Tag: Israel/Palestine

When Jews and Arabs agree and disagree

The horrors of the October 7 attack and the Gaza war are all too present. But it is notable that at least some Arabs and Jews are reacting in similar, if not identical ways. At least I find that true in the US and hope it is true more widely.

Atrocity is atrocity

Most of the Jews and Arabs I come into contact with find both the Hamas attack and the Israeli reaction atrocious. Both are prepared to acknowledge the context for the Hamas attack. It came in the midst of escalating Jewish settler violence against Palestinians on the West Bank and East Jerusalem as well as right-wing Jewish challenges to the status quo on the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount. But that in no way justified an indiscriminate attack on civilians inside Israel.

The same is true in the other direction. Most Arabs and Jews understand Israel had to respond. Nor do they think it wrong to seek justice for the Hamas perpetrators and release of the hostages taken to Gaza. But the indiscriminate and disproportionate assault on the civilian population there is still entirely unjustified and counterproductive. States today have obligations when they undertake military action that should not be ignored. Yes, it is true that the United States and its allies during World War II conducted indiscriminate and disproportionate bombing of Germany and Japan, including use of the atomic bomb. But international norms have changed. Even then, protection of civilians was required, not optional. Today it is de rigueur. Atrocity is atrocity.

What could Hamas and Israel have done?

Both Hamas and Israel should have focused their targeting on military targets. That would have meant for Hamas only attacking military bases, not the nearby music festival or kibbutzim, many of which are in fact sympathetic with the Palestinian desire for a state. For Israel it would have meant targeting individuals and groups clearly associated with Hamas and other armed factions in Gaza. That would have precluded the razing of more than 50% of the buildings in the Gaza Strip.

That both warring parties violated the rules of war will have long-term consequences. Israelis will have a lot harder time putting the October 7 attack behind them. Many are seeking revenge, not justice. Some Palestinians will likewise seek revenge. Gaza will be far more difficult to rebuild. Both will be rallying to the more extreme factions of their respective politics, making agreement harder than it might otherwise have been. If you kill people indiscriminately because of their identity, you can expect that identity to strengthen, not weaken.

What is to be done now?

The Americans and others have made no secret of their intensifying effort to reach agreement on a multi-week pause in the fighting to allow exchange of prisoners/hostages. That would certainly be a good thing. But if the exchange is less than complete, the fighting is likely to restart if the same people remain in power.

Prime Minister Netanyahu is determined to continue the war for as long as possible. He knows that a prolonged pause will open the possibility his government will fall and a less radical one take its place. Hamas may likewise fear a prolonged pause will bring its status into question as well. There have already been demonstrations in Gaza against Hamas. A pause will make the consequences of what it brought on starker.

It would make a big difference if Jews and Arabs inside Israel could get together to dump Netanyahu as well as Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas. He is almost as unpopular as Netanyahu. That would open the door to an Israeli government committed to getting the hostages released, Gaza rebuilt, and a common destiny mapped. It would also enable a reformed and more capable PA.

It is clear enough that neither Jews nor Arabs are going to leave Palestine/Israel to the others. The Jews complain when Palestinians talk about “from the river to the sea.” But Palestinians are correct to perceive that the settlers are trying to do it, not just talk about it. Neither will succeed in its maximal ambitions. They are going to have to share the land. There is no reason they can’t do that. It will require wisdom, not slogans.

Why won’t Biden change American policy?

Where Arabs and Jews in America disagree is on US policy. Arabs are sorely disappointed in the President Biden’s unconditional support for Israel and say they won’t vote for him again. Jews like me point out that he has shifted towards support for a fighting pause, exchange of hostages/prisoners, and support for a two-state solution, even though he hasn’t diminished his support for Israel’s right to defend itself or conditioned aid on Israeli behavior.

Much of the Administration and many Jews seem ready to go further, including Tony Blinken. The Secretary of State has said that the Jewish settlements on the West Bank are not consistent with international law. That is a big step in American politics, though the Administration has done nothing to reinforce the statement with actions.

Arab Americans are saying they won’t vote for Biden again. A significant number indicated their displeasure yesterday in the Michigan democratic primary by voting “uncommitted.” That was a smart move. It demonstrated political weight.

But it would be foolish for Arabs and Muslims in Michigan and elsewhere to carry through on the threat and not vote for Biden in November. His likely challenger, Donald Trump, would be far less likely to speak up for Palestinian rights than Biden is. Trump has always wanted increased Jewish support but never got it. Christian evangelicals, however, are vital to the Republican base today. Most of them don’t want to hear anything about the Palestinians. Trump has said little or nothing about Gaza so far. But when he does, Palestinians won’t want to hear it. Voting for Biden may be distasteful to Arab and Muslim Americans, but staying home or voting for Trump should be unthinkable.

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Gaza questions are easier than answers

No one wishing Israel well should want Netanyahu to remain prime minister.

The New York Times has already described how Netanyahu’s plan for postwar Gaza clashes with everyone else’s thinking. Netanyahu wants a full-fledged re-occupation of Gaza, complete with puppet Palestinian government there. He is already clearing a buffer zone inside the Gaza fence and wants to control the Egyptian/Gaza border as well. He imagines that UNRWA can be abolished. Israeli-selected local officials would manage an Israeli-imposed deradicalization process.

What is this really all about?

This is nothing but a formula to continue the Gaza conflict indefinitely. Netanyahu figures that as long as the war lasts he can delay his political downfall. So he is defying President Biden’s pitch for Palestinian Authority revitalization and takeover of Gaza, which would also be a difficult maneuver. Netanyahu has also repeatedly and forcefully ruled out a Palestinian state, which the US supports in principle. Israel and the US are not aligned, diplomats would say, except on Israel’s right of self-defense.

Inside Israel, Netanyahu’s policies are finding a good deal of support, even if he is still wildly unpopular. A lot of right-wing Israelis appear to be looking for revenge, not peace. While Gazans are suffering the horrors of indiscriminate and grossly disproportional attacks, Israel’s soldiers are celebrating the destruction of homes and mosques. Things will only get worse if the Israelis send ground forces into Rafah, where much of the Gaza population has taken refuge from attacks further north.

What is the alternative?

The diplomatic world is struggling to produce an alternative. That would apparently entail a longish pause in most of the fighting to permit a series of hostage exchanges. It is not a bad idea, but there are obvious limits. Hamas will not surrender all of the hostages, because once it does it fears Israel will restart the full-scaled assault on its cadres. But Israel won’t want to surrender all of its prisoners either, so perhaps there is a middle ground with some common interest. Hamas will be finding some of the hostages burdensome and Netanyahu is under political pressure to get some back.

If a pause and additional prisoner exchange does prove feasible, the Americans, Qataris, and Egyptians will want to use the occasion to try for a negotiated end to the war. That too is not a bad idea, but it is hard to see how they could get Netanyahu or Hamas to agree to it. It would either entail Israeli acceptance of a continued presence of Hamas in Gaza or Hamas agreeing to surrender. The former isn’t going to happen with Netanyahu and his rightwing allies in power. The latter isn’t going to happen without a more thorough military defeat than Hamas has suffered so far.

What if Netanyahu were no longer in power?

If Netanyahu and his coalition were to fall from power, other alternatives might emerge. A new Israeli government less committed to Jewish supremacy might conclude that the Netanyahu plan for postwar Gaza is nonsense. It might better understand that the war is creating chaotic conditions in Gaza that will be difficult to manage, never mind repair. Ever more radical groups could emerge and take over from Hamas. Or localized gangs and protection rackets could exploit the situation to establish drug and other smuggling operations.

Israel’s minimal goal in this war should include being at least as secure as it was before October 7. That will require local and international security forces, competent Palestinian governance, international humanitarian relief, Gulf economic assistance, and other inputs to stability that are already difficult to imagine. Continuing the war at this point is predictably counterproductive because it will make them more difficult, not easier.

But ending the war will require the Israelis to summon the political will and courage to get rid of Netanyahu sooner rather than later. That should now be President Biden’s top priority. Getting rid of the prime obstacle to peace is not optional. Continuing to cater to Netanyahu will only bring more grief to Israelis, Palestinians, and ultimately Biden himself.

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Stevenson’s army, February 14

Trump sees a protection racket because he is a mob boss.

– FT say 18 of 31 NATO members will hit 2% target this year

Trump advisor explains his NATO plan

– WaPo tries to explain Sen.Graham’s policy shifts

– J Street endorses 2 state solution [DPS comment: J Street has long endorsed two states. The news here is openness to recogntion before a final settlement]

– WH has new critical technologies list

Happy Valentine’s Day!

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Difficult is better than the alternatives

All three of these fine commentators agree: stabilization requires a recognized Palestinian state and international forces in Gaza. The international forces are needed at a minimum to monitor the ceasefire, protect civilians, preside over unification of the West Bank and Gaza, and organize Palestinian elections or some other means of validating legitimate authority. Gershon Baskin wants an Arab-led force for only two years. Sultan Barakat wants the international presence for two or three years to be non-Arab and mentions South Africa, Belgium, and Finland. Any deployment of that sort is likely to last far longer.

But all three are vague about how this international presence would be constituted and organized. We have learned a good deal from the past almost 35 years of such interventions. How should we apply this experience in Gaza?

The international intervention

First things first: the mandate. A strong, detailed, and comprehensive mandate is vital. For Gaza, that likely means a UN Security Council mandate voted unanimously. That will be difficult. The US has consistently prevented any resolution that the Israelis object to. A resolution that assigns them responsibility for the destruction of Gaza, no matter how objective or restrained, will attract a US veto. Any resolution that doesn’t condemn what the Israelis have done and provide for their complete withdrawal will arouse Russian, Chinese, and other objections.

What we know beyond that is not scientifically validated but derived from the 20 or so international interventions over more than three decades, starting in 1990. Jim Dobbins summarized his conclusions about a hypothetical country of 5 million in this table:

Illustrative Costs of Nation-Building

SectorPersonnelCost(millions of US$)
LocalInt’l
Light peacekeeping
Military 8,000360
15,000 50
Police 1,000170
11,000 18
Rule of law  18
Humanitarian  170
Governance  260
Economic stabilization  30
Democratization  50
Development and infrastructure  390
Total, light peacekeeping26,0009,0001,520
Heavy peace enforcement (additional requirements)
Military 57,00012,640
Police 7,0001,080
Development and infrastructure  360
Total, heavy peace enforcement26,00073,00015,600

NOTE: Estimated annual costs in a hypothetical country of 5 million people with a per capita gross domestic product of $500. Total costs do not sum due to rounding.

Gaza will require “heavy” rather than “light” peace enforcement, not least because remnants of Hamas and other violent groups will necessarily try to harass the intervention. Before the war Gaza had a significantly higher GDP per capita than this illustrative example, which complicates and increases the burden of peacekeeping.

Assuming about 2.2 million people in Gaza, Dobbins’ guesstimates would mean about 30,000 troops and 4,000 police. The troops could be from non-Arabic speaking countries. The force would then be more than twice the size of the largest UN peacekeeping operation in 2023 and perhaps the largest UN peacekeeping ever. Raising and deploying such a large force will be a monumental task. An effective police force will need to be capable in Arabic, which means literate as well as Arabic-speaking. For comparison, there are about 10,000 Palestinian Authority police in the West Bank, which has a population of 3 million, or 50% more than in Gaza. So 8000 is not excessive.

Trying to handle Gaza with fewer forces and a lesser mandate would be incredibly perilous. A return to extremist rule or chaos would be the likely outcomes.

Political conditions

Arab countries will only contribute to an international intervention with troops or money if the settlement guarantees at the least an eventual recognized Palestinian state, includingg by Israel and the US. It is going to be difficult for both even to promise that as a future step. Right now, President Biden cannot do it because it would undermine his political position in the US, even if it might help him among Democrats. Obviously Prime Minister Netanyahu won’t do it either. Recognition can only happen after his removal from power.

Even then, it would require a revolution in Israeli attitudes. A opposition-led government in Israel would certainly impose conditions. Those would include Hamas and other extremists out, nonviolence pledged, demilitarization accomplished. The Palestinians and most Arab countries will also condititon their cooperation. They will want Israeli troops out of Gaza and the West Bank, settlements withdrawn from much if not all of the West Bank, East Jerusalem clearly inside the Palestinian state.

All these are reasonable conditions lots of us would endorse. But getting Palestinians and Israelis to agree to them will, again, be a monumental task.

Humanitarian and economic requirements

The financing requirement Jim Dobbins cites is less daunting. In today’s world, $7-8 billion per year is doable. It might be more like $10 billion per year given the extensive destruction in Gaza. But getting humanitarian aid to the right people and money spent responsibly will still be challenging. Israel will want to inspect everything shipped into Gaza and monitor its use. Ditto with the funds. Israel will not again risk resources being used to dig tunnels and build rockets rather than feed the needy. Arab Gulf countries will not want Israel to maintain its stranglehold on their resources.

UNRWA is also an important issue humanitarian and economic issue. Once the fighting ends, it will be damaged but hopefully still capable. If you want to rid Gaza of Hamas, UNRWA or something derived from it is indispensable. But the Israelis are trying to destroy it. If they succeed, the difficulties of delivering aid after the war will be redoubled.

Neighbors are the good news

Another rule of thumb from previous interventions is that neighbors matter. If they are hostile to the post-war effort, they can and likely will hinder it. For both Jordan and Egypt, the neighbors with the longest borders with Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank, success in Palestine would be welcome. They will try to be helpful so long as they believe Palestinian interests are well-served.

That will be less true of Lebanon and Syria, which have borders with Israel but not Palestine. Both Hizbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria have their own issues. Neither is in a position to do much to undermine a serious peace settlement between Israel and Palestine. Even Iran and the Houthis in Yemen, other components of the “axis of resistance,” will be unable to do much to undermine a settlement that legitimate Palestinian leaders endorse.

The challenges are great but the alternative is worse

An international intervention isn’t a bad idea. It’s just a collosally challenging one. The alternative however is worse. In the absence of peacekeeping troops and police Gaza will see protection rackets, organized crime, and further radicalization. Hamas could revive. The only outcomes then will be autocratic, draconian, or both, not democratic. Neither Palestinians nor Israelis should welcome that. The difficult is better than the alternatives.

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What is needed to stop the fighting in Gaza

This was a fine event.

As Shibley Telhami underlines, the priority right now is to end the fighting in Gaza. But war is an enterprise with political objectives. So we need to consider what the parties involved want and what might bring the fighting to a negotiated end.

Hamas objectives

Hamas’s heinous mass murder and mayhem on October 7 likely had several objectives: to claim leadership of the Palestinian movement, to counter the Israeli occupation both in the West Bank and Gaza, to garner credit for a spectacular act of “resistance,” and to block impending Saudi normalization of relations with Israel. Israeli right-wing infringement on the Haram al Sharif (Temple Mount) in Jerusalem and settler violence against Palestinians on the West Bank provided an attractive opportunity. All Hamas’ main objectives were at least partially achieved on the day.

But the successes came with consequences. The Israelis have responded by destroying much of Gaza and displacing most of its population, with devastating humanitarian consequences. The IDF has killed, wounded, or captured many Hamas fighters. Saudi Arabia has not entirely forsaken normalization and none of the Arab world has done much more than talk smack about the Israelis. Only Iran and its partners (mainly Lebanese Hizbollah, Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq) have provided any military support. They would like to use this occasion to drive the US out of the Middle East, regardless of the harm to Palestinians.

Palestinian objectives

The war has predictably and understandably rallied Palestinians to their cause, more in the West Bank than in Gaza. On the use of violence, support for Hamas, and disdain for the Palestinian Authority (especially President Mahmoud Abbas) attitudes have hardened. No doubt the Hamas military leadership is celebrating that as success, but the Palestinians desperately need aid and relief. Small anti-Hamas demonstrations have started up and could grow. Ordinary folks unaffiliated with Hamas will want an end to the war sooner rather than later.

Armed groups are not monolithic. Some in Hamas will be starting to worry about survival. As the Israelis push south, they will kill, wound, and capture more militants as well as civilians. Hamas’ “resistance” ideology can survive that push and even prosper, if need be among organizational successors. But its current leadership and at least some of its cadres will be worrying about their own lives and fortunes. Once physical survival becomes unlikely, some will turn to negotiations. They will hope a pause or end to the war will do what continuing seems unlikely to do. Consolidating Hamas’ position as the leader of the Palestinians and the main negotiating interlocutor with Israel would spell success.

Israeli objectives

Israel’s announced objectives are to destroy Hamas so that nothing like October 7 can ever happen again and to free the hostages Hamas and other more militant groups in Gaza still hold. The war is still far delivering those outcomes.

Prime Minister Netanyahu knows that perfectly well. He welcomes it. A hardened Hamas and divided Palestinians help him to justify continuing the war and hold onto power. Israelis so far have not wanted to replace Netanyahu while the fighting continues. Palestinian division, the growth of West Bank sympathy with Hamas, and a hardened Hamas help him to claim that Israel has no viable negotiating partner.

But Israel is a pluralistic society, so not everyone shares Netanyahu’s objectives. The right-wing of his governing coalition (and perhaps Netanyahu tacitly) is using the war as thinly veiled cover for collective punishment, including by blocking humanitarian assistance, supporting the IDF in loosening its targeting, and encouraging the expulsion of Palestinians from both the West Bank and Gaza. While they complain that Palestinians talk about “from the river to the sea,” violent Jewish settlers in the West Bank are doing it.

Many in the much-diminished liberal Israeli opposition want to prioritize hostage release. Opponents of Netanyahu, they prefer negotiations sooner rather than later, as they recognize the risks to the hostages of delay. They presumably also understand that negotiations now will allow Hamas to survive. Many will think that inevitable even if the war continues.

American objectives

The US government, in particular President Biden, shares the Israeli objectives of destroying Hamas so that it can no longer attack Israel and ensuring release of the hostages. Most of the Congress supports those objectives, with some also supporting Netanyahu’s remaining in power and collective punishment of the Palestinians.

But President Biden also wants to be re-elected. The widening regional conflict threatens an unwanted war with Iran. The Gaza war is weakening his support among younger people countrywide and among Muslims, most consequentially among Arabs in the “swing” state of Michigan. It no longer suffices to claim, accurately, that the US is the biggest funder of humanitarian assistance for Gaza and that Washington is pressing the Israelis to let more in.

That has made at least a pause in the fighting a priority. It also makes renewed talk of a two-state solution important, because that is the one area in which the Americans can agree with the change in Palestinian attitudes. It in addition provides a welcome area of agreement with Arab and Muslim states, in particular Saudi Arabia:

The spoiler is Netanyahu, as he has made clear in his reaction to the Hamas proposals:

He is dead set against a Palestinian state and has said so. He has also rejected President Biden’s suggestion that the issue can be fudged. It is true, as Biden claimed, that there are many varieties of “states,” some with limited sovereignty, but Netanyahu won’t accept any of them.

The elephants aren’t leaving the room

This puts Biden in a tough spot. He needs Netanyahu and his right-wing sidekicks gone. Only then will it be possible to pursue some sort of more permanent ceasefire. A pause would be an important first step, but negotiations won’t end the fighting until its main protagonist has departed from power. Only Israelis can engineer that. None seem willing yet.

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Stevenson’s army, February 4

Houthi strikes and more NYT updates

– WSJ says US stays clear of Iran red lines

– WSJ interviews Israeli far-right leader

-NYT explains Xi’s nuclear approach

– FP says Trump would greatly change US foreign aid

-House GOP plans simple Israel aid bill

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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