Cause to celebrate
Why should you be pleased that NATO has invited Macedonia to join the Alliance? It’s a small country (2 million people) tucked away and landlocked on the Balkan peninsula without even much of a highway running through it. One quarter of its population is Albanian and 10% are all sorts of other things: Serbs, Croats, Vlachs and who knows what. It only declared independence in 1991 and has spent most of its existence squabbling with Greece, which claims Macedonia’s name exclusively for one of its provinces.
First and foremost, the NATO invitation will, one hopes, give both Macedonia and Greece the courage to end the squabbling. Skopje and Athens have negotiated an elaborate agreement that changes the official name (for all uses) to Republic of Northern Macedonia and resolves a host of contentious details concerning the country’s language, cultural history, textbooks, minorities, irredentist claims, economic cooperation….All that is needed is final approval in the two countries’ parliaments and in a referendum in Macedonia. That is a high water mark in a 25-year effort to resolve the issue.
Second, the invitation sends a strong signal in two directions:
- to the other countries in the Balkans who are not yet members of either NATO or the EU.
- to the Russians, who have been determined to slow if not block NATO expansion.
The signal to the rest of the Balkans is just this: if you have the political courage to take on and resolve tough issues, the trans-Atlantic institutions will hold their doors open to you. First NATO, then the EU. Solve your inter-ethnic issues and problems with your neighbors, reform your economies and political systems to reduce corruption and prevent state capture, and you will get a place at the table in the two most important alliances ever created.
To the Russians, the signal is just as clear: you may try to block NATO expansion and try to drive a wedge between Europe and the US, but you will not succeed. Even the relatively weak states in the Balkans will stand up to you. Macedonia has already expelled some of your intelligence agents trying to sow dissension from the “name” agreement. Montenegro last year, Macedonia this year. Maybe Kosovo the year after. Then only Serbia and Republika Srpska will stand between the Alliance and a Balkans whole and free. You can try to shore up your proxies, but they stand to gain more joining the West than continuing to bet on Vladimir Putin.
Third, NATO membership will add Macedonia’s small army and military capabilities to an Alliance that needs them. The Macedonians have already served years embedded in the Vermont National Guard in Afghanistan, where their commanding general thought they performed as well as US troops in combat. Who knows where they will be needed next, whether by NATO or the EU military structure? They are still short of the 2% of GDP goal NATO set for 2024, but their invitation gives Macedonia every incentive to reach it, sooner rather than later.
Of course in the scheme of things, “Northern Macedonia” in NATO is a small victory. It isn’t nearly as earthshaking as an American president who can’t find anything good to say about the Alliance while praising the Russian president who attacked the American electoral system. But it’s a good thing and something to celebrate.
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Who can fix Bosnia?
Delvin Kovač of Bosnian website Vijesti.ba asked questions; I replied:
- Should the international community increase its presence in Bosnia, since Bosnian politicians can’t come to an agreement on any important issues regarding Bosnia’s future?
A: No. It may need to adjust its presence, for example by moving all the EU military forces to Brcko to forestall any attempt to seize it by one entity of the other, but Bosnia’s politicians need to learn to deal with their own problems.
- Will Bosnia be sliding into a constitutional crisis after the autumn elections this year, as some politicians already announced such scenario due to unresolved electoral law issue?
A: No. As I’ve explained, there are adequate provisions in the existing Federation constitution to deal with any issues that may arise.
- Bosnian Croat lawmakers refused to attend a session of the lower house of the Federal Parliament because the body recently adopted an election-related law without them. Is boycotting a Parliament maybe a part of a Croat Democratic Party Leader Dragan Covic’s so called “Plan B”?
A: You’ll have to ask him. For me, boycotting is a way of eliminating yourself from the political equation, not getting what you want. If you want to protect your rights, show up.
- A coalition of parties representing Bosnian Serbs in the Government said that it would not allow Bosnia to enter NATO while neighbouring Serbia is not part of the international alliance. Should Bosnia really depend on neighbouring countries Serbia’s and Croatia’s decisions when it comes to foreign policy issues?
A: No. But it is up to Bosnia’s voters to punish at the polls politicians who want to follow foreign leaders rather than their own.
- Milorad Dodik is no longer the only ally of Russian Federation in Bosnia, since it is expanding an influence in Bosnia and Croatia through the Croat Democratic Party Leader Dragan Covic and the group of lawmakers in the Croatian Parliament. Russian Federation is obviously penetrating NATO countries territory increasingly. Is that to be considered dangerous?
A: Yes, but again it is up to voters to punish at the polls those leaders who kowtow to the Russians.
- Dragan Covic said that local parties cannot agree on the solution for the local election in Mostar and that the local election will almost definitely not be held in this city, which faces an indefinite wait for a new municipal council. What do you think is a adequate solution for this problem?
A: I think an adquate solution for this problem is one Bosnians can agree on. I don’t think you should expect foreigners to be very interested any longer in your municipal elections. I spent a lot of time on Mostar at the Dayton peace talks. It is time for you to invest the political energy needed to overcome the problems there.
- What can Bosnian citizens expect if Milorad Dodik and Dragan Covic become the Serb and the Croat member of the Bosnian tripartite Presidency. They both openly call for the destruction of Bosnia and the creation of a para-state – third entity? Who can confront such dangerous politics of the two?
A: Bosnia’s citizens, principally. But the West can be relied upon not to recognize any state that attempts to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nor will Croatia or Serbia want that.
PS: Here it is in Bosnian.
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Tighten your seatbelts
We are in that car crash moment: we can see the collision coming but can’t stop the vehicle or predict precisely the outcome. Only this time there is more than one crash coming:
- President Trump’s nomination of a Federalist Society-certified conservative to the Supreme Court pretty much guarantees that abortion will be a key issue in November’s Congressional election. To whose advantage that will be is not clear. But whether Judge Kavanaugh is approved before the poll, or especially if confirmation is delayed until afterwards, his apparent inclination to overturn Roe v. Wade will push women towards the Democrats and men towards the Republicans.
- In the foreign policy community, everyone is holding their breath for the NATO Summit in Brussels tomorrow and Thursday. Trump has been hyperventilating about Europe’s failure to spend more on defense, even as many of the allies have been raising their expenditures in order to meet the 2024 NATO target of 2% of GNP and to increase the Alliance’s odds against an increasingly aggressive Russia. If Trump repeats his dissing of the G7 last month in Canada, the Europeans will conclude the Alliance is dead.
- Next Monday Trump meets President Putin in Helsinki. Speculation is rife that he will hand Syria and perhaps also Crimea to Putin, in return for essentially nothing. If either happens, it will cause worldwide repercussions, the former because US withdrawal from Syria will strengthen Iran (Russian promises to restrain Tehran should be ignored entirely) and the latter because every would-be breakaway minority will be encouraged by US acceptance of Russia’s annexation.
- A bit further along on the time horizon is the escalating trade war with China, which is causing a lot of distress in the US, both because Trump’s tariffs raise prices to US producers and consumers of Chinese goods and because Chinese retaliation is hitting US exports hard. The tit-for-tat tariffs with Canada, Mexico, and Europe are also damaging, though the stock market isn’t yet feeling the pain. It will eventually, as the inflationary impact of the budget deficit, the tax cut, and the tariffs pushes the Fed to raise interest rates.
- The dialogue with North Korea about its nuclear program has degenerated into a diatribe, with Pyongyang accusing Secretary of State Pompeo of gangster-like behavior for insisting on quick denuclearization, rather than the long-term, phased (and likely never completed) process the North Koreans favor. No telling whether or when Trump will be back to threatening fire and fury, but it is already clear that his classic bait and switch tactic–he doesn’t seem to have mentioned quick denuclearization during the Singapore summit–won’t work with Kim Jong-un.
Trump will be in London Thursday evening and Friday, meeting with a Prime Minister teetering on the brink as she tries desperately to rescue the United Kingdom from the worst impacts of Brexit, which Trump supported. He’ll be flying everywhere, so as to avoid what are predicted to be massive protests.
Then he’ll spend the weekend in Scotland at one of his own golf clubs. We can hope he’ll spend some time with the briefing books, especially the ones that detail Russian interference in the US election and Moscow’s role in nerve agent murders in the UK. But I wouldn’t bet on it.
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Bad assumptions make bad policy
The Post recently published Jamal Khashoggi’s “It’s time to divide Syria.” A few assertions that Khashoggi made jump out as pertinent examples of biases and assumptions that can often be found in Western media reports about Syria. Here are a few examples of this:
To bring about a permanent peace in Syria, the southern part of the country must be protected. Victory for Assad there is not a complete solution so much as it is a pause. The territories governed by Assad are ruled by fear and a loss of hope for prosperity.
Assad has been responsible for the murder of hundreds of thousands of his own people. He has chemically attacked his compatriots and will go down in history as one of the cruellest and bloodiest despots in modern history. This can lead people to assume that he has managed to stay in power only by keeping the population under his control in a constant state of fear and oppression. It is this assumption – that Assad’s dictatorship commanded little or no popular support – that led international actors, particularly regional powers such as Turkey and Qatar, to believe that Assad’s regime would collapse quickly in 2011.
They were ultimately proven wrong. Syrian sectarian tensions, as well as the government’s historical use of clientelism and patronage to foster elite support, provided Assad with broad support from some ethnic minorities in Syria – particularly his own group, the Alawis. In addition, many non-minority Sunnis see Assad as the sole source of stability in the country. Judging and condemning Assad for the way in which he has treated his people is justified and right. It is, however, a tenuous and possibly counter-productive justification for intervention, particularly if we repeat the mistakes of Iraq in failing to properly plan for the aftermath.
The United States should propose partition in Syria. Assad can keep what he controls, and the rebels can form local governments and establish a new entity. With international recognition and support, it would be possible to hold elections for local councils [and] curtail radicalized individuals […].
Portraying Islamist and jihadist rebels as “radicalized individuals” makes them sound like a few bad apples within a more moderate rebel ensemble. Yet broad swathes of the Syrian opposition are radical, with the salafist Ahrar al-Sham or the jihadist Tahrir al-Sham among the largest and most effective opposition groups in Syria today. These are not just individuals but unavoidable strategic actors, determined power players, who will have a role to play in Syria for years to come.
The ideological composition of the opposition, and its fragmented nature, mean that distinguishing between “radical” and “moderate” elements is near-impossible. Curtailing radical groups would not only require more military power than any international actor is willing to currently provide, it would also require a level of insight and decisiveness in determining who needs to be curtailed and who should participate in governing a new Syria that no foreigners currently possess.
The assertion that we can – and should – eliminate radical elements of the opposition also underestimates the support these groups command within the population. American hostility and distaste for radical Islam clouds the fact that for many Syrians, particularly those who are Sunni Arabs, these groups are a viable and even desirable alternative to Assad’s rule. Many also see them as a necessary evil to counter creeping Iranian influence in Syria, a sort of counter-Hezbollah that will fight fire with fire.
What would Khashoggi recommend if his elected local councils installed radical Muslims in power? More generally, Western commentators should not assume that radical elements in Syria will be “curtail[ed]” by the Syrian population once it votes.
Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State will always be threats, but they will likely be rejected by the local Syrian community if there are international and regional forces supporting Syrian aspirations for moderate civilian rule.
Many Syrians want peace and stability more than they want “moderate civilian rule;” many fear that a transition to a more democratic form of government would prove a new source of chaos and instability, as it was in Iraq after 2003 and Egypt after 2012.
The assumption that democracy is something people inherently yearn for has plagued Western interpretation of Middle Eastern political crises for decades. It was particularly visible during the “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2010-11, when news organizations such as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal heralded the popular desire for democratic rule in the region.
Of course there are large numbers of local activists and citizens who call and hope for more popular representation and participation across the Middle East; but assuming this a basic and widespread concern for everyone is misleading. Not because they are inherently attached to strongman rule or too passive for civic participation, but because democracy is for many a privilege that comes after security and prosperity. If foreign powers intervened in Syria assuming that its citizens are on the same page as they are about what Syria should look like post-civil war, they could be in for a big surprise.
We should stop making assumptions and generalizations that we can’t back up with evidence. Western powers have too often intervened in Middle Eastern politics – often with destructive consequences – because of false assumptions and an inflated belief in the obviousness and infallibility of their liberal and democratic values.
The United States could do a lot to help the Syrian population today: more humanitarian assistance to the displaced Syrians in the South, and more political support to ensure that Syrian Kurdish interests are represented in negotiations about the future of Syria, for instance. For productive American involvement in the Syrian conflict to happen, however, it can’t be obscured by flashier plans based on misleading statements; they may sound more appealing, but are not grounded in reality. Accurate information should be a prerequisite, not an afterthought, of American foreign policymaking in the Middle East.
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Peace Picks July 8 – 15
You can find more events for the upcoming week here
1. A Vision: Ukraine – 2030: Sustainable Development Doctrine | Tuesday, July 10, 2018 | 1:30 pm – 3:00 pm | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Ukraine has made significant progress on ambitious economic and financial reforms in recent years. Steps have been taken to intensify the fight against corruption and boost economic growth across a range of sectors. However, much work is still needed for Ukraine’s economic development and improvement of the socio-economic situation. In addition to focus on specific reforms and bolstering investor confidence, strategies for long-term sustainable development must also be considered.
At this event, Mr. Serhiy Taruta, Member of Parliament, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, will present a paper, entitled Ukraine 2030, a vision which lays out a framework for the strategic direction of Ukraine’s long-term development. This will be followed by a discussion on the challenges and opportunities for Ukraine’s sustainable development will be discussed.
Speakers:
Moderator: Ambassador John Herbst, Director – Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Mr. Serhiy Taruta, Member of Parliament, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
Dr. Anders Åslund, Senior Fellow – Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Independent Member, Supervisory Board, Ukrzaliznytsia
Dr. Vira Nanivska, Policy Research Director, Collegium Anna Yaroslavna: East
Dr. Edi Segura, Chairman of the Board, The Blezyer Foundation; Partner and Chief Economist, SigmaBleyzer
Ms. Michelle Small, Director, Head of the Washington DC Representative Office, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Mr. Morgan Williams, President, US-Ukraine Business Council
2. Elections in Zimbabwe: Autocracy and Stasis, or Democracy and Change? | Tuesday, July 10, 2018 | 3:00 pm – 4:30 pm | National Endowment for Democracy | Register Here
Since the Movement for Democratic Change’s founding in 1999, Zimbabwe has been going through a protracted struggle for democratization. An entrenched incumbent, fortified by a strong political-military network, has met aspirations for democratic improvement with strong resistance. This network, however, underwent a serious rupture last November when former allies effectively deposed its long-serving leader, Robert Mugabe. The new president, President Emmerson Mnangagwa, has scheduled general elections for July 30, 2018. The upcoming polls present new political dynamics and a heightened level of anticipation both within and outside Zimbabwe. In his presentation, Dr. Alex Magaisa will consider the struggle to achieve greater democratic accountability in today’s Zimbabwe. He will assess preparations for the approaching elections and discuss the prospects for democratization, including possible post-election scenarios and the roles of the military and the international community. Comments by Dr.Alexander H. Noyes will follow.
Speakers:
Moderator: Natalie Kay, Program Officer, Southern Africa, National Endowment for Democracy
Alex Magaisa, Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow, National Endowment for Democracy
Alexander H. Noyes, Senior Associate (Non-Resident), Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
3. July 15 Coup Attempt: Two Years Later | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm | Turkish Heritage Organization
Please join the Turkish Heritage Organization and the Global Policy Institute on July 11 for a panel discussion on the second anniversary of the July 15 coup attempt that took place in 2016. Since this critical event in Turkey’s recent history, the country has witnessed profound changes within both its foreign and domestic politics. Our distinguished guests will discuss how the coup attempt shaped present day Turkey and the potential implications regarding U.S.-Turkey relations.
Speakers:
Moderator: Deniz Karatas, Global Policy Institute
Abraham Wagner, Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs & Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University
4. Future of US-Turkish Relations After Erdogan’s Victory | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 2:00 pm | Endowment for Middle East Truth | Register Here
Join EMET on Capitol Hill as we host Congressman Gus Bilirakis, FDD scholar and former Turkish parliament member Dr. Aykan Erdemir, the pro-Kurdish opposition US representative of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), Giran Ozcan, and EMET’s Director of the Kurdistan Project, Diliman Abdulkader. The panel will be moderated by EMET founder and President Sarah Stern. Our panel will analyze the implications of the June 24th Turkish elections called by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Leading Turkey since 2002 with the Justice and Development Party (AKP), internally Erdogan has tilted state institutions to further solidify his position, he has targeted political opposition groups, academics, journalists, and the Kurdish minority all while labeling those speaking against his rule as “terrorists.” Erdogan has distanced himself from his short-lived “zero problem with neighbors” policy as he has made more foes than friends in the region. He has threatened Greece with military action while continuing to have a foothold in Northern Cyprus. His incursions into Syria targeting US-backed Kurdish forces has created a diminishing of relations with the United States. Under Erdogan, Turkey has pivoted towards Russia by purchasing Russian missiles incompatible with NATO defense systems. The panel will examine the outcome of the elections, what Turkey’s future holds under Erdogan and how this will affect US-Turkish relations.
5. Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent After the Fall of the Caliphate | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 12:00pm – 1:45pm | Foreign Policy Research Institute | Register Here
In 2014, the United States stated its intention to “degrade and destroy” ISIS. Since then, a diverse array of forces has worked tirelessly to liberate key territories in Iraq and Syria from ISIS’s Caliphate. Now, in the summer of 2018, ISIS’s Caliphate largely has been dismantled as a territorial entity. However, the group is far from destroyed, and its ability to maneuver is much improved as it reverts to an insurgency. What’s more, there is very little to prevent yet another non-state armed group from retaking the very same lands that ISIS once held. Accordingly, American diplomacy, military strategy, and intelligence collection likely will focus on Iraq and Syria for many years to come. Thus, the question for policymakers is how the U.S. can prevent non-state armed groups from regaining a territorial foothold, further destabilizing these territories, and ultimately threatening U.S. interests in the region. Relatedly, the question of what to do about the likes of al-Qaeda and ISIS even if they do not hold territory remains equally pressing.
“Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent After the Fall of the Caliphate,” a special issue of Orbis: FPRI’s Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018) and the subject of this panel, seeks to provide a framework for thinking about the threat of terrorism emanating from the Fertile Crescent now that ISIS’s Caliphate is being undone and to provide concrete policy recommendations to establish a tenable politico-economic status quo.
Speakers:
Tally Helfont, Director of Program on the Middle East, Foreign Policy Research Institute
Samuel Helfont, Assistant Professor, Naval War College, Monterey
Barak Mendelsohn, Associate Professor, Haverford College
Assaf Moghadam, Adjunct Associate Professor, Columbia University
6. Next Steps on North Korea: Denuclearization and Building a New Relationship | Thursday, July 12, 2018 | 9:00am – 10:30 am | Korea Economic Institute of America | Register Here
With the historic first meeting between a sitting U.S. president and the leader of North Korea now complete, the difficult process of negotiating North Korea’s dismantlement and building a new relationship between the United States and North Korea begins. What are the key steps the United States and North Korea need to take to achieve the goals of the Singapore Statement? What is the role of South Korea as the process moves forward? What challenges beyond denuclearization are there for building new U.S.-North Korea relationship?
Please join the Korea Economic Institute of America and the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy for a discussion of the key next steps in dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program and moving towards the new relationship called for in the Singapore Statement.
Speakers:
Moderator: Jenna Gibson, Korea Economic Institute of America
Patrick Cronin, Center for a New American Security
Katrin Katz, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Kim Seok Hwan, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy
Kim Yong Hyun, Dongguk University
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Advantage North Korea
I’m old enough to remember when Donald Trump tweeted this:
Donald J. TrumpVerified account@realDonaldTrump
Many good conversations with North Korea-it is going well! In the meantime, no Rocket Launches or Nuclear Testing in 8 months. All of Asia is thrilled. Only the Opposition Party, which includes the Fake News, is complaining. If not for me, we would now be at War with North Korea!
We were supposed to believe his Singapore meeting with Kim Jong-un last month had changed everything: North Korea was tamed and America was safer.
Now Secretary of State Pompeo is claiming progress in the talks with North Korea, while Pyongyang is describing the US attitude as “regrettable.” That should not be surprising. Trump is simply lying. No one but him ever threatened war with North Korea, which would be catastrophic for our South Korean allies and possibly also for the US. And no one ever suggested the North Koreans had bought into complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization except his Administration, which will eventually have to accept that it is not going to happen. The flim-flam president is at it again, pushing lies and planning to bait and switch.
The contrast with the Iran nuclear deal couldn’t be greater. President Obama’s team negotiated a detailed, comprehensive agreement with Tehran, one that the Iranians have assiduously implemented, as confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Trump nevertheless withdrew from it. So why, pray tell, would the North Koreans ever want to fall into that trap? Nor is the Trump Administration, which can’t even keep track of the immigrant children it detains, capable of mounting the kind of expertise required to negotiate a serious technical agreement. Is there a single presidential appointee with any advanced level of scientific or engineering knowledge? Are the climate deniers and creationists going to be able to deal with North Korea’s nuclear and missile experts?
Of course there are lots of capable career experts in the government bureaucracy, but tell me one area in which this Administration has relied on them for help. Experts are in fact leaving the government in droves, because they see no point in sitting around while Trump dismantles policies on climate change, nuclear nonproliferation, biomedicine, pandemic diseases, and other important technical issues. The experts who helped Presidents Bush, Clinton, Bush, and Obama wrestle with these issues over the past three decades aren’t going to sit around waiting for Trump to see the light.
Trump is used to bargaining with people–many of them small contractors who worked on his building projects–whom he can stiff at will. There is always someone else who can put up dry wall. There is no alternative to negotiating with the North Koreans, who clearly understand the Americans better than we understand them. Kim snookered Trump in Singapore into granting him an appearance on a par with the American president, in return for nothing. It is clear the North Koreans have not tested missiles or nuclear weapons because they had come to the end of their protocols. When and if they need to test again, they will surely do so, claiming that Trump has not lived up to his promises of relaxing sanctions.
It’s not quite game/set/match. But it is definitely ad out. North Korea is several steps ahead of Donald Trump’s America.
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