Tag: Israel/Palestine
Proactive would be better
Tehran is justifying its barrage of more than 300 drones, cruise and ballistic missiles fired at Israel last weekend as “proportional” to the provocation. That provocation was an Israeli attack on an Iranian consular facility in Damascus that killed high-ranking officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Israel is justifying its 6-month attack on Gaza that has killed more than 30,000 Palestinians as proportional to its military objective. That is to destroy Hamas. Proportionality is obviously in the eye of the beholder
It shouldn’t be so
This is a serious limitation of the international regime. It sets up norms like proportionality but then leaves compliance to interested belligerents. Some Israelis will no doubt argue that proportionality requires a further response to the Iranian attack with more than 300 flying weapons. Assuming the Israelis are technically better and luckier in their targeting than the Iranians, an Israeli attack with even fewer could kill a lot of Iranians. Then the Iranians would want to kill just as many Israelis. The escalation ladder has no obvious limit.
The international system needs a better way of dealing with proportionality. It should not be left to belligerents to decide. Nor should a decision on proportionality come during court proceedings likely many years after the military action. We need norms, along with a way of convening a discussion of how to apply them to particular circumstances during a crisis.
It’s not only proportionality
Proportionality is today’s issue, but there are many others when it comes to military action and mass violence more generally. The UN has defined aggression, but like proportionality “aggression” may also be in the eye of the beholder. The Russian attack on Ukraine is aggression from President Zelensky’s perspective, but not from President Putin’s.
“Genocide” is likewise well-defined, but application of that definition to particular cases arouses a good deal of debate.
Ditto “responsibility to protect,” a UN General Assembly-endorsed doctrine. It requires states to protect their own civilian populations or risk international intervention that the Security Council authorizes.
The lawyerly approach to such issues is to rely on case law. Decisions in particular cases become precedents for future cases. But that process leaves a great deal of uncertainty and delay. What we need is a much more timely, even anticipatory process.
Proactive would be better
That is not impossible. The legal profession could provide mechanisms that provide guidelines and press belligerents to follow them even during a conflict. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is trying something of this sort with the Gaza conflict. It has responded with unusual speed to the South African complaint against Israel for violation of the genocide convention.
A less formal process might also work. The ICJ of necessity requires elaborate judicial proceedings. The Elders, a group of former world leaders already engaged on conflict issues, could become less reactive and more proactive. The UN’s International Law Commission could likewise take on this responsibility. The legal profession could also constitute an international nongovernmental group to advise on conflict issues before the shooting starts. Proactive would be better.
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Equality is for everyone
This week I joined dozens of colleagues in signing this letter to President Biden about Gaza. I suppose some would say it reflects the herd mentality of the Washington foreign policy establishment. I prefer to think it reflects a judicious appraisal of a bad situation likely to worsen if Israel continues its large-scale assault at Rafah.
That said, let me offer a speculation or two.
Elite Arab attitudes have changed
Arab sympathies are predominantly with the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. That has not and will not change. But it is all the more striking that consultations between the US and key Arab states have continued despite Israeli abuses in Gaza and the West Bank. It seems to me clear that Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, and others want to be seen as supporting the Palestinians but welcome the damage the Israelis are doing to Hamas. They may doubt the feasibility of completely destroying Hamas’ military capabilities. But there is no talk of an oil boycott or other escalation.
To the contrary, the Saudis have made it clear they want to pursue normalization with Israel once conditions permit. Discussion of that option is continuing even during the Gaza war. It is now half a dozen years since I met Israelis carrying lots of electronics in the Riyadh business class lounge. They were likely helping with internal security in the Kingdom. The Saudis also want a defense agreement and civilian nuclear cooperation with the US. That’s what “normalization” is really about.
Nor are the Arab states expressing any sympathy for wiping Israel off the map. That may still be a day dream in the Arab street, but only Iran, Hizbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis–the axis of resistance–are really backing “from the river to the sea.” I have no doubt but that some of them are serious. But it isn’t happening. Iran is in economic crisis and political ennui, Hizbollah is trying not to get into all-out war with Israel, and Hamas is hiding underground. Only the Houthis are flexing their capabilities, which are however limited for now in their reach and impact to shipping in the Red Sea.
The Israelis are doing from the river to the sea
The Israeli settlers on the West Bank, who object to Arabs saying “from the river to the sea,” are doing it. They are on a killing and displacement spree, taking advantage of the Netanyahu government’s tolerance for violence against Palestinians. The displacement so far is not massive. Things could get a lot worse. Certainly that is the settlers’ intention. They get ample support from more Orthodox Jewish communities in the US, but their really important political backing extends as well to some American Christian evangelicals.
The Biden Administration has begun to react. It has started to sanction Israeli settlers who perpetrate violence on the West Bank against Palestinians. But the Administration needs to do much more, focusing on the political leadership that condones such abuse as well as the American Jewish and Christian networks that support and finance it. Terrorism is terrorism. Blocking American financing for violent settlers should be a priority.
American Jewish attitudes are changing too
The settlers claim religious justification for their claims to what they call “Judea and Samaria.” But liberal American Jews couldn’t care less about that. And most American Jews are more liberal, if I can use that term to encompass nonpracticing as well as Reform, Reconstructionist, and Conservative Jews. They have generally supported the idea of a Jewish homeland. But one that is more secular than religious and treats its Arab citizens as equals and Arab neighbors with respect. You’ll find some of the people who signed the above letter in this category.
Let me speak though only for myself. I want to see an end to warfare between Jews and Arabs. That will only be possible with mutual respect for Palestinian and Jewish rights, whether in one state or two. I still think two is more feasible than one. But admittedly two become more difficult with the extension of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. That is one of many reasons they should be stopped and rolled back.
Also critical is treatment of Palestinian citizens of Israel, as many of what we used to call Israeli Arabs today prefer to be called. They constitute more than 20% of the country’s population. Equality for them is vital to Israel’s claim to be a democratic state and a free society. But you don’t have to look far to find ample evidence that the reality is far from the ideal. Separate but equal never worked in the US. It won’t work in Israel either. It is high time for Israeli practice to rise to the level of Jewish ideals. Human dignityt and therefore equality is for everyone.
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When Jews and Arabs agree and disagree
The horrors of the October 7 attack and the Gaza war are all too present. But it is notable that at least some Arabs and Jews are reacting in similar, if not identical ways. At least I find that true in the US and hope it is true more widely.
Atrocity is atrocity
Most of the Jews and Arabs I come into contact with find both the Hamas attack and the Israeli reaction atrocious. Both are prepared to acknowledge the context for the Hamas attack. It came in the midst of escalating Jewish settler violence against Palestinians on the West Bank and East Jerusalem as well as right-wing Jewish challenges to the status quo on the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount. But that in no way justified an indiscriminate attack on civilians inside Israel.
The same is true in the other direction. Most Arabs and Jews understand Israel had to respond. Nor do they think it wrong to seek justice for the Hamas perpetrators and release of the hostages taken to Gaza. But the indiscriminate and disproportionate assault on the civilian population there is still entirely unjustified and counterproductive. States today have obligations when they undertake military action that should not be ignored. Yes, it is true that the United States and its allies during World War II conducted indiscriminate and disproportionate bombing of Germany and Japan, including use of the atomic bomb. But international norms have changed. Even then, protection of civilians was required, not optional. Today it is de rigueur. Atrocity is atrocity.
What could Hamas and Israel have done?
Both Hamas and Israel should have focused their targeting on military targets. That would have meant for Hamas only attacking military bases, not the nearby music festival or kibbutzim, many of which are in fact sympathetic with the Palestinian desire for a state. For Israel it would have meant targeting individuals and groups clearly associated with Hamas and other armed factions in Gaza. That would have precluded the razing of more than 50% of the buildings in the Gaza Strip.
That both warring parties violated the rules of war will have long-term consequences. Israelis will have a lot harder time putting the October 7 attack behind them. Many are seeking revenge, not justice. Some Palestinians will likewise seek revenge. Gaza will be far more difficult to rebuild. Both will be rallying to the more extreme factions of their respective politics, making agreement harder than it might otherwise have been. If you kill people indiscriminately because of their identity, you can expect that identity to strengthen, not weaken.
What is to be done now?
The Americans and others have made no secret of their intensifying effort to reach agreement on a multi-week pause in the fighting to allow exchange of prisoners/hostages. That would certainly be a good thing. But if the exchange is less than complete, the fighting is likely to restart if the same people remain in power.
Prime Minister Netanyahu is determined to continue the war for as long as possible. He knows that a prolonged pause will open the possibility his government will fall and a less radical one take its place. Hamas may likewise fear a prolonged pause will bring its status into question as well. There have already been demonstrations in Gaza against Hamas. A pause will make the consequences of what it brought on starker.
It would make a big difference if Jews and Arabs inside Israel could get together to dump Netanyahu as well as Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas. He is almost as unpopular as Netanyahu. That would open the door to an Israeli government committed to getting the hostages released, Gaza rebuilt, and a common destiny mapped. It would also enable a reformed and more capable PA.
It is clear enough that neither Jews nor Arabs are going to leave Palestine/Israel to the others. The Jews complain when Palestinians talk about “from the river to the sea.” But Palestinians are correct to perceive that the settlers are trying to do it, not just talk about it. Neither will succeed in its maximal ambitions. They are going to have to share the land. There is no reason they can’t do that. It will require wisdom, not slogans.
Why won’t Biden change American policy?
Where Arabs and Jews in America disagree is on US policy. Arabs are sorely disappointed in the President Biden’s unconditional support for Israel and say they won’t vote for him again. Jews like me point out that he has shifted towards support for a fighting pause, exchange of hostages/prisoners, and support for a two-state solution, even though he hasn’t diminished his support for Israel’s right to defend itself or conditioned aid on Israeli behavior.
Much of the Administration and many Jews seem ready to go further, including Tony Blinken. The Secretary of State has said that the Jewish settlements on the West Bank are not consistent with international law. That is a big step in American politics, though the Administration has done nothing to reinforce the statement with actions.
Arab Americans are saying they won’t vote for Biden again. A significant number indicated their displeasure yesterday in the Michigan democratic primary by voting “uncommitted.” That was a smart move. It demonstrated political weight.
But it would be foolish for Arabs and Muslims in Michigan and elsewhere to carry through on the threat and not vote for Biden in November. His likely challenger, Donald Trump, would be far less likely to speak up for Palestinian rights than Biden is. Trump has always wanted increased Jewish support but never got it. Christian evangelicals, however, are vital to the Republican base today. Most of them don’t want to hear anything about the Palestinians. Trump has said little or nothing about Gaza so far. But when he does, Palestinians won’t want to hear it. Voting for Biden may be distasteful to Arab and Muslim Americans, but staying home or voting for Trump should be unthinkable.
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Gaza questions are easier than answers
The New York Times has already described how Netanyahu’s plan for postwar Gaza clashes with everyone else’s thinking. Netanyahu wants a full-fledged re-occupation of Gaza, complete with puppet Palestinian government there. He is already clearing a buffer zone inside the Gaza fence and wants to control the Egyptian/Gaza border as well. He imagines that UNRWA can be abolished. Israeli-selected local officials would manage an Israeli-imposed deradicalization process.
What is this really all about?
This is nothing but a formula to continue the Gaza conflict indefinitely. Netanyahu figures that as long as the war lasts he can delay his political downfall. So he is defying President Biden’s pitch for Palestinian Authority revitalization and takeover of Gaza, which would also be a difficult maneuver. Netanyahu has also repeatedly and forcefully ruled out a Palestinian state, which the US supports in principle. Israel and the US are not aligned, diplomats would say, except on Israel’s right of self-defense.
Inside Israel, Netanyahu’s policies are finding a good deal of support, even if he is still wildly unpopular. A lot of right-wing Israelis appear to be looking for revenge, not peace. While Gazans are suffering the horrors of indiscriminate and grossly disproportional attacks, Israel’s soldiers are celebrating the destruction of homes and mosques. Things will only get worse if the Israelis send ground forces into Rafah, where much of the Gaza population has taken refuge from attacks further north.
What is the alternative?
The diplomatic world is struggling to produce an alternative. That would apparently entail a longish pause in most of the fighting to permit a series of hostage exchanges. It is not a bad idea, but there are obvious limits. Hamas will not surrender all of the hostages, because once it does it fears Israel will restart the full-scaled assault on its cadres. But Israel won’t want to surrender all of its prisoners either, so perhaps there is a middle ground with some common interest. Hamas will be finding some of the hostages burdensome and Netanyahu is under political pressure to get some back.
If a pause and additional prisoner exchange does prove feasible, the Americans, Qataris, and Egyptians will want to use the occasion to try for a negotiated end to the war. That too is not a bad idea, but it is hard to see how they could get Netanyahu or Hamas to agree to it. It would either entail Israeli acceptance of a continued presence of Hamas in Gaza or Hamas agreeing to surrender. The former isn’t going to happen with Netanyahu and his rightwing allies in power. The latter isn’t going to happen without a more thorough military defeat than Hamas has suffered so far.
What if Netanyahu were no longer in power?
If Netanyahu and his coalition were to fall from power, other alternatives might emerge. A new Israeli government less committed to Jewish supremacy might conclude that the Netanyahu plan for postwar Gaza is nonsense. It might better understand that the war is creating chaotic conditions in Gaza that will be difficult to manage, never mind repair. Ever more radical groups could emerge and take over from Hamas. Or localized gangs and protection rackets could exploit the situation to establish drug and other smuggling operations.
Israel’s minimal goal in this war should include being at least as secure as it was before October 7. That will require local and international security forces, competent Palestinian governance, international humanitarian relief, Gulf economic assistance, and other inputs to stability that are already difficult to imagine. Continuing the war at this point is predictably counterproductive because it will make them more difficult, not easier.
But ending the war will require the Israelis to summon the political will and courage to get rid of Netanyahu sooner rather than later. That should now be President Biden’s top priority. Getting rid of the prime obstacle to peace is not optional. Continuing to cater to Netanyahu will only bring more grief to Israelis, Palestinians, and ultimately Biden himself.
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Stevenson’s army, February 14
– FT say 18 of 31 NATO members will hit 2% target this year
– Trump advisor explains his NATO plan
– WaPo tries to explain Sen.Graham’s policy shifts
– J Street endorses 2 state solution [DPS comment: J Street has long endorsed two states. The news here is openness to recogntion before a final settlement]
– WH has new critical technologies list
Happy Valentine’s Day!
—
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Difficult is better than the alternatives
All three of these fine commentators agree: stabilization requires a recognized Palestinian state and international forces in Gaza. The international forces are needed at a minimum to monitor the ceasefire, protect civilians, preside over unification of the West Bank and Gaza, and organize Palestinian elections or some other means of validating legitimate authority. Gershon Baskin wants an Arab-led force for only two years. Sultan Barakat wants the international presence for two or three years to be non-Arab and mentions South Africa, Belgium, and Finland. Any deployment of that sort is likely to last far longer.
But all three are vague about how this international presence would be constituted and organized. We have learned a good deal from the past almost 35 years of such interventions. How should we apply this experience in Gaza?
The international intervention
First things first: the mandate. A strong, detailed, and comprehensive mandate is vital. For Gaza, that likely means a UN Security Council mandate voted unanimously. That will be difficult. The US has consistently prevented any resolution that the Israelis object to. A resolution that assigns them responsibility for the destruction of Gaza, no matter how objective or restrained, will attract a US veto. Any resolution that doesn’t condemn what the Israelis have done and provide for their complete withdrawal will arouse Russian, Chinese, and other objections.
What we know beyond that is not scientifically validated but derived from the 20 or so international interventions over more than three decades, starting in 1990. Jim Dobbins summarized his conclusions about a hypothetical country of 5 million in this table:
Illustrative Costs of Nation-Building
| Sector | Personnel | Cost(millions of US$) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Local | Int’l | ||
| Light peacekeeping | |||
| Military | 8,000 | 360 | |
| 15,000 | 50 | ||
| Police | 1,000 | 170 | |
| 11,000 | 18 | ||
| Rule of law | 18 | ||
| Humanitarian | 170 | ||
| Governance | 260 | ||
| Economic stabilization | 30 | ||
| Democratization | 50 | ||
| Development and infrastructure | 390 | ||
| Total, light peacekeeping | 26,000 | 9,000 | 1,520 |
| Heavy peace enforcement (additional requirements) | |||
| Military | 57,000 | 12,640 | |
| Police | 7,000 | 1,080 | |
| Development and infrastructure | 360 | ||
| Total, heavy peace enforcement | 26,000 | 73,000 | 15,600 |
NOTE: Estimated annual costs in a hypothetical country of 5 million people with a per capita gross domestic product of $500. Total costs do not sum due to rounding.
Gaza will require “heavy” rather than “light” peace enforcement, not least because remnants of Hamas and other violent groups will necessarily try to harass the intervention. Before the war Gaza had a significantly higher GDP per capita than this illustrative example, which complicates and increases the burden of peacekeeping.
Assuming about 2.2 million people in Gaza, Dobbins’ guesstimates would mean about 30,000 troops and 4,000 police. The troops could be from non-Arabic speaking countries. The force would then be more than twice the size of the largest UN peacekeeping operation in 2023 and perhaps the largest UN peacekeeping ever. Raising and deploying such a large force will be a monumental task. An effective police force will need to be capable in Arabic, which means literate as well as Arabic-speaking. For comparison, there are about 10,000 Palestinian Authority police in the West Bank, which has a population of 3 million, or 50% more than in Gaza. So 8000 is not excessive.
Trying to handle Gaza with fewer forces and a lesser mandate would be incredibly perilous. A return to extremist rule or chaos would be the likely outcomes.
Political conditions
Arab countries will only contribute to an international intervention with troops or money if the settlement guarantees at the least an eventual recognized Palestinian state, includingg by Israel and the US. It is going to be difficult for both even to promise that as a future step. Right now, President Biden cannot do it because it would undermine his political position in the US, even if it might help him among Democrats. Obviously Prime Minister Netanyahu won’t do it either. Recognition can only happen after his removal from power.
Even then, it would require a revolution in Israeli attitudes. A opposition-led government in Israel would certainly impose conditions. Those would include Hamas and other extremists out, nonviolence pledged, demilitarization accomplished. The Palestinians and most Arab countries will also condititon their cooperation. They will want Israeli troops out of Gaza and the West Bank, settlements withdrawn from much if not all of the West Bank, East Jerusalem clearly inside the Palestinian state.
All these are reasonable conditions lots of us would endorse. But getting Palestinians and Israelis to agree to them will, again, be a monumental task.
Humanitarian and economic requirements
The financing requirement Jim Dobbins cites is less daunting. In today’s world, $7-8 billion per year is doable. It might be more like $10 billion per year given the extensive destruction in Gaza. But getting humanitarian aid to the right people and money spent responsibly will still be challenging. Israel will want to inspect everything shipped into Gaza and monitor its use. Ditto with the funds. Israel will not again risk resources being used to dig tunnels and build rockets rather than feed the needy. Arab Gulf countries will not want Israel to maintain its stranglehold on their resources.
UNRWA is also an important issue humanitarian and economic issue. Once the fighting ends, it will be damaged but hopefully still capable. If you want to rid Gaza of Hamas, UNRWA or something derived from it is indispensable. But the Israelis are trying to destroy it. If they succeed, the difficulties of delivering aid after the war will be redoubled.
Neighbors are the good news
Another rule of thumb from previous interventions is that neighbors matter. If they are hostile to the post-war effort, they can and likely will hinder it. For both Jordan and Egypt, the neighbors with the longest borders with Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank, success in Palestine would be welcome. They will try to be helpful so long as they believe Palestinian interests are well-served.
That will be less true of Lebanon and Syria, which have borders with Israel but not Palestine. Both Hizbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria have their own issues. Neither is in a position to do much to undermine a serious peace settlement between Israel and Palestine. Even Iran and the Houthis in Yemen, other components of the “axis of resistance,” will be unable to do much to undermine a settlement that legitimate Palestinian leaders endorse.
The challenges are great but the alternative is worse
An international intervention isn’t a bad idea. It’s just a collosally challenging one. The alternative however is worse. In the absence of peacekeeping troops and police Gaza will see protection rackets, organized crime, and further radicalization. Hamas could revive. The only outcomes then will be autocratic, draconian, or both, not democratic. Neither Palestinians nor Israelis should welcome that. The difficult is better than the alternatives.
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