Tag: Balkans

Happy and dull

I did this hangout with RFE’s Gordana Knezevic and Dzenana Halimovic, moderated by Brian Whitmore, Wednesday and forgot to post it: 

I also forgot to post this interview with Elton Trota of the Pristina-based Independent Balkans News Agency:

IBNA: How do you assess the negotiation process between Kosovo-Serbia? What are the negative and positive aspects of the talks between Prime Minister Thaci and his Serbian Counterpart, Ivica Daciq?

Serwer: I think the dialogue process has been successful in limited but important ways. I’d like to see it move faster towards what ultimately has to happen: diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadors. But Serbia has now accepted the territorial integrity of Kosovo and the applicability of the Kosovo constitution on that whole territory. It has also exchanged liaison officers, under a thin EU cover. Those are steps in the right direction.

IBNA: Is it possible for reconciliation to happen between Balkan nations in the near future, taking into account that it’s a demand that comes from Brussels for good neighboring relations in the region?

Serwer: Reconciliation is different from good neighborly relations. Reconciliation will take a generation, or two. Good neighborly relations are a question of political will. The governing institutions can make that happen whenever they decide to do it.

IBNA: How is Kosovo moving toward the Euro-Atlantic integration? Is this going to be a long journey for the new state?

Serwer: It will be a long journey to the EU, whose requirements are much more elaborate and demanding than NATO’s. Kosovo has the advantage of being able to build its security forces from the ground up to meet NATO requirements. It has already done that for the Kosovo Security Force that exists. It will need to continue in that direction as that is converted into an armed force. Once it has real armed forces, entry into NATO should be quick if Kosovo meets the requirements. The only political obstacle is the non-recognizers, who will need to be convinced that Kosovo in the Alliance is a much better idea than Kosovo outside the Alliance.

IBNA: How is FYR  Macedonia moving toward the Euro-Atlantic integration?  Will the disputes of this country with its neighboring country make the journey of this country toward EU and NATO accession any longer?

Serwer: The only real hindrance for Macedonia is the “name” dispute with Greece, which is really about Greek and Macedonian identity, not the name. Macedonia’s armed forces have served with distinction in Afghanistan and its governing structures meet NATO requirements, if I understand correctly. I would like to see Macedonia enter NATO sooner rather than later under the interim agreement as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. That won’t be possible for the EU, which is still a long way off in any event.

IBNA: Riots and protests took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the government and the current political class, is the same is expected to happen in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia?

Serwer: I’m not in the riot/protest prediction business, but neither Kosovo nor Macedonia has suffered the stagnation that Bosnia and Herzegovina has suffered for the past eight years or so. Kosovo’s agreement on the north with Belgrade removes one possible source of instability. In Macedonia, I think NATO membership would contribute a good deal to the sense that the country is moving in the right direction. The normal political process in both Kosovo and Macedonia is in much better shape than it is in Bosnia, which is handicapped with a constitution that enshrines nationalists in power and leaves little room for issue-based politics. But the citizens of Kosovo and Macedonia should watch Bosnia with interest, because it is certainly a model to avoid.

IBNA: What will be the fate of northern Kosovo?

Serwer: Northern Kosovo consists of four Serb-majority municipalities that will now govern themselves in many respects, under the overall constitutional framework of the Republic of Kosovo. Its courts and police will be integrated with the system in the rest of Kosovo, and its municipal authorities will participate in an association of Serb municipalities formed under Pristina’s aegis. With any luck, it will prosper a bit more than in the past and become a happy and dull place.

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Citizens are the place to start

My friends are in a tizzy about Bosnia.  Ed Joseph wants urgent international action.  So do Bodo Weber and Kurt Bassuener.  All fear that Bosnia’s social unrest in recent days may degenerate into ethnic conflict.  They want the United States and the European Union to step in with clear ideas for reform and strict conditionality to force their adoption.

I am a bit more cautious.  I agree entirely with Bodo and Kurt that the current situation is in part the result of bankrupt and ineffective EU policies.  I agree with them and Ed that a different approach is required, including stronger American diplomatic engagement and strengthening of Europe’s military presence.  But I am suspicious of the notion that the right formula to untie the Bosnian knot can be devised in Washington and Brussels.  We tried that at Dayton.  It worked to end the war, but not to make Bosnia a functional state.

We need to hear more from the Bosnians, who are busily organizing themselves into plenums that will formulate grassroots demands for reform.  Tim Judah describes what is going on: Read more

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Small states and the power of pragmatism

Kosovo Foreign  Minister Enver Hoxhaj has kindly provided a copy of his remarks prepared for SAIS last week.  They seem to me to merit publication in their entirety.  I’ll of course be glad to publish the remarks of others as well on the dialogue process between Pristina and Belgrade.

Small States and the Power of Pragmatism: Kosovo’s Approach to the Dialogue with Serbia

 ENVER HOXHAJ

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo

 A small state like Kosovo is obliged to think how to define its role in international affairs and how to conduct its foreign affairs in a way it can advance its vital interests. For small states that have limited military, economic, and demographic resources, it is essential to adapt a smart and pragmatic foreign policy. Being smart for small states means undertaking actions that increase the likelihood for success, utilize the available resources and capacities. In this context, pragmatism means a combination of realist and practical approaches to foreign affairs with strategic reliance on idealism. Pragmatism is not about being strong or weak, but it is about taking the right decisions in right time. Pragmatism is to adapt but maintain strategic vision and policy coherence. It is about making short-term compromises for long-term triumphs. It is about getting what you want, while also addressing other parties concerns. The current dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia under the EU facilitation is a quintessential example of the pragmatic and smart approach of a small state like Kosovo. The normalization dialogue has been considered historic and a breakthrough achievement. It has been considered a success of EU foreign policy, and a merit of constructive approach of both Kosovo and Serbia.

Read more

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Pragmatic Kosovo!

I enjoyed a conversation at SAIS yesterday with two of Kosovo’s finest:  Deputy Prime Minister Slobodan Petrovic and Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj.  Slobodan has led Serb participation in Kosovo’s government for the past three years, holding also the portfolio for local governance.  Enver, a political science professor, has participated in many of the international negotiations that Kosovo has undergone over the past twenty years.

The watchword was “pragmatic.”  Both speakers are clear about their goals.  Slobodan wants improvement in the lives of Serbs who live in Kosovo.  Enver wants the Kosovo state to have a well-recognized place in the international community.  They have worked together to achieve these goals, but both are ready to compromise along the way, so long as things keep moving in the right direction.

Enver thinks normalization of relations between Pristina and Belgrade means eventual mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadors, but for the moment Kosovo has taken what it could get:  an April agreement that recognized its constitution should govern in all of Kosovo and exchange of liaison officers located in the respective capitals’ European Union missions.  Belgrade won’t accept Kosovo passports, but it has accepted its identity cards.  The other “technical” agreements are also steps in the right direction.

Slobodan thinks the municipal elections held for the first time under Pristina’s authority in Serb-majority northern Kosovo were far from perfect:  intimidation and even assassination determined the outcome, which favored a Belgrade-sponsored Serb list.  But Petrovic’s Liberals got more votes than ever before and captured what seats they could.  The international community should have taken a stronger stand against irregularities and supported those who have been committed to the political process.  Next time, he hopes.

In the foreign minister’s view, Kosovo faces some difficult issues in 2014.  It wants to get into NATO’s Partnership for Peace but needs to overcome resistance from the Alliance’s non-recognizing members.  Kosovo also needs to decide the size, composition label for its security forces.  It has passed the halfway mark in gaining recognitions from members of the UN General Assembly and hopes to make it to the two-thirds mark, but it will still face a veto by Russia in the Security Council.  Kosovo hosts too many international missions.  The UN has been superfluous for some time; the OSCE is overstaffed and undertasked.

The EU rule of law mission is still necessary to handle sensitive cases like that of the recently arrested mayoral candidate Oliver Ivanovic, but the deputy foreign minister thought it important that the remaining cases of this sort be settled expeditiously.  In his view, 2014 will be important for the fall parliamentary elections.  A gentleman’s agreement to maintain reserved seats for Serbs and other minorities, which were to be phased out after two election cycles, should be respected, not abrogated.

Asked whether the Pristina/Belgrade agreement and recent election results might presage “Bosnia-ization” of Kosovo into two ethnically identified entities, both Slobodan and Enver think not.  The already functioning Serb municipalities south of the Ibar will not want to give up what they’ve gained.  The northern municipalities are beginning to see clearly that they will gain from operating under Pristina’s authority, as they will retain a good deal of local control as well as substantial resources.  If the agreement is implemented in good faith as written and the EU remains the guarantor, the risks are minimal.

I remember a time when I could not have imagined such a conversation.  Enver reminded our audience that the war was fought between the Serbian state and the Albanian population of Kosovo.  That may be true, but there were long periods when it seemed you could count on one hand the number of Albanians and Serbs willing to have a civilized conversation with each other.   Now more than a handful are using democratic institutions to govern together.  I know the challenges are still great, but pragmatic can go a long way with time.

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My Bosnian daydream

Like many of the Bosnians quoted by Reuters, I’ve got mixed feelings about the ferocious protests of the past few days.  The violence and destruction are deplorable.  The resentment and demand for change understandable.  The country has seen little economic, political or social progress for more or less a decade.

Bosnia is stuck in an institutional morass created at the Dayton peace talks that ended the war in 1995 but failed to provide functional governance.  My colleague at SAIS Ed Joseph thinks the US and EU should make another push at internal reforms in exchange for acceleration of Bosnia’s EU candidacy.  I agree that is a good idea.  And as he suggests, there are constitutional proposals left over from past efforts that are worth reviving, revising and returning to parliament for approval.

But little will change unless Bosnians decide it has to. Peaceful continuation of the protests is one way to signal the desire for change.  Peaceful protests have a much better chance of mobilizing large numbers of people across ethnic lines than the violence of the past few days, which frightens Bosnians concerned with anything that might return the country to war.  Minorities in particular worry that the protests may take an ethnic turn.  Even peaceful demonstrations unnerve older Bosnians, who may remember that the war started with one.

Another opportunity comes in next fall’s presidential and parliamentary elections.  By then, the Dayton constitution will have kept Bosnia enchained in a strait jacket of ethnically-based parties for almost twenty years.  The Americans and Europeans would do well to abandon their usual refrain, “we support the process, not any particular candidates.”  They need to support those who are ready to cross ethnic lines to find allies willing to advocate constitutional change that will enable more effective governance consonant with EU requirements.  Otherwise, the ethnic nationalists may well succeed once again, electing people who advocate an entirely different kind of constitutional change, including independence for Republika Srpska and a third, Croat entity.

These two ideas are the zombies of the Bosnian war.  They never seem to die.  Here is my wooden stake:  both notions would lead to a three-way partition of Bosnia, with one of the emerging entities a land-locked, non-viable Islamic republic ripe for radicalization and seething with irredentist ambitions.  It is hard for me to picture a worse neighbor for Belgrade and Zagreb, or a less welcome development from the US and EU perspective.

Fortunately, the idea of a Bosnian Islamic republic isn’t very attractive to most Bosnian Muslims either.  The more common and deeply rooted Bosniak attitude is support for a unified secular state on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with minority protection primarily based on respect for individual (rather than group) human rights and the rule of law.  But the Bosniak political leadership has failed to find sufficient Croat and Serb allies to give that vision the votes it needs in parliament, partly because it is so much easier to fish for votes with the bait of Bosniak nationalism.

This is the bad habit Bosnians need to break:  the slide back to identity politics because the Dayton political system and long habit make it so much easier to garner votes that way.  Someone has to emerge with the capacity to transcend ethnic nationalism and speak effectively for the genuine Bosnian aspirations that put people into the streets this week:  jobs, equality, good governance and a European future.  When that happens, there will be a rush to cross-ethnic coalitions, because it will be the only way to compete effectively.  So far, only Željko Komšić, the Croat member of the presidency, has succeeded at this, which is why he comes in for so much approbation from the nationalists.

Am I day dreaming?  Yes.  But sometimes daydreams come true.

Going into Bosnia in battle rattle for the last time, late 1995
Going into Bosnia in battle rattle for the last time, late 1995
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It is only a matter of time

Edita Tahiri, the main “technical”-level negotiator on behalf of Pristina with Belgrade and now in charge of implementation of the agreements reached, has issued a report on implementation of the Brussels Agreements that is well worth reading, especially as I need to moderate an event Friday with Kosovo Deputy Prime Minister Petrovic and Foreign Minister Hoxhaj on the subject.  While definitively written from a Pristina perspective, the report does an admirable job of maintaining a relatively neutral tone, including by citing various Belgrade positions on the issues.

The main lacunae in implementation that Edita underlines are

  1. Continued existence of Serb civil protection forces in northern Kosovo;
  2. Failure to integrate Serb judges and prosecutors into the Kosovo judicial system.

There are many other complaints in the report about this delay or that misinterpretation, and I have no doubt a comparable Serbian report (I don’t know of one, but will gladly receive and post it if someone has it) would include many complaints as well.

But the complaints do not negate the main point:  real progress is being made in reintegrating the Serb-majority north with the rest of Kosovo, progress that would have seemed impossible even a few months ago.  The progress is not only, or perhaps not primarily, in inter-ethnic relations, which remain tense.  But it is impossible to read Edita’s report without recognizing that the Kosovo institutions really do now exist:  courts, parliament, police, customs, cadastre, civil registry, etc.  There has been enormous advance of institionalization in Kosovo, even if the state remains a work in progress and leaves much to be desired in terms of efficiency and incorruptibility.

By the same token, there has been enormous progress also in Serb behavior and attitudes.  The protests that once dogged integration of the north are attenuating.  Belgrade deserves a lot of credit for that:  Deputy Prime Minister Vucic and Prime Minister Dacic have chosen to favor Serbia’s own European Union ambitions over an empty claim to Kosovo, which two-thirds of Serbia’s citizens already thought specious even before the Brussels agreements were reached.  Belgrade’s focus now seems mainly on maintaining and expanding its own influence over the Serbs in Kosovo, which can be used either for or against establishment of Pristina’s authority but will not change the simple fact that Kosovo is independent.  And the EU should want to make sure that Belgrade’s influence is used in the right way.

As I’m sure Edita would agree, the task is not fundamentally a technical one.  The real issue in this process is legitimate authority.  Pristina has been wise to recognize that the north could not be forced into integration with the rest of Kosovo, to allow for transitional arrangements, and to devolve many responsibilities to local (therefore mostly Serb) authorities.  None of this will hurt the Kosovo state if Serb citizens in the north accept its legitimacy.

But Kosovo is not yet fully sovereign, as it still relies on the NATO-led KFOR military forces to protect its territorial integrity and on EULEX, the EU rule of law mission, for some judicial functions.  Neither mission will still be around in its current form five years from now, so it is time that Kosovo begins to plan for their drawdown.

A US-led security study to be unveiled soon will lay out the parameters for Kosovo’s military forces.  Unless Belgrade decides to recognize Kosovo and establish diplomatic relations with it, the threat of a Serbian military incursion will have to be taken seriously and the security forces sized and equipped accordingly.  Kosovo will require some combination of its own forces and NATO guarantees to respond.  Ensuring that the necessary arrangements are in place five years hence will require fixing the formula soon.  Now that NATO has certified Kosovo’s existing security force as fully operational, the process of arming and equipping them appropriately should start with Kosovo entry into NATO’s Partnership for Peace and end eventually in NATO membership.

EULEX is a more complicated question.  While the Kosovo judicial system has dealt with many difficult issues–including two constitutional questions regarding the presidency–I don’t know anyone who thinks it is yet up to the admittedly challenging task of trying war crimes or high-level corruption cases.  It is not alone in the Balkans in those respects, but the number and complexity of the war crimes is extraordinary.  Corruption cases are also particularly difficult in a small country where everyone knows everyone else and witness protection is difficult.  Would it have been possible for a Kosovo court without international participation to hold a prominent Serb like Oliver Ivanovic in pre-trial detention without causing major disturbances?  Would it have been possible to bring a corruption case against Kosovo judges?

So establishing legitimate authority in the judicial sector may still take time.  Better to get it right than to rush the process.  The right approach might be to incorporate EULEX into the Kosovo justice system, reducing its role as a separate mission but maintaining the international judges and prosecutors it provides.  Another important step will be entry of Kosovo into the Council of Europe, enabling its citizens to avail themselves of remedies in the European Court of Human Rights.

Establishing legitimate authority is a long and difficult process.  But Belgrade and Pristina are on the right path and clearly moving ahead.  If that continues, it is only a matter of time before they put things right.

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