Blithering
This is a president of the United States in near total self-delusion. Ninety percent of what he says and implies in this rambling peroration is untrue. The simple facts are these: most undocumented immigrants and drugs in the US come through regular border crossings, few come through areas where this is no fencing, crime rates by undocumented immigrants are lower than by native-born Americans, and the overall numbers of undocumented immigrants have fallen dramatically for decades. There is no immigration crisis and no need for more than modest extensions and modernization of existing border barriers.
Trump belatedly realized that closing down of a large part of the US government in order to get border wall funding was a big political mistake. Republican Senators had started to defect on keeping the government closed, and Senate Majority Leader McConnell was warning Trump that he could no longer hold the line. Trump’s approval rating, already unusually low, had fallen further. The strong economy he inherited from Barack Obama is starting to tremble. Special Counsel Mueller has indicted one of Trump’s closest pals for crimes incident to long-denied cooperation with Wikileaks on release of Russian-hacked documents purloined from Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign.
Things are going to get a lot worse.
The re-opening of the government is only for a few weeks. But Trump won’t be able to shut it down again. Instead he is threatening to declare a national emergency that would give him authority to spend money on his border wall. That move would trigger lawsuits that will prevent any border wall construction for years to come.
The Special Counsel has now unveiled a web of cooperation between Trump’s campaign, his friends, Wikileaks, and Russia that suggests the worst: a candidate for President not only willing to accept illegal foreign assistance, but to do so in the form of stolen emails. For details, see law professor Jennifer Taub’s Tweetsummary:
Thread We Have Seen the Mueller Report –– And It’s Spectacular 1/
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The foreign policy process is broken
The Center for Strategic and International studies ( CSIS) held a discussion January 23 focused on effects of the US withdrawal from Syria and Afghanistan there, in the region and on US national security. The panel included Jon B. Alterman, Senior Vice President and Director of the Middle East Program, Melissa Dalton, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the International Security Program and Director of the Cooperative Defense Project, Seth G. Jones, Harold Brown Chair and Director of Transnational Threats Project and the Senior Adviser to the International Security Program, and Nancy Youssef, National Security Correspondent for The Wall Street Journal.
Alterman claims that what is troublesome about the US moving out of Syria is reduced control over what it leaves behind, compromising its leverage in the negotiations about the future of Syria. Trump could have negotiated terms of US withdrawal to get concessions from Syria, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Kurds. The immediate and unconditional exit makes the parties do their own deals, with US interests ignored. President Trump has wanted to withdraw but people surrounding him did not. National Security Adviser John Bolton announced last September that the US is staying in Syria as long as Iran troops are there. Alterman added that this shows the broken system: the president does not consider the various options presented to him, and the government does not follow his directions. The President is issuing tweets or making statements that generate reactions because policy is not agreed.
Syria remains crucial for the US, according to Dalton. She claimed that what happens in Syria has wide implications elsewhere. The terrorism threat is still looming, along with the refugee and humanitarian crisis. It is thus hard to forecast the negative effects of this conflict on the region and Europe. US competitors like Russia and Iran can easily fill the gap left behind, increasing their sphere of influence in the region. Worse, the long-standing principle prohibiting the use of chemical weapons against civilians and facilities is eroding. Dalton asserts that the recent public opinion polling by Pew shows that half of Americans do not believe the US has achieved its objectives in Afghanistan. The majority also suggests US should be pulling out of Syria.
Jones noted that in a recent C-Span appearance he found it striking that all people who called in– Democrats, Republicans and Independents–were supportive of the withdrawal. They were wondering why the money spent in Syria and Afghanistan is not being used at home. Americans seem in favor of withdrawal. Trump’s doctrine for foreign policy looks like restraint: minimizing the use of military force in some areas which he sees not as a strategic interest, such as the Middle East and Asia.
Yet the US is not talking about bringing the 2000 troops back home. Youssef said they are thinking of placing them in Iraq, Kuwait, and other neighboring countries. The risk in this is that when the US is not present, and instead relying on Kurds who feel abandoned, the ability to understand the situation and shape events shrinks. Russia and Iran have long-standing influence in Syria. Neither the US presence nor withdrawal will affect them much. The US is not the dominant force Syria, as the Israeli strikes against Iran and its proxies there suggest. Youssef too noted a major change in how the US makes decisions. In the past, the US deliberated all possible options and the costs associated with them, and then announce its policies. Now it’s the opposite. The policy is announced first, and deliberation comes later.
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Buffer zone in northern Syria
The Foundation of Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) hosted a discussion on January 18, about the US withdrawal from Syria, with Mark Kimmitt, retired General and defense consultant. He was joined by Hassan Hassan, Senior Fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy and Andrew Tabler, Martin J. Gross Fellow in the Geduld Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. They addressed the US withdrawal from Syria, and its implications for the region, mainly Turkey, Syria and the Kurds.
Pointing out the reasons for the US withdrawal from Syria, Kimmitt believes ISIS is no longer an existential threat to the US. It has not been completely defeated, but it has been degraded. The caliphate is gone. The mission has been accomplished. He claims that asking the US to stay in Syria to finish off ISIS would entail a US presence in the twenty-three other countries where ISIS operates.
YPG, Kimmitt asserts, are brave and allies of the US. But working alongside them to fight ISIS was, quoting US envoy James Jeffrey, “temporary, transactional and tactical.” Having given no expectations or promises to the YPG when the mission is over, the US is off the hook. Turkey’s concerns about the Kurds pose a serious challenge. Kimmitt suggests a safe zone in Syria, like the one set up as part of the Dayton Peace Accords between the Serb and Federation forces. The YPG can be protected while also honoring Turkish national security concerns.
Hassan is still concerned with ISIS. Besides sleeper cells and ISIS members who got tired of fighting, sympathizers with the group are everywhere in the region. They can return to violence at anytime. He considers the hasty US withdrawal from Syria at odds with the slow defeat of ISIS. But ISIS is not the only problem. Peace in Syria is still fragile and can crumble at any time. If the fight gets renewed, ISIS and Al-Nusra will benefit the most, as moderate groups have been completely decimated.
These facts get ignored because the U.S withdrawal from Syria has been hijacked by two arguments. One calls into question the role 2000 US troops can play against Iran. The other questions what they can possibly do to confront ISIS. Hassan considers these flawed arguments, as the mission was never to fight Iran and US troops were not the spearhead of the fight against ISIS. It is possible for the US to pull the troops from Syria while fighting ISIS, and decide with other countries the fate of the one-third of Syrian territory they have controlled.
Acknowledging the complex nature of the conflict in Syria, Andrew offered an overall perspective to understand its intricacies. Assad, with the help of Russia and Shiite militias was able to take over 60% of the territory. Syrian opposition backed by Turkey played a major role in freeing some areas, including Idlib. In the eastern part of Syria, the US partnered with YPG to defeat ISIS.
The outcome was unacceptable to two neighboring countries: Israel and Turkey. Israel is concerned with Shiite militia and Iran-backed units moving heavy weapons into the country. For Turkey, the PKK is an existential threat. US backing for Kurds allied with the PKK, which fights the Turkish government made Ankara feel a huge threat.
The moderator of the discussion, Kadir Ustun, Executive Director at SETA Foundation, spelled out the Turkish position . He claims that Turkey has put a lot of pressure on the US to stop cooperating and empowering what he labeled “terrorist YPG,” who are linked to PKK. Their primary objective is to enlarge themselves and get international legitimacy, not fighting ISIS. Turkey’s operations west of the Euphrates and Manbij were undertaken to limit the movement of the YPG.
Bottom line: US withdrawal is a subject of intense debate among the Americans, Turkey, the PYD and other stakeholders wactive inside Syria. A buffer zone between the warring parties is an option.
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Riyadh impressions
I spent four days in Saudi Arabia last week, which is wholly insufficient to do anything but scratch the surface. But I’m not without those superficial impressions. The SAIS study trip was focused on the GCC conflict, but I won’t comment in detail on that today. Caveat emptor: I am not agreeing with the Saudi perspectives, only trying to render them faithfully.
Here are my more general impressions:
- Saudis in government and government-influenced institutions (which are the only ones I visited) sincerely support the domestic reforms the Crown Prince has undertaken and believe they will lead to profound and badly needed changes in opening up and modernizing the society.
- The Saudi elite is not prepared to question the Crown Prince on anything, including his foreign policy moves like the rift with Qatar and the war in Yemen. They emphasize forcefully the justice of the grievances against Qatar and humanitarian assistance provided to Yemen. They of course see Iran as a serious threat throughout the region.
- While appreciating the ample support of the Trump Administration and good citizen-to-citizen feelings (due mainly to the many Saudis who study in the US), Saudis have doubts about the Administration’s reliability that were not much alleviated by Secretary of State Pompeo’s visit last week. Many people in Riyadh view American withdrawal from the region as highly likely if not inevitable.
The inclination in Riyadh to accept top/down decisions on reform is palpable and often attributed to tribal attitudes: consultation and discussion are welcomed, but in the end it is the sheikh’s responsibility to decide and everyone else’s to obey. Constraints on executive power by an independent judiciary or other regulatory bodies, separation of powers, or a press free of government pressure are ideas that have little resonance.
Saudi Arabia’s justice system is viewed as fair, though many are aware that it is subject to scathing international criticism. The Saudi teenager who escaped to Thailand and has found refuge in Canada is viewed as someone who failed to take advantage of existing human rights mechanisms in the Kingdom. The murder of Jamal Khashoggi is viewed as a matter for the courts, which will decide whether the accused are guilty in open hearings with adequate defense attorneys. The women activists who protested the driving ban stand accused, it is said, of other crimes having to do with passing information to foreign governments or accepting foreign assistance (no one seems clear about which). Protection for foreign workers, all hired under contracts approved by their own governments, has been enhanced.
There are discontents. The conservative religious establishment comes in for frequent criticism (again, by people associated with the government). The Muslim Brotherhood looms menacingly. Fear of youth radicalization is palpable. Anxiety about terrorism and disorder, both in the Kingdom and in the region, is high. Sectarianism is bad. The government is sponsoring active efforts to counter extremism and promote dialogue among Saudis of different stripes.
There are good things as well. Pluralism, even if more apparent in ancient ruins we visited in Al Ula than in Riyadh, is good. Islam and Sharia law are good, when properly understood. The solidarity of the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt in the Gulf conflict is good, as is the Gulf Cooperation Council, especially its military cooperation (which still includes Qatar, Saudis claim). Moderation, often defined as allowing everyone to modernize at their own pace, is good. Israel might be okay, but only if it does right by the Palestinians and accepts the Arab Peace Plan.
But above all, stability is good and worth sacrificing for. The nearby examples of Syria and Yemen are glaring. Even the one success of the Arab spring, Tunisia, is tottering. It is critical to counter the big de-stabilizing factor–Iran–and to avoid any new sources of Middle East strife. That Crown Prince is the key to stability as well as reform in the Kingdom and merits, the Saudis I talked with think, the wholehearted support he is getting, the internationals be damned.
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Take the money, ask no questions
The Wilson Center held a discussion this week on “Democratic and International Impacts of Kleptocracy,” with Edward Melon, Kennan Institute Fellow, along with Casey Michel, reporter at Think Progress, and Jodi Vittori, a Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The panelists touched on kleptocracy in Asia, mainly in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and its implications for democracy. They also addressed the implications of financial secrecy as practiced in some states.
Edward Melon diagnosed the political situation in Tajikistan as extremely corrupt, with one leader, Emomali Rahamon, holding a grip on the country for decades. Since coming to power, Rahamon has built an authoritarian regime grounded on nepotism and favoritism. His family controls politics and business all over the country. His eldest son is the current mayor of the capital city. His daughter is the chief of the staff. His sons-in-law and other family members monopolize the biggest companies and projects that render the most lucrative benefits. The also embezzle money embezzlement and export capital. Tajikistan is one of the most kleptocratic countries in Asia, with a highly unequal distribution of wealth.
The state apparatus silences voices of opposition and even, as Melon puts it, engages in “transnational oppression” by targeting its opponents outside the country. This strengthened authoritarianism could revive the civil war that tore the country apart from 1992 to 1997.
Michel focused on the US. It is increasingly a hub of explicit financial secrecy internationally. The small state of Delaware has been in the forefront of implementing financial secrecy rules. Friendly laws and a unique model of “take the money, ask no questions” has captivated myriad corporations. Big companies, embezzlers, traffickers and shady corporations moved there to cloak their money in secrecy. Michel claims, “Delaware now has more corporations than people.”
But Delaware is not the only state exploiting secrecy. Nevada and Wyoming have joined it. According to Michel, in 1991 Nevada loosened its laws to model itself as Delaware of the west. By 2001, it further increased financial secrecy to attract more corporations. The same thing goes for Wyoming; it has adopted similar policies to accommodate corporations. Shell companies find such states a safe haven for their money.
Michel argues the US is ranked as the second contributor to financial secrecy in the world after Switzerland. Delaware, Nevada and Wyoming are at the bottom of the barrel in terms of financial stanadards.
Vittori offered an overview of kleptocracy in Afghanistan. Corruption there has become endemic in almost all segments of the Afghan state. High level officials are involved in payoffs, embezzlement, and drug trafficking, fueling insurgent groups instead of combating them. The insurgents are readily recruiting, as they can provide protection and money. Vittori sees the kleptocratic environment in Afghanistan as becoming normalized, rendering the status quo more beneficial for some than reform would be.
Security sectors in a majority of Third World countries are maintained by loyal people, mostly family members or trusted individuals. Their role has more to do with defending the regime than the borders or citizens. Vittori says around 50% of the budget in sub-Saharan Africa goes to security sector. Transparency and accountability are rarely raised. Patronage and nepotism cover things up.
Bottom line: kleptocracy is inherent in weak states. It undermines democracy and the rule of law. It feeds grievances, terrorism, and criminal groups. But some democratic countries do not care about kleptocracy in other countries, as long as the money flows to them.
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The innocent don’t react this way
I’m glad the FBI opened a counter-intelligence investigation of President Trump. He had appealed publicly for Russian hacking of American emails and met with Russian diplomats without a notetaker, reportedly spilling the beans on an ally’s secrets. If any other government official had done those things, the FBI would open an investigation in a heartbeat.
Of course there are risks in doing so when the subject is the President. He is the commander in chief and is normally allowed great latitude in what he says and does. I doubt there were many counter-intelligence investigations opened on Trump’s predecessors. But that is because they were cautious in using their latitude. Trump is unable to exert the same kind of self-discipline. He says what he wants.
That is dangerous, not least because what he wants is always something he views as redounding to his personal benefit. So if he spilled the beans to the Russian ambassador, there was surely a self-aggrandizing reason. It might have just been show-boating. But it might also have been an expectation of something in return: financing for real estate, for example, or preventing the Russians from pulling the plug on his condos and golf clubs.
We’ll have to wait for Special Counsel Mueller’s report to find out, because he took over the counter-intelligence investigation. What we know now is that Trump’s assaults on the FBI were not unmotivated. He has been trying to back them off. My guess is the impact has been the opposite. FBI agents likely redoubled their efforts to unveil the full extent of the President’s relationship with Russia as a result of the Comey firing, the McCabe early retirement, and the tweet attacks. That’s their job: to discover whether Trump has been compromised, and if so how.
One thing however is already clear: Trump is not behaving like an innocent man. Most people subject to an counter-intelligence investigation they thought ill-founded would cooperate to the fullest, providing whatever evidence they could and resisting the temptation to blast the agents carrying out their duty. Sure you might get aggravated, but you would also want to make sure the investigators were not aggravated. Trump, to the contrary, has done everything he can to ensure their job is as hard as possible. Do the innocent do that?
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