Governance | 260 | ||
| Economic stabilization | 30 | ||
| Democratization | 50 | ||
| Development and infrastructure | 390 | ||
| Total, light peacekeeping | 26,000 | 9,000 | 1,520 |
| Heavy peace enforcement (additional requirements) | |||
| Military | 57,000 | 12,640 | |
| Police | 7,000 | 1,080 | |
| Development and infrastructure | 360 | ||
| Total, heavy peace enforcement | 26,000 | 73,000 | 15,600 |
NOTE: Estimated annual costs in a hypothetical country of 5 million people with a per capita gross domestic product of $500. Total costs do not sum due to rounding.
Gaza will require “heavy” rather than “light” peace enforcement, not least because remnants of Hamas and other violent groups will necessarily try to harass the intervention. Before the war Gaza had a significantly higher GDP per capita than this illustrative example, which complicates and increases the burden of peacekeeping.
Assuming about 2.2 million people in Gaza, Dobbins’ guesstimates would mean about 30,000 troops and 4,000 police. The troops could be from non-Arabic speaking countries. The force would then be more than twice the size of the largest UN peacekeeping operation in 2023 and perhaps the largest UN peacekeeping ever. Raising and deploying such a large force will be a monumental task. An effective police force will need to be capable in Arabic, which means literate as well as Arabic-speaking. For comparison, there are about 10,000 Palestinian Authority police in the West Bank, which has a population of 3 million, or 50% more than in Gaza. So 8000 is not excessive.
Trying to handle Gaza with fewer forces and a lesser mandate would be incredibly perilous. A return to extremist rule or chaos would be the likely outcomes.
Political conditions
Arab countries will only contribute to an international intervention with troops or money if the settlement guarantees at the least an eventual recognized Palestinian state, includingg by Israel and the US. It is going to be difficult for both even to promise that as a future step. Right now, President Biden cannot do it because it would undermine his political position in the US, even if it might help him among Democrats. Obviously Prime Minister Netanyahu won’t do it either. Recognition can only happen after his removal from power.
Even then, it would require a revolution in Israeli attitudes. A opposition-led government in Israel would certainly impose conditions. Those would include Hamas and other extremists out, nonviolence pledged, demilitarization accomplished. The Palestinians and most Arab countries will also condititon their cooperation. They will want Israeli troops out of Gaza and the West Bank, settlements withdrawn from much if not all of the West Bank, East Jerusalem clearly inside the Palestinian state.
All these are reasonable conditions lots of us would endorse. But getting Palestinians and Israelis to agree to them will, again, be a monumental task.
Humanitarian and economic requirements
The financing requirement Jim Dobbins cites is less daunting. In today’s world, $7-8 billion per year is doable. It might be more like $10 billion per year given the extensive destruction in Gaza. But getting humanitarian aid to the right people and money spent responsibly will still be challenging. Israel will want to inspect everything shipped into Gaza and monitor its use. Ditto with the funds. Israel will not again risk resources being used to dig tunnels and build rockets rather than feed the needy. Arab Gulf countries will not want Israel to maintain its stranglehold on their resources.
UNRWA is also an important issue humanitarian and economic issue. Once the fighting ends, it will be damaged but hopefully still capable. If you want to rid Gaza of Hamas, UNRWA or something derived from it is indispensable. But the Israelis are trying to destroy it. If they succeed, the difficulties of delivering aid after the war will be redoubled.
Neighbors are the good news
Another rule of thumb from previous interventions is that neighbors matter. If they are hostile to the post-war effort, they can and likely will hinder it. For both Jordan and Egypt, the neighbors with the longest borders with Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank, success in Palestine would be welcome. They will try to be helpful so long as they believe Palestinian interests are well-served.
That will be less true of Lebanon and Syria, which have borders with Israel but not Palestine. Both Hizbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria have their own issues. Neither is in a position to do much to undermine a serious peace settlement between Israel and Palestine. Even Iran and the Houthis in Yemen, other components of the “axis of resistance,” will be unable to do much to undermine a settlement that legitimate Palestinian leaders endorse.
The challenges are great but the alternative is worse
An international intervention isn’t a bad idea. It’s just a collosally challenging one. The alternative however is worse. In the absence of peacekeeping troops and police Gaza will see protection rackets, organized crime, and further radicalization. Hamas could revive. The only outcomes then will be autocratic, draconian, or both, not democratic. Neither Palestinians nor Israelis should welcome that. The difficult is better than the alternatives.
RSS - Posts
