Tag: Egypt
Diplomatic observers for Syria
I’d like to revive an idea that I put forward more than a month ago: diplomatic observers for Syria.
I think we are in for the long haul in Syria. Bashar al Assad shows no signs of giving up. The international sanctions will pinch with time, but Iran is doing its best to counter them. While Bashar’s support has frayed in Damascus and Aleppo, that is only around the edges. The protesters are under a lot of pressure and have been unable to do what the Libyans did so successfully: put together a proto-government that could project a constitutional framework and roadmap to elections.
Military intervention is simply not in the cards. The Arab League isn’t asking for it. Russia has so far blocked all serious propositions in the UN Security Council. Moscow’s naval base at Latakia guarantees this will continue. I imagine Putin admires Bashar’s spunk and isn’t going to worry about what is done to the demonstrators. Turkey may stiffen its position a bit, but Ankara hasn’t yet done anything that really pinches hard.
If the protest movement in Syria is going to survive, it needs some help. We’ve been through this before. In some of the darkest days of the Kosovar rebellion against Serbia in 1998, the international community provided a Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission that reported on who was doing what to whom. It was too little too late and did not avoid war, but it was that mission that confirmed mass atrocities and helped to rouse the international community to its military intervention.
I don’t expect in Syria that there will be a military intervention, even if an observer mission were to confirm mass atrocities. The Russians won’t sign on to it, and I doubt the Americans and Europeans have the stomach to do it without Security Council authorization, which is what they eventually did in Kosovo.
But an international observer mission would likely reduce the ferocity of Bashar’s assault on Syria’s citizens and give us a far better window on what is happening than we have at present. Ambassador Ford’s visits to the protesters have clearly been a boost. Multiply that 1000 times in quantity (hard to match Ford in quality) and you’ve got something that might make a difference.
Would Bashar agree to it? At some point, he is going to be feeling the international pressure enough to make concessions. It is unlikely he will make any serious political reforms, since those would put his hold on power at risk. If he thinks that agreeing to international observers might eventually help him to relieve international pressures, he might do it.
In any event, I don’t see a downside to proposing it. The protesters have been literally crying for international protection. Civilian observers are not what they have in mind–some of them would like military intervention. But if the Arab League were to press the case and recruit the observers, the time may come when Bashar will yield to the proposition. If he doesn’t, all the worse for him: it suggests he has a great deal to hide.
I fear that if we fail to get something like this in place, the Syrian protest movement may fail, as the Iranian one did. That would be a big defeat for democratic forces in the Middle East, which are having a hard time elsewhere even if Libya and Tunisia seem to be proceeding more or less in the right direction.
In Yemen, the return of President Saleh to Sanaa has upped the ante and increased the violence. In Egypt, it is no longer clear–if ever it was–that the country will end up with a significantly more democratic system than the one Hosni Mubarak reigned over for decades. A Bashar victory in Syria would encourage reactionary forces elsewhere and help Iran to survive the Arab spring with its main client state still firmly attached. We haven’t got a lot of cards left to play on Syria: proposing international observers is a half measure that might be worth a try.
PS, October 26: The Syrian National Council is now calling for international monitors.
PPS, Octoer 28: Human Rights Watch likes the idea too.
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The long and the short of it
As I prepare to head home to DC from Cairo today, my two weeks in Egypt and Libya seem enormously interesting and informative, even as they reconfirm how little can be understood from such short stays in complicated environments. What do we really see of another society without speaking its language and living at length in its midst?
I am close to finishing Alaa al Aswany’s The Yacoubian Building. There is little in its penetrating accounts of abusive sexual relationships in Egypt that I would gather from staying at the Fairmont and running around Cairo to talk with various participants in its recent revolution, though I knew enough about harassment of women here to understand how fraught with sexual dysfunction the society is.
In Libya, the thing that struck me is how difficult it is to understand the role of religion. Pervasive, but not really political, at least not yet, Islam seems more a unifying factor (again, for the moment) than a divisive one, as it certainly is among some Egyptians. But that may be changing.
The east/west geographical divide in Libya appeared far less important to me (and to many journalists who have spent a lot of time in Libya) than some experts had predicted. At the same time, the demands of fighters from Misrata are roiling what had appeared to be relatively tranquil regional relationships. I understand they yesterday laid claim to the prime ministry in a reshuffled executive committee of the National Transitional Council, on grounds that they have fought more aggressively against Qaddafi’s forces, especially at Sirte, than anyone else. The Benghazis, who claim to have initiated the revolution, did not react well.
Egypt and Libya are certainly not the only countries with sexual dysfunction, regional differences and problems with the role of religion in public life. I didn’t live 10 years in Italy without hearing a great deal about all three. But even after 10 years I wasn’t sure that I understood things the way Italians understood them–in fact, I’m sure I didn’t. I was still an American with different cultural baggage and presumptions about gender, geography and religion.
Societies in the midst of revolution are particularly problematic. How much is changing and how much is staying the same? Most historians would hesitate to say until years later. Libya and Egypt have both decapitated their autocratic regimes, but they are still far from having established new ones.
For all the giddy enthusiasm of the revolutionary days and weeks, there is no guarantee that they will be democratic, or even much different from the old ones. Libyans often say they know what they don’t want, namely a leader who tells them what to think (and enforces the dictate with violence). But does that mean they won’t accept a softer autocracy? No one in Egypt seems sure any longer that the military will be prepared to leave power, even if the generals seem ready to set a date for the first round of elections on November 21.
Short visits may be unsatisfying and even misleading, but it doesn’t follow that longer visits will be much more enlightening. I wouldn’t want to wait until the history books are written to have a look for myself. The point I suppose is to take the opportunities we can to expose ourselves to other societies and learn whatever can be gathered in the time available, remembering always that there is a great deal more beneath the surface that we can’t possibly fathom.
I certainly don’t regret having passed up a summer holiday for this September interlude in two very exciting places!
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One hand
My stake-out of a Tripoli mosque during noon-time prayers yesterday led to a conversation with a professor of forensic science. Admittedly my sample is infinitesmal and my sampling technique highly biased: I need someone who speaks English (my years of studying Arabic produced little) and is willing to talk with a foreigner. Very few randomly approached Libyans speak passable English, and my Arabic is truly primitive.
The sermon focused on unity, the professor said. “One hand” is the metaphor used both here and in Egypt. This includes all Libyans, he said, referring explicitly to the Catholic church around the corner, not just Muslims. The biggest threat to unity comes from tribalism, which my professor (against conventional wisdom) thought strong even in Tripoli, where there are occasional wall posters advising against it. The sermon asked people to be patient and to support the new authorities, who would bring greater prosperity.
Libyans are at pains to emphasize their gratitude to NATO. My professor thought that without NATO the rebels would surely have lost to the regime. He and other intellectuals who sided with the February 17 revolution would have been hung, or even chopped into pieces. He and others are grateful.
Many people did lose their lives in the six months of fighting. Perhaps 2-3000 lie in mass graves in Tripoli and elsewhere. Some were burned alive in containers doused with gasoline. DNA analysis will be possible, but there is little capacity to conduct it in Libya. They are just starting to organize the effort, hoping that instructions to leave the mass graves undisturbed are followed.
Then there is Abu Saleem, the notorious prison where Qaddafi ordered a massacre of more than 1200 prisoners in 1996. Their remains, too, need to be identified. Both in Benghazi, where the court house square hosts a big display on the Abu Saleem massacre, and here in Tripoli there is a vivid memory of the event and a strong feeling that justice has to be done on behalf of the victims.
As in so many Muslim countries, the religiosity on display in Tripoli Friday had little to do with going to mosque, where not much more than a handful of classically thawb-dressed men seemed to attend noon-time prayers in my neighborhood, though I understand there was a big crowd in Martyrs’ square for prayers with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan. Just as important are the pervasive sounds and symbols of Islam: the call to prayer (but if they are doing the early morning adhan I am missing it), the star and crescent moon that appears on the “independence” flag and therefore on most revolution paraphenalia, and women covering at least their hair (well over 90%). I imagine Islam is also present more or less constantly in both public and family life.
The natural question is whether Islam will take a political form in Libya. The Muslim Brotherhood is far weaker than in Egypt, but some of the militias and their leaders are explicitly Islamist. I have no way of telling whether they will gain traction in the nascent political arena. I imagine that they will to some extent, even if every Libyan I’ve asked about this so far says no.
One hand cannot endure forever if Libya is to be a democracy, or even a proto-democracy. The emergence of parties and factions will be an important test for the revolution, as the fingers on that one hand start to point in different directions.
But for the moment, unity is still producing results: the UN General Assembly acceptance of the NTC to occupy Libya’s seat and yesterday’s at least partly successful attacks on Qaddafi’s holdout towns of Sirte and especially Bani Walid.
We’ll have to wait to see what tomorrow will bring, but last night all of Tripoli was down at Martyr’s square to show support for the NTC and commemorate the hanging eighty years ago of Omar Mukhtar, Libyan hero of resistance to the Italians. Ironic therefore that many Libyans today dream of visiting Italy, admire the Italians and make a very fine caffe’ ristretto as well as a half-decent pizza rustica. Strange that a decent ice cream, even of the packaged (confezionato) kind, seems impossible to find. That’s one of my religious devotions. Maybe in the New Libya.
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A sense of direction
Friday night’s attack on the Israeli embassy in Cairo has already generated more heat than light. The analytical question is what were its short and long term impacts?
One in the short term is the recognition by many on both sides of the rather wide Egypt/Israel divide that the Camp David accords, however defective they may be regarded in particular details, have an enormous benefit: they eliminate the need for either country to be constantly on a war footing, thus avoiding enormous burdens that neither country would want to take on in the current environment. Several Egyptians I spoke to yesterday viewed Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statements as far more forthcoming than he has been in the past. Even Egyptian Salafists seemed to think the attack a bad idea, therefore possibly incited by the U.S. and helpful to Israel.
Egypt wants to renegotiate some aspects of the accords. The recognition on both sides of their value may make renegotiation easier, though I imagine the Israelis will want provisions that make it more difficult for a future Egyptian government to renege on the accords entirely. Politicians are now competing to see who can be more opposed to the current version of the accords and more vigorous in pursuit of renegotiation. It is widely believed that the military will not allow the accords to be abrogated, which ironically frees the politicians to call for precisely that, knowing that it won’t happen. Over the longer term, democratically elected politicians could find themselves trapped by their own promises.
The economic impact of Friday night’s riot is likely to be substantial. I’ve enjoyed some of Egypt’s fine tourist attractions the last few days: the step pyramid at Saqqara as well as the more famous pyramids and sphinx at Giza. We were almost alone at Saqqara. There were a few more people at Giza, mostly Egyptians enjoying a fine Saturday. No long lines of tour buses, no wait for anything. We also enjoyed a good lunch at Meena House, the spectacular hotel at the edge of the Giza pyramids. It, too, was deserted. The attack on the embassy will likely set the recovery in tourism to Egypt back another six months to a year, which means a lot to the significant percentage of the population that depends on it for their livings.
For those who thought the revolution was about making things better for the average Egyptian, the attack on the embassy is therefore not only a diversion, but also a perversion of priorities. Friday’s demonstration was supposed to have been about “correcting the path,” but it was far too small to get the army to accelerate the handover to civilians or even to get it to fix a date for elections. To the contrary, the embassy attack inspired a re-imposition of emergency laws, not a loosening of military controls. One keen American observer I spoke to suggested that the “scales are falling from Egyptian eyes” and they are now recognizing that their “revolution” was in fact hijacked by a military coup, one that was popular for a while but is now much less so. But even many of those who may no longer be enthusiasts for the army do not want to see disorder and disruption, which is becoming more widespread.
What the Egyptian transition seems to lack today is a clear sense of direction. People are doubting whether the military really intends to turn over power to civilians. I’ve already found in my few hours in Libya a dramatically different spirit: Benghazi at least thinks it knows where it is going and has advertised the fact repeatedly on the road from the airport: “we have a dream,” the signs read. Even though Qaddafi and his sons are still at large, people here are determined to push ahead to establish a more open and democcratic regime. I have little doubt but that Egyptians also want that, but they seem less sure of how to get it. The complexities of Egypt are far greater than those of relatively unpopulated and hydrocarbon-rich Libya.
PS: For those who might still wonder whether the football hooligans were in fact at the Israeli embassy Friday night, I discussed the matter yesterday with an Egyptian observer who knows their leadership well and stayed on the streets until 5 am. He assured me that the leaders of the “ultras” had not participated but that younger adherents had. They precipitated the confrontation with the police with gusto and determination.
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What I said and didn’t say
I’m not much into the duelling aspect of blogging, but there has been enough misunderstanding of what I wrote yesterday about my experience in Tahrir that it may be enlightening to respond to at least a few of the criticisms.
Let me focus on Angry Arab, whose comments have been repeated elsewhere. He writes under the heading “dumbest comment of the day”:
Daniel Serwer, who is in Cairo, reckons last night’s violence at the Israeli embassy had more to do with discontent against Egypt’s military rulers than Israel. He also suggests (see 11.12am post) that many of those protesting could be regarded as football hooligans.
This is dumb, but it is not what I said. I wrote: “The predominant themes in Tahrir however had little to do with Israel.” I then went on to outline what those themes appeared to be. I’ve checked this point several times: people in Tahrir were talking, chanting and singing about mainly internal Egyptian issues.
I never suggested that Egyptians were not angry with Israel. Nor did I suggest that the attack on the Embassy had more to do with Egypt’s military than with Israel. In fact, I wrote:
Egyptians regard the Israeli killing of several Egyptian policemen in Sinai in the aftermath of a terrorist attack inside Israel as humiliating and want a more fulsome apology for it.
I went on to conclude that peace between Egypt and Israel could not be maintained unless the people are committed to it, “society to society.”
Angry Arab also suggests I said “many of those protesting could be regarded as football hooligans.” What I actually said was “some of whom were surely what would be termed football hooligans in Europe.” I might prefer today to have said “likely” rather than “surely,” but the point here is that I never said “many of those protesting” (I added the bold face) could or should be regarded as football hooligans, which is what Angry Arab said I said. In case there is any doubt: I assume most of them were Egyptians angry with Israel.
Accuracy is not Angry Arab’s strong point. Let’s take this statement: “this ‘US blogger’–whoever he is–because she holds a PhD from Oxford University and is a young academic.” Yes, I am a PhD, from Princeton not Oxford, male and not young, all of which is readily ascertainable from this website.
I don’t however expect anyone to believe me because of age, education or gender. I only expect to be quoted accurately and debated honestly. That is not what Angry Arab did. I would rate his comments dumbest of my day.
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My Tahrir experience last night
I spent yesterday evening in Tahrir square, which meant that I missed the attack on the Israeli embassy that has dominated the news from Cairo. Colleagues on their way back from the pyramids got caught in a pitched battle betweeen rock-throwers and riot police in front of the Saudi embassy, down the street from the Israelis. They got a good scare, but were uninjured.
My own contact with the would-be rock throwers was limited to their recruiting marches through Tahrir, where most people were ignoring the chants of “to the embassy!” sung out by fist-pumping small groups of young men. But they apparently managed to assemble thousands at the embassy, some of whom were surely what would be termed football hooligans in Europe. The arrival of Ahli and Zamalek (the two Cairo teams) fans in Tahrir was greeted earlier in the evening with a roar of approval.
The predominant themes in Tahrir however had little to do with Israel. A big sign denounced the media cronies of the Mubarak regime, all still in their jobs. Another called for justice for those who had resisted the revolution, noting that they are not even arrested but pro-democracy demonstrators are still being processed in military courts.
Anti-military sentiment tinged the speeches, which called on Egyptians to be like one hand, a civilian one. The crowd wanted the army to fulfill its promise to turn over power to civilians. “Liberty, social justice and bread” was a popular chant–it sounds a lot more rhythmic in Arabic. The atmosphere is a bit like Hyde Park: anyone with a microphone stands on a soap box, quickly assembles a crowd and holds forth, to the amusement and banter of the listeners, who denounce him for hogging the mic. The Communist Party was handing out leaflets that denounced human rights violations by the military and called for liberation from everything, including bachelorhood.
Women were less than a quarter of Tahrir’s population last night, many but not all covering at least their hair. “The one who governs shoud be bigger in wisdom than beard” was a popular, I am told Koranic, quotation. But neither religion nor secularism was on serious display so far I could tell.
If there was any link between the general sentiment of the crowd and the violence at the Israeli embassy, it may lay in the idea of humiliation. “Keep your head up, you are Egyptian” was a strong current in the speeches. Egyptians regard the Israeli killing of several Egyptian policemen in Sinai in the aftermath of a terrorist attack inside Israel as humiliating and want a more fulsome apology for it. As Rob Satloff suggests, “a more generous statement on the unfortunate killing of Egyptian security forces might have been
both appropriate and helpful.”
That would not likely have carried much weight with last night’s rioters, who destroyed a security wall built recently in front of the embassy and injured a lot of people. But it is only by making the “cold peace” between Israel and Egypt a warmer one that politicians on both sides of the Sinai border will be able to convince their electorates that the Camp David accords are worth defending.
This is the real meaning of the Arab spring to Israel, as Satloff also notes: peace is no longer an issue that can be settled president to prime minister, or even government to government. It will have to be society to society, which is much harder, especially if your ambassador has fled from Cairo and the Egyptian one has been withdrawn from Tel Aviv as well.
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