Tag: European Union
Peace picks, October 3-7
- Charting a Way Forward in Afghanistan | Monday, October 3 | 10:30am – 12:00pm | The Brookings Institution | Click HERE to register
Fifteen years after the September 11 attacks drew the United States into Afghanistan to defeat al-Qaida and their hosts, the Taliban, cooperation with the Afghan people remains key to the generational conflict against violent extremists in the region. While multiple conflicts rage across the broader Middle East, continuing to build an enduring partnership with Afghanistan is pivotal. The situation in Afghanistan remains difficult, but the country is considerably better off today than it was at the start of this conflict, and the Afghan people are an important ally. In a new paper, former ambassadors, military commanders, special representatives, and Afghanistan scholars outline a way forward for the United States and its Afghan partners, centered on the concept of enduring partnership.On October 3, the Brookings Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligencewill host an event to examine the effort in Afghanistan and the region based on the recommendations from the paper. Former Special Representative for Afghanistan/Pakistan James Dobbins and former Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann, as well as former Ambassador James Cunningham will join retired General David Petraeus, who led the NATO military effort there from 2010 to 2011, as panelists. Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon will moderate the event. - Crossroads of the Caucusus: Implications of Georgia’s Elections for the Region and Beyond | Monday, October 3 | 2:00pm – 3:15pm | The German Marshall Fund of the US | Click HERE to Register
The instability stretching from Ukraine to Turkey to the Middle East places Georgia at the middle of regional and geopolitical developments. Though Georgia’s relationship with the Alliance is long standing, Georgia has made significant strides in greater governmental transparency and efficiency that have bolstered the country’s democracy and pulled Georgia closer to NATO and Europe. However, escalating tensions between the ruling Georgian Dream party and the opposing United National Movement, as well as controversial amendments to the country’s constitutional courts, have raised questions about the direction of internal politics. With this in mind, The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) invites you to a discussion with Ambassador Tedo Japaridze, member of the Georgian Parliament and chairman of the International Relations Committee, who will discuss the upcoming elections on October 8, Georgia’s strategic context in a rapidly changing region, and Georgia’s relationship with Europe and NATO. The discussion will be moderated by Transatlantic Academy Executive Director Stephen Szabo. - What Does Success in the Middle East Look Like for the Next President? | Wednesday, October 5 | 8:15am – 9:15am | The Brookings Institution | Click HERE to Register
Syria. Iraq. Iran. It’s no secret that many of the top challenges for the security and stability of the world lie in the Middle East. On day one of their administration, the next president will be forced to make major strategy decisions in the region. Will the U.S. choose to engage militarily in Syria? How will the U.S. move forward with the Iranian nuclear agreement? After four years of the next president’s first term, what would success in the Middle East really look like?
On October 5, come have breakfast at Brookings and hear an exciting conversation about how the next president can navigate these hot spots in foreign policy, and make both the U.S. and the world a safer place. As part of the Brookings Election 2016 project, this event is the first in a series of live podcast recordings.
Brookings Senior Fellow and former Iranian nuclear negotiator Robert Einhorn has released a new set of recommendationsto the next president on Iran on how the U.S. can reinforce support for the Iran nuclear deal at home and abroad and promote stability in the region. Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon recently delivered a policy recommendation on the Syrian conflict, and will speak to how the next president can balance the dual goals of U.S. security and the protection of Syrian lives.
The event will be moderated by veteran journalist Indira Lakshmanan of the Boston Globe, who will prompt each expert to deliver a recommended course of action in a concise manner, press them with alternate perspectives on the issue, and ensure a lively conversation about realistic pathways to success and the obstacles that lie in the way.
- Stronger with Allies: The Future of Europe after Brexit | Thursday, October 6 | 8:30am – 1:00pm | Atlantic Council | Click HERE To Register
As British and EU policymakers map out the UK’s exit from the European Union, Europe is already confronted with a triple threat: Russia’s aggressive posture to the East, Mideast wars and instability producing waves of migrants and extremism from the South, and centrifugal, nationalist forces tearing at the continent’s internal fabric. The UK referendum, horrific terrorist attacks, and a continually sluggish economy put the future of Europe in question. Against this backdrop of uncertainty, this conference is organized in partnership with the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic to flesh out a strategy for Europe and transatlantic cooperation following the Bratislava EU Summit in September.
The event will feature: E. Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia, Mr. Carlos Costa, Governor, Bank of Portugal, Ambassador Paula Dobriansky, Senior Fellow, Future of Diplomacy Project, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, Senior Counsel, Covington & Burling, LLP; Former US Ambassador to the European Union, Ms. Ashlee Godwin, Committee Specialist, Foreign Affairs Committee and Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, UK House of Commons, Mr. Benjamin Haddad, Research Fellow, Hudson Institute, H.E. Ratislav Kacer, Ambassador of Slovakia to Hungary, Ms. Laure Mandeville, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Future Europe Initiative, Atlantic Council, Dr. Andrea Montanino, Director, Global Business and Economics Program, Atlantic Council, H.E. Pierre Moscovici, Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs, EU Commission, H.E. David O’Sullivan. Ambassador of the European Union to the United States, Minister Ana Palacio, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Former Prime Minister of Denmark and Secretary General of NATO, Ms. Teri Schultz, Freelance Reporter, National Public Radio and CBS Radio, Mr. Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President, Programs and Strategy, Atlantic Council - Pakistan’s Economic Turnaround: What Basis for Peace? | Thursday, October 6 | 9:30am – 11:00am | US Institute of Peace | Click HERE To Register
Reforms under the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif have boosted economic growth. Still, the world’s sixth most-populous country faces the economic and long-term security imperative of providing jobs, especially for young adults, who form 30 percent of the population—a demographic “youth bulge” that is one of the world’s largest. And security problems, including violent extremism, threaten economic development and risk derailing Pakistan’s efforts toward rapprochement with its neighbors, including India. Mohammad Ishaq Dar has served as finance ministry throughout the current government’s term, and is a longtime leader within the governing Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz). He will speak at USIP in a visit to Washington that will include the annual meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This event will feature Mohammad Ishaq Dar, Finance Minister of Pakistan and will be moderated by Moeed Yusuf, Associate Vice President, Asia Center, U.S. Institute of Peace - Shifting Paradigms: The Role of Young People in Building Peace and Security | Thursday, October 6 | 2:00pm – 4:00pm | Woodrow Wilson Center | Click HERE to Register
The Wilson Center’s Global Sustainability and Resilience Program, in coordination with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), invites you to an expert discussion on building peace and countering violent extremism with young people.
In 2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2250, which marked the emergence of a youth, peace, and security agenda. What should policymakers prioritize to support young people’s active engagement in peacebuilding processes? How can Resolution 2250 support the United States’ domestic and international efforts on peace? Panelists will explore these questions and invite questions from the audience. The event will feature Joyce Banda,Distinguished Fellow, Roger-Mark De Souza,
Director of Population, Environmental Security, and Resilience, Benoit Kalasa,
Director, Technical Division, United Nations Population Fund Natalia Kanem, Deputy Executive Director, Programme, United Nations Population Fund, Alaa Murabit, Medical Doctor; High-Level Commissioner, Health Employment and Economic Growth, United Nations and Andy Rabens, Special Advisor, Global Youth Issues, U.S. Department of State
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Dodik’s folly
American University Professor Ulas Doga Uralp asked last night whether I had written anything about the Bosnian Serb referendum, which passed Sunday with over 99% voting “yes.” Turnout was modest: somewhere around 55%. The issue on the ballot was whether Republika Srpska’s national day should be celebrated January 9. I won’t bother to explain why that is important to some people. Nor do I regret not having written something about it, though I believe I wasted a few breaths on it in an interview.
The substance of the referendum deserves to be ignored. The significant thing was that it was held at all, after the Bosnian constitutional court ruled it unconstitutional, rightly or wrongly. If the referendum is allowed to stand, Dodik intends to move ahead with an independence referendum in 2018. For some in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that would be a casus belli, just as it was in 1992.
I don’t really expect real war to ensue, though the risk of violence needs to be taken seriously. Many approved independence referendums don’t result in widely recognized sovereignty, most notably Russian-inspired referendums in Transnistria, South Ossetia, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Crimea. Don’t know all those places? That’s because they are under normal circumstances obscure provinces, now converted into poor, backwater satellites of Moscow with no prospect of wide international recognition. Their main function is to destabilize and retard the countries that continue to claim them, in service to Moscow’s anti-Western, anti-NATO and anti-EU ambitions.
That’s the best Republika Srpska can hope for if it proceeds with its current course: to become a poor, unrecognized, backwater satellite of a country whose GDP is now less than that of Spain and still decreasing. Russia is a declining regional power with little to offer even a strategically important place like Crimea. Republika Srpska as a self-declared independent state will get little recognition and even less money, since it doesn’t happen to sit on significant real estate. Dodik will no doubt have increased opportunities to line his pockets if RS declares independence, but the population is guaranteed to lose access to World Bank funds as well as American and European assistance.
I don’t expect it to come to that. It would be far better if Bosnia’s courts would handle the issue, declaring the referendum null and void and doing what they can to hold Dodik accountable for conducting it in spite of a constitutional court decision. This is Bosnia’s Marbury v Madison moment, when the court’s authority to review legislation and executive decisions requires affirmation. If the Americans and Europeans have any interest left in Bosnia, they need to make sure that happens.
Of course they might have just used the “Bonn powers” of the High Representative, who has said the referendum violates the Dayton agreements. They can no longer readily do that because they have somehow allowed Moscow to acquire a de facto veto over their use, and they fear they have no way of implementing the HiRep’s decisions. Putin’s Russia is happy to use the veto and ostentatiously provided support to Dodik with a visit to Moscow just before the referendum.
But none of that changes reality: Republika Srpska won’t become a widely recognized independent state but may well join half a dozen other Moscow-sponsored backwaters in serving Moscow’s commitment to destabilization. The EU and NATO may not be perfect, but they offer a lot better future than Russia does. That’s Dodik’s folly.
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Happy birthday Blic!
1. As the talk about Chinese growth intensifies, its military is getting stronger, and while Beijing is defying even USA in the South Chinese sea dispute…what is your prediction for the decades that are coming: Could China become a world’s number one superpower?
A: No. China is a rising power, but it also still very poor and undeveloped. It faces enormous internal challenges: environmental conditions are deplorable, economic growth is slowing, social tensions have few political outlets, global warming will have a big impact on its infrastructure. China will be an important regional power, and it is already economically active in Africa and Latin America. But it will be a long time before it can play the kind of varied and multi-valent security, political and economic leadership role that the US plays globally.
2. It seems that Russia is getting support from some political factors in the EU countries. Is it possible that some of them will abolish the sanctions and open a wider cooperation with Moscow, especially now when the EU has a lot of its problems?
A: Russia is also getting support from “some political factors” in the US, but our sanctions will remain in place.
The EU will need to review again its sanctions against Russia, but there aren’t any positive developments in Ukraine to justify loosening them.
None of the EU’s problems would be ameliorated by dropping sanctions. The Russian economy is in a deep recession from which it is unlikely to recover without a big increase in oil prices. That isn’t happening.
3. Right-wing movement is getting stronger in Europe, and it seems it could reshape the EU as we know it today. Is that comeback of national states good or bad for Europe?
A: I’ll let Europeans decide. I can see positive developments emerging from the current euroskepticism, but I also see big risks to the single market.
4. Angela Merkel’s popularity has never been lower. If she decides not to run for fourth term, or if she loses, who do you see as her successor? Do you think that Germany will stop with the open door policy, with or without Merkel, because it is obvious that there is no solidarity between the member states?
A: I wouldn’t count Merkel out yet. She is at a low point in her personal popularity, but her political party is still polling very well. Europe is already controlling the inflow of migrants better than it had done. I expect that tighter control to continue.
5. Migrant crisis is shaking the EU for a while, but despite that, it seems that Brussels is avoiding to fulfill the promises given to Turkey, the main dam which is stopping the refugees to come in even bigger number to Europe. For how long could that take, especially now when Erdogan has grown warmer relations with Russia and Putin?
A: Brussels is in a bind. Turkey is taking an autocratic turn. It will be very hard to continue on the path to closer relations with Brussels if Ankara moves in a non-democratic direction. Erdogan has got some solace from Putin, who of course has no problems with autocrats, but Russia really has little to offer Turkey compared to the EU.
6. ISIS has become the world’s number one boogie-man. It seems that the strong actions in Syria has hurt this terrorist organization, but they didn’t destroy it, like something is missing. In your opinion, what is necessary to finally end “ISIS era”?
A: ISIS won’t “end.” It will be defeated in Raqqa and Mosul, then peter out. There never was an ISIS era. There was only an ISIS moment. ISIS has now lost lots of important territory in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. It will survive at least for a while as a terrorist group causing real harm to real people, but it is not, and never was, an existential threat to the West.
7. Hillary or Trump? What would the USA look like if Trump wins?
A: I am a supporter of Hillary Clinton for President. A Trump win would be bad for the US, bad for Europe, bad for the Balkans and good for Russia.
8. What is the best path for Serbia? Our ruling political elite is eager to bring Serbia in the EU, majority of people thinks the same, but that same majority wants good relations with Russia. Is it possible to sit on two chairs like that, or not? Also, do you think that some members of the EU will demand from Serbia to recognize Kosovo independence as a condition of joining the EU?
A: Lots of countries in Europe want good relations with Russia. Washington would also like good relations with Russia. It has become difficult to “sit on two chairs” only because of Russia’s renewed aggressiveness, especially in neighboring areas it regards as part of its “near abroad.” Russia’s behavior in Ukraine in particular is unacceptable and has aroused a strong–but peaceful–NATO response. It has also pushed several non-member countries to tighten relations with NATO. This is precisely the opposite of what Putin should want.
There is not now, nor has there ever been, any possibility of Serbian membership in the EU without Belgrade’s acceptance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kosovo, which is already de facto acknowledged in the Brussels political agreement. Belgrade has a choice of methods by which it can act to accept Kosovo’s de jure sovereignty and territorial integrity. It can recognize Kosovo and establish diplomatic relations. Or it can allow Kosovo to enter the UN General Assembly. There may be other clever solutions that I haven’t thought of. But the EU states that have already recognized Kosovo will not allow Serbia’s accession if this issue is still outstanding. Remember: this is not only a question for European presidents and prime ministers but also for their parliaments, which have to ratify accession.
Everyone in Belgrade knows that. But the current authorities don’t want to pay the price, and some like to think they can get a better deal on this issue at the end of the EU accession process than now. I think they are wrong about that. At the end of the process, Belgrade will be under enormous pressure from internal public opinion to remove any obstacles to EU accession, including Kosovo recognition. Serbia today could hope that Kosovo would accommodate some of its needs in return for recognition. I’ll leave it to Serbs and Albanians to cut that deal.
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In the box can be good too
I enjoyed 90 minutes today with SAIS’s Mike Lampton and CSIS’s Michael Green commenting on Amitai Etzioni’s Foreign Policy: Thinking Outside the Box, a recent Chatham House publication. Here are my speaking notes, though I should note much of the event focused on China, which was not within my remit:
- First let me say it has been a privilege to be required to read this book. It is a model of precision and intelligibility. Professor Ezioni says what he means clearly and concisely, marshaling the evidence with skill and erudition.
- My doubts have to do mainly with the title: it advertises thinking outside the box, but much of the book is devoted to ideas I would regard as well inside the box, even if some of them might be labeled “new normal.”
- Take, for example, the chapter on “defining down sovereignty.” A good deal of it is spent pooh-poohing the Westphalian notion of sovereignty and arguing in favor of a more contemporary alternative: sovereignty as entailing rights as well as responsibilities.
- This leads naturally to Responsibility to Protect, which is well within the box these days, and another, new to me notion, “responsibility to counter terrorism.” If states fail or refuse to do this, intervention might be justified, Professor Etzioni says.
- It’s an interesting idea that even explains some current behavior, in particular the anti-ISIL intervention in Syria, which the host government has not unauthorized.
- The downsides are all too clear: the slippery slope that leads to an unjustified excuse for invasion or other intervention, as in George W.
- The chapter on spheres of influence is not so much outside the box as it is outside the realm of academic discussion, as Professor Etzioni himself documents. Spheres of influence are a well-established practice in international affairs, even if the concept has not attracted much scholarly attention.
- Professor Etzioni sees spheres of influence, Russia’s “near-abroad” for example or Iran’s influence in Iraq, as providing space for rising regional powers and buffer zones that bolster a feeling of security.
- The trouble with that notion is that it discounts the will of those who live in these buffer states. The limits of his approach are all to evident in Ukraine, where Etzioni admits Russia used force to try to prevent the Ukrainians from choosing their alignment with Europe.
- People just aren’t always content to serve the purposes of other powers.
- When it comes to self-determination, I would quibble with Amitai’s characterization of Kurdistan as more democratic than the rest of Iraq, but more importantly he ignores the negative regional and internal political contexts for any independence move by the Iraqi Kurds. I doubt it will happen, or that it will be democratizing if it does.
- I would agree however with Amitai’s main conclusion: decentralization rather than secession is far more likely to produce positive outcomes in democratic societies like Spain, where unfortunately the central government has been unwilling to concede even that. That however is a conclusion well inside the box, not outside it.
- One concluding thought: Professor Etzioni repeatedly doubts the applicability of liberal democratic notions outside the family of liberal democratic states.
- As an American, I feel condemned to believe in universal rights, as our founding documents are all too clear on this subject.
- But I would also say that I’ve virtually never met someone outside the liberal democratic world who didn’t aspire to those rights.
- We don’t need to export the notion that all people are created equal. We only need to help people find ways of institutionalizing equal rights in ways that are appropriate to their particular contexts.
- All in all, a good and interesting read, even if the novelty is overblown.
I made two points in the discussion period worth recalling:
- Liberal democracy is not congruent with secularism, since we have liberal democratic states (where rights are in principle equal) like Italy and the UK with established churches (not to mention the penetration of religion into government in the US).
- Russia’s behavior in Ukraine cannot properly be attributed to NATO expansion. Putin has made it clear that he is trying to re-establish Moscow’s hegemony in what he considers Russia’s near-abroad. That is not a reaction to NATO expansion but rather an aggressive program vital to his view of Russia’s historic and cultural role, as well as to his domestic political standing.
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Believing in peace in Colombia
A SAIS alum living in Bogotá writes:
While the world rejoices that the government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) reached an agreement to end a 52 year-old conflict, my parents refuse to accept the terms negotiated in the agreement. “Those people should be in jail for what they have done to this country!” announced my father, a 65 year-old who in his life has not seen peace. “I am going to vote ‘No’ in the plebiscite, because I don’t believe in this government,” declared my mother. The October 2 will give Colombians an unprecedented opportunity to vote ‘Yes’, or ‘No’ on a yet-to-be determined question.
My parents are not alone in their skepticism of the agreement. Many Colombians, led by former president (2002-10) Alvaro Uribe Velez, are campaigning against it on the grounds that the government was too lenient in terms of transitional justice, political participation, and reparations for victims. The sentiment is understandable. The name FARC in Colombia carries the psychological weight of massacres, kidnappings, bombs, and all sorts of terrorist attacks orchestrated by the world’s longest standing Marxist guerrilla.
The terms of the agreement are revealed in a 297-page document that the government has done a poor job socializing to the public. It contains important concessions by both the government and the FARC. Tellingly, the FARC agreed to disengage from the narcotics trade. However, the scourge of narcotrafficking will remain as long as consumers in Europe and the United States continue with their voracious and inelastic appetite for cocaine. The agreement also contains landmark steps on victims rights, a truth commission, and transitional justice for FARC-fighters, paramilitaries, and state actors who committed grave crimes in the context of the conflict.
The agreement will arguably take 20 years or more to implement, but its effects will begin to be seen on tomorrow, August 29,when the government and the FARC declare a complete bilateral ceasefire. The accords will be signed in Bogota on September 23, which will signal ‘D-day,’ the beginning of the transition period when the FARC will move to 23 hamlet zones and eight temporary camps across the country for 180 days. This will be followed by an 18-month stabilization period, a 10-year period of implementation of the agreements and a further 10-year period to consolidate peace. This doesn’t mean Colombia is out of the woods yet, as there remain important narcotrafficking Organized Armed Groups (GAO) and a smaller, yet fierce, communist insurgency, the National Liberation Army (ELN). These groups will continue their criminal activities for a while. But removing the FARC from the picture will make a huge dent in the bloodshed.
Figure 1: Showing the number of civilian, public forces, and FARC deaths during offensive actions and combats. Source: CERAC
As a result of the agreement, little will change for urbanites in Bogota, Medellín, Cali, and Barranquilla. Yet for individuals living in distant rural areas, the effect will be enormous. No longer will the FARC recruit their children for war, plant landmines, destroy their makeshift infrastructure, or participate in battles in their territories. The implementation of the accords will mark the beginning of the implementation of an ambitious plan to redistribute land to victims, build tertiary roads, and provide rural electrification to the countryside, which has suffered from the abandonment of the State for over 200 years. It is an enormously complex challenge, to which the United States, European Union, and United Nations have pledged assistance.
Yet the opportunity to dream of a better country, one where political differences are debated and argued, where we finally get an opportunity to heal 52 year old wounds, depends on the October 2 vote. Peace with the FARC is within our reach. The referendum will initiate a transition to a period full of uncertainty but immense promise.
In order to fulfill that promise, the first order of business will be to rid ourselves of the generational bitterness caused by the longstanding confrontation. “Do you think you will see peace during your lifetime, Dad?” I asked. “Probably not,” he replied, “but your children might.”
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Stronger Erdogan, weaker Turkey
The July 15 Turkish coup attempt was swiftly quashed. Just as swiftly came President Erdogan’s fulfillment of his promise that those responsible “will pay a heavy price for their treason to Turkey.” Why the coup failed, who was behind it, and what is the future of US-Turkey relations were the main questions explored at the Atlantic Council event last Tuesday “Ten Days after Quelling the Coup: Where is Turkey Headed?” Moderated by Aaron Stein, Senior Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the event featued Elmira Bayrasli, Visiting Fellow at New America, and Steven Cook, ENI Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Cook offered four reasons for the coup failure. The first and most important was the divided Turkish military. The coup was a factious scheme, not a unified undertaking. Second, the plotters underestimated Erdogan’s hold on power, which he has held since 2003. Third, the Turkish military is not as strong as it seemed. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Fethullah Gulen — whom Erdogan regards as the main culprit of the coup attempt — used to be partners and worked in parallel to weaken and subordinate the military. Lastly, Turkish society appears no longer willing to accept military rule.
Bayrasli clarified that Fethullah Gulen is a US-based cleric who founded the Hizmet movement. Rooted in moderate Islam, Hizmet has attracted millions of followers and has funded hundreds of schools, think tanks, and media outlets around the world. Erdogan accuses Gulen of orchestrating the coup and has urged the US to extradite him. It is possible he was behind the coup, but it is also true that Gulen has become Erdogan’s “default scapegoat.” Until Turkey provides solid evidence, the US cannot extradite Gulen, but the claim of his involvement advances Erdogan’s effort to concentrate power.
Bayrasli noted that the AKP came to power with technocrats who delivered. Turkey has seen enormous economic growth since Erdogan came to power. But economic prosperity hasn’t been matched with political and social advancement.
Cook and Bayrasli believe that Washington and the EU are positioned as mere spectators, with little leverage over Turkey’s internal affairs. The implicit Turkish threat to send a large number of refugees in the direction of Europe means that the EU will remain mute over Erdogan’s purge. According to Cook, “Turkey has the EU over a barrel.” Turkey’s paramount importance in the fight against ISIS will silence Washington too.
With its military in chaos, with police and the ministry of interior decimated by purges, Turkey may not remain an effective partner in the fight against ISIS, either in controlling its borders with Syria or working with the US at Incirlik. Who is going to substitute thousands of judges and teachers, and tens of thousands of policemen and army personnel? The purges are weakening Turkey and are undermining its capacity for effective governance. Turkey might have the EU over a barrel, but at least Washington should not be a mere spectator.
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