Silence is eloquent

The Senate Republicans silenced Elizabeth Warren last  night after she read a 1986 letter from Coretta Scott King that they viewed as impugning the reputation of Jeff Sessions, the Trump administration’s nominee for Attorney General. The letter and attached statement definitely do call into question Senator Sessions’ reputation and qualifications, based in part on his service as a US Attorney in Mobile, Alabama. That is apparently contrary to Senate rules, according to McConnell, even though examining reputation and qualifications is obviously an important to advising and consenting (or not) to the nomination.

Why all this sensitivity about a more than 30-year-old letter? The problem is this: the letter cites Sessions’ efforts to “intimidate and chill the free exercise of the ballot by citizens….Mr. Sessions has used the awesome powers of his office in a shabby attempt to intimidate and frighten elderly black voters.”

That is precisely what President Trump has set out to inspire by claiming that millions of people voted illegally for Hillary Clinton in last November’s presidential contest. It is also what Republicans nationwide have been trying to do for years by adopting unjustified voter identification laws, closing polling places, gerrymandering Congressional districts, and encouraging unqualified “poll watchers.” The only difference 30 years have made is that the target is no longer limited to elderly black voters but now includes young ones, Hispanics, and immigrants of all sorts. These efforts are well-documented in court cases throughout the country, many of which the Republicans have lost.

Silencing Warren has attracted far more attention than allowing her to complete her statement. McConnell should have anticipated that, but whether he did is unclear.

What difference does all this make to foreign policy, international affairs, or war and peace, which are the subjects of www.peacefare.net In short, the effort to suppress voting is inconsistent with American values and interests, both of which the US government spends a good deal of time, money, and effort promoting abroad. If the Trump administration, Republicans in Congress, and Republican-controlled states continue in this direction, the United States will have no credibility at all in promoting democracy abroad.

That will trouble serious Republicans, but it is not going to bother Trump. He has no intention of promoting democracy at home or abroad. His executive order on immigration is intended to establish the broadest possible scope for presidential authority to protect national security, including non-fact based measures that deny individuals equal treatment under the law. As Nora Ellingsen puts it on Lawfare:

Since January 2015, the FBI has also arrested more anti-immigrant American citizens plotting violent attacks on Muslims within the U.S. than it has refugees, or former refugees, from any banned country.

If Trump wins on immigration, he’ll try to import the broad, irrational, and unequal application of presidential national security authority to the domestic scene.

That’s why Coretta Scott King’s aging letter is so problematic. It accuses Sessions, who will play a vital role in Trump’s administration as Attorney General, of doing precisely what the Trump administration intends to do: deny individual rights, created its own alternative facts, and use them to empower the President to do as he pleases, even if that means silencing critics like Elizabeth Warren.

Fortunately, silence is eloquent.

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Lost in translation

On Friday, the American Enterprise Institute hosted “Lost in Translation: The Unsung War Heroes of Iraq and Afghanistan”. The evening kicked off with a discussion between Paul Wolfowitz of AEI, and General David Petraeus, partner, KKR and Chairman KKR Global Institute. Following this was a panel discussion featuring former Iraqi translator Salwan Al Toki, former Afghan translator Janis Shinwari, and Matthew Zeller, founder of No One Left Behind.

Wolfowitz noted the timeliness of this event given the recent Trump administration immigration restrictions, though the purpose of the gathering was not to criticize the executive order but to recognize the important role of foreign translators. Petraeus recalled his own experience working with translators from all over the world. He said that the translator’s job goes beyond interpretation; the translater is an adviser to senior US leadership with incredible responsibility. He recalled the bond of those who serve together and the risk these men and women take to put themselves in line of danger.

The US armed forces are veterans in every way except legal status, Petraeus said. He remarked that he is happy to see General Mattis immediately taking on the task of setting up exceptions to the immigration ban. Taking care of those who serve US interests abroad is not only the right thing to do, but also the smart thing to do. Next time we enter into a foreign conflict, we want individuals on the ground to support us.

Al Toki asked the audience how many of them had stood in front of foreign soldiers while their countrymen stood on the opposing side. Remembering the day American soldiers approached him and asked if he would get involved, he was hesitant, unclear of US intentions in Iraq and wanted to speak to their general. After getting involved he helped build schools, train police, and worked to form a solid governance strategy for Iraq. After the military, he worked for USAID and established a chamber of commerce, along with centers for women and children. He said that the US service members in Iraq were his guests, and now he is the guest in the US. He served the US loyally and to the best of his ability. He is not afraid of death but he is afraid of someone being left behind.

Shinwari became a translator because he wanted to help his own country and to support his family, not because he wanted to come to America. As one of the most trusted translators he was at every conflict and afforded the privilege of a weapon. When recounting the tale of how he saved the life of fellow panel member Matt Zeller, he echoed Salwan’s sentiment that the Americans were guests in his country and that he felt a need to protect them, putting his own life in danger. Though he never planned on going to the US, in 2009 he was informed that the Taliban had his name, face, and information. He started receiving phone calls threatening his life and that of his family. After waiting many years for his visa to come through, he left Afghanistan for a new life in the US.

Matt Zeller recounted the day he met Shinwari at the airport and welcomed him and his family to the United States. They arrived with four small suitcases, and no idea where they were to live. Zeller realized that he needed to do something and started a “go fund me” page to raise money. Within days he got the family set up in a two-bedroom apartment, furnished with donations, and offered Shinwari a check for $35,000 from the American people. Shinwari refused the money, instead suggesting that they start an organization to help bring over other interpreters.

There was no existing organization to step up and meet this need, and thus No One Left Behind was created. The goal of the non-profit is to help former translators get a visa, welcome them at the airport with a proper reception, and find them a home for at least 90 days furnished at no cost to them. Then the group aims to buy them a car, find them a first job and a first American friend or mentor. Zeller remarked he would eventually like the Defense Department to take on these responsibilities and take care of the people who help us abroad. He recalled the honorary veteran status extended to Philippine soldiers during WWII, and suggested a similar recognition be granted to those who served with the US in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Watch the full event here:

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What’s at stake

As I am not a lawyer, I won’t comment on the legal aspects of the hearing later today on the President’s executive order temporarily banning travel from seven Muslim-majority countries and indefinitely barring Syrians, including refuges with a well-founded fear of persecution, from entering the US. The case will presumably be decided on legal grounds, but as Madeleine Albright cogently said on NPR this morning, the policy implications are enormous:

Three things are at stake:

  1. Equality: While the executive order carefully avoids singling out Muslims for the ban, it is clearly intended to favor Christians and other minorities, who admittedly often suffer significant persecution in the countries in question. There is no need to favor them. Christians and other minorities already represent a disproportionate percentage of the refugees who gain admittance to the US. What those who wrote the executive order are trying to do is establish a precedent for presidential authority to distinguish among ethnic and sectarian groups, rather than individuals. I have no doubt at all if the court rules in the Administration’s favor that the President and his minions will try again in the domestic context, perhaps going as far as to try to register Muslims. If the court denies the President the authority to make such distinctions for foreigners who have not yet entered the US, it will be hard to argue in favor of any proposal that makes them for lawful US residents and citizens.
  2. Facts: The Administration has explicitly sought to establish “alternative facts,” including not only the mythical three million illegal voters but more recently also terrorist attacks in Europe that the media have hidden from the US public. Another of its alternative facts is the claim that this executive order is required to protect national security, because immigrants from the seven countries in question might conduct terrorist attacks inside the US. That is of course a possibility that has to be taken seriously. It is a major factor in the rigorous, existing vetting processes, which have ensured that not one immigrant from any of these countries has attempted a terrorist act in the US since 9/11. Of course past performance does not necessarily predict future results, but we have no factual basis on which to expect anything different, provided the vetting remains rigorous. No one has proposed anything else. If the Administration merely wanted to improve and tighten the vetting, it could have done that without a high-profile ban.
  3. National security: As Madeleine and her colleagues have correctly noted, the executive order hurts national security: it will make it less attractive for both individuals and countries to collaborate against terrorism with the US, it will aid extremist recruiting, and it will damage relations with our traditional allies in Europe if not also the Middle East. It also damages travel and educational exchanges in ways that are both economically and culturally harmful: fewer students will be studying in the US and fewer Americans will venture abroad. There is no reason whatsoever to believe that the executive order will protect US national security.

A judicial ruling in favor of the government will not be the last word on these three issues. The government could win on immigration but lose when these issues arise in a domestic context, where equal treatment under the law, factual support, and real national security concerns could be treated more rationally, without reference to the broad executive authority a president wields in the international arena.

But a government win would validate Trump’s outrageous critique of the W-appointed judge who provided the temporary restraining order suspending the immigration ban and send a global message (including to our own citizens) that the US is no longer a rational actor committed to equal protection for all individuals or to factual assessment of its national security risks, but rather prefers some groups over others and exaggerates the potential for those others to threaten America.

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Cooling it

Iran for the moment appears to be taking a low key approach to responding to new US sanctions aimed at its ballistic missile program and support for Hizbollah. It is continuing to test missiles and radarswithout however any indication as yet that they are nuclear capable. That is the minimum we should expect of them.

Iran as I understand it has already blocked Americans from entering, in response to Trump’s travel ban. They can do much more. It is easy for the Iranians to hassle the US Navy in the Gulf and the strait of Hormuz. US troops are particularly vulnerable to Iranian surrogates in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Hizbollah maintains capabilities to strike the US not only in Lebanon but also elsewhere, including inside the US. Use of these capabilities could significantly escalate the conflict with the US, which would likely respond with military force, either openly or clandestinely.

Whatever happens, the likelihood is a significant deterioration of already pretty bad relations between Washington and Tehran. Trump, who denounces the Iran nuclear deal regularly in stentorian tones, may even be aiming to get Iran to renounce it. This would leave the Iranians free to pursue nuclear weapons without however any real possibility that the US could restore the multilateral sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table. Military action would quickly become the only option for stopping the Iranian nuclear program from producing everything needed for nuclear weapons.

We should therefore appreciate the low-key approach the Iranians have taken so far. By far the best bet for the US on the nuclear weapons front is strict implementation of the deal. Even hard-line opponents of it are coming down on that option. It just doesn’t make any sense at all to do anything else.

Even with full implementation (on both sides), relations between Iran and the US are unlikely to improve during a Trump administration. The President’s National Security Adviser, General Flynn, is Tehran’s favorite American general, because appears to have accused President Obama of creating and supporting the Islamic State, a standard Iranian propaganda talking point. But he is also ferociously anti-Iranian and I would say a certifiable Islamophobe. He appears to be driving Iran policy, at least for now, but Steve Bannon, the white nationalist (I would say supremacist) chief White House strategist no doubt concurs.

Trump himself is stridently anti-Iranian, which scores him points both domestically as well as with the Israelis and Gulf states. Apart from the nuclear deal, these constituencies, as well as many others, have two problems with Iranian behavior: its aggressive support of proxies in the region (especially in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Bahrain) as well as its continued support to Hizbollah worldwide.

Iran is still a revolutionary regime aiming to maintain its semi-autocratic brand of theocracy, arm Shia populations in other countries to resist abuse, and use those surrogates to defend itself. It sees the US and Israel as its most dangerous main enemies, with the Gulf states a close second. At least in American eyes, there has been no sign of moderation in Iranian rhetoric and behavior since the signing of the nuclear deal. President Rouhani is enjoying at least some of its benefits to the Iranian economy, but the Supreme Leader, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and most of the Majles remain just as staunchly and stridently anti-American as Trump is anti-Iranian.

No, I don’t see much likelihood this will change. The main thing now is to prevent increased tensions between the US and Iran from exploding into armed conflict. Cooling it is the best we can hope for.

 

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Withdraw, renegotiate, or enforce?

With apologies, I’ve been slow to post this fine piece by Sarah Timreck on an event that occurred the week before last:

The Hudson Institute January 25 discussed the Iran deal’s prospects and challenges during the Trump administration. Participants were Michael Pregent, Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute, Gary Samore, Executive Director for Research at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and Trita Parsi, Founder and President of the National Iranian American Council. Suzanne Kianpour, Capitol Hill and Foreign Affairs Producer at BBC News, moderated the panel.

With a background as an intelligence officer in Iraq and military experience on the ground facing the IRGC, Pregent opposes the Iran deal and feels that the concessions given by way of sanctions relief are fundamentally destabilizing. Pregent said that he hopes for changes under the Trump administration, which might recognize the deal’s potential to fuel Iran’s hegemonic aspirations and further weaken the region. Although the deal was intended to benefit Iran economically, right now it allows Iran to more freely support groups such as Hezbollah and regimes such as Assad’s. Trump does not need to rip up the deal but rather enforce it, end secret side deals, deny Iranian companies with IRGC stakeholders access to US banking, and continue to put pressure on Iran’s human rights abuses and support of terrorism.

Samore outlined Trump’s options for the deal moving forward. The first , to renege on the agreement and withdraw current presidential sanctions waivers, would undermine support if other members of the P5+1 saw the US as responsible for killing the agreement without just cause. It could also make Iran resume nuclear activity. The second option, renegotiating with Iran for a better deal, is a more complicated choice. The US would add new conditions in order to trade with Iran but also be prepared to offer additional sanctions relief. Samore was not confident that Trump would support this option or if Iran would come to the table. The third option, in which Trump abides by and enforces the deal, would be the option most favored by the P5+1, the foreign policy establishment, and allies in the region. It is therefore Trump’s safest choice. Samore concluded by saying that he is not confident that the deal will last, citing current minor Iranian violations, lingering tension between the US and Iran, and Iranian frustration over the lack of visible sanctions relief.

Parsi discussed the Iran deal in the context of America’s future in the Middle East. The deal was reflective of a change in US-Iranian relations, signaling progress that many believed would never occur. Ultimately, opposition to the deal was more about the regional and geopolitical repercussions than about coming to terms with Iran on critical issues. The Middle East has lost strategic significance for the US and its focus should shift, pivoting towards Asia and other global challenges. The deal allows America to focus its attention elsewhere and not bog down in the region.

Kianpour then asked the panelists about the potential for renegotiating the deal. Pregent emphasized America’s need to remain focused on the Middle East, calling a US pivot away a mistake considering Iran’s strategic goal of keeping the region fractured. Samore believes renegotiation is possible, but does not see willingness within the Trump administration to make more concessions towards Iran. Parsi also did not see a strong likelihood of re-entering talks given how gruesome and tiring the first round was. He also felt the deal gave the US a degree of maneuverability in its relations with regional allies.

Kianpour also asked the panelists about the impact of the deal on internal politics within Iran. While Parsi said there is curiosity on the part of Iranians about Trump’s actions, American conduct in the region, as well as Iranian conduct, will only slowly reveal themselves over the long term. Pregent felt that the deal has emboldened Iran to continue its “nefarious activit[ies],” while also constraining the US, in particular in Syria. Conversely, both Samore and Parsi felt that Pregent was overstating Iran’s influence on America. Problems in the Middle East did not originate from the deal, nor did the Obama administration feel Iran was central to its decision-making.

Many of the questions focused on the impact of destroying the deal and methods of countering Iranian influence in the region. Pregent took the view that because Iran constantly cheats, strictly enforcing the deal would help keep them in check. He advocates that the US take a position of strength when entering negotiations and hold Iran accountable for its actions. Samore remained skeptical the deal would last the entirety of its lifespan, but also warned about what might come after the deal’s expiration, namely the resumption of nuclear activity. Parsi emphasized the need to honor the deal. He also urged the US to listen to the sentiment within Iran to better understand how the deal impacts prospects for the future of the region and American interests there.

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Peace picks February 6-12

1. Missing OPEC? The Unwelcome Return Of Boom-Bust Oil Prices | Monday Feb 6 | 5:00 pm – 7:30 pm | Johns Hopkins SAIS – Rome Building | Register Here

Bob McNally will discuss his new book, Crude Volatility – The History and Future of Boom-Bust Oil Prices. World oil prices have fallen drastically over the last two years, spurred partly by the rise of tight oil production in the US, and by OPEC’s failure to cut production.

Recently, in an effort to raise oil prices, OPEC is attempting to regroup and has agreed to lower its production. Will it succeed? This is one of the questions to be discussed at this energy forum which will also review the history of oil prices. Kevin Book, Managing Director at Clearview Energy Partners will serve as the commentator.

2. Rebuilding Syria: Reconstruction and Legitimacy | Tuesday February 7, 2017 | 10-11:30 AM | Atlantic Council | Register Here

Please join the Atlantic Council for a discussion on the technical and political challenges ahead for rebuilding Syria with country and development experts on February 7, 2017.

3. Media Consumption in Turkey | Wednesday, February 8, 2107 | 9-10 AM | Gallup World Headquarters | Register Here
The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and Gallup invite you to attend a research briefing on media use in Turkey.

Despite the crackdown on opposition media over the past few years, most adults in Turkey (71.8%) say they are at least somewhat satisfied with the information provided by the country’s media. However, far fewer are very satisfied with media coverage in the country.

The widespread adoption of broadband connections and smartphones in Turkey has made the internet a major source of news for many residents. About two-thirds of adults (65.0%) currently say they go online for news at least weekly in Turkey, up from half (49.7%) in 2013. Among Kurdish speakers in Turkey, the rise has been even sharper, from 49.8% in 2013 to 70.8% in the current study. In conjunction with the growing use of online news, weekly audiences for TV and radio news have tapered slightly.

The speakers will share data on media trends in the country, and review attitudinal data from the Gallup World Poll. Speakers include Chris Stewart, Partner, Gallup, Ben Ryan, Research Consultant, Gallup, and William Bell, Research Director, Voice of America.

4. From Aleppo to Washington: Crisis in Syria | Thursday February 9, 2017 | 6-8 PM | AMIDEAST | Register Here

Join the Penn State School of International Affairs and AMIDEAST on Thursday, February 9, for a panel discussion on the conflict in Syria and what it means for the Syrian people, American foreign policy in the Trump administration, and the international community at large. “From Aleppo to Washington: Crisis in Syria,” features a panel of distinguished foreign policy experts and practitioners, all of whom are connected with the School of International Affairs

The speakers include Vice Admiral (Ret.) James W. Houck, retired judge advocate general of the U.S. Navy, Theodore Kattouf, former U.S. Ambassador to Syria, Flynt Leverett, professor of international affairs at Penn State, former Middle East analyst at the CIA, Rachel Sayre, senior disaster specialist for Iraq and Syria at the U.S. Agency for International Development, and Scott Sigmund Gartner (moderator), director of the Penn State School of International Affairs.

5. NAFTA 2.0? | Thursday February 9, 2017 | 9-10:30 AM | Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center | Register Here

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, Mexico, and the United States, was signed by U.S. President George H.W. Bush, Mexican President Carlos Salinas, and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1992. By 1993, the agreement was ratified by the legislatures of the three countries, and by December 8, 1993, President Bill Clinton signed the agreement into law. NAFTA entered into force on January 1, 1994.    By 2014, the agreement reached it’s 20th year anniversary, acknowledged by the “Three Amigos Summit” in February of that same year. After the 2016 U.S. Presidential campaign season, NAFTA once again was brought to the forefront of the political and economic discussions.   Please join WITA as we look at the future of trade in North American, and what  revisiting the 22-year old agreement might look like.

6. The Transatlantic Policy Symposium (TAPS) | Thursday February 9, 2017 | 10 AM- 8:30 PM | Georgetown University’s Copley Formal Lounge | Register Here

Georgetown University is hosting the Transatlantic Policy Symposium (TAPS) this Thursday February 9, 2017. The transatlantic relationship has flourished in the post-war era, becoming a cornerstone of both American and European foreign policy. In light of contemporary challenges, including issues of global security, humanitarian assistance and the re-emergence of populism in both Europe and the United States, it is imperative to evaluate the current state of the transatlantic relationship as well as speculate on its future.

Join the expert and graduate student panelists as they discuss and explore these issues in relation to the future of the transatlantic relationship.

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