Tag: Iran
Kurdistan under pressure
I enjoyed a couple of hours serving on a panel this morning with Kurdistan Regional Government Representative in Washington Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, the Atlantic Council’s Nusseibeh Younes, and SAIS second year student Yael Mizrahi. Sasha Toperich of SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations and leader of its Mediterranean Basin Initiative moderated. I won’t even try to reproduce the nuanced and fine-grained presentations by Bayan, Nusseibeh and Yael, but here are the talking points I used:
1. I am, like most Americans, an admirer of Iraqi Kurdistan and what it has achieved, even if I wouldn’t say the democratic transition there is even near complete.
2. That’s not surprising: Kurdish national aspirations were frustrated in the aftermath of World War I. Even in recent decades, Kurdistan has seen oppression, war, expulsion, and chemical attacks.
3. It has taken a hundred years for a fraction of the Kurdish population—the part fortunate enough to live in Iraq—to gain some degree of self-governance.
4. Until recently, it looked to some people as if that self-governance might progress towards independence and sovereignty.
5. I had my doubts, not I hasten to add due to weakness in the Kurds case: they were treated at least as badly as Kosovo Albanians and arguably much worse.
6. But geopolitical pressure from Iraqi Kurdistan’s neighbors has made independence a dicey proposition. Ankara, though friendlier than ever with Erbil, does not want independence for Kurdistan. Tehran is dead set against it. Baghdad doesn’t want it either.
7. In the last year, the situation has become even more complicated.
8. Kurdistan is under pressure for three dramatic reasons:
• The fall of oil prices;
• ISIL’s successful takeover of most of Sunni Iraq;
• Its own internal political strife.
9. Let me consider these one by one.
10. Oil prices are now at less than half their level of June 2014. At $100/barrel, Kurdistan needed production of something like 500,000 barrels per day to replace its share of Iraq’s overall oil production.
11. I’m guessing, but it seems to me likely it now needs production of well over 1 million barrels per day to replace the money it expects from Baghdad.
12. Even 500,000 bpd was a stretch. A million is a much bigger stretch, even with Kirkuk production now in Kurdistan’s control.
13. Second, Kurdistan now has to defend about six hundred miles of confrontation line with the Islamic State, as well as something like two million displaced people and refugees it is hosting with international assistance.
14. That is a daunting battle front and a massive humanitarian requirement.
15. Third is the serious political strife within Kurdistan, which pits President Barzani and his PDK against Gorran and other dissenters from his desire to prolong his stay in the presidency. They want a more parliamentary and less presidential system.
16. Soldiers who are expected to fight ISIL will want to know who and what they are fighting for. There is more ambiguity and dissension about that today than there has been for many years.
17. I don’t see any of these pressures letting up soon.
18. Erbil is getting ready to return to Baghdad in an effort to restore the agreement on oil that was supposed to allow exports directly from Kurdistan in exchange for payment of what Baghdad owes Erbil.
19. Let’s hope that issue can be sorted out, but even if it is oil prices remain under $50 per barrel and are unlikely to go above $80, due to unconventional production enabled by US technology that is now spreading to other countries.
20. Oil is priced in a global market. Kurdistan now has little prospect of meeting its budgetary needs as an independent state.
21. ISIL is not going away. Even if it is forced to withdraw from Ramadi, as it has been forced to do from Tikrit and Bayji, it will be some time before Mosul is retaken. The Kurdish confrontation line with ISIL is likely to remain long for some time to come.
22. Even after ISIS is defeated, I would anticipate extremist attacks on the KRG, as have occurred in the past.
23. Nor is Kurdistan’s internal strife likely to go away. Barzani is standing his ground. So is Gorran, which has been suspended from the parliament and the coalition government. Even if things were to get patched up, the differences remain profound and the willingness to resolve them weak.
24. So Kurdistan faces some intractable problems, even without mentioning the complications that come from the war in Syria: Turkish attacks on the PKK inside Iraqi Kurdistan and the help Erbil has given to the Kurdish forces flying PYD/YPG banners, which Ankara resents.
25. So what looked like a natural slide towards independence a year or two ago now looks like a return to the 20th century: a Kurdistan hemmed in on all sides and unable to pursue the self-determination that its people unquestionably want.
26. What should the U.S. do?
27. It should certainly support the Kurds, both Syrian and Iraqi, in the fight against ISIS, so long as they are prepared to treat Arabs and other non-Kurds well.
28. It should also continue to provide generous humanitarian assistance.
29. And Washington should do what it can to help Erbil and Baghdad resolve their dispute over the distribution of oil revenue.
30. On the internal Kurdistan issues, we should want to see them resolved sooner rather than later, since later could mean disrupting the fight against ISIS.
31. But we also need to nudge our Kurdish friends in a direction that respects the rule of law and democracy.
32. No president is forever. No governing party is forever. Adherence to the constitution as well as fair and free competition for votes is what we should expect of our partners, no matter what the outcome for longstanding friends.
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Peace picks November 2-7
- The Iran Deal and the Future of US-Iranian Relations | Monday, November 2nd| 4-5:30 | American University | Email USFP@american.edu for more information | Join the United States Foreign Policy Program to welcome Ambassador Pickering back to SIS. He will discuss the recent Iran accord and its implications for the future of US-Iranian relations. Speakers include: Ambassador Thomas Pickering, former U.S. diplomat and founder of the Iran Project.
- Blood, Oil, and Cast: Confronting Terror Finance in Today’s Middle East | Monday, November 2nd | 10:00-11:00 | Center for American Progress | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In the years since 9/11, the United States has built effective tools to disrupt funding for Al Qaeda. More than a decade later, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and similar groups that extract resources from the land and people they control challenges the existing policy framework that focuses on safeguarding the formal international financial system. Meanwhile, Iran continues to destabilize the region through direct support to proxy groups such as Hezbollah. Although key U.S. partners in the region have taken action to crack down on terror financing, others have yet to take the necessary steps to counter terrorist fundraising in their own borders. Speakers include: Juan Zarate, former Deputy National Security Adviser for Combating Terrorism, William F. Wechsler, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, and Hardin Lang, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress.
- Turkey’s snap elections: Resuscitation or relapse? | Monday, November 2nd | 3:00 – 4:30 | Brookings Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND |As Turkey prepares for highly-contested elections on November 1, concerns are growing about the country’s politics, economy, security, and foreign policy. Just a few years ago Turkey was recognized as a model of democracy and beacon of stability and economic growth in a challenging region. However, more recently, Turkey’s economy has lost its dynamism, its leaders’ commitment to democratic principles seems to be eroding, and doubts are emerging about the country’s interests and engagement in the region. Even more disturbing, as the conflicts in Syria and Iraq continue unabated and massive refugee flows spill over into Europe, violent Islamic extremism has now surfaced in Turkey. With the government and opposition trading accusations, the horrific, recent bombing attack in Ankara has further polarized an already deeply-divided and anxious country. Panelists will discuss how recent events might influence voters what the election results might portend for Turkey’s strategic orientation. Speakers include: Ömer Taşpınar, National War College and Brookings, Gönül Tol, Middle East Institute, Kadir Üstün, SETA Foundation; and Robert Wexler, S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace.
- A Conversation with Tunisian Nobel Prize Laureate Hussein Abassi | Wednesday, November 4th | 9:30-11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | unisia has made tremendous efforts since its 2011 revolution to establish the institutions and practice of pluralistic democracy, and on October 9 the Norwegian Nobel Committee recognized Tunisia’s achievements. The committee awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, a group of four civil society groups including the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT). The UGTT, led by Mr. Hussein Abassi, played a powerful leadership role in the National Dialogue and in making Tunisia a model country for the region. The Atlantic Council is pleased to invite you to a discussion with Mr. Abassi on the role of institutions in pluralistic democracies in the Middle East. Other speakers include: Ambassador Thomas Shannon, and former Slovenian President Danilo Türk.
- Syria webinar: Putin in Syria- does it change anything? | Wednesday, November 4th | 10:00-11:00 | Aegis Advisory | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On 30 September, Russia began its airstrikes in Syria ostensibly against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Aegis Advisory is offering a webinar which will provide a framework for understanding the ever more complex situation, offering a privileged understanding of the environment in country and the likely range of scenarios. Why did the Russians decide to intervene now in the Syrian conflict? Would their intervention help in “degrading and destroying” ISIL? Should we expect a breakthrough in the security and political stalemate that will result in a meaningful solution?
- Kirkuk: Iraqi Keystone and ISIS Target | Wednesday, November 4th | 12:00-1:15 | Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | While ISIS militants control the western reaches of Kirkuk, Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and local police have prevented the fall of Kirkuk city and most of the oil-rich province. Kirkuk hosts hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons who have fled ISIS aggression. With funding and support from the Baghdad government disrupted, the challenges facing Kirkuk are mounting. The Middle East Institute is pleased to host Dr. Najmaldin Karim, governor of Kirkuk province since 2011, for a discussion about the province’s precarious place at the center of the Iraq war against the Islamic State. Governor Karim will review the threat posed by ISIS and how local government is trying to deliver for Kirkuk’s Kurdish, Arab, Turkmen, and Christian citizens while in the grip of a security and humanitarian crisis. Gönül Tol, director of MEI’s Center for Turkish Studies, will moderate the audience discussion with Dr. Karim following the governor’s opening remarks.
- Roundtable with the Leadership & Advocacy for Women in Africa | Thursday, November 5th | 11:00 – 12:00| Georgetown University | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Leadership and Advocacy for Women in Africa (LAWA) Fellowship Program was founded in 1993 at the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C., in order to train women’s human rights lawyers from Africa who are committed to returning home to their countries in order to advance the status of women and girls in their own countries throughout their careers.
- Afghanistan Today: Facing Challenges, Opening Opportunities | Thursday, November 5th | 5:00 – 7:00 | SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Speakers will provide in-depth knowledge of current developments, as well as prospects for the future in Afghanistan, as seen from the perspectives of the government, media, and the private sector. Speakers: TBA.
- The state of Africa’s Great Lakes region | Friday, November 6th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Brookings Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Great Lakes region of Africa is crucial to Africa’s general stability, yet it remains plagued by a number of ongoing security and development challenges. A broad question, among others, is how or if the United States should try to promote democracy and security in these key countries at this crucial juncture? Other concerns include how to ensure stability and continue to protect human rights. Speakers include: Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Co- Director, Center on 21st Century Security and Intelligence , The Brookings Institution, Anthony Gambino, Former USAID Mission Director in Congo, Kristin McKie, Assistant Professor of African Studies & Government, St. Lawrence University, The Honorable Thomas Perriello, Special Envoy, Africa Great Lakes Region, U.S. Department of State.
- Rising Tides: a simulation of regional crisis and territorial competition in the East China Sea | Saturday, November 7th | 11:30am – 6:00 pm | George Washington University | REGISTER TO ATTEND | This simulation will examine the complex maze that actors must negotiate when dealing with the tense social, political, and military dilemmas currently occurring in the East China Sea. Participants will assume the roles of influential policymakers, and must work with both state and non-state regional actors to execute comprehensive and multilateral government responses to issues ranging from great power politics, piracy, and natural resource conflicts; to state bargaining dilemmas, humanitarian assistance, and collective action problems. Participants will have the unique opportunity to grapple with serious questions of national interest through the eyes of the government of the United States and the People’s Republic of China as they are divided into teams in order to develop their respective policies and agendas. Participants will need to develop strategies in line with their team’s objectives to manage a variety of crises and react to actions from other teams.
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A small step forward, a big step backwards
Yesterday’s communique after Vienna talks is classically ambiguous. It represents a small step forward, and a big step backward. It raises as many questions as it answers.
The step forward is this: Iran is included in the 19 parties issuing the statement. It had not previously been party to multilateral talks on Syria, even though it plays a vital role in sustaining Bashar al Assad in power. Without Iranian troops, weapons, command and control as well as oil and other assistance, he would be long gone by now.
Much of what Iran has agreed to is not controversial in principle: Syria’s unity, independence, territorial integrity, the continuity of its state, human rights for its citizens and humanitarian access. However difficult to implement in practice, none of Assad’s international opponents has wanted anything else. Nor does Russia, though its concept of human rights might not coincide with ours (Saudi Arabia’s doesn’t either). There is value in getting Iran to sign on to things already agreed in the 2012 communique that until now has been the touchstone of international diplomacy on Syria. It was in fact Iran’s refusal to sign on to that communique that prevented it from attending the January 2014 Geneva 2 conference, which was the last time something resembling the “international community” met on Syria.
But there is a big piece of the 2012 communique missing from yesterday’s document: the provision for a transitional governing body with full executive powers based on mutual consent. This is a big step backwards. In its place, we got this much vaguer promise about the transition:
a political process leading to credible, inclusive, nonsectarian governance, followed by a new constitution and elections. These elections must be administered under U.N. supervision to the satisfaction of the governance [sic] and to the highest international standards of transparency and accountability, free and fair, with all Syrians, including the diaspora, eligible to participate.
Herein lies the devil of all details: what to do about President Assad between now and elections. The Iranians have not signed on to delegation of his authority to a transitional governing body, but only to his fate being decided in UN-supervised elections. And implicitly the Americans and their partners have backed off the demand that he give up power at the start of the transition process, settling instead for his removal at the end, if the voters so decide (or perhaps earlier if the Russians are prepared to prevent him from standing at the elections).
The Americans will argue that this is really not the case because “no credible, inclusive, nonsectarian governance” can be established with Bashar still in place. But they have certainly lost something important in the omission of reference to a transitional governing body with full executive powers established by mutual consent. That was far more explicit than the reference to “a political process.”
Were I in the Syrian opposition, I would be concerned about this step backward. But a lot still depends on whether the Russians are prepared to continue to support Assad, who is costing more in blood and treasure than Moscow can afford. The Americans believe the fight against the Islamic State in Syria can’t succeed with Assad still in place, because his brutality pushes so many Sunnis in the extremists’ direction. They need to convince Moscow that they are correct. Peeling Russia away from Assad and Iran has long been critical to prospects for peace in Syria. It still is.
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Iran in the tent
Tomorrow’s meeting on Syria in Vienna will include Iran, until now excluded from multilateral efforts to negotiate a political solution to the multi-sided civil war. Some see this as an innovation that gives Tehran “legitimacy” and strengthens its diplomatic hand in the region.
To the contrary: Iran needs to be at the table because there can be no diplomatic solution in Syria without its contribution. Iran is Bashar al Assad’s mainstay. Tehran provides Damascus with arms, ground troops (mainly through Hizbollah), command and control as well as economic support (largely in the form of oil). Only recently have the Russians come out out of the shadows to provide air attacks, intelligence and some ground capabilities. For the previous four and a half years, Iranian enabled Bashar al Assad to hold Damascus and western Syria as well as a link between those critical areas.
The international community tried to negotiate a political settlement without Iran. The June 2012 Geneva communique’ was the product of a UN-sponsored meeting Tehran did not attend. The Geneva 2 meeting in 2014 likewise kept the Iranians at arms’ length, because Tehran was unwilling to endorse the 2012 communique’. Excluding Iran didn’t work. Neither Geneva conference led to serious progress in ending the Syrian wars, though the communique’ remains what diplomats call an important touchstone or point of reference.
Now Washington has concurred in allowing Tehran into the tent. Foreign Minister Zarif, who led its nuclear negotiating team, will participate. This is a mixed blessing. Zarif and his boss, President Rouhani, do not control Iran’s Syria policy. Supreme Leader Khamenei does. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), not the Foreign Ministry, is the executive agency. It is hard to picture how Zarif could agree to something the IRGC does not want, in particular any plan that involves the removal of Bashar al Assad from power.
The best that can be hoped for in Vienna is a discussion that initiates a struggle over Syria policy inside Iran. The Islamic Republic has long sought a leading role in the Islamic world, not just among Shia. The war in Syria is alienating Sunnis, who are by far the majority in the Islamic world. It is also decimating Hizbollah, killing thousands of Iranian troops and costing Tehran a fortune. While Americans worry that its engagement in Syria will increase Iran’s influence in the Middle East, Iranians worry that it is weakening the Islamic Republic and aligning it with a lost cause.
Iran will be on the spot in Vienna. It has already put forth a plan to end the Syrian wars with a ceasefire, a national unity government, constitutional changes and elections. This is broadly consistent with the 2012 Geneva communique.’ The Russians have reportedly fleshed this out in somewhat more detail. Iranian failure to support the purported Russian plan would risk a serious breach in Assad’s support. But the Russian plan includes an explicit provision for Assad not to run in any new election, raising a serious risk to Iran’s longer-term interests in Syria. This would be unacceptable to the IRGC and the Supreme Leader, if not also to President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif.
So the Vienna meeting is an opportunity for American diplomacy, which is presumably why Secretary of State Kerry has doggedly pursued it and agreed to inviting Iran to the table. It would be a mistake to expect any dramatic breakthroughs. But the meeting could initiate strains between Russia and Iran as well as within Iran that might ultimately produce positive results from Washington’s perspective.
Of course the meeting will also produce strains on the other side of the equation. The Syrian opposition, which is not invited to Vienna, will fear being sold out. Saudi Arabia and Turkey, who will attend, will insist that Iran and Russia abandon Assad. Failing that, they will want to continue and increase arms shipments to the rebels in Syria, shipments that have already proved effective in blocking regime advances on Idlib and Aleppo.
My sense is that at this point the US-led Coalition, despite its notoriously different objectives, has better alternatives to a negotiated solution than Russia, which has already doubled down on a bad bet and risks what President Obama terms “quagmire.” Iran may still be willing to throw good money, supplies and troops after bad, but only because it lacks a viable alternative. He who has a better alternative to a negotiated solution has leverage. The Americans need to use it, by threatening to increase further the quality and quantity of arms shipped to the Syrian opposition. They could also increase their own air engagement and begin to target Hizbollah, which is certainly as much a terrorist organization as its Sunni counterparts.
What is still missing is a way out. The Americans want one that displaces Bashar al Assad from power. The Iranians want one that keeps him in place. I’m not seeing a solution to that problem. Vienna at best will be the beginning of a process, not the end of one. At worst, it will fail and lead to further military escalation, with ever more dreadful consequences for ordinary Syrians until one side or the other “wins.”
Iran inside the tent is better than outside, but no guarantee of a negotiated solution.
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What the Russians are proposing
Friday’s meeting on Syria in Vienna will include everyone but the Syrians: the US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. I’ll be surprised if the Europeans don’t edge their way in as well. The Egyptians will try too.
A Russian proposal, so far ignored by the English-language press, will be on the table for the occasion. A Syrian source has assured me it is real. I am hoping it is. With gratitude to MEI intern Bridget Gill for the translation from الشرق الأوسط here it is:
- Determining a ‘bank of targets’ shared between the nations which are conducting strikes in Syrian territory, and putting the factions that do not accept a political solution in the ‘target bank.’
- Freezing fighting forces, whether the FSA or the regime forces.
- Putting in motion a conference for dialogue that includes the Syrian regime, the domestic and external opposition, and the FSA. This is a dialogue which must produce:
- A general amnesty
- Release of all prisoners
- Parliamentary elections
- Presidential elections
- Formation of a national unity government in which all parties are represented.
- Conducting constitutional amendments that transfers several of the president’s mandatory powers to the government as an assembly (along the lines of the Lebanese model).
- The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, personally promises that the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad will not stand as a candidate in these elections, but this does not prevent the candidacy of those close to him or other figures in the regime in these elections.
- The creation of a framework to integrate the brigades of the FSA with the regime army after the integration of the Syrian militias supporting the regime into the army.
- Russia assures that the amnesty will include all opposition figures domestically and abroad, even those who have picked up arms, and in exchange the opposition [must] commit not to pursue al-Assad and regime figures legally in the future, whether they choose to remain in Syria or to leave it.
- Breaking the siege in all besieged areas on the part of the regime, in exchange for [the opposition] lifting the siege on the regime’s besieged areas, and the opposition’s cessation of acts of aggression and nations’ freezing their arming of these parties.
- Russia preserves its military bases inside Syria, on the strength of a resolution from the Security Council.
- Russia has stipulated that some of the articles of the agreement be kept secret, among them the issue of al-Assad’s participation in the elections, out of fear of his losing control of the army and other armed forces.
I see lots of things wrong with this proposition, but it is certainly not one that should be dismissed out of hand. Assuming it is real, the Russians are essentially saying that they want out of their current bad bet on Bashar al Assad while preserving their military bases and influence in Syria. They don’t much care about the rest, though we can expect them to back someone in the elections who promises to do what Moscow wants.
The devil is of course in the other details. It wouldn’t be easy to get Moscow and Washington to agree on a target list. How would it be decided who accepts a political solution? Freezing areas of control would be difficult, as they are uncertain and often changing. Quid pro quo ending of sieges has been tried many times and hasn’t worked well so far. Amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity is not possible in the 21st century. Who conducts parliamentary and presidential elections? How is the transitional national unity government formed? How is this proposition related to ongoing United Nations-sponsored talks?
Too many people have seen the Russian intervention in Syria as a sign of Moscow’s strength. To the contrary: it was undertaken to prevent the Assad regime from losing vital territory in Latakia. Moscow is spending more than it can afford in blood and treasure on helping the Iranians preserve Assad’s hold on power. This proposal, while unacceptable in many respects, is a clear indication that the Russians are looking for a way out. While bargaining hard for improvements in this still unacceptable proposition, Washington will have to decide whether to give it to them.
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Declining is the right answer
The Middle East is one of the few foreign policy areas other than climate change and trade that will get many electrons during the upcoming election year. Discord will dominate the discourse: President Obama is insufficiently resolute, he needs to stand up more against {you fill in the blank}, we should or should not intervene {here} or {there}. We should support our allies {more} or {less}, we {should} or {should not} condition aid on human rights concerns, and we should {defeat}, {deter} or {contain} one terrorist group or another.
You wouldn’t know that there is wide area of agreement among Americans and their political leaders on what US goals in the Middle East should be. Here they are, more or less in order of their salience to national security:
- Nuclear non-proliferation: no (more) nuclear weapons states in the greater Middle East (which stretches more or less from Mauritania to Pakistan).
- Free flow of energy: oil and gas should flow unimpeded from the Middle East to world markets.
- Counterterrorism: extremist groups in the region should not be able to mount a mass casualty attack against the United States or Europe.
- Support for allies: America’s regional allies should wield the means necessary to confront internal and external adversaries successfully.
- Spreading democratic values: all other things being equal (which they aren’t on most days), Washington prefers to deal with inclusive governments that reflect the will of their people.
If there is agreement on these goals, why so much dissonance on the Middle East?
It comes from two things: different priorities accorded to these generally agreed goals, and differences over the means to achieve them.
Priorities are important. The Obama Administration arguably has prioritized nuclear non-proliferation over support for allies, reaching an agreement with Iran that if implemented fully would prevent it from getting nuclear weapons for a decade or more but giving it relief from sanctions that strengthens Tehran’s position in the region and enables it to confront American allies. Washington would prefer a democratic government in Egypt, but has prioritized support for President Sisi and his fight against what he defines as terrorism. Some argue Washington’s focus on anti-American terrorism is leading us to over-emphasize security cooperation and under-emphasize political reform.
So too are the means to achieve these goals. President Obama has preferred killing terrorists with drones to risking American lives in efforts to build up states in the region capable of confronting the terrorist threat with law enforcement means. He has also followed a long American tradition of keeping oil flowing through Hormuz principally through military means rather than encouraging oil producers to build pipelines to carry oil around the strait. Some still think threatening the use of force is necessary to ensure compliance with the Iran nuclear deal.
So yes, there is discord, but the discord is about priorities and means, not about goals. Basically, all American politicians are singing the same lyrics, even when they strike up different tunes or use an orchestra instead of a rock band.
The bigger question is whether these goals in the Middle East are increasing or declining in importance. Let’s look at the goals one by one.
With the Iran nuclear deal, we have at least postponed the major non-proliferation issue in the Middle East. There are still others: will Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Turkey now be tempted to at least match Iran in nuclear technology? Will Pakistan deploy battlefield nuclear weapons as a deterrent against India? Will Israel’s nuclear weapons generate increasing concern in the region? But on the whole I think we can say the issues are less urgent and less compelling, now that the Iran question is settled for a decade or more.
The US is now far less dependent on Middle East oil than it has been for decades, but energy experts will quickly counter that oil prices are determined in a global market, so a serious supply disruption would be felt economically in the US even if we imported no oil at all. Still, with prices around $50/barrel and Iran soon to regain and eventually expand its export position, there is little to worry about for the moment. The people who should worry most are in China, Japan and elsewhere in Asia, which is increasingly dependent on Middle East oil and gas exports. They should bear the burden of protecting energy flows.
Little can be said about the terrorist threat. An attack can always sneak through. 9/11 was less a probability than a “black swan”–a rare and unpredictable deviation from the norm. Ever since, the number of Americans killed by international terrorists has been less than the number killed by (non-Muslim) domestic ones (even if we don’t always call them terrorists). With Al Qaeda Central much diminished and the Islamic State preoccupied with taking and defending territory in Syria and Iraq, not to mention heightening of counterterrorist defenses worldwide, it is harder to plan and execute a major terrorist plot than it was 15 years ago.
Support for allies is arguably more important in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal, but the means we have chosen to achieve it are such that it involves little in-depth engagement with the Middle East. We ship truly gargantuan quantities of advanced armaments to the Gulf and Israel. We have also supported, despite a lot of doubts, the Saudi war against the Houthis in Yemen. The main purpose of our support for allies is to reduce the need for direct American engagement, not increase it.
Apart from guys like me and my friends in the thinktank community who make a living (or not) thinking and writing about the Middle East, there is little support left in the US for spreading democratic values in the region. The positive results of the Arab uprisings are so paltry–a fragile transition in Tunisia and some reforms in Morocco and Jordan–that most Americans (and certainly the presidential candidates) wouldn’t want to waste much taxpayer money or electoral breath on what they regard as a quixotic pursuit.
So declining is the right answer, even without considering the rising threats to the US from China in the Pacific and from Russia in Europe. Those of us who still worry about the Middle East need to figure out more economical and effective ways to achieve the goals that Americans agree on. More about that in future posts.
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