Peace picks April 24-28

  1. Report Launch: “The Other Side of the World” | Monday, April 24 | 10:30-12 | CSIS | Register Here | China’s growing interests in the Middle East, and the United States’ enduring interests in the Middle East, create challenges for two of the world’s most powerful nations. Should they seek more active collaboration? Are their goals for the future of the Middle East compatible? To discuss the implications of increasingly robust China-Middle East ties for U.S. interests, CSIS invites you to the launch of its new Brzezinski Institute Report: “The Other Side of the World: China, the United States, and the Struggle for Middle East Security,” featuring Anne Gearan, Political Correspondent at the Washington Post; Jon B. Alterman, Senior Vice President and Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director of the Middle East Program at CSIS; Michael J. Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS; Matthew P. Goodman, William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy and Senior Adviser for Asian Economics at CSIS; and Christopher K. Johnson, Senior Adviser and Freeman Chair in China Studies.
  2. What is the Future of EU-Turkey Relations? | Monday, April 24 | 2-3:30 | Wilson Center | Register Here | This panel will address a number of questions related to the April 16 Turkish constitutional referendum: Can the European-Turkish migration deal last? How might upcoming national elections in several European countries affect European ties with Turkey? What could cause the EU to freeze or end Turkey’s accession process? Is Erdogan willing to abandon Turkey’s EU membership bid or follow through with his threat to end the migration deal? Can the EU and Turkey find a way forward? Speakers include Michelle Egan, Professor and Jean Monnet Chair ad personam at School of International Service, American University; Aykan Erdemir, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies; and Constanze Stelzenmueller, Senior Transatlantic Fellow and Director of Transatlantic Trends at the German Marshall Fund, Berlin and Robert Bosch Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
  3. The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics, and Policy-Making | Tuesday, April 25 | 12-1:30 | AGSIW | Register Here | Led by Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates has become deeply embedded in the contemporary system of international power, politics, and policymaking. Only an independent state since 1971, the seven emirates that constitute the UAE represent not only the most successful Arab federal experiment but also the most durable. However, the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath underscored the continuing imbalance between Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and the five northern emirates. Meanwhile, the post-2011 security crackdown revealed the acute sensitivity of officials in Abu Dhabi to social inequalities and economic disparities across the federation. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Baker Institute Fellow for the Middle East at Rice University, charts the various processes of state formation and political and economic development that have enabled the UAE to emerge as a significant regional power and major player in the post-Arab Spring reordering of Middle East and North African politics, as well as the closest partner of the United States in military and security affairs in the region.
  4. New Approaches to Israel-Palestine Peace Efforts: Can Regional Powers Make a Difference? | Wednesday, April 26 | 1-3:30 | MEPC | Register Here | Panelists will discuss whether there are new opportunities to work with regional powers to realize a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. Speakers include Chas W. Freeman Jr., Chairman of Projects International Inc., Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Former US Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Former President, MEPC; Hady Amr, Nonresident Senior Fellow at Brookings, Former Deputy Special Envoy, Israeli-Palestinian Relations at the Department of State; and Former Deputy Assistant Administrator, Middle East at USAID; Ian Lustick, Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, Former President of Politics and History Section of the American Poltical Science Association, and Member of the Council on Foreign Relations; and Riad Khawaji, Founder and CEO of INEGMA, Middle East Bureau Chief at Defense News, and Middle East Correspondent at Jane’s Defense Weekly.
  5. The Syrian Crisis: What Lies Ahead on the Battlefield and in Diplomacy | Wednesday, April 26 | 1:30-5 | MEI | Register Here | The Middle East Institute (MEI) Track II Dialogues Initiative and the National Defense University Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies have convened three rounds of private consultations with Russian counterparts about the Syrian conflict, most recently in February 2017. Participants from those and parallel MEI Track II encounters with Middle Eastern leaders will join with other experts on the military and diplomatic aspects of the conflict in two panel discussions to consider possible ways forward. These panelists include Jennifer Cafarella, Lead Intelligence Planner at the Institute for the Study of War, Charles Lister, Senior Fellow at MEI, Andrew J. Tabler, Martin J. Gross Fellow at WINEP, LTG (ret) Terry A Wolf, Deputy Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS at the Department of State, Wa’el Alzayat, CEO at Emerge USA, (ret) Robert S. Ford, Senior Fellow at MEI, Roger Kangas, Academic Dean and Professor, NESA Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, and Randa Slim, Director of Track II Dialogues at MEI.
  6. A Story to Tell: Changing the Narrative of American Muslims with Hena Khan | Wednesday, April 26 | 6-8pm | The Elliott School | Register Here | Join us for a conversation with Elliott School alumna and children’s author Hena Khan about her experiences writing books that represent American Muslims, promote understanding, and build tolerance and compassion. She will share her newest novel, Amina’s Voice, the first publication of Simon & Schuster’s groundbreaking new imprint Salaam Reads, which focuses on books about Muslims. Amina’s Voice recounts the story of a Pakistani-American Muslim girl who struggles to stay true to her family’s vibrant culture while simultaneously blending in at school after tragedy strikes her community.
  7. Tunisia in Transition: Challenges and Prospects | Thursday, April 27 | 2-3:30 | POMED and the Arab Center Washington | Register Here | Tunisia, the birthplace of the “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2011, stands today as the only country undertaking a democratic transition. But despite the historic progress, daunting challenges remain, including confronting corruption, bolstering the economy, and reforming the justice sector. What are the most important steps in confronting these challenges? And what role can international actors, including the United States, play in supporting Tunisia’s fragile democracy? Speakers include Amine Ghali, Program Director at Al Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center in Tunis, Leila Hilal, Senior Fellow, International Security Program at New America, Chawki Tabib, President of Tunisia’s National Authority for the Fight Against Corruption, and Sarah Yerkes, Fellow, Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment.
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Mil asks, civ responds

Military colleagues (same ones who produced this fine piece) recently asked some good questions. I replied:

  1. How could DoD and DoS be better postured to address regional and world conflicts to ensure a whole of government approach to identify and synchronize lines of effort in both planning and execution?

While intellectually DoD and DoS are more in agreement on a whole of government approach than any other time I can remember in the past 20 years, there is a gigantic imbalance in the capacities and cultures of the two institutions. State persists with a “sink or swim” culture fundamentally opposed to planning, which is still honored more in the breach than the observance. It also lacks appropriate personnel and resources. That is about to get worse, not better, due to budget cuts.

Ideally, State Department officers should train with military units with which they might deploy in the future. That would vastly increase mutual esteem and communication. But it is mostly impossible today. The best that can be hoped for is some commonality in the training materials for both, though State is likely to be doing precious little training for stabilization operations in the next few years. I fear we are back to where we were 20 years ago: our military instrument is far more potent than our civilian instruments, and there is a yawning gap between them.

2. What does a successfully concluded campaign against ISIS look like? Considering costs, reputation, and balance of influence, how should the U.S./Coalition define success?   Is the defeat of ISIS a success if it causes the balance of power in the region to shift towards Iran, Assad, or Russia?

Success in Syria should be defined in terms of sustainable peace and security. That won’t be possible under Assad or with the Russians and Iranians playing the roles they play today in propping up a minority dictator and repressing the majority Sunni population. So long as Assad is there, Syrians will be fighting him. The longer it lasts, the more those Syrians will be extremist.

After a successful campaign against ISIS, Syrians in different parts of the country should be able to govern themselves, repress terrorist activity with forces that do not oppress or attack the rest of the population, begin to return economic activity to prewar levels, and return to their homes or resettle freely without fear of persecution. We are a very long way from that, even in the most stable parts of the country (some Kurdish-controlled areas and parts of the south).

3. Does U.S. foreign policy strike the right balance in supporting U.S. interests and its role as a global power? Or, should the U.S. consider a more isolationist approach to foreign policy?   What impact could an isolationist policy have on Middle East security and stability, balance of influence by regional and world actors, and U.S. national interests?

It is a mistake to ask foreign policy experts about isolationism, which they will all condemn, but I’ll go this far: U.S. interests in the Middle East are not as salient as they once were and we should be thinking and planning about reducing our commitments and burdens there.

The main U.S. interests in the region apart from counter-terrorism are generally defined as these: non-proliferation, oil, maintenance of alliances, and human rights/democracy. The only significant proliferation risk in the region (Iran) is on hold for 10-15 years or so, the U.S. is far less dependent on Middle East oil than once it was, our allies are mostly interested in military assistance, and we appear to have mostly given up on human rights and democracy in the region.

I think it is arguable that a) deterring Iran could be (maybe better be) accomplished with a much reduced U.S. presence in the Gulf, b) we should not be spending as much American treasure as in the past or risking American lives for oil flowing out of the Gulf to China and Japan (which should share that burden more than in the past), c) our allies should be taking on more of the burden of defending themselves with the enormous amount of kit we’ve sold them, and d) human rights and democracy will gain traction in the region better with less U.S. military presence.

4. What are the competing national interests of the U.S. and Iran in the Middle East and what are the options for alleviating U.S. / Iranian tensions to mutual satisfaction and improved regional stability?

Iran is a revolutionary power looking to extend its security perimeter into neighboring states and to burnish its Islamist credentials by resistance to Israel. It will be impossible to overcome these problems exclusively in a bilateral U.S./Iran context, though increased communication between Tehran and Washington (including diplomatic representatives at some level in each of their capitals) is highly desirable.

Regional stability would also benefit from some sort of regional security architecture—think OSCE in Europe or ASEAN in Asia. This would aim at de-escalating Sunni/Shia, Saudi/Iranian, Turkish/Iranian, and other regional conflicts and tensions. There are few places on earth today with less regional cooperation and connectivity than the Middle East and North Africa.

5. What are the respective national interests of the U.S. and Russia in the Middle East and what are the options for alleviating U.S./Russian tensions to mutual satisfaction and improved regional stability?

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Still adrift

After a rough start, the Trump Administration has gotten more plaudits lately: the cruise missile attack on a Syrian airfield and the Mother of All Bombs used in Afghanistan pleased those who wanted the United States to show more “resolve.” Vice President Pence then used those two attacks to suggest that North Korea should not try to test the President, all but laying down a new red line. The US would react, he suggested, if Pyongyang tested missiles or a nuclear weapon.

Meanwhile, Defense Secretary Mattis is rallying allies in the Middle East and National Security Adviser McMaster has been in Afghanistan and India. The President has met with the NATO Secretary General, signed on to Montenegrin accession to the Alliance, endorsed the Export-Import Bank, and certified that Iran is complying with the nuclear deal.

That is all good. It is starting to look like a more or less normal American administration, even if it is using force with more abandon than its predecessor.

It’s not, mainly because of Trump himself. His congratulatory phone call to Turkey’s President Erdogan was the tip-off, as it ignored the obvious problem of a popular referendum used to establish autocratic powers. While Mattis and McMaster are adults who will try to do things right and steer Trump in productive directions, the President’s instincts and mode of operation still raise serious questions. No clear strategy has followed up either the Syrian or the Afghanistan attack. President Assad is still killing civilians with abandon, with help from the Russians and Iranians. The Taliban are still making progress in Afghanistan, perhaps more than ever before. Unless something changes, both American attacks will soon be seen as one-offs that presage no serious plan in either country.

The North Korean situation is similar. While the Americans boast that all means are on the table, Kim Jong-un knows perfectly well that his tens of thousands of conventional artillery pieces targeted on Seoul’s more than 20 million people will deter Washington from serious use of military force. Pence’s bravado was aimed squarely at the American and Chinese audiences. The best he can expect from Pyongyang is a willingness to talk. Kim does not back down on development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, because they are the guarantee of his regime’s survival.

Even if the Chinese exert their maximum leverage, Pyongyang is likely to stay adamant. Meanwhile, the Americans made fools of themselves by losing track of the carrier battle group the White House and Pentagon had said was on its way towards the Korean peninsula when in fact it was near Indonesia. I can only guess how much laughter that is causing in Beijing and Pyongyang. They’ve certainly now learned to doubt whatever Trump claims, which would have been wise anyway.

Despite this and other gaffes, there is at least some reversion to a more normal foreign policy direction. Secretary of State Tillerson remains alone at the State Department, with no other presidential appointees. That in a way is good, as it leaves any issues on which the Administration has given no new guidance in the hands of professionals who will continue to do what they were doing before, albeit with a bit less confidence and a bit more hedging of their bets. But any real progress depends on developing strategies for Syria, Afghanistan and North Korea, not to mention Yemen and Libya, that are clear and achievable. In other words, we are still adrift.

 

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Stability from the bottom up

On Wednesday April 12, New America hosted a conversation with Ammar Kahf and M. Yaser Tabbara, co-founders of the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, on the role of local councils and security sector reform in shaping the future of Syria.

Kahf began by describing the security landscape in Syria, specifically focusing on restructuring the security architecture given new realities on the ground post-2011. Because scrapping and revamping the entire system is idealistic, the more pragmatic approach is to gradually and systematically change the function of security in Syria, from controlling the population’s actions and solely serving the regime to promoting peace, preserving security, and protecting citizens. Before Arab Spring, the Syrian government functioned through a bureaucratically complex and overwhelming state structure of overlapping agencies designed to remain loyal to the regime, focus on its security, and restrict political activity.

Now, as the country has devolved into zones of control or influence, Kahf sees decentralization as the most effective means of governing the state. Despite its current state of fragmentation, if Syria can plan and coordinate negotiations on how to decentralize, and determine which government functions should be localized and which centralized, it can strengthen its security architecture and successfully reorganize. Security sector reform, aiming to create a professional service that works to preserve state institutions rather than the regime, must go through a legal and structural process that codifies any changes and ensures durability and stability for the long term.

Kahf stressed that it is important not to dismantle entire institutions but rather create changes within the existing frameworks. For peace negotiations, this means relying on those operating on the ground and learning from their lived experiences. He said that these individuals should not be overlooked and can act as reliable interlocutors in developing new state systems. Tabbara also advocated for local governance as a foundation on which to build a new state once the conflict ends.

Tabbara specifically saw local councils as an excellent model for state government at large. Looking at local administrative councils (LACs) across Syria, he highlighted the relative success these councils have achieved absent regime control. In the early stages of the revolution, activists worked together to form coordinating bodies to govern local affairs, developing functional local governance from the bottom up. Responding to a political vacuum in opposition-held territory, LACs work to provide basic services and to a large extent are politically inclusive and democratically run. Indeed, in a report surveying the LACs operating across Syria, 38% of the councils are elected and 57% chosen through consensus, leaving less than 5% established through appointment or individual activist efforts. Tabbara says these councils are far more transparent and accountable (than the regime) to the people they govern, providing a good template for future state governance.

Despite their effectiveness, LACs present a direct threat to the regime. Given the de facto decentralization that is currently dividing Syria, LACs could be a tool to stitch the country back together and strengthen the peace process. But the regime, which wants a more unified governing structure under Assad, stands in opposition to this and continues to prevent the success of the current negotiations. Tabbara argued that LACs form a direct threat to the regime, challenging the state’s entrenched governing philosophy that denies grassroots participation and rejects any manifestation of democracy.

Ultimately, Kahf believes that a paradigm shift, in which LACs are treated as legitimate governing structures, needs to happen in order to change the reality in Syria. Stability from the bottom up is possible, and LACs can provide the ideal building blocks for reconciliation and reform for long-term peace.

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One more for illiberalism

Turkey’s President Erdogan won his constitutional referendum Sunday by a narrow margin (more or less 51/49, but the results aren’t official yet). The approved amendments will confirm the power already concentrated in his hands by making Turkey’s government a presidential system: eliminating the office of prime minister, strengthening the president’s hand in judicial appointments, and enabling Erdogan to stay in power for more than another decade.

But while he won the referendum, Erdogan has lost legitimacy. The result was no acclamation. Erdogan lost the vote in Turkey’s three largest cities: Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. The overall margin was tighter than expected, given the government’s noisy campaign in favor. Since the coup attempt last summer, Erdogan has eviscerated much of the opposition to his rule, especially in the media, universities, schools, and security forces. “No” campaigners were few and far between. There are even reports of ballot-box stuffing, which I am told is not common in Turkish elections.

Erdogan will nevertheless treat the referendum as authorization to do as he likes. In recent years, that has meant cracking down on political opponents, abandoning the hope of EU membership, cozying up to Russia, fighting against Kurds, and intervening in Syria (but accepting a future role there for Bashar al Assad). The crackdown on followers of Erdogan’s erstwhile ally, Fethullah Gulen, has been particularly ferocious, as Erdogan contends Gulen was behind the July 2016 coup attempt. But Erdogan has also targeted secularists and others who have dared express doubt about the benefits of his rule.

In the end Erdogan’s fate may be determined as much by economics as politics. Turkey’s economy is on the skids: growth has slowed, tourism has collapsed, the Turkish lira is devalued, unemployment is up. The economic reforms and rapid growth that generated a good deal of Erdogan’s popularity in the 2000s have stalled. The renewal of hostilities against the Kurdish armed rebellion has roiled large parts of the country and damaged the economy. Erdogan is no longer the crusading Islamist opposed to corruption and ready to make peace with the Kurds. He merits more recognition in the years since he was elected president in 2014 for crony capitalism than for opening up the Turkish economy.

Washington will do little to resist Erdogan’s worst instincts. While it would prefer that Turkey remain on track towards the EU, the Administration needs Ankara to continue to allow use of Turkish bases in support of US operations against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Turkey would also be vital to any eventual military operation against Iran. President Trump may even be inclined to extradite Gulen, though doing so depends on judicial proceedings that have barely begun.

Illiberal democracy has had another win, even if the margin was narrow. Chalk up approval of the referendum with Brexit, the election of Trump, and budding autocrats in Hungary, Poland and elsewhere. The advocates of liberal democracy are going to have to up their game if they are going to stem the illiberal tide, which has lost lately only in the Netherlands. Next stop: first round of the French presidential election, April 23.

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Peace picks April 17-21

ISIS, Russia, and China: Can America Win at Three-Front Information War? | Tuesday, April 18 | 11:45-1:30 | Hudson Institute |Register Here

The Hudson Institute is hosting a roundtable discussion that will focus on the whole range of approaches, from US international media to public diplomacy to strategic communications to “grey” and “black” psy-ops, with Jeffrey Gedmin, senior fellow at Atlantic Council and former president and CEO of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Martha Bayles, visiting fellow at Hudson Institute, and Eric Brown, a senior fellow at Hudson Institute.

As the information age becomes the disinformation age, America faces three distinct adversaries, each with its own expertise in marrying cutting-edge technology with age-old methods of manipulation and deception. What are the differences between radical jihadist, Russian, and Chinese propaganda? How is America responding? How should it respond?

Contentious Cultural Politics in the Middle East and North Africa| Tuesday, April 18 |12-1:30 | Elliott School | Register Here

Join the Elliot School’s Project on Middle East Political Science for a conversation on current issues in the Middle East and North Africa. The expert panel features Laryssa Chomiak, Centre d’Etudes Maghrébines à Tunis; Lisel Hintz, Barnard College; Jillian Schwedler, Hunter College CUNY; and Lisa Wedeen, University of Chicago

Turkey’s New ‘Sultan’: Prospects for US and Regional Policy | Tuesday, April 18 |12:30| WINEP |Register Here |

It seems inevitable that Turkey will play a role in navigating many of the crises currently challenging U.S. interests, including the outcome of the Syria war and the future of Russian involvement in the Middle East. And at Turkey’s helm amid this storm is the populist president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who continues to consolidate his hold on domestic politics while using military and diplomatic means to solidify Ankara as a regional power — trends that could accelerate after the country’s landmark April 16 constitutional referendum.

In his latest book The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey, Dr. Soner Cagaptay assesses how the longtime leader has cemented his rule over the years — and at what cost to his country’s stability and democratic future. To discuss these ambitions and how they might affect the Trump administration’s regional calculus, The Washington Institute is pleased to host a Policy Forum with the author, who will be joined by experts Amberin Zaman and Gonul Tol.

2017 Global Development Forum | Wed April 19|8:30-2:30| CSIS | Register Here

Please join the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) for the third annual Global Development Forum (GDF) on April 19. The GDF will feature over 40 speakers, including key stakeholders from U.S. government agencies, leading multilateral and non-governmental organizations, foreign governments, and the private sector.

The 2017 Global Development Forum seeks to examine the role and purpose of official development assistance against a backdrop of rising incomes, economic growth, youth unemployment, and other continued complex challenges in many parts of the world. To address these challenges, the next U.S. administration will need to apply new approaches and remain highly flexible in a rapidly changing development landscape. In particular, this conference will explore ways in which the next few years will shape the role of the United States in international development, and how the United States can work with official donors and key partners, including the private sector, civil society, and multilateral institutions.

The Difficult Road Ahead: Stabilizing Iraq and the Gulf Region | Wednesday, April 19 | 9:00-10:30 | Stimson Center | Register Here

While U.S. and Iraqi forces are making clear progress in the fight against ISIS, the security situation in Iraq and the Gulf region remains tenuous. ISIS was able to grow and develop largely due to the difficulties the government faced in controlling its vast territory and establishing inclusive governance to effectively integrate Iraq’s diverse constituencies. In the context of the ongoing instability in Iraq, Iran has increased its involvement in the region’s conflicts and has been able to assert a great deal of influence over Iraqi politics.

Bringing security to Iraq is essential, and the impact of U.S. intervention continues to be felt regionally and globally. Iran, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the U.S. all have an interest in a stable, peaceful Iraq. However, even as ISIS is defeated in Iraq, the question remains whether the U.S. or the Iraqi government are prepared to “win the peace” in the long-term. This on-the-record discussion hosted by the Stimson Center and TRENDS Research & Advisory will feature Iraqi Ambassador to the U.S. Fareed Yasseen and an expert panel examining the question of what the U.S. and its regional partners can do to support Iraq in a way that will help ensure durable peace and stability.

While U.S. and Iraqi forces are making clear progress in the fight against ISIS, the security situation in Iraq and the Gulf region remains tenuous. ISIS was able to grow and develop largely due to the difficulties the government faced in controlling its vast territory and establishing inclusive governance to effectively integrate Iraq’s diverse constituencies. In the context of the ongoing instability in Iraq, Iran has increased its involvement in the region’s conflicts and has been able to assert a great deal of influence over Iraqi politics.

Vision 2030: One Year into Saudi Arabia’s Economic Reforms | Thursday, April 20|3:00-4:30 | CSIS | Register Here |

Join the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in a conversation with H.E. Dr. Majed Bin Abdullah al-Qasabi, the minister of commerce and investment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia who also serves on the Kingdom’s Council of Economic and Development Affairs, chaired by Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Previously, Dr. al-Qasabi served as minister of social affairs and was an adviser to then-Crown Prince Salman’s Court, with the rank of minister. He was also secretary general of the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and director general of the Sultan Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud Charity Foundation. Dr. al-Qasabi holds a Ph.D. in engineering management from the University of Missouri, and two M.A.s and a B.A. in civil engineering from University of California, Berkeley, and the University of Portland, respectively.

Energy Innovation and Entrepreneurship in the Middle East | Wednesday, April 19 | 9:00 AM | Atlantic Council | Register Here

Please join the Atlantic Council on Wednesday, April 19 from 9:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. for a discussion about how energy innovation and entrepreneurship in the government and private sector are reshaping the Middle East and creating economic opportunities in the region. Joining us are Julia Nesheiwat, presidential deputy envoy for hostage affairs at the US Department of State; HE Majid Al-Suwaid, consul general of the United Arab Emirates in New York; and Salah Tabbara, general manager of ALBina Industrial Construction Company.

Across the Middle East, countries are pursuing energy innovation. Last year, Saudi Arabia announced its “Vision 2030” goals, by which the country aims to transform the economy and reduce its dependency on oil. Turkey plans to prioritize research and development (R&D) in the energy sector in the coming years, while Egypt’s Ministry of Electricity and Renewable Energy has set a goal of renewables providing 20 percent of all power used domestically by 2022. In the United Arab Emirates, Masdar is committed to the mission of renewable energy by investing in education and R&D.

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