Tag: ISIS

Peace picks April 12-17

  1. Iraq Under Abadi: Bridging Sectarian Divides in the Face of ISIS | Monday, April 13th | 9:00- 10:15 AM | American Enterprise Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | At the request of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, US warplanes began airstrikes against ISIS positions in Tikrit on March 25. But ISIS isn’t the only challenge standing in the way of a stable, unified, democratic Iraq. How should the United States approach Iranian influence in Iraq? Can Iraq ever achieve a true power-sharing democracy in spite of the sectarian divides between Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’ites? A day before Abadi meets with President Obama in Washington, join a panel discussion on the future of America’s strategic partnership in Iraq. Speakers include: Brian Katulis, Center for American Progress, Denise Natali, National Defense University and Douglas Ollivant, New America Foundation and Mantid International.
  2. The Iran Nuclear Deal | Monday, April 13th 2015 | 11:00-1:30 PM | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND| What are the short and long-term obstacles to finalizing and sustaining a nuclear deal with Iran, and how would a U.S.-Iran nuclear detente impact ongoing conflicts and long-standing alliances in the Middle East? The two panels will focus on the future of the deal, and the regional implications of the deal. Speakers include: Jessica Tuchman Mathews, George Perkovich, Karim Sadjadpour, Yezid Sayigh, Frederic Wehrey, Ali Vaez, and David Sanger
  3. ISIS: The State of Terror| Tuesday, April 14th| 12:00-1:15 PM| New America | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In 2014, ISIS shocked the world with their brutality and the speed with which they took a large swath of Iraqi and Syrian territory. One year later, most countries, including the United States, are still trying to figure out what is driving this group and how best they can be defeated. J.M. Berger, an investigative journalist and non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, brings a uniquely qualified perspective to the analysis of the challenges posed by ISIS’s rise. In ISIS: State of Terror, Berger and Jessica Stern, a lecturer on terrorism at Harvard University, draw upon intelligence sources, law enforcement officials, and their own groundbreaking research to explain the genesis, evolution, and implications of the Islamic State—and how we can fight it. The authors analyze the tools ISIS fighters use both to frighten innocent citizens and lure new soldiers—including the “ghoulish pornography” of their pro-jihadi videos, the seductive appeal of “jihadic chic,” and its startlingly effective social media expertise.
  4. Setting the Stage for Peace in Syria | Tuesday, April 14th | 12:00-1:30 PM | The Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After four years of conflict, the prospect of a stable Syria continues to be bleak, with a diplomatic solution nowhere in sight and military steps lacking in international support. In their report titled, Setting the Stage for Peace in Syria: The Case for a Syrian National Stabilization Force, authors Hof, Kodmani, and White present a new way forward – one that takes President Obama’s train and equip program to the next level forging a Syrian ground force which could constitute the core of the future Syrian Army.. How can this force change the dynamics of the conflict on the ground and how can the international community help build it? What other elements need to be in place to make this force an effective part of a broader resolution of the conflict? Speakers include: Ambassador Frederic C. Hof Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council, Bassma Kodmani Executive Director The Arab Reform Initiative, and Jeffrey White Defense Fellow The Washington Institute
  5. The Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Critical Issues | Thursday, April 16 | 12:00-1:00 PM |The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5 plus 1 have entered a crucial phase ahead of the March 30 deadline for a framework agreement. examine some of the key issues involved in the negotiations and assess some of the pitfalls that must be avoided if an acceptable agreement is to be reached by the June 30th deadline for a final agreement. Speakers include, Fred Fleitz Senior Vice President for Policy and Programs, Center for Security Policy, Greg Jones Senior Researcher, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and Henry Sokolski. Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.
  6. Geopolitics of Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean | Wednesday, April 15 | 12:00-5:oo PM| American Security Project | REGISTER TO ATTEND| A half day conference examining the energy security challenges faced in the Eastern Mediterranean. Over the course of three panel discussions, the event will first examine the geopolitical importance of the region, focusing on the recent discovery of major natural gas fields in Israel.The next panel will look at the challenges of promoting energy cooperation throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, and will attempt to offer prescriptions for increasing energy security. The final panel will discuss the potential role that the US can play in the region in terms of investment opportunities and regional cooperation.
  7. Assessing U.S. Sanctions: Impact, Effectiveness, Consequences | Thursday, April 16 | 8:45- 3:30 PM |Woodrow Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The unfolding crisis in Ukraine has the United States and its European allies struggling to find a way to respond to Russia’s actions and continuing violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. To date, that response is centered on calibrated but escalating sanctions against Russia. Once again, American reliance on sanctions as an essential foreign policy tool is on display. Past and current examples of sanctions, including Iran, South Africa, Cuba and others will provide important context for understanding the role that sanctions play in American statecraft.
  8. Honeypots and Sticky Fingers: The Electronic Trap to Reveal Iran’s Illicit Cyber Network | Friday, April 17 | 2:00-5:00 PM | American Enterprise Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The West has severely underestimated Iran’s cyberwarfare capabilities. Despite sanctions, the Islamic Republic has managed to build a sophisticated information technology (IT) infrastructure, and new intelligence indicates that the Iranian regime may be maintaining front companies in the West to obtain cyber technology. How can the United States and its allies enhance their security and combat Iran in cyberspace?. General Keith Alexander, former commander of US Cyber Command and former director of the National Security Agency, will deliver a keynote address.
Tags : , , , , , , ,

Salafists, Sectarianism, Social Media

The Stimson Center held an event last week, entitled, Salafists And Sectarianism: Twitter And Communal Conflict In The Middle East. Speakers included Geneive Abdo, a Fellow at the Stimson Middle East Program, and
 Khalil al Anani, Adjunct Professor  Johns Hopkins/SAIS, moderated  by Mokhtar Awad, a Research Associate at the Center for American Progress.

The Shi’a-Sunni divide has become one of the most destabilizing factors in the Middle East—with no end in sight. The rise of the Salafist anti-Shi’a discourse is of great interest, as the movement has cleverly exploited the current sectarian conflict in Syria, with spillover effects into parts of Iraq and Lebanon that have succeeded in furthering their rhetorical and theological positions.

Abdo presented an overview of the findings of her recent paper, including suggestions on the future of extremism and social media. She opened with the question of why now? The disruption of the longstanding political order in the Middle East, as well a shift in power dynamics from a Sunni ruled Arab world to increased Shi’a control, has led many Sunnis to believe that the survival of their sect is at stake. Beyond the search for land and power, Salafis truly believe that the Shi’a are not real Muslims, and are out to destroy Sunni believers.

This evolution of sectarian tension post-Arab Spring was not anticipated. She points to the example of Bahrain, where the revolts started as a peaceful reform movement with both Sunnis and Shi’as were protesting together. This has sadly not remained the case. The Salafis are interesting not only for the window they offer into the world of anti-Shia discourse, but also for their recent entrance into the political sphere. They are less violent than their jihadi counterparts and have a broad constituency. “Celebrity sheiks” have amassed giant followings on twitter, examples of whom include Adnan Al-Arour and Mohammad Al Arefe, who has 11.5 million followers on Twitter.

Khalil Al Anani underlined that violent Salafists are dominating the discourse. Non-violent ones are often overlooked, yet they are operating more and more in the public sphere, and have obvious mass appeal. The traditional Salafist traditional discourse is widely disseminated using modern technology. The anti-Shi’a discourse is not limited to the Salafists, and has been picked up by some others. The rise of Salafists goes hand in hand with the rise of sectarian tensions. It has also helped to empower non-state actors, by increasing their following. An example is Yemen, where the fight against the Houthis has been framed as the fight against Iran’s goals to recreate the Safavid empire and to butcher all the Ah’l-Sunnah.

Mokhtar Awad discussed social media use in the Arab world.  Saudi Arabia has the highest Twitter penetration rates in the Middle East, accounting for over 40% of active twitter users in the region. However, there is an inherent problem with Twitter, as 140 characters does not lend itself to the expression of nuanced views. Islamist embrace of Twitter has fueled the sectarian divide, as their ideas are retweeted thousands of times, reaching hundreds of thousands of people. The online discourse is dominated by Salafists, as proved by the Islamic State’s embrace of Twitter and other social media tools as a means of gaining followers and disseminating their message. How does the Western world counter this messaging? Alternative narratives are needed to balance the discourse of extremism, yet who will provide this?

 

 

Tags : , , ,

Reclaiming, reconstructing and reconciling

The Middle East Institute and Johns Hopkins’ SAIS co-hosted a panel on the future Iraq on Tuesday, moderated by peacefare’s own Daniel Serwer. He was joined by Lukman Faily, Iraqi ambassador to the US, and Abbas Kadhim, a fellow at SAIS. At the heart of the discussion was the ongoing campaign to counter ISIS, but also the long road needed to restore order in Iraq in the longer term. The panel was particularly timely in light of the upcoming visit by Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi to Washington, set to take place next week.

Ambassador Faily said Iraq post 2003 has been moving away from dictatorship and towards democratic governance. This vision remains alive today, although Iraqis have paid a heavy price in its implementation, which changes over time. While there have been many shortcomings in practice, Iraqis increasingly have understood that they are mutually interdependent: the threat of ISIS in particular has tempered Kurdish independence ambitions (if only temporarily) and has convinced Shia politicians to share power.

Returned recently from a trip to Baghdad, the ambassador was relatively optimistic. In spite of the threat from ISIS, Baghdad and some other cities now feel safer than in a long time. There are fewer car bombs and assassinations. Removal of concrete barriers has freed up traffic. People are discussing post-ISIS scenarios. Elites are increasingly frustrated with the polarized political environment. There is a generally positive view of the US role in the fight against ISIS, though Iraqis find it hard to understand the geopolitical and domestic constraints on US policy making. The Tikrit operation has been a rollercoaster, featuring mainly Iraqi forces helped by Iranians.

Faily pointed to five key parameters for the current government. First is the need for inclusive governance. Abadi is serious about achieving decentralization. He is also serious about seeking and accepting cabinet-level decisions, sometimes to the frustration of partners who want a faster decision making process.

Second is the restructuring of Iraqi the military and the Ministry of Interior. This includes a more hands-on approach in reaching out to the tribes, and a serious effort to create a truly multi-sectarian National Guard. While reform is starting, patience is needed, as logistical and financial problems will make reform slower than desirable.

The third parameter is fixing the economy, where the government is still playing catch-up. Corruption remains a pervasive problem. It goes deep, requiring changes in political culture, structure and process. Decentralization reforms should help to address this problem.

Fourth, the government is engaged in reconciliation. Faily pointed to Abadi’s recent visit to Erbil and argued that the government is taking steps to build confidence between Iraqi communities. Part of this effort is to recognize that human rights abuses have taken place. In this respect, Abadi has reached out to international organizations to help the government in mapping abuses so that it will be able to deal with them more effectively. At the same time, the conflict in Iraq has been messy. Some casualties, however regrettable, would have to be expected.

Finally, the Iraqi government is determined to improve its relationship with foreign countries. The key message is that Baghdad is a reliable partner in the fight against ISIS both at home and ultimately throughout the region. Relations with Iran are neighborly, but the government does not act on orders from Tehran. Iraq is ready and willing to cooperate with other powers in the region.

Following the ambassador’s remarks, Kadhim suggested a way forward for Iraq based on three Rs: reclaiming, reconstruction and reconciliation. Physically reclaiming Iraqi sovereign territory is the sine qua non of rebuilding Iraq. ISIS is at least partly a problem of ungoverned spaces in Iraq. There is therefore a need for a comprehensive approach to the ISIS campaign, without which they will simply reappear once the campaign has ended. Such an approach involves significant military reform, some of which is already taking place.

Second, Iraqi society needs to engage in a reconstruction effort. Comparable in scope to the American Reconstruction Era, this effort should include rebuilding political, economic and social infrastructure, with the aim of rebuilding the Iraqi nation in a way that will ensure it does not again fall prey to destructive internal forces. In order to achieve this, Iraq will need international support and expertise.

Hand in hand with the reconstruction effort, Iraq will also need to engage in reconciliation. Kadhim noted that this traditionally has been achieved through providing political posts to members of marginalized groups. However, in post-2003 Iraq, this approach often produced politicians that unable to serve their constituents, thereby contributing to undermining rather than supporting the political transition. Instead, Kadhim suggested that there must be an effort to achieve popular reconciliation. This would involve reaching out to marginalized communities regardless of sect or ethnicity. Key to this effort is a genuine decentralization, which would deny divisive and demagogic leaders the destructive role they have hitherto played.

Serwer pointed out that an absolute requisite for reconciliation is acknowledgment of harm done. Only by such acknowledgement can the parties of a conflict escape the spiral of violence. Such acknowledgements are hard work however, and are unfortunately not yet forthcoming in the Iraqi conflict.

Faily emphasized the need to strike a balance between justice and peace in Iraq. While justice is critical in the tribal society of Iraq, there is also a need for the nation to move forward in order to achieve stability and peace. Finding an acceptable formula that balances these two considerations is inherently difficult.

On a more positive note, Faily argued that Iraqi society has moved beyond the deep structural problems that are facing many of the other countries in the region. Policymakers should not to view Iraq only through the prism of Iran. Iraq is a young nation that wants, and needs, good relations with the rest of the world, both in its neighborhood and beyond.

Tags : , , ,

Bridging the Gulf

Cinzia Bianco, an analyst for the “Mediterranean and Gulf” programme at NATO Defence College Foundation whom I met on a recent visit to Rome, offers this guest post, based her “The Changing US Posture in the Gulf as an Opportunity for Regional Cooperation. The role of the EU,” paper presented at the Fifth Gulf Research Meeting (GRM), University of Cambridge, 25-28 August 2014. Her full paper will be published with others from the GRM by the Gerlach Press.

The commitment of the United States in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as well as Al Qa’eda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has silenced rumors about imminent American disengagement from the Gulf in order to pivot to the Asia Pacific. This commitment stems chiefly from the proliferation of terrorist groups in the Middle East and North Africa, which poses a threat to the US national security.

Nonetheless it has become clear that the US shows fatigue in managing unilaterally this ever-boiling, resource-consuming region. In favoring a “leading from behind” approach, the Obama administration has demonstrated a lack of coherent leadership in navigating the regional challenges, which include state failures in Syria, Yemen and Iraq as well as the consequences of a nuclear agreement with Iran. The US needs to find a way to prevent leaving a hazardous vacuum by relying on an ally to try and build a more stable, long-term strategic outlook in the Gulf. Despite all of its well-known weaknesses, that ally might be the European Union (EU).

The EU has the the potential and interests to step forward. Despite ups and downs, the EU has been involved for decades in direct dialogue with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), made a big commitment in post-war Iraq and has almost uninterruptedly maintained communication open with Iran. Conflicts in the Gulf would directly affect Europe, whose geographic proximity raises the stakes. Europe is much more dependent than the US on the Gulf for oil and gas supplies. Its trade and investments volume could be hugely disrupted, as Gulf ports are Europe’s gateways to Asia. EU-GCC investments are far more significant than that involving the US.

These motives should be sufficiently compelling to encourage the EU to take on a more proactive role in the region, which would also consolidate its place as a global strategic player.

The presence of a heavy-weighted American military umbrella has not sufficed to protect the region from the emergence of the unconventional threats that are tearing it apart. The regional problems are, at their roots, not military but political  and require courageous political responses. Since grievances and conflicts in the Gulf are mushrooming along sectarian fault lines – empowering Sunni and Shi’a extremism in a way that endangers internal as well as external stability of almost all regional countries–it is sectarianism that needs to be addressed head-on, by putting all Gulf countries around the same table. A truly effective dialogue on security in the Gulf needs active participation from Saudi Arabia, and cannot be built without or in spite of Iran and Iraq. Given the considerable distrust between the Sunni and Shi’a in the region, only the EU and the US together have enough political capital to entertain such a challenging enterprise.

The approach in the Gulf should start with limited cooperation on practical issues, in an incremental process of confidence-building focusing on many shared challenges and opportunities. All parties share critical resources, not only oil and gas fields but also water, whose management is strategic in such an arid region and needs to be coordinated. Joint patrolling of regional waters, under the umbrella of existing international initiatives, to fight the transnational criminal networks that engage in illicit trafficking and piracy, might be one step towards normalization.

Nothing can be done without a structured regional dialogue on the sociopolitical front, supporting existing fora of inter-sectarian dialogue and fighting extremist narratives. Tuning down the sectarian narrative at all levels, from leadership to population, might be the only way to prevent spillover from Syria, Iraq and Yemen into the broader region. The most concerned countries should in fact be Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Frameworks of this sort have failed to prosper in the past, but always in the presence of huge level of hostility between the US and Iran. The main GCC fear is that Iran always works to extend its influence in the Gulf, by playing the Shia communities against the Sunni rulers. Arguably, however, critical engagement rather than classic deterrence would the most effective approach to prevent this behavior.

As much as this idea may seem daunting, neglecting the challenge of sectarian-based extremism and allowing deep-seated conflicts to escalate would put national and international strategic interests at great risk. In order to return the Gulf to long-lost stability, bold steps are required, as well as the ability to adapt quickly to a changing strategic outlook, that might soon include the rehabilitation of Iran in the international arena. A visionary plan for a regional rapprochement based on shared challenges and shared opportunities might in the upcoming future become the best possible option.

Tags : , , ,

Iraq’s Sunnis

Someone asked me last week to introduce a discussion of Iraq’s Sunnis. Here are the speaking notes I used:

1. For much of the time since 2003, Iraq’s Sunnis have been the proverbial puzzle piece that didn’t fit for the Americans.

2. We knew and liked the Kurds because of the no-fly zone we imposed on northern Iraq in 1991 and their gradual political evolution in a relatively democratic direction, not to mention their good relations with Israel and their now improved relations with Turkey.

3. We knew the Shia and ignored their Iranian connections, because they were inevitable winners in a democratic Iraq.

4. The Sunnis were the odd ones out: they had pretensions and grandiose ideas but little clout. They didn’t like to be called a minority. They resisted the American invasion and lynched American operatives. Only during the relatively brief period of the Awakenings did we have a clue how they might fit.

5. The Sunnis were also divided: some clung to Saddam and manned a persistent stay-behind operation, others were attached to religious organizations that lacked the clarity and hierarchy of the Hawza but still mounted a serious insurgency, others were tribal, whatever that meant.

6. I’ve always been struck by the opening sentences of the 2005 Iraq constitution: “We are the people of the land between two rivers, the homeland of the apostles and prophets, abode of the virtuous imams, pioneers of civilization, crafters of writing and cradle of numeration. Upon our land the first law made by man was passed, the most ancient just pact for homelands policy was inscribed, and upon our soil, companions of the Prophet and saints prayed, philosophers and scientists theorized and writers and poets excelled.”

7. Those are the only words in the constitution intended to warm Sunni hearts. For the rest, they were losers. The Kurds got recognition of their language and their regional government as well as the presidency. Shia gained control of the Baghdad government, upending more than 80 years of Sunni rule.

8. The Sunnis got the parliament speaker and three provinces in which they were the clear majority: Ninewa, Anbar and Salaheddin. Those three provinces came close to rejecting the constitution, but missed by a few thousand votes according to the official count. They are the three provinces that led the protest movement against Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki in 2011/12. They are the three provinces that fell easily to Islamic State control in June 2014.

9. We’ve got a Sunni problem. What happens to it next?

10. Sectarian tensions have certainly heightened dramatically in Iraq since the fall of Saddam, who was a Sunni nationalist but made sure that Shia participated and benefited from his dictatorship.

11. Today, a good number of Sunnis loathe and fear Shia domination. While many Sunnis still claim to identify as “Iraqi” and say they are not sectarian, we should not be fooled. Sectarianism is strong when it comes to how power and status should be distributed in the society.

12. Most of those who welcome ISIS into their communities did not do so because they liked its religious discipline and brutality. According to the Iraqi pollster Munqith Dagher, support for ISIS among Iraqi Sunnis is low and support for the anti-ISIS coalition is high. But Sunnis felt the need to protect themselves from what they viewed as a sectarian, Iranian-dominated government bent on repression of Iraqi identity. They prefer ISIS to Shia militias.

13. Some would conclude from this that partition is a good idea. It is not. I don’t know any Iraqi Sunnis who want a future state of their own without Baghdad, which is now predominantly Shia. Nor are there sufficient resources in the Sunni provinces to finance a serious state.

14. There is no agreement on the lines that partition would necessarily draw between Sunnistan and Shiastan, or between Sunnistan and Kurdistan. Those lines, if they are to be drawn, will be drawn by war, especially as there is oil and gas at stake. Partition is a formula for another 10 years or more of armed conflict.

15. What other scenarios can we contemplate for Sunni Iraq?

16. It might still be possible to reintegrate Sunnis into Arab Iraq, but only if they were to get an equal share of power with Shia in Baghdad. Such things have been done—in the Balkans, where ethnic powersharing built on the Ottoman millet system is the rule in Bosnia, for example.

17. The Federation Council—the upper house of the Iraqi parliament included in the constitution but never created—could provide a power-sharing mechanism of this sort, with mutual vetoes, which is what powersharing of this sort requires.

18. The advantage is inclusion. Nothing could be accomplished without Sunni support. The disadvantage is dysfunctionality. In my way of thinking, the disadvantage outweighs even the very considerable advantage, but that is largely because I’ve seen how mutual vetoes have rendered the Bosnian state virtually useless.

19. I also am at a loss to explain how to convince Shia to yield veto power to Sunnis at the national level. It would imply a virtual reversal of everything they have gained since the fall of Saddam.

20. More reasonable is devolution to geographically defined units. There are two obvious options: one is a Sunni Regional Government analogous to Kurdistan’s, which was one of the demands of some Sunni protesters. The procedures for creating a region are outlined in the constitution and relatively easy to fulfill, though how three provinces join into one is not so clear. Read more

Tags : , , , ,

Peace picks April 6 – 10

  1. The Kurds: Strategic Partners in the Fight Against ISIS? | Monday April 6 | 9:00 – 11:00 | Bipartisan Policy Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Although the terrorist group calling itself the Islamic State (or ISIS), has been the focus of U.S. military operations in Iraq and Syria, this is far from a monolithic war. Instead it is a patchwork of overlapping conflicts between myriad groups in which today’s tactical allies might be tomorrow’s enemies. The challenge for U.S. policymakers now is finding reliable partners amid this jumble of factions. In the long run, however, it will be how to help the region recover from both the humanitarian and political crises created by these internecine conflicts. In both these aspects, the region’s Kurds are emerging as important players. Kurdish groups, from the peshmerga of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), to the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units, and even Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party, have been on the front lines in the fight against ISIS. Kurds are also playing an important role in sheltering refugees and protecting other minorities in the region. To learn more about the challenges facing the region, the role of the Kurds, and the implications for U.S. policy, BPC invites to remarks and a discussion with Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, the KRG representative to the United States, followed by an expert panel. The panel includes John Hannah, Former Assistant for National Security Affairs to the Vice President and Member, BPC Turkey Initiative, Kenneth Pollack, Former Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs and Director for Persian Gulf Affairs, National Security Council, General (Ret.) Charles Wald, Former Deputy Commander, United States European Command and Vice Chairman Senior Advisor, Deloitte Services LP.
  2. Tracking Arms In Conflict – Lessons From Syria And Iraq | Tuesday April 7 | 11:00 – 12:00 | The Stimson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Identifying and tracking weapons being used in armed conflicts is a dangerous but vital task. At times this is done by investigators on the ground, but often relies on footage and other evidence viewed from afar. On April 7, experts will discuss how they are tracking weapons used in Syria and Iraq, and share some of their recent findings. Jonah Leff, Director of Operations, Conflict Armament Research, will report on findings based on documentation of nearly 40,000 weapons and ammunition as part of field investigations and the new iTrace system. He’ll discuss the prevalence of U.S. weapons found among Islamic State fighters; findings of newly manufactured Russian, Iranian, and Sudanese ammunition; evidence of supply to Syrian rebels from Saudi Arabia; and large scale industrial production and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Syria and Iraq. Matt Schroeder, Senior Researcher, Small Arms Survey, will share examples of using YouTube and other footage to track the increasing complexity of use of MANPADS (aka shoulder-fired missiles) by fighters in the Middle East. The discussion will be moderated by Rachel Stohl, Senior Associate, Managing Across Boundaries, Stimson Center.
  3. Ambassador Lukman Faily on the Future of Iraq | Tuesday April 7 | 3:00 – 4:30 | Johns Hopkins SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As Iraq tries to re-take territory from ISIS, what are the challenges it faces? How are efforts to re-integrate Sunni fighting forces proceeding, and what steps have been taken toward a more inclusive government? Baghdad’s relations with Iraqi Kurdistan are still fraught. Oil prices are dramatically lower than once expected. The country’s most important friends – the United States and Iran – are trying to reach a nuclear deal even as they support opposing forces in Syria and Yemen. How will lraq manage in this turbulent and challenging environment? The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Conflict Management Program at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) are pleased to host the Ambassador of Iraq, His Excellency Lukman Faily, and Abbas Kadhim, Senor Foreign Policy Fellow, SAIS, in a discussion about Iraq and its future. The discussion will be moderated by Daniel Serwer, Senior Research Professor of Conflict Management, SAIS and Scholar, Middle East Institute.
  4. Morocco’s Contribution to Countering Violent Extremism in Africa and the Middle East | Wednesday April 8 | 10:00 – 11:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The recent terrorist attack on the Bardo National Museum in Tunis underscores the growing danger extremist ideologies and violence pose to the North African region and beyond. Countries still unsettled by the tumult of the Arab Spring are now confronting the radicalizing influence of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and other extremist organizations as thousands of North Africans flock to join the militants. The Kingdom of Morocco has not been spared the challenge of radicalization as one thousand or more of its citizens have joined terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria in recent years, but the innovative counter-radicalization program it launched in following terrorist attacks in the early 2000s and which it continues to expand, offers hope to the entire region. H.E. Salaheddine Mezouar, Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation,  will provide insights into the political context that led to Morocco’s creation and continuing commitment to its program of combatting violent extremism at home and abroad. The Foreign Minister’s remarks will be followed by a panel discussion on the religious approach to deradicalization featuring Ahmed Abbadi, Secretary-General, Rabita Muhammadia of ‘Ulamas, Geneive Abdo, Fellow, Middle East Program, Stimson Center and Stephen Grand, Executive Director, Middle East Strategy Task Force, Atlantic Council. The panel will be moderated by Peter Pham, Director, Africa Center, Atlantic Council.
  5. Cyber Risk Wednesday: The future of Iranian cyber threat | Wednesday April 8 | 4:00 – 5:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Few other events have so far dominated 2015 as the P5+1 negotiations to limit Iranian nuclear capabilities. Against the backdrop of the negotiations, it is likely that Iran, Israel, and the United States are gathering their strength for a renewal of cyber conflict of the past several years. The confrontations include attacks both from Iran, such as disruption of the US banking sector and against Gulf energy companies, and against Iran, such as Stuxnet and the Wiper worm. Should the talks fail, what are the chances of an escalating cyber conflict? The moderated panel discussion will analyze the latest developments in Iranian cyber capabilities and discuss the chances of larger cyber conflict. The panel will feature Neal Pollard, Director, Forensics Technology Practice, PricewaterhouseCoopers, General James L. Jones, Jr., USMC (Ret.), Founder, Jones Group International, David Sanger, Chief Washington Correspondent, New York Times, Barbara Slavin, Nonresident Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council and Andretta Towner, Senior Intelligence Analyst, CrowdStrike. The discussion will be moderated by Paul Kurtz, CEO, TruSTAR Technology.
  6. The Search for International Consensus on Syria and Beyond | Thursday April 9 | 10:00 – 12:00 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In 2013, the international community came together to protect the Syrian population by committing to the elimination of Syria’s declared stockpile of chemical weapons, a feat achieved the following year. Together, the United Nations and the Nobel Prize-winning Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) are credited with achieving one of the few breakthroughs in containing the ongoing crisis in Syria. What lessons can be learned for application in other conflict areas, especially as OPCW continues its work destroying chemical weapons facilities in Syria this year? On April 9, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings and The Hague Institute for Global Justice will host OPCW Director General Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü for a discussion about the process of dismantling Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile and implications for peace, security, and accountability. Brookings Executive Vice President Martin Indyk will introduce Ambassador Üzümcü.  Deputy Mayor of The Hague Ingrid van Engelshoven will provide brief opening remarks, and Abiodun Williams, president of The Hague Institute for Global Justice, will moderate the discussion. Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute Robert S. Ford (U.S. ambassador to Syria, 2010-2014) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mallory Stewart will join the discussion with Ambassador Üzümcü, following his keynote address. After the program, the speakers will take audience questions.
  7. Burma’s Peace Potential: Portraits of Diversity | Thursday April 9 | 2:00 – 3:30 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Every day in Burma, monks, doctors, teachers, even a popular reggae singer from Yangon, set examples of unity and cooperation, in contrast to headlines about violence between Buddhists and Muslims. U.S. Institute of Peace, in partnership with the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, invites to a screening of a film series highlighting such stories, Portraits of Diversity, followed by a discussion of how these examples can inform support for the country’s transition. The question-and-answer session following the screening will feature Venerable Tayzar Dipati, a monk portrayed in the film whose chief role is to care for patients with HIV and to run the monastery of young monks. He will be joined by Dr. Emma Leslie, Executive Director of the Cambodia-based Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies who has led and supported initiatives for conflict transformation, peace and development throughout Asia since 1993. The Rev. Susan Hayward, Interim Director for Religion and Peacebuilding, USIP, will act as moderator.
  8. Israel and the EU: Perceptions in a Complex Relationship | Friday April 10 | 12:00 – 1:00 | The Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Institute is pleased to host Professor Sharon Pardo for a presentation on Israel’s vital relationship with the European Union (EU). With over half a billion people in its 28 member states, the EU is Israel’s largest trade partner. EU countries and Israel enjoy rich cultural exchanges as well as close security cooperation treating the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, the EU is a significant donor to the Palestinian Authority, and public sentiment in Europe regarding Israel’s settlement and occupation policies is broadly negative. Pardo and co-author Neve Gordon recently examined the complexities of the relationship in an article published by MEI in The Middle East Journal. He will discuss Israeli perceptions of the EU and paths the relationship may take in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s new term. Kate Seelye, Senior Vice President, Middle East Institute, will serve as moderator.
Tags : , , , , , ,
Tweet