Tag: Balkans

Election results count

Tarik Lazović, editor in chief of the Bosnian News Agency Patria, asked a few questions yesterday.  He published today.  Here are the Q and A in English.

Q: Would you like to comment on a statement of Bakir Izetbegović, chief of the Bosnian presidency, who said that US will intensify engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the election. He said that this was confirmed to him in direct contact with US officials.

DPS: The Americans have made it known they are searching for a new approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is reasonable that they would wait until after the election to implement whatever it is they decide. And of course the results of the election will have an impact on what is feasible.

Q:  What do you think about the impact of Serbian elections on Bosnia?

DPS: The Serbian election will strengthen the position of Aleksandar Vucic, who is likely to become prime minister. He and President Nikolic are no friends of Milorad Dodik, who backed the losing horse in Serbia’s last presidential election.

But there is nothing permanent about friendships in the Balkans. I expect Dodik to try to ingratiate himself with Vucic, who however needs to do everything he can to avoid slowing Serbia’s progress towards the EU. Telling Dodik to stop talking about independence for RS and to start cooperating with the government in Sarajevo so that it can take on the responsibility of negotiating and implementing the obligations of EU membership would be one way to facilitate Serbia’s own accession process.

Q:  What do you think about the demonstrations and plenums in Bosnia?

DPS: I think it perfectly reasonable for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to complain about corruption, nepotism, unemployment, social conditions and abuses of privilege by government officials. So long as the demonstrations are non-violent, they are likely to attract large crowds—because the grievances are real. But it is unclear how this popular discontent will be translated into political change. The nationalist political parties are trying hard to repress and hijack the discontent to promote their own agendas by warning of danger to their respective ethnic groups and offering protection from imaginary threats. The authorities are also trying to frighten people away from the streets by bringing terrorist charges against some of the more rowdy demonstrators.

Someone has to figure out how to translate discontent and manifestations of direct democracy into a program of reform that can win votes and legislate change. Bosnia may not be an idyllic democracy, but election results count [Bosnia’s next election is scheduled for October 5.]

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Everything uncertain, except the winner

After less than two years, Serbia is about to hold new parliamentary elections March 16. Even though the voting is just a week away, most people show little interest in the campaign, but turnout is still expected to be relatively high. The upcoming election is unique in that it is not about who will win, as the winner is already known. It is the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) of Aleksandar Vučić, the incumbent first deputy prime minister.

The election race is rather for Vučić’s junior coalition partner in the government. It won’t necessarily be the winner of the second place. It can be any party that will manage to meet the threshold (5% of all voters who participate in voting, including invalid ballots) and thus enter the parliament.

Prime Minister Dačić’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) is currently the second in terms of popular support according to most relevant opinion polls. The former ruling Democratic Party (DS), now led by former Belgrade Mayor Đilas, and former President Tadić’s new party are struggling for the third place.  The contest seems to be extremely tight (in some polls Tadić has a little more votes, in others Đilas). And in addition to Dačić, Tadić and Đilas’ parties, it is only the Liberal-democratic Party and Vojislav Koštunica’s nationalist Democratic Party of Serbia that are expected to win some seats in parliament, though barely exceeding the threshold.

According to opinion polls, Vučić’s popularity is so high that his party might even win an absolute majority, so he might not need a partner at all. Unless Vučić intends to change the constitution, which will require approval by two thirds of MPs.

While there is no doubt as to who will lead the government, everything else is uncertain.The campaign is full of populist messages and unrealistic promises. Interestingly, Kosovo and other “big national topics” have been rarely mentioned, except by minor nationalist and Russophile parties. The focus is almost entirely on the economy. All candidates agree on the need for deep structural reform, but differ on the type of measures and methodology of implementation. Some, including Vučić, are proposing a shift toward a more liberal, market-oriented model. Others, like Prime minister Dačić, are calling for even more state intervention.

Top priorities for whoever is in power after the elections will be rationalization and reorganization of an oversized public sector and creation of a more attractive environment for direct long-term investment. The outgoing government has taken some steps in that direction, but that’s a small part of what has to be done if Serbia is to avoid financial collapse.

Vučić’s frequently repeated insistence that he will not give up on sweeping economic reforms, however painful they are, has not degraded his popularity thus far. The secret of Vučić’s success lies in his bold action against high-level corruption and organized crime. Delivering on his promises, Vučić has revived at least a portion of people’s lost hope. That’s an encouraging sign.

The problem is, however, that people tend to support changes only so long as their personal lives remain unaffected. The main challenge to the next government will be how to mitigate social consequences of reforms, especially in the early stages of implementation. This will require extraordinary effort, but it is the price that has to be paid for lack of courage and decisiveness on the part of previous administrations.

And what about the opposition? Once powerful, the DS is in steep decline and a deep crisis of identity after suffering defeat in the 2012 elections. It is no longer even the second strongest political force, pushed out of that position by Dačić’s SPS. The latest in a series of blows came when former Serbian president and DS leader Boris Tadić left the party and formed his own following a period of heavy infighting with his successor at the party’s helm, Dragan Đilas. Both DS and Tadić’s new party should be happy if each of them gets between 5 and 10 percent of votes.

DS is desperate to attract parts of the electorate that are bitterly opposed to Aleksandar Vučić. High party official Borko Stefanović recently went so far as to warn that Vučić’s victory is likely to lead to the “Ukrainian scenario” in Serbia, but his statement immediately backfired on his party’s rating. The strategy of DS in the campaign basically boils down to claiming they are the only party that is not going to form a post-election coalition with Vučić’s “Progressives.” Unfortunately for DS, Vučić obviously has no intention of calling them into a coalition, either.

Meanwhile, the Democrats and other critics of Vučić have been accusing him of establishing a “soft dictatorship.” Their fear is that Vučić’s nearly unprecedented popular support, coupled with too much power in his hands, could seriously undermine the already fragile democracy Serbia has achieved. But there is little difference between Vučić and most of his predecessors when it comes to authoritarian tendencies. Not to mention that the reforms awaiting the next government will require a firm hand on the tiller.

After all, it is not bad for a country to have a highly popular mainstream politician at a time when many countries, including a number of developed Western democracies, are experiencing a crisis of representation and democratic legitimacy, with extremist parties and fringe movements gaining ground. But that’s another story.

Vis-a-vis European integration, Belgrade will look to trade any progress in normalization of relations with Kosovo for concessions from Brussels on various chapters of accession talks. Such an approach carries a clear risk. If Brussels demonstrates too much leniency, Serbia could be allowed to proceed without satisfying all the criteria, particularly in areas such as human rights, media freedoms and the rule of law. They will demand a lot of attention in the years ahead.

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Kosovo, the US, the EU, Serbia and Facebook

Pristina-based Zeri has kindly given me permission to publish in English this interview with Kosovo Deputy Foreign Minister Petrit Selimi:

Zeri: At the last Hearing of the US Helsinki Commission, Congressman Eliot Engel stated Kosovo to be the most pro-Western and pro-American. He also added that Kosovo was left unfairly isolated in the Balkans. How do you assess the continued support of US officials to Kosovo ?

Petrit Selimi:  The US has remained the main pillar of support for Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic integration. The US vision for Kosovo for several decades has been stable and unchanging. Independent, civic , secular, enjoying friendly relations with neighbors – including Serbia – a member of EU and NATO, a country with a small but dynamic economy, based on full human rights for all. Read more

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Kosovo’s army

Hoyt Yee, the Deputy Assistant Secretary who covers the Balkans at the State Department, testified Wednesday at the Congressional Helsinki Commission.  In answer to a question, he said the United States strongly supports Kosovo’s goal of joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and eventually NATO, a precondition for which is having an army.  Washington will also continue to provide assistance to Kosovo to reach the goal of NATO membership. This in my book is exactly the right thing to be saying and doing.

It comes on the heels of Kosovo government approval of transforming its Kosovo Protection Force, a largely unarmed but uniformed corps, into the Kosovo Armed Forces, which will function as an army.  Belgrade has asked for a discussion of this issue at the United Nations Security Council.  My guess is the powers that be in New York will decide the UNSC has more important things to do right now. Read more

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Bosnia: heal thyself

I did this interview yesterday for Edita Gorinjac of Klix.ba, who published it today in whatever you want to call the language of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

1) What is your general opinion on recent protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were the biggest since after the war?

A: I certainly understand why citizens in Bosnia are disappointed in the services they are getting from their many governments. Protesting seems to me a healthy reaction, so long as it remains nonviolent.

2) Parallel to the protests, during which citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, mostly of BiH Federation, asked for government’s more responsible approach to solving of their issues, additional political questions arose, such as more serious approach to constitutional reforms, even territorial reorganization of the state. How realistic is it to expect such changes? And are Bosnia and Herzegovina and international community ready for this? What is, in your opinion, the best solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina? Read more

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Putin speaks

President Putin today finally addressed some of the issues Russian behavior in Ukraine has raised.  I can find neither video nor transcript so far,* so I am relying on the RT account, which is ample but certainly not complete.

Putin’s main point is that Russia has the right to protect ethnic Russians in Ukraine’s east:

If we see this lawlessness starting in eastern regions, if the people ask us for help – in addition to a plea from a legitimate president, which we already have – then we reserve the right to use all the means we possess to protect those citizens. And we consider it quite legitimate.

Putin makes clear his distaste for deposed Ukrainian President Yanukovich and shows no inclination to restore him to power, but at the same time he thinks his removal was not legitimate:

I strictly object to this form [of transition of power] in Ukraine, and anywhere in the post-Soviet space. This does not help nurturing a culture of law. If someone is allowed to act this way, then everyone is allowed to. And this means chaos. That’s the worst thing that can happen to a country with an unstable economy and an unestablished political system.

So what we’ve got here is a claim to legitimacy based on protection of ethnic Russians and rejection of the overthrow of an elected president.  Putin would have us believe that he is at least as justified as the United States was in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Read more

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