Tag: Iraq
Peace picks June 9-13
1. Shaping the Future? The Role of Regional Powers in Afghanistan and Pakistan Monday, June 9 | 9:00 am – 10:00 am Woodrow Wilson Center, Fifth Floor; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan and the presidential election there are taking place in a context of growing internal political and economic instability. Roberto Toscano, former Public Policy Scholar of the Wilson Center and former Ambassador to Iran and India, as well as Emma Hooper and Eduard Soler i Lecha, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, will discuss the reasons why the regional perspective on Afghanistan and Pakistan is relevant, and particularly so at this point in time.
2. Youth and Violence: Engaging the Lost Generation Monday, June 9 | 9:00 am – 11:00 am US Institute of Peace; 2301 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND This talk explores the factors that are pushing young people towards participation in various forms of violence, including participation in extremism or political violence. It will challenge pre-existing assumptions about youth peace building work and discuss policy changes necessary for new interventions that steer youth away from violence. SPEAKERS Anne Richard, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Department of State, Maryanne Yerkes, Senior Civil Society and Youth Advisor, US Agency for International Development, Rebecca Wolfe, Director, Conflict Management & Peacebuilding Program, Mercy Corps, Marc Sommers, Consultant & Visiting Researcher, African Studies Center, Boston University, and Steven Heydemann, Vice President, Applied Research on Conflict, USIP.
3. Re-Thinking Democracy Promotion Amid Rising Authoritarianism Monday, June 9 | 9:30 am – 5:00 Kenney Auditorium, Paul H. Nitze Building; 1740 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The crisis caused by Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the threat to freedom posed by kleptocratic autocracies. The world is watching how the democratic community of nations responds to Putin’s brazen attack not only against Ukraine, but against the very concept of freedom and the ability of people to choose their own political destiny. Much is at stake, for authoritarian regimes pose a danger not only to their own populations through suppression of human rights but to others as well. This requires a re-examination of democracy promotion, the threats it faces, and how best to advance it. SPEAKERS Charles Davidson, Francis Fukuyama, Walter Russell Mead, Elliott Abrams, Michael Mandelbaum, Richard Haass, and more.
4. Nuclear Flashpoints: US-Iran Tensions Over Terms and Timetables Tuesday, June 10 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND This event will explore key conflicts and possible trade-offs with Iran as the third round discussion hosted by a coalition of eight Washington think tanks and organizations. It will assess how many years an agreement could last, the breakout time, and when and how the U.S. will act. SPEAKERS Stephen J. Hadley, Chairman of the Board, USIP, Jon Wolfsthal, Deputy Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association, and Robert S. Litwak, Vice President for Scholars and Academic relations, Director for International Security Studies.
5. Rhythms at the Intersection of Peace and Conflict: The Music of Nonviolent Action Tuesday, June 10 | 9:30 am – 1:00 pm United States Institute of Peace; 2301 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND This event brings together three individuals whose work meets at the nexus of music and nonviolent action: Arash Sobhani, an underground musician from Iran, Timothy O’Keefe, a music producer and co-founder of Freedom Beat Recordings, and Dr. Maria Stephan, one of the world’s leading scholars on strategic nonviolent action and Senior Policy Fellow at USIP. These three individuals will guide us through an exploration of nonviolent action, both past and present, through a musical lens.
6. WWI and the Lessons for Today Tuesday, June 10 | 12:30 pm – 1:30 pm Allison Auditorium, Heritage Foundation; 214 Massachusetts Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Victor Davis Hanson, Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow in Residence at Stanford University, will explore the lessons that the U.S. has learned since World War I and how the lead-up to the Great War has affected our government’s policies over the past 100 years. This event will be hosted by James Jay Carafano, Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and E. W. Richardson Fellow.
7. Researching the Middle East Tuesday, June 10 | 2:00 pm – 4:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND This panel will discuss the challenges of researching and writing on recent international Middle East history and U.S. policy in the region. Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Consulting Archivist, David Palkki, Council on Foreign Relations, Gregory D. Koblentz, Associate Professor at George Mason University, Michael Eisenstadt, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Kevin M. Woods, Institute for Defense Analyses, will all discuss their own experiences and substantive findings studying conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq War, and the War in Afghanistan.
8. After Snowden: The Road Ahead for Cybersecurity Thursday, June 12 | 8:45 am – 1:15 pm American Enterprise Institute, Twelfth Floor; 1150 17th Street, NW, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Internet has been a remarkable force for freedom and prosperity, but it has faced challenges from individuals and governments intent on abusing its openness and interconnectivity. This conference will kick-start a national debate on America’s role in protecting and promoting free enterprise, personal security, and individual liberty in cyberspace. Jeffrey Eisenach, AEI, Michael Hayden, Chertoff Group, and Mike Rogers, Chairman of the US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, will share their insights into the future of cybersecurity policy, and will be moderated by Mike Daniels.
9. The Many Faces of Tyranny: Why Democracy Isn’t Always Possible Thursday, June 12 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Heritage Foundation, Lehrman Auditorium; 214 Massachusetts Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. History has not ended. Across the world today, we are witnessing both a heroic struggle for democracy and reform and the disturbing strength of tyrannical regimes and movements. Whether it be the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war, the aggressiveness of Putin’s Russia or the increasing bellicosity of China, the forces of democracy and the forces of tyranny are in a dead heat. Waller R. Newell, Carleton University, examines how the West should respond and how we should make the difficult choice between better and worse kinds of non-democratic authority when overthrowing today’s dictatorship may only bring about a much worse totalitarian alternative tomorrow.
10. Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy Thursday, June 12 | 12:00 pm Hayek Auditorium, Cato Institute; 1000 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND In his new book, Barry R. Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of Security Studies Program at MIT, explains why the dominant view among the nation’s foreign policy elites, what he calls “liberal hegemony,” has proved unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful. His alternative – restraint – would resist the impulse to use U.S. military power, and focus the military’s and the nation’s attention on the most urgent challenges to national security. This discussion features comments by Justin Logan, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute, Blake Hounshell, Deputy Editor of POLITICO Magazine, and is moderated by Christopher Preble, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute.
11. Center for a New American Security Debate: War with Iran? Friday, June 13 | 9:00 am – 12:00 pm Willard Intercontinental Hotel; 1401 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Center for a New American Security and the Civis Institute invite you to attend a public debate featuring two of the country’s top collegiate debate programs – Georgetown University and the University of Michigan. The teams will discuss whether or not the United States should use military force against Iran if nuclear diplomacy fails. The debate will be followed by comments from Dr. Colin Kahl, senior fellow and director of the Middle East Security Program at CNAS, and a moderated Q&A with the debate teams.
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Do Arabs like Obama?
Five years ago, President Obama promised in a landmark speech in Cairo to usher in a new chapter in America’s relationship with the Muslim world. On Tuesday, June 3, the Middle East Institute and the Arab American Institute co-hosted a discussion on how Arab attitudes have evolved in the five years following the speech. The panel included James Zogby, Marwan Muasher, Barbara Slavin, and Paul Salem, who moderated. The consensus: while expectations for the Obama presidency did not live up to reality, his policy of non-intervention remains popular in the region.
The discussion was based on the results of a May 2014 Zogby poll, which was conducted across seven countries in the Arab world. The survey examined a host of issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, US policy on Syria, and the Arab world’s view of Iran. Unsurprisingly, Palestine was seen as the key obstacle to stability in the Middle East, followed by a perception of American over-interference in the region. The US approval rating did not break 50% in any of the countries surveyed, but Zogby noted a considerable increase from 2011. All three panelists attributed the uptick in American popularity to Obama’s retreat from the military interventionism of his predecessor.
There was one notable exception in the trend: Saudi attitudes towards the US have fallen sharply since 2011, largely because of America’s perceived ambivalence towards the conflict in Syria. Likewise, support for Iran has also fallen, due its support of the Assad regime.
Obama’s favorability ratings were higher that the US’s favorability ratings. While the President’s lighter footprint in the world has softened Arab attitudes towards the US, America’s previous exploits in Iraq and Afghanistan have not been forgotten.
In every country polled, strong majorities said that maintaining good relations with the US is important. This suggests that there is no inherent ideological opposition to America. The majority of the Arab world’s qualms are with American policy.
Outside of the Gulf countries polled (Saudi Arabia and the UAE), Iran was not seen as a major destabilizing factor in the region. In fact, the President’s attempt to find a negotiated solution to the Iran nuclear impasse found a great deal of support outside the Gulf. According to Slavin, the insignificance of the Iranian nuclear issue in Arab public opinion is unsurprising, as Iran was never seen as a direct threat in much of the Arab world. In fact, she suggested that some derive a perverse satisfaction from the idea that a Middle Eastern country other than Israel might acquire nuclear weapons.
Muasher noted that the results of the survey highlighted an interesting paradox in Arab public opinion: while the Arab-Israeli conflict is cited as the primary challenge to US-Arab relations, it is followed closely by the perception that the US is overly meddlesome in the region. It was thus unclear how the respondents expected the conflict to be resolved, as an American-led resolution would necessitate American intervention. He also noted that support for US foreign policy was at its highest when it refrains from interfering in the region.
While an earlier poll found that in most Arab countrie, 65% or more opposed President Assad, this survey found little support for US intervention in the conflict, vindicating Obama’s policy of non-interference. Zobgy further suggested that support for Assad could in fact rise if the US chose to pursue a military option in Syria.
While American approval ratings are on the upswing, the poll found that both Iran and Turkey have lost the support they enjoyed earlier in the decade. Iran’s decline began with in 2006 and accelerated with the failed Green Revolution of 2009; however, all three panelists attributed the majority of the decline to Iran’s support of Assad. Turkey, which has dedicated the better part of the last twelve years to mending ties with its Arab neighbors, has seen its popularity fall in the wake of the Arab Spring. It was unclear why this started in 2011, as Erdogan’s heavy-handedness did not begin until 2012.
One unexpected finding was that only 21% of those polled in Lebanon thought the Syrian conflict was a pressing issue. Slavin suggested that this was due to the country’s diverse population, with close to two-thirds identifying as either Shiite or Christian and therefore more likely to sympathize with the regime and discount the conflict’s significance. Lebanon’s support for Iran also far outpaced the other countries in the survey, due to Iran’s generosity towards Lebanon following that country’s 2006 war with Israel.
Of all the countries polled, Palestinians were surprisingly the most likely to say that the US acted evenhandedly towards both Palestinians and Israelis (30%). According to Muasher, this is possibly because Palestinians are simply exhausted by the conflict and are willing to give the Americans the benefit of the doubt. Zogby added that Obama has gone further than other American presidents in emphasizing the importance of recognizing Palestinian rights.
Nonetheless, the speakers noted that if America remains unable or unwilling to negotiate a two-state solution, then it should step aside and allow someone else to take the lead—perhaps the EU, or the UN. America’s window of opportunity in this regard is closing fast. At some point it will taken out of the game, whether it chooses or not.
Ultimately, five years after his Cairo speech the sentiment is that Obama has not lived up to expectations. Nonetheless, public opinion has rebounded somewhat from its nadir in 2011. This is primarily due to America’s policy of non-interference in the Middle East, and in spite of its failure to mediate a solution to Arab-Israeli crisis.
“We are living in the house that George [W. Bush] built,” Zogby said. Had America not exhausted its resources and goodwill in Iraq, it might have been able to pursue other issues, including the peace process, more successfully.
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Triage again
President Obama gave an intellectually vigorous response to his foreign policy critics today, in a commencement speech at West Point:
He made clear that the US would use military force, if necessary unilaterally, to defend its core interests. But at the same time he made it clear that crises that do not directly threaten the US do not merit the same response. Then, he suggests, nonmilitary efforts and multilateral military action are more appropriate and more effective.
Terrorism he identifies as the current top priority threat. But he wants to deploy the US military less and partner more with the countries where terrorists find haven. The now diffuse threat requires a more networked response, with other countries’ security forces taking the lead, as is soon to happen in Afghanistan. He wants $5 billion for training and equipping others. In Syria, he pledged to step up support to the neighbors and to the Syrian opposition, with the objective of reaching a political solution. In undertaking direct strikes against terrorists, the President cites the need for a continuing imminent threat and near certainty of no civilian casualties, so as not to create more enemies than we eliminate. He pledges to explain what we do publicly, asking the military to take the lead.
The second priority the President cites is protection of the international order, including multilateral international institutions. World opinion and international institutions blocked a Russian invasion of Ukraine and gave the country a chance to elect a new president, with America “firing a shot.” Sanctions on Iran, and the ongoing nuclear negotiations, are another example. We hope to achieve something better than what could have been achieved using force. These are signs of American strength and leadership, not weakness or hesistancy. So too is strengthening the forces of countries that contribute to international peacekeeping.
Cybersecurity, the South China Sea and climate change require a multinational approach. The President said we need to lead by example, subjecting ourselves to the same rules that apply to everyone else, including the still unratified Law of the Sea Convention. America is made exceptional by affirming international law and its own values, not by flouting it. This means closing Guantanamo and putting rules in place to regulate intelligence collection.
American leadership also requires acting in favor of human dignity. This means support for democracy, open economies and human rights, even where security interests come first, as in Egypt. Everyone’s best example these days is Burma (despite the many equivocal aspects of its still ongoing transition). But the President also squeezed in helping with electricity in Africa and education in Nigeria. “Human dignity” is a category that encompasses a lot of things.
It wasn’t a particularly stirring speech, but it was a logical one. I still wish he would do more about Syria, which threatens to collapse the neighboring states and provide haven to international terrorists. But he is into triage, not retreat, trying to limit American commitments and conserve America’s strength for whatever serious threats lie ahead. That’s what any smart president would want to do.
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Memorial Day for the people
I have little to add to what I said the past three years on Memorial Day, so I am republishing what I wrote originally in 2011 with slight updates and a short additional paragraph:
I spent my high school years marching in the Memorial Day parade in New Rochelle, New York and have never lost respect for those who serve and make sacrifices in uniform. Even as an anti-war protester in the Vietnam era, I thought denigration of those in uniform heinous, not to mention counterproductive.
It is impossible to feel anything but pride and gratitude to those who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention Kosovo, Bosnia, Panama and Somalia during the previous decade. Nor will I forget my Memorial Day visit to the American cemetery in Nettuno accompanying Defense Secretary Les Aspin in the early 1990s, or my visit to the Florence cemetery the next year. These extraordinarily manicured places are the ultimate in peaceful. It is unimaginable what their inhabitants endured. No matter what we say during the speechifying on Memorial Day, there is little glory in what the troops do and a whole lot of hard work, dedication, professionalism and horror.
That said, it is a mistake to forget those who serve out of uniform, as we habitually do. Numbers are hard to come by, but a quick internet search suggests that at at least 2000 U.S. civilians have died in Iraq and Afghanistan, plus quite a few “third country” nationals. They come in many different varieties: journalists, policemen, judges, private security guards, agriculturalists, local government experts, computer geeks, engineers, relief and development workers, trainers, spies, diplomats and who knows what else. I think of these people as our “pinstripe soldiers,” even if most of them don’t in fact wear pinstripes. But they are a key component of building the states that we hope will some day redeem the sacrifices they and their uniformed comrades have endured.
Iraqi and Afghan civilians killed number at least 100 times the number of American civilians killed. Numbers this large become unfathomable. Of course some–and maybe more–would have died under Saddam Hussein or the Taliban, but that is not what happened. They died fighting American or Coalition forces, or by accident, or caught in a crossfire, or trying to defend themselves, or in internecine violence, or because a soldier got nervous or went beserk, or….
Memorial Day in this age of “war among the people” should be about the people, civilian as well as military, non-American as well as American, not only about the uniform, the flag or the cause.
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There is more thankless work to be done
Lakhtar Brahimi, the UN special envoy for Syria during the better part of the last two years, resigned yesterday, with appropriate apologies to the Syrian people. In many obvious senses, the UN has been a colossal failure in Syria:
- it has failed to bring about a political settlement between the regime and its opposition,
- it has not prevented 150,000 deaths and millions of people displaced,
- it hasn’t even managed more than local ceasefires,
- it delivers humanitarian aid mostly behind regime lines, and
- it has been unable to get concerted regional or great power action to end the war.
But looked at from a different angle it has also managed to do quite well: even before Brahimi’s appointment, it put forward a plan for an end to the fighting, it deployed international monitors, it withdrew them when it became apparent they weren’t doing any good, it managed two Geneva conferences (the first in 2012 at least produced a joint US/Russian plan and the second got the warring parties to the same table), it has helped managed the process of eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons, it has documented human rights abuses, and it has provided absolutely vital humanitarian assistance to large numbers of vulnerable civilians.
The UN is only as good as its member states allow it to be. It is not a miracle worker. But it is also not finished yet, even if Brahimi deservedly wants to withdraw.
So what should it do next? Given the failure of the Geneva 2 talks, and the apparent fruitlessness of further efforts along those lines, what should the UN and its specialized agencies do to alleviate suffering, protect civilians, increase the odds of an eventual political settlement (or hasten its arrival) and reduce the likelihood of a burdgeoning conflict that engulfs Lebanon, Iraq and maybe even Turkey and Jordan?
There are several options, not mutually exclusive:
- Deliver 360 degree aid: The bulk of UN humanitarian assistance has gone people in need in regime-controlled territory. The UN agencies could join many nongovernmental organizations in providing ample humanitarian assistance across borders from Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan, thus enabling it to deliver more to rebel-held areas.
- Facilitate regional dialogue: While they have embassies in each others’ capitals, the Saudis and Iranians are barely on speaking terms and conducting a proxy war in Syria; refocusing them on common interests like countering violent extremists and maintaining state structures in the Levant could improve the situation. It is a good sign that the Saudis yesterday invited the Iranian foreign minister for a visit.
- Begin planning for post-war reconstruction and transition: When the war ends, as it inevitably will, the UN will be called upon to support reconstruction; it should be thinking about that now, helping to negotiate local ceasefires where possible and to build the local governing structures and civil society that can support the reconstruction process. Efforts of this sort are vital to improving the prospects for a democratic transition in Syria.
- Provide a moral compass: the UN could do more to publicize war crimes and crimes against humanity, it could take a strong position against the presidential “election” Assad is planning to conduct under thoroughly unfair and unfree conditions June 3, it could insist more loudly on protection of civilians and humanitarian access, it could get religious leaders to insist on observance of the laws of war.
- Cut off regime and terrorist financing: The sanctions on the Syrian regime are not nearly as tight as they might be, and terrorist organizations like ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) as well as Jabhat al Nusra are still receiving international funds as well as arms and other assistance from abroad. A more concerted effort to reduce the availability of resources could help de-escalate the conflict and reduce the harm to civilians.
There are arguments against all these propositions. The UN generally requires the permission of the host country to deliver aid from any direction. The regime could conceivably boot the UN from Damascus if it tries without permission. It is not easy for the UN to get the Saudis talking, as they tend to be both secretive and hierarchical. Local level reconstruction efforts to establish a minimum of governance and civil society require a capillary international presence in rebel-held areas, where security is dicey. He who holds a moral compass will not always be welcomed by those–on both sides of the war–who don’t.
But the UN is a reflection of ourselves. If we want these things done, the organization will find at least some people and means to get them done. The soft-spoken and precise Brahimi, well-suited to the high political level he has been dealing at, would not have necessarily been the best person for these tasks. The US needs to lead an effort to ensure that Brahimi’s departure does not end the UN’s focus on Syria. There is more thankless work to be done.
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Between Iraq and a hard place
I’ve been too busy with meetings in New York yesterday and moderating a panel on the Iraq elections this morning to write much (not to mention my visit with grandson Ethan Isaac in Atlanta over the weekend). So I’m grateful for this quickly produced Middle East Institute podcast of the Iraq panel. I was joined for the occasion by former Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, now businessman (formerly Iraqi civil servant) Saif Abdul-Rahman, SAIS scholar Abbas Kadhim and National Defense University professor Denise Natali.
It seemed to me the bottom lines were these:
- The electoral process so far has gone better than expected, with strong turnout (60%) and relatively few complaints (854);
- The anticipated good but not overwhelming results for Prime Minister Maliki do not ensure the hat trick he seeks, but they make him the man to beat, in particular in intra-Shia negotiations;
- The government formation process will be difficult and possibly prolonged, leaving Maliki in power with the advantages of incumbency;
- The security conditions under which the process will unfold are precarious in several central provinces, including not only Anbar but also Saladin and Diyala;
- The regional conditions are also precarious, with Syria unraveling and high tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia;
- Because of its internal fault lines, Iraq is highly vulnerable to external pressures (mainly from Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia), including some that could lead in the direction of state failure.
Iraqis have still not created a state that all its sects and ethnicities feel comfortable in. It needs a stronger political compact. The Kurds are on the fiscal ropes and need a deal with Baghdad, but independence sentiment is growing. Some Sunni-majority provinces are seeking “region” status; why shouldn’t they have it, consistent with the constitution?
Extremists are taking advantage of the tense internal situation in ways that pose real threats to US interests. Washington should pay more attention than it does, not only to Iraq’s immediate military and intelligence requirements but also to fulfilling civilian aspects of the strategic framework agreement, which remains far short of the implementation it merits.
Those are the points that stick in my mind. There is much more of merit where that came from. Listening to the whole thing won’t be the worst 90 minutes you’ve indulged in lately. I commend it to you!
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