Tag: Russia
Good news, finally, but unlikely to last
Bits of good news all around. The US House of Representatives, after months of allowing a small number of dissenting Republicans to block vital expanded aid to Ukraine (as well as infusions for Israel and Taiwan), has now approved it. Israel has retaliated against Iran for last weekend’s massive barrage of missiles and drones. It managed to do so without provoking any further escalation. And on a much lesser scale of geopolitics, the Council of Europe appears to be readying itself to admit Kosovo as a member.
Better late than never
All of this is good news, even if much delayed.
The Congress should never have allowed its Russophile right-wingers to put Ukraine’s existence at risk. It is appalling that someone could become Speaker who required months of cajoling to recognize the importance of getting more assistance to Kyiv. Last year’s Russian dominance in the war of attrition has done real damage, not only to Ukrainian morale.
We can hope that the US will now send Ukraine everything it needs. The aim should be not only to resist Russian advances but also to roll back Moscow’s recent gains and the threat they now poses to Kharkiv. Ukrainian F-16s should arrive this summer. A big Ukrainian push with the right weapons could force Russian retreats in Donbas, the south, and even Crimea.
Israel needs to do more
Israel has been rampaging in Gaza as if it had nothing to fear. The Iranian attack, though a failure, is hopefully a reminder to Jerusalem that self-restraint and diplomacy can be virtues, not weaknesses. The Israelis need now to resuscitate the talks with Hamas and reach an agreement, however unsatisfactory, for the release of at least the civilian hostages.
They also need to get rid of Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has repeatedly endangered Israeli security. His encouragement of US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, his financial and political support for Hamas, his opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state, and the deplorable intelligence and military failures of October 7 qualify him as the worst Israeli prime minister, not just the longest-serving.
Serbia’s spite is shameful
The Council of Europe has dawdled far too long in approving Kosovo for membership. It is far more qualified than its principal opponent, Serbia. And allowing Kosovo in will give Serbs who live there a new and potentially fruitful avenue to pursue complaints, through the European Court of Human Rights.
The spitefulness of Belgrade’s opposition, which directly contradicts an agreement the European Union claims Serbia adhered to in February, may be expected, but it is still deplorable. Kosovo is demonstrably better qualified for CoE membership than Serbia.
Can we hope for more?
Good news is particularly welcome when it is a harbinger of more. Some may hope that the voting in Congress augurs a less polarized political atmosphere in which moderate Democrats and Republicans can cooperate to neutralize the nutty MAGAites. But I see little hope of that. Speaker Johnson will now face an effort to remove him. If he wins, the MAGAites will be embittered and he will be more cautious in the future. If he loses, we could face a truly dire situation, as then he would have to be replaced with an even more convinced MAGAite.
In the Middle East, Netanyahu still seems firmly in power. Though his margin in the Knesset is narrow, his allies stand no chance of remaining in power if he falls. He himself could end up in prison on corruption charges. Netanyahu is not going to be easy to displace. Let’s hope the civilians in Rafah won’t pay the price of keeping him in the prime ministry.
In the Balkans, Belgrade may lose the battle to keep Pristina out of the Council of Europe. But that is a minor skirmish in Kosovo’s effort to gain full international recognition. There is no sign of progress on UN membership. EU membership is far off. NATO will have to be the next major battle. Fortunately that excludes Serbia from having a veto or even a vote. But Hungary and now Slovakia will more than likely be prepared to do Belgrade’s dirty work.
A long road ahead
Those of us looking for a Ukrainian military victory, a Palestinian state that will live in peace with Israel, and UN membership for Kosovo still have a long wait ahead. But every step in the right direction today is one that doesn’t have to be taken tomorrow.
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Proactive would be better
Tehran is justifying its barrage of more than 300 drones, cruise and ballistic missiles fired at Israel last weekend as “proportional” to the provocation. That provocation was an Israeli attack on an Iranian consular facility in Damascus that killed high-ranking officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Israel is justifying its 6-month attack on Gaza that has killed more than 30,000 Palestinians as proportional to its military objective. That is to destroy Hamas. Proportionality is obviously in the eye of the beholder
It shouldn’t be so
This is a serious limitation of the international regime. It sets up norms like proportionality but then leaves compliance to interested belligerents. Some Israelis will no doubt argue that proportionality requires a further response to the Iranian attack with more than 300 flying weapons. Assuming the Israelis are technically better and luckier in their targeting than the Iranians, an Israeli attack with even fewer could kill a lot of Iranians. Then the Iranians would want to kill just as many Israelis. The escalation ladder has no obvious limit.
The international system needs a better way of dealing with proportionality. It should not be left to belligerents to decide. Nor should a decision on proportionality come during court proceedings likely many years after the military action. We need norms, along with a way of convening a discussion of how to apply them to particular circumstances during a crisis.
It’s not only proportionality
Proportionality is today’s issue, but there are many others when it comes to military action and mass violence more generally. The UN has defined aggression, but like proportionality “aggression” may also be in the eye of the beholder. The Russian attack on Ukraine is aggression from President Zelensky’s perspective, but not from President Putin’s.
“Genocide” is likewise well-defined, but application of that definition to particular cases arouses a good deal of debate.
Ditto “responsibility to protect,” a UN General Assembly-endorsed doctrine. It requires states to protect their own civilian populations or risk international intervention that the Security Council authorizes.
The lawyerly approach to such issues is to rely on case law. Decisions in particular cases become precedents for future cases. But that process leaves a great deal of uncertainty and delay. What we need is a much more timely, even anticipatory process.
Proactive would be better
That is not impossible. The legal profession could provide mechanisms that provide guidelines and press belligerents to follow them even during a conflict. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is trying something of this sort with the Gaza conflict. It has responded with unusual speed to the South African complaint against Israel for violation of the genocide convention.
A less formal process might also work. The ICJ of necessity requires elaborate judicial proceedings. The Elders, a group of former world leaders already engaged on conflict issues, could become less reactive and more proactive. The UN’s International Law Commission could likewise take on this responsibility. The legal profession could also constitute an international nongovernmental group to advise on conflict issues before the shooting starts. Proactive would be better.
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The wider war has arrived, when will peace?
Iran yesterday retaliated against Israel for its bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, which killed high ranking officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The barrage of hundreds of drones and missiles was ineffective, due to Israeli, American, British, and Jordanian air defenses. The Iranians made no secret of what they intended to do and presumably are hoping it will not trigger another round.
Multiple vectors
But it is still reasonable to conclude that the wider Middle East war many have feared has already begun. Israel continues its attack on Gaza. Lebanese Hizbollah and Israel are exchanging shots across the border. Israel is frequently targeting Iranian assets in Syria. Yemen’s Houthis are targeting shipping and warships in the Red Sea. Iraq’s Iranian-sponsored “Popular Mobilization Forces” have been targeting American military bases. Israeli settlers have been chasing Palestinians from their homes on the West Bank.
Of course the pace and lethality of this wider war could heighten. So far, its most deadly axis by far has been Israel/Hamas. Hamas has killed about 1500 Israelis and the Israelis have killed tens of thousands of Palestinians, in retaliation for the mass murder, kidnapping, and mayhem of October 7. Elsewhere the wider war is more than symbolic, but still far less fatal.
Worsening prospects
Once such things start, the natural tendency is towards escalation. Certainly things have gotten worse in the past six months. They are likely to get worse still. The murder of an Israeli teenager on the West Bank last week sparked heightened settler violence against Palestinians there. Hizbollah could do a lot more damage if it unleashes its missiles. So could the Israelis if they decide to push into southern Lebanon. Iran still has lots of drones and missiles it could use in a second attack.
The next round will be Israel’s choice. It could choose to write off yesterday’s attack as ineffective and unworthy of response. Or it could decide to reassert deterrence with a direct attack on Iran or on Iranian assets in the region. I suspect the decision will be based primarily on Prime Minister Netanyahu’s domestic political calculations. He faces growing demands for his resignation. Any pause in the fighting could provide the time to bring him down. He is still hoping for enough of a victory in Gaza, Lebanon, or Iran to enable him to remain in power.
That seems unlikely in Gaza. Israel has done significant harm to Hamas there but is still far from the total defeat Netanyahu has set as its war goal. Israel has been hitting Hizbollah in Lebanon without much reaction. That could be a likelier prospect. He may think a devastating blow against Iran would enable him to avoid the inevitable for a while longer. Why anyone in his war cabinet would go along with that is unclear to me, but so far they have generally supported his wartime decisions.
Can diplomacy work?
The still wider and more deadly war in prospect is not in the US interest. Nor do the Europeans want it. Karim Sadjadpour on MSNBC last night pointed out that the Chinese would likewise prefer stability in the Middle East to lower and steady oil prices. The Russians by contrast benefit from de-stabilization and the consequent distraction from the Ukraine war as well as the bump up in oil prices. But even acting together it is unclear that the Americans, Europeans, and Chinese could exert sufficient influence on Israel or Iran to de-escalate.
Both countries have leaders whose political mandates won’t last much longer. Iran’s Supreme Leader is almost 85 years old and ill. Netanyahu is suffering a catastrophic decline in popularity as well as serious corruption charges. Both are claiming not to want to escalate. But neither sees an enticing option other than escalation. Both want victory over the other as a political legacy. The wider war has arrived, but until there is decisively new leadership in both Tehran and Jerusalem peace is unlikely.
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Double down on success, not failure
The US Ambassador in Belgrade has vaunted cooperation with the Serbian Army even as the President of Serbia makes clear his intention to invade Kosovo at a time of his choosing. How can both be true?
No big puzzle
It’s really not hard to figure this out. Serbia cooperates with US and NATO exercises for two reasons. First, they provide good training, which the Russians are unable to equal. The performance of the Russian Army in Ukraine has improved, but its losses are simply colossal. No one would want to emulate them. Second, NATO exercises provide excellent opportunities to gather intelligence. That will serve well in any Serbian military action against NATO-led forces in Kosovo. Belgrade no doubt also feeds that intelligence back to Moscow.
Only marginally harder to understand is the reference to the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) as the KLA (or Kosovo Liberation Army). The KLA was demobilized after the 1999 war. The KSF that exists today is the creation of US and British training and equipping several generations of organization and personnel removed from the KLA. The US Ambassador in Belgrade knows that perfectly well. His reference to the KLA is intended to signal that he agrees with the Serbian government that the KSF is illegitimate.
Toadying hasn’t worked
This toadying to Vucic has become the default behavior in Belgrade. The question is why it is tolerated in Washington. I suppose there are reasons. But they are unlikely to be good ones. No amount of lickspittle will change Belgrade’s decision to align with Russia. Vucic has made clear that he intends to try to take back a piece of Kosovo whenever he gets an opportunity. Any agreement in Ukraine to surrender territory to Russia will provide that opportunity.
Washington needs to reconsider its long effort to court Vucic. That effort has failed. It has also encouraged his irredentist ambitions, not only in Kosovo but also in Montenegro and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The “Serbian world” he aims for is strictly analogous to the “Russian world” President Putin is trying to create in Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, and most ambitiously Ukraine. The West should be countering Russian and Serbian ethnoterritorial ambitions, not encouraging them. Instead, Washington is doubling down on a policy that has failed to produce anything more than minor results.
A better policy would not be hard to find
A re-evaluation is long overdue. The current Trumpian affection for ethnonationalism and irredentism is inconsistent with the liberal democratic pretensions of the Biden Administration. Tony Blinken, bless is hard-traveling body and no doubt preoccupied mind, needs to say to State Department Assistant Secretary Jim O’Brien: we have failed to get Vucic on side. Let’s try tough love.
That would mean reading him the riot act on many things. First would be prioritizing justice, preferably in Kosovo, for the organizers and perpetrators of the September 24 terrorist incident that Belgrade sponsored inside Kosovo. Second would be ensuring that Pristina gets the support it requires not only for membership in the Council of Europe and relief from outdated and counterproductive EU “consequences” but also for opening of negotiations on NATO membership. Third would be readiness to denounce any cheating in preparation for the upcoming rerun of Belgrade elections.
I could go on, but you get the point. US policy needs to return to favoring its friends in the Balkans and countering its enemies. That should not be too hard to do. Double down on success, not failure.
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C+ is not a good grade
C+ is what I would give as a grade for implementation of the year-old “Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia.” Koha asked for an interview on this subject but then did not call at the appointed time. So I wrote this piece instead. It’s a B or B+ for Pristina and a C for Belgrade.
Let’s break it down article by article:
Good neighborly relations:
Certainly not in general, but there has been some limited progress on mutual recognition of their respective documents and national symbols, including passports, diplomas, license plates, and customs stamps. Pristina was never the problem. Belgrade has moved on this. B or B+ I guess.
Respect for the UN Charter:
Serbia fails (that’s an F) miserably on respect for “the sovereign equality of all States, respect for their independence, autonomy and territorial integrity.” Kosovo gets a B+, marked down due to continued shortcomings in protection of human rights and non-discrimination. Things are improving in those departments, but problems remain.
Peaceful settlement of disputes:
Serbia fails (F) on settlement of disputes exclusively by peaceful means and refraining from the threat or use of force. Belgrade sponsored the September 24 attempted uprising intended to create a pretext for the use of force, which it threatened by mobilizing its forces on Kosovo’s borders. Belgrade had also already kidnapped two Kosovo police from Kosovo territory and organized a mob that attacked NATO-led peacekeepers. Kosovo has no real option for use of force, but nevertheless gets an A for the police handling of the September 24 incident.
International representation:
Serbia (D) continues to oppose Kosovo’s membership in international organizations. Kosovo (A) has not to my knowledge objected to Serbia’s membership in them.
EU path:
Serbia (D) is no longer in transition to democracy and does not align with EU foreign policy, especially but not only on Ukraine and Russia. Kosovo (B+) is moving in the right direction on democracy and does respect EU foreign policy.
Dialogue process:
Neither Belgrade nor Pristina is much engaged, the former because it objects to the basic premises and the latter because it has gotten little benefit. C+ for both.
Treatment of the Serbian community in Kosovo:
Kosovo has conceded little on “self-management” but is resolving one important issue concerning Serbian Orthodox Church property at Decan/i. Pristina has muddied the waters on financial support from Belgrade by insisting on use of the euro but there is really no bar to direct communication for the Serbian community with the Kosovo government. B for Pristina, but no better than a C+ for Belgrade, which insists on violating Kosovo law in transferring finances opaquely and in dinars.
EU and others’ support package:
I really don’t know. Has it been created? Is anything happening on this front?
Joint Committee on implementation:
Is this just the Dialogue writ small, or has such a thing been created?
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Stevenson’s army, February 18
– WaPo book review tells how anti-tax movement captured GOP
– WaPo columnist sees value in Washington books
– CRS has new background paper on the budget process
– Brookings has a debate about Ukraine policy
– I like DARPA and wish DOD would do more OTA. Here’s background on the approach.
– Pakistani official admits election rigging
– Fred Kaplan skewers Tucker Carlson
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My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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