Tag: Bahrain

Stevenson’s army, September 16

Pew survey finds falling world views of US
Jeffrey Goldberg lists winners and losers in new Israel-UAE-Bahrain agreements.
Here’s another F-35 to UAE report.
WSJ says US is using Magnitsky Act to impose sanctions on Chinese companies helping to build overseas bases.
Politico sees a toxic feud between DNI & intelligence committees.
As you know, I worked for Joe Biden many years ago [1981-5]. FP’s James Traub has  a very good analysis of how Biden thinks about foreign policy.

Just before the Jewish High Holy Days, there’s a discouraging report on the levels of ignorance about the Holocaust among younger Americans.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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No real deal

President Trump’s much-vaunted “deal of the century” landed with a thud today. Conceived and developed without input from the Palestinians, it gives Israel the territory it has sought in Golan, the West Bank, and Jerusalem in exchange for a $50 billion aid package and a supposedly contiguous Palestinian state.

There are lots of ambiguities, which I suppose will be resolved only once we study the 80-page text (not yet on the White House website):

  1. The President claimed in his announcement that Jerusalem will be undivided but also said there would be a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem. That doesn’t make sense.
  2. He also said Palestinian territory would be “doubled,” which by my calculation suggests that at least 10% of the West Bank (and possibly much more) would be taken by Israel without land swaps.
  3. There would be a four-year period during which Israel would not encroach further on the West Bank, but it is not clear whether this would require prior Palestinian acceptance of the plan, which is not forthcoming.
  4. The President did not mention the Jordan River valley, but given his claim that Israel’s security would not be even marginally compromised it is likely the idea is for Israel to hold on to it.
  5. The plan is said to be “conceptual” and will now be elaborated further in a joint committee, which isn’t going to happen as the Palestinians won’t go along.

What happens now? Nothing much. Most of the Arab world seems to have shunned the announcement–the President mentioned only that the Omani, Bahraini, and Emirati (he said Emiratris) were present. That would mean most of the political heavy hitters, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, stayed away.

The main destinations for this peace plan are the political campaigns of President Trump–whose impeachment trial was ongoing while he made the announcement–and Prime Minister Netanyahu, who today was indicted on corruption charges (specifically fraud, breach of trust, and bribery). They are both hoping to get a bit of political boost out of the White House peace plan, which will likely be forgotten within days.

There is however a broader significance: the playing field has tilted against the West Bank Palestinians in recent years, in part because they have mostly abandoned violence against Israelis and internationals. It would be surprising if no one noticed how their cause has suffered from resorting to nonviolence.

Trump and Netanyahu are trying to supplant the “land for peace” formula that has prevailed in negotiations since 1967. They want “money for peace” instead. It should be no surprise that Trump views the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as requiring a real estate deal for its resolution. But then remember: Trump was no good at real estate and made most of his money franchising his name. Like so many of his deals, this one is a sales gimmick. There is no real deal.

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The time is ripe

When adversaries square off, as the US and Iran have done in recent weeks, they sometimes reach a point at which they think escalating to violence can get them no more than what they hope to get at the negotiating table. If both reach that point within the same time frame, talking becomes a serious alternative to escalating. That is the “ripe” moment at which it is worth considering whether there is a “way out” that will do better for both than resorting to violence.

President Trump has reached his ripe moment. He is saying he is ready to meet with Iran to discuss one subject: nuclear weapons. He has dropped Secretary of State Pompeo’s 12 preconditions, he has forgotten about Iran’s missiles as well as its involvement in Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, and Iraq, and he called off military retaliation against Iran for its shoot-down of an American drone. He even tried to given Tehran an “out” by suggesting the downing of the drone was not properly authorized. The man is begging for negotiations with Iran.

The Iranians are hesitating, for several reasons. They want the US back in the nuclear deal and the associated relief from sanctions before talking to Washington. Tehran knows that Trump is erratic and doesn’t want to be the next victim of his decisionmaking. The Iranians may also believe that they can continue to “bleed” the Americans with little risk of retaliation, because they know neither the US public nor the Congress is prepared to sustain a new war in the Middle East. There will also be some in Tehran, especially the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, that want to continue expanding the nuclear program, with a view to eviscerating the nuclear agreement even if Iran doesn’t formally withdraw from it.

My sense though is that the time is ripe for at least clandestine talks between Iran and the US, likely focused initially not on the nuclear deal but rather on release of prisoners. That accomplished, with more or less simultaneous but unilateral releases, the adversaries could proceed on to other matters, including some relief from sanctions while talks continue. That will be a requirement for the Iranians. The Europeans would certainly appreciate loosening of sanctions, as would the Chinese, Turks, Iraqis and many others. Getting them to support Washington in any future nuclear negotiation should be a high priority for Trump. They won’t do it while the sanctions continue to make their trade and investment impossible.

The Iranians will fear that any negotiation will have to tighten the nuclear agreement, or extend it. But they have surely seen how incapable of negotiating any serious agreement the Trump administration is. The renegotiation of the South Korea free trade pact generated little. The NAFTA negotiation produced a modest update. The North Korea negotiations have produced nothing. President Obama had as one of his chief negotiators a Nobel-prize winning physicist who was then Secretary of Energy. Trump’s Secretary of Energy wouldn’t know a nuclear reactor from a coal-burning plant.

Tehran should also understand that there are only a very few serious US objections the the Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). First is that it didn’t cover missiles or Iran’s regional interventions. Those issues are going to require a long conversation, and President Trump has dropped them from the agenda, at least for now. Even if started tomorrow, talks on missile and regional issues are unlikely to be completed before the next US election, when Tehran certainly hopes to see elected a more reliable, even if no more friendly, president.

Second is that the JCPOA “sunset,” or ended, at various times in the next decade or more. That too is a conversation that could drag on, but there may be some relatively easy pickings in that department. Iran has good reason to make it clear to Israel and Europe, its two most concerned neighbors, that nuclear weapons are not its objective, even in the long term. Israel has first strike capabilities that make a nuclear Iran a dangerous place to live. Europe is an important trade and investment partner with potential to enormously ease Iran’s desperate economic situation.

All that Trump really needs from Iran in the short term is to rename and extend the JCPOA so that he can claim proprietary rights. The technical aspects are likely to remain unrevised. As Evelyn Farkas suggests, the Trump/Iran Nuclear Adjustment (TINA) need be no more than a JCPOA 2.0. US sanctions might stay in place during talks, but their application to third countries would have to be at least suspended. The Iranians are serious people and will understandably hesitate to be sucked in to an agreement with a notoriously unreliable negotiating partner. But when the moment is ripe and the way out is better than war, it is a mistake to pass up the opportunity.

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Doha impressions

I’ve been slow to write my impressions of Doha, where I spent four days last week after four days in Riyadh the week before (my impressions there are reported here). It’s fitting though that I should publish on Qatar the very day that its soccer team won the Asian Cup, defeating Japan 3-1 after triumphing in the semifinal 4-nil over arch-nemesis United Arab Emirates (in addition to beating Saudi Arabia).

The Qataris are riding high, at least in their own estimation and not only on the soccer field. They have more than survived what they term the blockade by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt imposed in June 2017. After an initial panic that emptied grocery stores, cut off family and other personal ties with compatriots, and caused a sharp fall in central bank reserves, the Doha government triggered a successful emergency response planned since the 2014 flare-up of their frictions with the Saudis and Emiratis.

The costs have been high, but the plan stabilized the situation and enabled Qatar to take advantage of its natural gas-derived wealth to make alternative arrangements and also  begin to stimulate domestic production to replace imports. People recount the story of flying in 3000 cows for milk production with smiles on their faces. Saudi food supplies, which dominated the market before the “blockade,” are no longer missed.

Relations with Iran and Turkey have improved. Turkey is often credited as having prevented a Saudi invasion early in the Gulf crisis by deploying 3000 troops. The massive US air base at Al Udeid is seldom mentioned, but Qataris clearly treasure their close relations with Washington. Outreach around the world to other countries has grown. Qataris regard the Gulf crisis as a “blessing in disguise,” a phrase heard repeatedly. It compelled Qatar to diversify and strengthen its ties around the world.

The result is pride and allegiance, including (from my limited contact) among the 90% of the population that is expats. Qataris and foreign experts think the government has done well and that the country’s star is rising. Portraits of the Emir, once ubiquitous, are still much in evidence, despite government instructions to remove them. World Cup 2022 preparations are said to be going well. Criticism of labor conditions on the many construction projects has declined, as accidents have proven much less common than some had predicted. The $6-7 billion of direct World Cup spending is only a drop in the bucket, as the government is building another $200 billion or so in new infrastructure. That’s on top of already lavish spending over the last two decades.

The ideological underpinnings are not, of course, democratic. Qatar is an autocracy that does not permit political organizations of any sort. But a lot of people we talked with are convinced that the traditional system of tribal consultations enables the top to hear from the bottom and the bottom to register its discontents. There is talk of elections this year or next for a newly empowered Shura Council, which now issues legislation on behalf of the Emir. But there are also concerns that elections will give the largest tribes dominance that the current system does not permit, thus reducing the diversity of voices and narrowing the political base of the monarchy.

Why did tiny, non-democratic Qatar support the Arab Spring and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood? The most common answer is that Doha supported the political forces it thought Egyptians, Syrians, Yemenis, Tunisians, Libyans, and others wanted. It has dialed back on that support and blocked private financing of radical groups, monitored by the US Treasury.

Doha claims to be a strong supporter of economic and military integration through the Gulf Cooperation Council, whose work has been disrupted. But Qataris want to conduct an independent foreign policy, not one dictated by Saudi Arabia or least of all by the UAE, which is believed to still resent Qatar’s choice to remain independent and not join the other sheikhdoms. Bahrain is the paradigm for what the Qataris do not want: a country forced to follow in the Kingdom’s footsteps wherever it goes.

What about Al Jazeera, the TV news channels that spare only Qatar and not its Gulf neighbors from criticism? Qatar’s neighbors view Al Jazeera Arabic in particular as promoting rebellion and extremism. At least some Qataris are willing to contemplate modifications in editorial policy, but all assume Al Jazeera is not going away, as the Saudis and Emiratis would like. Though said to be privately owned, it is under the government’s thumb and can be reined in when and if need be.

At times in Doha and Riyadh, I felt I was in a hall of mirrors: both claim leadership in modernizing the Arab world, both see the Gulf conflict as a struggle over what one Saudi termed “seniority” in the region and many Qataris termed Saudi/Emirati “hegemony.” In both Saudi Arabia and Qatar these days conservatism is bad, diversity is welcome, dialogue and consultation are promoted, and freedom to organize political activity is restricted. These are absolute monarchies with the deep pockets required to buy their way into the 21st century.

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Riyadh impressions

I spent four days in Saudi Arabia last week, which is wholly insufficient to do anything but scratch the surface. But I’m not without those superficial impressions. The SAIS study trip was focused on the GCC conflict, but I won’t comment in detail on that today. Caveat emptor: I am not agreeing with the Saudi perspectives, only trying to render them faithfully.

Here are my more general impressions:

  1. Saudis in government and government-influenced institutions (which are the only ones I visited) sincerely support the domestic reforms the Crown Prince has undertaken and believe they will lead to profound and badly needed changes in opening up and modernizing the society.
  2. The Saudi elite is not prepared to question the Crown Prince on anything, including his foreign policy moves like the rift with Qatar and the war in Yemen. They emphasize forcefully the justice of the grievances against Qatar and humanitarian assistance provided to Yemen. They of course see Iran as a serious threat throughout the region.
  3. While appreciating the ample support of the Trump Administration and good citizen-to-citizen feelings (due mainly to the many Saudis who study in the US), Saudis have doubts about the Administration’s reliability that were not much alleviated by Secretary of State Pompeo’s visit last week. Many people in Riyadh view American withdrawal from the region as highly likely if not inevitable.

The inclination in Riyadh to accept top/down decisions on reform is palpable and often attributed to tribal attitudes: consultation and discussion are welcomed, but in the end it is the sheikh’s responsibility to decide and everyone else’s to obey. Constraints on executive power by an independent judiciary or other regulatory bodies, separation of powers, or a press free of government pressure are ideas that have little resonance.

Saudi Arabia’s justice system is viewed as fair, though many are aware that it is subject to scathing international criticism. The Saudi teenager who escaped to Thailand and has found refuge in Canada is viewed as someone who failed to take advantage of existing human rights mechanisms in the Kingdom. The murder of Jamal Khashoggi is viewed as a matter for the courts, which will decide whether the accused are guilty in open hearings with adequate defense attorneys. The women activists who protested the driving ban stand accused, it is said, of other crimes having to do with passing information to foreign governments or accepting foreign assistance (no one seems clear about which). Protection for foreign workers, all hired under contracts approved by their own governments, has been enhanced.

There are discontents. The conservative religious establishment comes in for frequent criticism (again, by people associated with the government). The Muslim Brotherhood looms menacingly. Fear of youth radicalization is palpable. Anxiety about terrorism and disorder, both in the Kingdom and in the region, is high. Sectarianism is bad. The government is sponsoring active efforts to counter extremism and promote dialogue among Saudis of different stripes.

There are good things as well. Pluralism, even if more apparent in ancient ruins we visited in Al Ula than in Riyadh, is good. Islam and Sharia law are good, when properly understood. The solidarity of the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt in the Gulf conflict is good, as is the Gulf Cooperation Council, especially its military cooperation (which still includes Qatar, Saudis claim). Moderation, often defined as allowing everyone to modernize at their own pace, is good. Israel might be okay, but only if it does right by the Palestinians and accepts the Arab Peace Plan.

But above all, stability is good and worth sacrificing for. The nearby examples of Syria and Yemen are glaring. Even the one success of the Arab spring, Tunisia, is tottering. It is critical to counter the big de-stabilizing factor–Iran–and to avoid any new sources of Middle East strife. That Crown Prince is the key to stability as well as reform in the Kingdom and merits, the Saudis I talked with think, the wholehearted support he is getting, the internationals be damned.

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Keeping our bases covered

The Persian Gulf region has seen a buildup in American military power in recent decades. With major bases in various countries – Kuwait (Ali Al Salem Air Base), Bahrain (headquarters of the Fifth Fleet), Qatar (Al Udeid Air Base), and the UAE (Al Dhafra Air Base) among them – the US has grown its military footprint across many of the Gulf.

This map, created by Qualitative Military Edge (a project of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies) in 2016, should remain generally accurate today.

Today, the operation of American bases has been complicated by the ongoing feud between Qatar and rival Arab Gulf states, most notable Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have cut diplomatic and trade relations since June of 2017. With the crisis showing no sign of resolution, the US is caught in the struggle between its Gulf allies, with America’s military bases put increasingly into question. Will the US follow the demands of its Gulf allies and cut its alliance with Qatar, as some in the White House have indicated?

On April 5, the American Security Project held an event to discuss US military bases in the Persian Gulf region, and their role in furthering American strategic interests in the wake of this crisis. The event featured the Inspector General of the Qatari Armed Forces, Staff Major General Nasser AbdulAziz Al-Attiyah. Joining him were USMP (Ret.) David Des Roches, Associate Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Security Studies, and Brigadier General (Ret.) Stephen Cheney, CEO of the American Security Project, along with Asha Castleberry, Professor at Fordham University, who served as moderator in the discussion. Watch a full video recording of the event here:

 

Takeaways:

The Qatari government is very eager for U.S. bases to remain open. As Asha Castleberry and Stephen Cheney opened the event, they noted that it was put together rather quickly, predicated upon the participation of their Qatari guest. Nasser Al-Attiyah, for his part, repeated that the government of Qatar has been a friend and steadfast ally to the US for over 20 years, as exemplified by readiness to accept American air forces after pressure from Saudi Arabia forced them to move in 2003. Al-Attiyah emphasized Qatar’s value to the United States in both economic terms (as the 2nd-largest global buyer of American weapons) and strategic (as Qatar plans to expand Al Udeid Air Base and construct a new US naval base in coming years). His government sees its relationship with the US “as one of our top priorities,” echoing the views of the Qatari palace.

Qatar has been a particularly comfortable host of American troops in the Middle East. Both Stephen Cheney and David Des Roches noted the tricky nature of hosting military bases in the Middle East. The US government insists on legal immunity for American soldiers, despite the Mideast’s distaste for “capitulations” to foreign powers. Bilateral relations can easily become strained. Qatar has given the US few headaches. American soldiers face fewer restrictions based on cultural taboos than other bases in the region (in contrast to Saudi, in particular). The air base at Al Udeid has been notably comfortable for American troops, with ample creature comforts and enough capacity to handle America’s largest aircraft.

The gains of keeping military bases abroad outweigh the liabilities. The speakers listed the benefits of having military bases distributed around the world: ability to respond to situations quickly, maintaining readiness for larger operations, training with allied nations, and allowing public diplomacy to the host country. But there are drawbacks too. Host countries can gain a certain amount of leverage over the United States by threatening to deny troops’ freedoms, but this is only possible when base residents were highly dependent on local infrastructure (as in Panama).

US strategy in the Persian Gulf benefits from keeping an array of regional allies. Building on Stephen Cheney’s comment that withdrawal from the Persian Gulf would be “inherently foolish” given US interests, Des Roches argued that keeping a “constellation of bases” in the region is an asset in case access to any one is suddenly rescinded. While Al-Attiyah assured that Qatar had agreed to lease its base at Al Udeid to the US until 2023, his promise was couched with the caveat that “in our region everything can be changed overnight.”

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