Tag: Al Qaeda
Shifting sands
Uncertainty is breaking out all over the Greater Middle East.
With Crown Prince Nayef’s death in Saudi Arabia, the House of Saud will soon have to look past its octogenarian leadership to the next generation, with all the uncertainties that implies. Will the next generation be as attached to religious and social Wahhabi conservatism as the current one? Will it open an era of serious reform?
The suspension of the UN monitoring effort in Syria presages an increase in violent conflict with a highly uncertain outcome. Russia seems determined to keep Bashar al Assad in power, though its Foreign Minister denies it. Iran will certainly exert itself in that direction. I doubt the armed rebellion can beat the Syrian security forces any time soon, but we could see a lengthy insurgency fed by Saudi and Qatari arms shipments through Turkey.
The only real certainty in Egypt is that the military is trying to hold on to power. Whether it can and what the consequences will be is highly uncertain, as are the results of today’s presidential election. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has arrogated to itself legislative power, which means it now has to deal with Egypt’s economy and social problems along security and law and order. I don’t know any military establishments equal to that task, but the risk of new parliamentary elections may be greater than the SCAF wants to run. It could end up forced to rule Egypt, likely badly, for some time to come.
Iraq‘s Prime Minister Maliki has faced down a parliamentary rebellion but Al Qaeda has renewed its murderous attacks against the country’s Shia. If they succeed in reigniting Iraq’s sectarian warfare, the promise of a relatively democratic society that produces a lot of oil will evaporate, leaving a bitter residue.
Iran‘s Supreme Leader Khamenei has concentrated power as rarely before in the Islamic republic’s history, but American and Israeli threats of military attack against it nuclear program make prediction even a year out difficult.
After ten years of rule by Hamid Karzai, even Afghanistan faces the uncertainty of an election (to be held no one knows when in 2013 or 2014) in which he will not be running and an end to the NATO combat role shortly thereafter.
I needn’t mention next month’s elections in Libya or the aging leadership in Algeria, where military success in repressing Al Qaeda in the Maghreb seems to have pushed the militants into the Sahel, where they are destabilizing several other countries.
A region that enjoyed decades of stability–some would say stagnation, much of it autocratically imposed–now registers high volatility. Of course volatility can move in either direction: there are possible positive developments as well as negative ones. Tunisia has pushed the envelope in the positive direction. Yemen seems to be making progress against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and affiliates, though some think the government offensive and U.S. drone attacks are creating more extremists than they are killing. Morocco and Jordan have attempted some modest reforms that seem unlikely to suffice, but they may stave off open rebellion.
It is not easy to deal with uncertainty. Most experts would recommend triage and prioritization. Triage happens naturally. There are only a few Middle East problems that will make it to the President’s desk: Iran and Egypt most frequently, Afghanistan because of the American troops, and we can hope Syria when Obama meets with Putin this week at the G-20 in Moscow.
Prioritization of issues is harder. Even those who recommend it muddle exactly what they mean. Colleagues at the Carnegie Endowment recommend in a recent overview of the situation in the Middle East:
international actors should focus on a few, very specific issues for special emphasis, such as international human rights standards, the maintenance of existing treaty relationships, and the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes.
But then they go on to recommend economic cooperation aimed at job creation, a non sequitur virtually guaranteed to disappoint expectations given limited U.S. resources and a track record of failure. Not to mention the difficulty of meeting human rights standards, since these require equal gender treatment not readily available in the workplace in many of the countries in question.
Shifting sands will make navigation in the Middle East difficult for a long time to come. I recommend to all my international affairs students that they learn Arabic, or another of the regional languages (Farsi most of all). Even if American oil production continues to reduce already low U.S. dependence on the Middle East, the global oil market and the extremist movements the region has spawned will ensure we remain engaged there for a long time to come, triage and prioritization notwithstanding.
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Is Al Qaeda Inc. bankrupt?
It is hard for me to imagine adding anything original to the flood of commentary on the Letters from Abbottabad, as West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center calls them. As the New York Times put it,
The frustrations expressed by Bin Laden as he issued instructions sometimes in vain might be familiar to any chief executive trying to keep tabs on a multinational corporation that had grown beyond its modest origins.
Osama even worried about which currencies to keep ransom proceeds in. Mario Draghi will be pleased to learn that Al Qaeda’s reserves were kept in euros as well as dollars. I guess its only a matter of time before they add Chinese renminbi.
In what I’ve read so far, which is not much, Bin Laden’s advice on leadership stands out:
As you well know, the best people are the ones most agreed on by the people, and the key attributes that bring people together and preserve their staying behind their leader are his kindness, forgiveness, sense of fairness, patience, and good rapport with him, as well as showing care for them and not tax them beyond their ability.
What must always be in the forefront of our minds is: managing people at such times calls for even greater wisdom, kindness, forgiveness, patience and deliberation, and is a complex task by most any measure.
This is quoted from the last of the letters, labelled no. 19 in the translations.
Getting people to do what Al Qaeda does obviously requires much more kindness than portrayed in American movies. This is an important lesson. The evil groups of people do is almost always done for some purpose the members of the group regard as good, not evil. Leadership is what convinces them that they are acting for a good purpose, so it needs to behave well towards those it wants to rally. At other points in the letters, it is clear that Bin Laden was unhappy with Al Qaeda and affiliated attacks on Muslims. He wanted his cadres to focus on Americans, because they are the real enemy.
Americans hope to defeat Al Qaeda. Certainly it has suffered a good deal of damage, self-inflicted as well as drone and special forces-inflicted in the last few years. But it is unlikely to disappear entirely, any more than homegrown right-wing terrorism, much reduced from its heyday, has disappeared entirely from the United States. The real question the Bin Laden papers pose is how much more effort we should put into what the Bush administration called the Global War on Terror, which we are still fighting in Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan and other places.
Only a closer examination of the entire trove of letters and other documents could enlighten us as to the answer. I doubt the American public will ever get that privilege. The published letters have presumably been carefully chosen. They can give us only an incomplete picture of Al Qaeda. We’ll have to rely on the assessments of our (not always) intelligence community and the wisdom of our elected leaders to make the decision on whether Al Qaeda Inc. is bankrupt.
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Red lines drawn
The audience for the President’s speech last night on the Strategic Partnership agreement with Afghanistan was the American electorate, but the agreement itself is more interesting for the messages it sends to President Karzai, the Taliban and the Afghan people. In part it sets out American red lines, that is limits beyond which the Washington is not prepared to go. There are also some Afghan red lines, drawn to hem in the Americans. What are they?
Here’s a sample extracted from the text:
Afghanistan reaffirms its strong commitment to inclusive and pluralistic democratic governance, including free, fair and transparent elections in which all of the people of Afghanistan participate freely and without internal or external interference….Afghanistan reaffirms its commitment to protecting human and political rights…Afghanistan reaffirms its commitment to ensuring that any kind of discrimination and distinction between citizens of Afghanistan shall be forbidden…Afghanistan shall ensure and advance the essential role of women in society, so that they may fully enjoy their economic, social, political, civil and cultural rights.
These clauses are clearly intended to limit what can be agreed in the talks with the Taliban, as well as to fence in Karzai. No selling out women and minorities.
Contrary to what some have claimed, the agreement does not cover the status of U.S. forces, which continues under existing agreements until a new one is negotiated, with a goal of doing so within a year. The existing agreements are to remain in force until the new one is negotiated, which is good since the one-year goal may not hold.
The agreement also sets out some Afghan red lines. The United States
…reaffirms that it does not seek permanent military facilities in Afghanistan, or a presence that is a threat to Afghanistan’s neighbors. The United States further pledges not to use Afghan territory or facilities as a launching point for attacks against other countries.
The “permanent military facilities” is a bit of a sop, since the U.S. claims none of its overseas bases are permanent. They just tend to stay around for a long time. Afghanistan will have sought the pledge about launching attacks to reassure Pakistan and Iran, but “pledges” are less than complete commitments, and of course Afghanistan can always agree (overtly or covertly) to such operations.
The U.S. says it will try to get money for the Afghan security forces year by year. No amount is specified, but it is likely to be a few billion. The U.S. also says
…it shall regard with grave concern any external aggression against Afghanistan.
If someone attacks, the Afghans get consultations to decide on an appropriate response. This is pretty thin gruel, far short of a mutual defense pact.
There is some handwaving about regional cooperation, but the language is aspirational and the proof can only come with the pudding. Ditto the stuff on economic cooperation, including the fight against corruption, drugs, money laundering and organized crime.
The U.S. pledges to put 50% of its aid through the government and to align 80% with Afghan priorities. Those would have been decent goals years ago: a lot of our aid goes directly to U.S. contractors and grantees and never enters the government’s field of vision. Try running a country without knowing what your biggest donors are up to.
The agreement sets up a bilateral commission, which is standard operating procedure.
If this is all it takes to get us out of the longest war in our history, we’re lucky. It will likely be enough to get us through the NATO Summit in Chicago next month, which was one of the purposes of getting it signed now. Beyond that, there are a lot of uncertainties, but at least we’ve got some red lines drawn, on both sides.
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All deliberate speed
President Obama flew in secret today to Kabul, where he signed with President Karzai the strategic partnership agreement that will govern the bilateral relationship with the United States after security responsibility is turned over to the Afghans by the end of 2014. At best, this agreement marks the final, peacebuilding phase after the longest war in American history.
The President’s speech will be given at 4 am local time, which means it isn’t intended for Afghans. The target is the American electorate, tired of the war and focused on domestic problems. It will be hard to make Afghanistan resonate with his fellow countrymen, but he will try.
The agreement, I imagine he will say, is the responsible way to end a war that America undertook in self defense against Al Qaeda and the Taliban authorities who sheltered it. We have succeeded. But Afghanistan will need our help and support for long into the future: it is a poor country that has sacrificed a great deal and will need our continued help to keep extremists at bay even after its security forces take on the primary responsibility.
I am an Obamista, but even to me this is not the full story. The price tag for the help we provide Afghanistan will be billions per year for the foreseeable future. Leaving aside the questions of how many U.S. troops will stay and the capacity (or lack thereof) of the Afghan security forces, there are still has a lot of wrinkles that need ironing out: Pakistan’s refusal to deal Al Qaeda a death blow or to rein in the Taliban, the so far inconclusive negotiations with them, growing Taliban influence in some areas, the corruption that is rife in Karzai’s government, the failure to create anything like decent governance in most of Afghanistan, the shaky economic foundations on which the Afghan government sits, the role of Iran in Afghanistan, and whether some U.S. troops will stay longer than currently planned.
We are not so much getting out of Afghanistan victoriously as getting out before it all flies apart. Don’t get me wrong: I wouldn’t want us to stay, and I’ve said it is time to go, without however destabilizing the situation. We cannot and should not stay to iron out all the wrinkles, but we should at least be aware that they are there and may cause difficulty in the future.
Mitt Romney, John McCain and others will complain that we are not doing enough–that we should stay in Afghanistan until we’ve ensured that things will not come apart, or the Taliban back to power. But if they think that is likely to be a view popular with the American electorate, they are fooling themselves. By a wide margin, Americans want out of Afghanistan to take care of priorities at home.
I’ll be happily surprised if ten years from now we’ll be proud of what Afghanistan has become. But move we must, with what the Supreme Court famously called “all deliberate speed.”
PS: I haven’t seen the agreement yet, but here is a White House fact sheet.
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This week’s peace picks
It’s a quieter week on the international front than in the recent past. But some good events nevertheless:
1. A Year Beyond Bin Laden: the New Al Qaeda, Center for National Policy 12:30-1:45 pm May 1 at the Capitol Visitor Center, Room HVC-215
It has been exactly a year since an elite team of Navy SEALs killed al Qaeda’s Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The world has seen other changes as well: the “Arab Spring,” the reverberations of which continue to rock the Middle East and the larger Muslim world.
With the benefit of a year of reflection, how has Bin Laden’s death change al Qaeda? How are these changes likely to play out in the future? What are al Qaeda’s prospects in a post-Arab Spring world, given the ascendance of Islamic political parties? With CNP President Scott Bates moderating, our panel of experts will discuss and debate these questions and more
Mary Habeth
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
Will McCants
Center for Naval Analyses
Stephen Tankel
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Moderator:
Scott Bates
President, Center for National Policy
| Mary Habeck is an associate professor in Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). From 2008 to 2009, she was the special advisor for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council staff. She is the author of Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror and two forthcoming sequels, Attacking America: How Salafi Jihadis Are Fighting Their 200-Year War with the U.S. and Fighting the Enemy: The U.S. and its War against the Salafi Jihadis. | ||
| William McCants is a Middle East specialist at CNA’s Center for Strategic Studies and adjunct faculty at Johns Hopkins University. He previously managed the Minerva Initiative for the Department of Defense and served as a State Department senior adviser for countering violent extremism. He is the author of Founding Gods, Inventing Nations: Conquest and Culture Myths from Antiquity to Islam. | ||
| Stephen Tankel is an assistant professor at American University, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment in the South Asia program, and an adjunct staff member at the RAND Corporation. Professor Tankel has conducted field research on insurgency, terrorism, and other security issues in Algeria, India, Lebanon, Pakistan, and the Balkans. He is the author of Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba. |
2. Threats to Defenders of Democracy in Balochistan, NED, 12:30-2 pm May 2
featuring
Malik Siraj Akbar, Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow
with comments by
Brian Joseph, National Endowment for Democracy
Wednesday, May 2, 2012
12 noon–2:00 p.m.
(Lunch served from 12:00 to 12:30 p.m.)
1025 F Street, N.W., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20004
Telephone: 202-378-9675
RSVP (acceptances only) with name and affiliation by Monday, April 30
About the Event
The February 2012 hearing on Balochistan at the U.S House of Representatives brought rare public attention to a longstanding conflict in Pakistan’s mineral-rich southwestern province. While high-level discourse has focused on issues of national sovereignty, security, and secession, the gross violations of human rights in the region have received little international coverage, due in part to government censorship and the threats faced by journalists. Since its accession to Pakistan in 1948, Balochistan has been the scene of periodic uprisings that have resulted in the extrajudicial killing, torture, and enforced disappearance of countless civilians, professionals, and political leaders. Despite judicial and parliamentary initiatives on the part of Pakistan’s civilian government, the conflict remains unresolved.
In his presentation, award-winning journalist Malik Siraj Akbar will offer insights into the origins of the human rights crisis in Balochistan, and an account of the threats faced by defenders of democracy in the region, as well as preliminary recommendations for how best to move forward. Brian Joseph will provide comments.
About the Speakers
Malik Siraj Akbar is a Pakistani journalist who has risked his life covering enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, assaults on journalists, and other human rights violations, particularly in his native Balochistan. The founding editor of the Baloch Hal, Pakistan’s first online local newspaper, he previously served as the Balochistan bureau chief of the Daily Times, Pakistan’s leading English-language newspaper (2006–2010). A recognized regional expert, he is the author of The Redefined Dimensions of the Baloch Nationalist Movement (2011), as well as numerous articles on press freedom, human rights, religious radicalism, and the war on terror in Pakistan.
Brian Joseph is the senior director for Asia and multi-regional programs at the National Endowment for Democracy.
3. Why the US is Not Destined to Decline: A Debate, WWC, 4-5:30 pm May 2
To argue against the widely proclaimed idea of American decline, as this book does, might seem a lonely task. After all, the problems are real and serious. Yet if we take a longer view, much of the discourse about decline appears exaggerated, hyperbolic, and ahistorical. Why? First, because of the deep underlying strengths of the United States. These include not only size, population, demography, and resources, but also the scale and importance of its economy and financial markets, its scientific research and technology, its competitiveness, its military power, and its attractiveness to talented immigrants. Second, there is the weight of history and of American exceptionalism. Throughout its history, the United States has repeatedly faced and eventually overcome daunting challenges and crises. Contrary to a prevailing pessimism, there is nothing inevitable about American decline. Flexibility, adaptability, and the capacity for course correction provide the United States with a unique resilience that has proved invaluable in the past and will do so in the future. Ultimately, the ability to avoid serious decline is less a question of material factors than of policy, leadership, and political will.
Author Robert J. Lieber will discuss his new book, Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why the US is Not Destined to Decline. He will be joined on the panel by Michael Mandelbaum.
If you wish to attend this event, please send RSVP to iss@wilsoncenter.org.
4. The Arab Awakening: Progress or Peril? A Conversation with Amr Hamzawy and Jane Harman
| Date / Time | Thursday, May 3 / 12:00pm – 2:00pm |
|---|---|
| Location |
Woodrow Wilson Center 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004
|
| Description | As transitioning Arab countries struggle to consolidate revolutionary change with elections and constitutional reform, it is still unclear whether they will succeed in becoming democracies. Economies are in crisis, Islamists are dominating elections, former regime elements are resurgent, and civil society is under threat. Are revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya succeeding in delivering dignity and freedom, or are they being hijacked by illiberal forces?Amr Hamzawy, a leading voice of the Egyptian revolution who has become one of his country’s most active parliamentarians, and Wilson Center President Jane Harman will debate where Egypt and other transitioning Arab countries are headed.The Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council and the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center invite you to participate in this inaugural event in a series of debates on the future of the transitioning Arab countries. |
Friday, May 4th
9:45 AM – 10:00 AM
Coffee and Registration
10:00 AM – 12:00 PM
Panel Discussion and Q&A
Senate Dirksen Office Building
Room 106
Panelists: Brahma Chellaney
Panelists : Centre for Policy Research
Panelists: Michael J. Green
Panelists : Center for Strategic and International Studies
Panelists : Lodi G. Gyari
Panelists : Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama
Panelists : Ambassador Lalit Mansingh
Panelists : Former Indian Foreign Secretary
Moderator: Ellen Bork
Moderator: Foreign Policy Initiative
To RSVP, click here.
As the Obama administration pursues its “Asia pivot,” Tibet is taking on increased strategic significance due to its importance as a source of water and minerals, the militarization of the Tibetan plateau and the Sino-Indian border, Chinese influence in Nepal, and Beijing’s insistence on deference to its control of Tibet as a “core interest.” The series of self-immolations by Tibetans over the past year demonstrates that 60 years of Communist Chinese occupation has not succeeded in destroying Tibetans’ identity and desire for freedom. This still unfolding unrest and the democratization of the Tibetan government-in-exile make imperative a review of international policies.
Moving forward, what role will Tibet play in the region’s peace and security? Do the U.S. and India have the right policies in place for Tibet? What policies is China pursuing in response to recent events and in anticipation of the future? What are the prospects for achieving the autonomy the Dalai Lama seeks? Can Tibetan Buddhism and democracy provide a bridge between Tibetans and Chinese?
Discussing these vital questions will be Brahma Chellaney of the Centre for Policy Research; Michael J. Green of the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Lodi G. Gyari, special envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama; and Ambassador Lalit Mansingh, former Indian Foreign Secretary. FPI Director of Democracy and Human Rights Ellen Bork will moderate the discussion.
Speaker Biographies
Brahma Chellaney is a professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, a fellow of the Norwegian Nobel Institute, a trustee of the National Book Trust, and an affiliate with the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization at King’s College London. He has served as a member of the Policy Advisory Group headed by the Foreign Minister of India. Before that, Dr. Chellaney was an adviser to India’s National Security Council until January 2000, serving as convener of the External Security Group of the National Security Advisory Board. A specialist on international security and arms control issues, Dr. Chellaney has held appointments at Harvard University, the Brookings Institution, the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and the Australian National University. He is the author of six books, including Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan and his latest book Water: Asia’s New Battleground. Dr. Chellaney has published research papers in publications such as International Security, Orbis, Survival, Washington Quarterly, Security Studies, and Terrorism. He regularly contributes opinion articles to the International Herald Tribune, The Wall Street Journal, the Japan Times, the Asian Age, the Hindustan Times, and the Times of India. In 1985, Dr. Chellaney won a Citation for Excellence from the Overseas Press Club in New York. He holds a B.A. from Hindu College and an M.A. from the Delhi School of Economics. Dr. Chellaney also has a Ph.D. in international arms control.
Michael J. Green is a senior adviser and holds the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is also an associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University. He previously served as special assistant to the President for national security affairs and senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC) from January 2004 to December 2005, after joining the NSC in April 2001 as director of Asian affairs. Dr. Green speaks fluent Japanese and spent over five years in Japan working as a staff member of the National Diet, as a journalist for Japanese and American newspapers, and as a consultant for U.S. business. He has also been on the faculty of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses, and a senior adviser to the Office of Asia-Pacific Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He did graduate work at Tokyo University as a Fulbright fellow and at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as a research associate of the MIT-Japan Program. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Aspen Strategy Group. He is also vice chair of the congressionally mandated Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission and serves on the advisory boards of the Center for a New American Security and Australian American Leadership Dialogue as well as the editorial board of The Washington Quarterly. Dr. Green earned his undergraduate degree in history from Kenyon College and his M.A. and Ph.D. from SAIS.
Lodi G. Gyari is the special envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the lead person designated to negotiate with the government of the People’s Republic of China. Mr. Gyari is also the executive chairman of the board of the International Campaign for Tibet, an independent Washington based human rights advocacy group. Born in Nyarong, Eastern Tibet, Mr. Gyari and his family fled to India in 1959. Realizing that Tibetans need to publicize their struggle to the world, he became an editor for the Tibetan Freedom Press and founded the Tibetan Review, the first English language journal published by Tibetans in-exile. Mr. Gyari was one of the founding members of the Tibetan Youth Congress and served as president of the Congress in 1975. He was elected to the Assembly of Tibetan People’s Deputies, the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile, and subsequently became its chairman. He then served as deputy cabinet minister with responsibilities for the Council for Religious Affairs and the Department of Health. In 1988, he became senior cabinet minister for the Department of Information and International Relations.
Ambassador Lalit Mansingh has served as India’s foreign secretary, ambassador to the United States, and high commissioner to the United Kingdom. He has also been ambassador in the United Arab Emirates and high commissioner in Nigeria with concurrent accreditation to Benin, Chad, and the Cameroons. Ambassador Mansingh joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1963. After his initial posting in Geneva, he went on to serve as deputy chief of mission in the Indian Embassies in Kabul, Brussels, and Washington. At headquarters in Delhi, Ambassador Mansingh worked in a variety of assignments: as joint secretary in the Ministry of Finance, director general of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, dean of the Foreign Service Institute, and secretary (West) in the Ministry of External Affairs. Before joining the Foreign Service, he worked as a research fellow in American studies at the School of International Studies in Delhi and as a lecturer in the Post-Graduate Department of Political Science at Utkal University, Bhubaneswar, Orissa. His current engagements include prof emeritus at the Foreign Service Institute of India and member of the governing body or executive committee of institutions in New Delhi including the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Development Alternatives, and the Indian Council for Sustainable Development. He is chairman of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry – India U.S. Policy Group and president of the World Cultural Forum (India). Additionally, he is on the International Advisory Boards of APCO Worldwide in Washington and the Bonita International Trust in London. Ambassador Mansingh is currently active in a number of international initiatives for conflict resolution, regional security, and sustainable development including being a part of a Track II dialogue between India and Pakistan focusing on confidence-building measures between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. Ambassador Mansingh holds a master’s degree in political science. He was recently conferred the Doctorate of Laws, Honoris Causa, by the University of North Orissa.
Ellen Bork is the director of Democracy and Human Rights at the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI). She came to FPI from Freedom House where she worked on projects assisting activists and dissidents around the world. She previously served as deputy director of the Project for the New American Century, a foreign policy think tank, an adviser to the Chairman of the Hong Kong Democratic Party, as the professional staff member for Asia and the Pacific at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and at the Bureau of Latin American Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. Ms. Bork has been published in publications, including The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, The Financial Times, and The Weekly Standard. She has participated in election observation missions to Afghanistan, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Ukraine and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the board of the International Campaign for Tibet. Ms. Bork graduated from Yale University and the Georgetown University Law Center and is a member of the District of Columbia bar.
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U.S.-Iraq relations after the withdrawal
I’m speaking at noon with Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman and former Iraqi UN Deputy Perm Rep Feisal Istrabadi at the Middle East Institute (the event is at SEIU, 1800 Massachusetts). Here are the notes I’ve prepared for myself (but I’ll vary it depending on what they say):
–Tony Blinken, speaking last month at Center for American Progress, said: “Iraq today is less violent, more democratic and more prosperous…than at any time in recent history.”
–There are some indications that violence, especially from Al Qaeda in Iraq, is up since late last year. But even if true, Tony’s statement sets a low bar and the gains are still reversible.
–If our goal is a “sovereign, stable, self-reliant country, with a representative government that could become a partner in the region, and no safe haven for terrorists,” we are not there yet.
–On security, Iraq still endures an unacceptably high number of attacks: deaths per month in politically motivated attacks are way down from the peak, but they are still sufficient to keep sectarian tensions high, which is what Saddam Hussein loyalist Izzat al Duri said was intended in his recent video.
–The economy is not really in good shape. High Iraqi oil production helps Baghdad’s budget and moderates world prices, which Americans like, but it does not an economy make.
–Democracy in Iraq does not yet include an independent judiciary, protection of basic human rights, vigorous parliamentary oversight, effective provincial and local governments or fulfillment of many constitutionally mandated procedures.
–Looking to the future, there are three fundamental threats to Iraq that might vitiate U.S. efforts there:
- First is the threat of breakdown: an Iraq that becomes chaotic and dysfunctional, a more or less failed state like the one Prime Minister Maliki took over in 2006.
- Second is the threat of breakup: an Iraq that fragments along ethnic and sectarian lines, with broad regional consequences as each of the neighbors seeks advantage.
- Third is autocracy: fear of breakdown or breakup may motivate Maliki, or someone else, to centralize power and refuse to transfer it in accordance with the will of its people, expressed in verifiably free and fair elections.
–None of these Iraqs can be the kind of partner the United States seeks, but I won’t spend much time on the first two possibilities. It is the third that worries people these days.
–We need an Iraq that respects the rights and will of its people.
–The question is what influence we have, apart from the usual diplomatic jawboning, which Jim Jeffrey and the embassy have mastered beyond a shadow of doubt.
–There are four specific potential sources of U.S. influence in today’s Iraq: arms, aid, oil and what—for lack of a better term—I would call relationships.
—Arms transfers, some people say, give us “leverage”: we should make providing our support conditional on Iraqi adherence to democratic norms, or meaningful power-sharing, or depoliticization of the security forces.
–Those are all worthy objectives, but this seems to me easy to say and difficult to do. Once you’ve embarked on a program of transferring F-16s, it is going to take a big issue to override the vested interests involved. Conditionality would encourage the Iraqis to get their arms elsewhere.
–The best we can do it seems to me is to make it clear—preferably in writing in advance—that none of the weapons systems the U.S. provides can be used against Iraq’s own citizens exercising their legal rights.
–We should also make it clear that we will cooperate only with a professional army under civilian control. But Iraq’s specific governing arrangements are no longer ours to determine, so long as they remain representative and democratic.
—Aid is a more flexible tool. It should be targeted towards democracy and rule of law. I would focus on encouraging a more independent judiciary and promoting a civil society that will demand real democracy while carefully monitoring government expenditures and corruption.
–To be clear: there is no reason why the U.S. should still be spending hundreds of millions in Iraq for economic and agricultural development. The Iraqis have more than enough incentive, and their own resources, to do those things.
–Iraqi resources come from exported oil, more than 90% of which is shipped through the Gulf under Iranian guns, even when the existing pipeline to Turkey is operating.
–This is where we have so far failed clamorously: shipment of Iraq’s oil by pipeline to the north and west—once Syria undergoes its transition—would help to reduce Iranian pressure on Iraq and align Iraqi interests with those of Europe and the United States.
–Of course this means Iraq’s oil, and eventually gas as well, would have to traverse Kurdish and Sunni-populated territory, which means domestic political reconciliation is a prerequisite.
–Some will see that as an insurmountable obstacle. I see it as a challenge, one well worth overcoming. Iraq should be tied umbilically to Turkey and the Mediterranean, not to Hormuz.
–Finally: relationships. American influence inside Iraq comes in part from good relationships with the main political players, with the obvious but I hope declining exception of the Sadrists.
–While they may still resent the occupation, Iraqis of most stripes look to the Americans for protection. Iraqis of all stripes believe that the United States is vital to re-establishing their country’s regional role.
–We should be ready and willing to help, expecting however that Iraq will align with the United States where it really counts: right now, that means supporting the P5+1 effort on Iran’s nuclear program and the Arab League plan for Syria.
–And it means pumping as much oil as possible into a world market concerned with the prospect of war with Iran.
–Just a word in conclusion about the long term. Maliki, whatever his virtues and vices, is not for ever if democracy survives in Iraq.
–We need to use the Strategic Framework Agreement to ensure that our institutions and Iraq’s institutions, our people and Iraq’s people, our economy and Iraq’s economy, our culture and Iraq’s culture, are tied closely together.
–I’ll be glad if the Assistant Secretary tells me I am wrong, but I have the impression that we still have not learned how to fully exploit the potential of this agreement to sharply increase the interconnectedness between Iraq and the United States.
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