Tag: ISIS

Peace picks March 23 – 27

  1. Boko Haram, the Islamic State’s West African Franchise | Monday March 23 | 12:00 – 1:00 | Hudson Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Boko Haram swore fealty to the Islamic State earlier this month. The Nigerian Islamist terrorist organization, infamous for the abduction of 276 Chibok schoolgirls last April, has a long record of violent atrocities. Recently, it has increased attacks on marketplaces and public spaces, indiscriminately murdering moderate Muslims and Christians alike. How will this new affiliation impact the operations and reach of Boko Haram? To assess the humanitarian situation in Nigeria and the global security implications of an alliance between two of the world’s deadliest terror groups, Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom Director Nina Shea will host a discussion with Bukky Shonibare and Emmanuel Ogebe. Bukky Shonibare is a strategic team member of the #BringBackOurGirls Campaign and the coordinator of Adopt-A-Camp, a program that assists internally displaced persons in Nigeria. She will provide her firsthand account of conditions on the ground. Emmanuel Ogebe, a human rights lawyer from Nigeria, will evaluate the broad impact of the new alliance between Boko aram and the Islamic State.
  2. Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations: Learning from 2013-2014 & Looking Ahead | Monday March 23 | 3:30 – 5:00 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | President Obama has raised the possibility of another push for an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement before he leaves office.  With stability on the ground already severely at stake, it is imperative that any renewed attempt take account of lessons learned from last year’s round of failed talks.  Join the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Center for a New American Security on March 23, for a discussion with Ilan Goldenberg, the chief of staff to the U.S. special envoy during those talks and author of the new report Lessons from the 2013-2014 Israeli-Palestinian Final Status Negotiations. What suggestions and recommendations can we draw from a process that built upon and at times diverged from the path of previous diplomatic efforts? How can they be leveraged by the U.S., the international community and the parties themselves to move forward constructively toward a peace agreement? Goldenberg will be joined by a panel of experts who will offer an assessment of the report’s findings and recommendations, particularly in light of lessons learned from earlier rounds of negotiations. The panel will include William B. Quandt, Professor Emeritus, Department of Politics, University of Virginia and Tamara Cofman Wittes, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution. Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, Director of Arab-Israeli Conflict Programs, USIP, will
  3. Jerusalem: Divided or Indivisible? | Tuesday March 24 | 9:30 – 11:00 | Foundation for Middle East Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Israel has controlled East Jerusalem for almost 50 years. During that time, Israeli authorities have been responsible for municipal services, housing, and urban planning for Jerusalem’s more than 300,000 Palestinian Arabs. Yet even as Israeli politicians proclaim that Jerusalem will never be divided, the contrast between its Jewish and Palestinian neighborhoods is starker than ever. The poverty rate for Palestinians in East Jerusalem is near 80%, physical infrastructure in Palestinian neighborhoods is poor, public facilities are few and far between, and a chronic housing shortage leads Palestinians to resort to unpermitted construction, for lack of alternatives. Simultaneously, Israeli settlement and building and construction further consolidates Israeli control over the city, undermining prospects for a political resolution on the city. The inequity and friction between Palestinians and Jews in Jerusalem is in many ways a microcosm of the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict. FMEP invites to hear from Yudith Oppenheimer from Israeli NGO Ir Amim as she outlines key findings from its report, “Jerusalem: The Rising Cost of Peace,” a longitudinal mapping of developments on the ground from the introduction of the Clinton Parameters in 2000 until today. In context of the findings, Yudith will discuss the current forecast for a political resolution on the city. Yudith is joined by Nava Sheer (Bimkom – Planners for Planning Rights), who will present on the challenges facing those who advocate the development of planning policies and practices that are more just and respectful of human rights, and responsive to the needs of local communities in Jerusalem.
  4. Facing Terrorism: A Lebanese Perspective | Wednesday March 25 | 12:00 – 1:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Lebanon is surprisingly quiet while the region around it is literally burning. The country is facing many challenges, from the vacancy in the presidency to Hezbollah’s involvement in the fight in Syria to the presence of over one million Syrian refugees. Because of the government’s war on terror, Lebanon has succeeded in keeping a lid on the sources of tension in the country while fighting extremism and fending off terrorism. Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk, a key figure in this fight to keep the country stable and secure, will discuss fighting extremism in Lebanon and how to keep Lebanon from becoming involved in the surrounding wars.
  5. Voices of Civil Society in Iraq | Wednesday March 25 | 12:00 – 2:00 | National Endowment for Democracy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As part of the World Movement for Democracy’s Civic Space Initiatives (CSI), the World Movement will hold an event to discuss a landscape of civil society in Iraq. The event will serve as a launch of the World Movement’s new CSI video, Fatima. Fatima Al-Bahadly, featured in the film, will be one of the featured panelists. The CSI video shows how she deals with challenges and works with various communities, such as youth, women, religious minorities, and the public sector (provincial council). Amina Hassan, who was behind a camera and produced the Fatima video, is also an extremely courageous activist. Because of her media/journalism work, she was shot three times by militants some years ago, but she survived. And, today she is committed to continuing working to address social issues through media production. The activists will be joined by Zainab al-Suwaij, from the American Islamic Congress in Washington DC. Laith Kubba, Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa, National Endowment for Democracy, will act as moderator.
  6. Fragility and Extremism in Yemen, Again |Thursday March 26 | 9:00 – 10:30 | Bipartisan Policy Center | Yemen seemingly only attracts U.S. attention when tied to a terrorist attack or plot: the USS Cole in 2000; Anwar al-Awlaki’s incitement to terror since 2004; the “underwear bomber” in 2009; the cargo plane plot in 2010. The country’s long-simmering political fragility and endemic civil wars largely escape notice. Now, both dynamics are at play simultaneously: just days after Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) took credit for the Kouachi brothers’ attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris, the Iran-backed Houthis have overrun the capital and forced the resignation of the Yemeni government. Please join us for a discussion of recent events in Yemen and how they will affect U.S. counterterrorism efforts and regional dynamics. The panel debate will feature Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen, William D. Murray, Founder, Alphom Group and former Senior Executive, Central Intelligence Agency. The debate will moderated by Mark Hosenball, Journalist, Reuters.
  7. The Way Forward in the U.S.-Afghanistan Security Partnership | Thursday March 26 | 11:00 – 12:00 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join us as Abdullah Abdullah, Chief Executive Officer of Afghanistan, discusses the way forward for the U.S.-Afghanistan partnership. How can the two countries continue to work together to ensure Afghanistan’s long-term security and stability? What kinds of support do the Afghan security forces require to stave off Taliban advances? What should be the long-term U.S. role in helping to stabilize the country? Following months of political tensions over disputed election results, the two main contenders, Dr. Abdullah and Dr. Ashraf Ghani, agreed last fall to a power sharing arrangement in which Ghani became the country’s new President and Abdullah was sworn in as his Chief Executive. The two leaders will be in Washington for an official visit March 22-25. Jim DeMint, President, The Heritage Foundation, will act as discussant.
  8. States of Fragility: Post-2015 Ambitions | Friday March 27 | 10:30 – 12:30 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | More than 1 billion people live in countries affected by armed conflict or by the fragility of their societies. Fragile states are often vulnerable to conflict because their populations tend to see their governments as ineffective, illegitimate, or both. As a group, they are the ones that lag furthest behind in achieving the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals. USIP invites to a discussion on a new report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions,” sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank. The panel will include Melissa Brown, Director, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, USAID, Alexandre Marc, Chief Technical Specialist, Fragility, Conflict and Violence-Cross Cutting Solutions Area, World Bank Group, Brenda Killen, Deputy Director, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD, Jolanda Profos, Peace and Conflict Adviser, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD, Sarah Hearn, Associate Director and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation. Andrew Blum, Vice President of Program Management and Evaluation, USIP, will moderate, and Nancy Lindborg,
    President, USIP, will hold the opening remarks.
  9. Discussion with Prince Moulay Hicham of Morocco on the Future of Authoritarianism in the Middle East | Friday March 27 | 11:00 – 12:30 | Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs | Morocco’s Prince Moulay Hicham Ben Abdallah El Alaoui is an established voice calling for political reform and greater democracy in the Arab world. As an author, scholar, and philanthropist, he has been deeply involved in establishing creative initiatives for scholarly research on the Middle East on topics including democracy, climate change, governance, and authoritarianism. He will share his expertise on current regional issues during his lecture.
  10. Colombia: Peace from the Regions | Friday March 27 | 3:00 – 4:30 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Colombia Peace Forum is a series of policy discussions sponsored by USIP to support a peaceful resolution to one of the world’s longest-running internal armed conflicts. At our March 27 forum, a panel of experts will analyze how a peace accord might be implemented on the ground. How will it build on existing efforts? And how can it be made inclusive and participatory? The session also will take up questions of the linkages among the regions and with the central government; the rights and needs of citizens; and ways to enhance citizens’ participation and effectiveness in promoting peace in the regions. The program will be conducted in Spanish with a simultaneous English translation for those who attend the event. The webcast will be in Spanish and an English video of the event will be available a day or so after. Speakers will include Virginia M. Bouvier, Senior Advisor for Latin America Programs, USIP, Andrés Santamaria Garrido, President, National Federation of Ombudspeople (Personeros), Adela Aguirre, Ombudswoman of Pasto, Department of Nariño and Marino Córdoba, Afro-Colombian Peace Council (CNPA) and Association of Displaced Afro-Colombians (AFRODES).
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The Levant will never be the same

I spoke Thursday morning at the International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome on “The Fight Against ISIS and US Middle East Policy.” The powerpoint I used is attached.

Questions focused on Iran and whether it might play a positive or negative regional role if a nuclear deal is reached. My guess is that it may continue to play a negative role, because the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will lose something in a nuclear deal and may require compensation. That could come in the form of a free hand to pursue aggressive Iranian objectives in the region, including not only Syria and Iraq but also in Yemen, Lebanon and Bahrain.

There is, however, one important constraint on Iran: partition of Iraq or Syria would be against its interests, as it would likely lead to problems in the Iranian province of Eastern Kurdistan. Iran will not want its strong support for Shia militias in Iraq or for the regime in Syria to precipitate partition of either of those countries. The question is whether they will recognize the danger before it becomes irreversible. In my view, it is important to have Iran inside any future multilateral talks on Syria, precisely to expose them to the risks of going too far.

A couple of people raised the question of how the ISIS is financed. I know of no one with a really good answer to this question. I certainly don’t have one. It is clear enough that they used to get lots of money from trading in oil and oil products, but the anti-ISIS coalition has destroyed a good deal of their capacity to refine (and the drop in oil prices hits them too). They gained a good deal of hard cash from banks in Mosul, but that is a non-renewable resource. My impression is that Gulf funding has largely dried up, though it may still continue from private sources.

One person asked about the mutual silence of ISIS and Israel. They seem to be leaving each other alone. I think that is a temporary bit of restraint. Both recognize the danger and enmity of the other but are not willing yet to engage. That condition won’t last forever. Israel wants to be sure ISIS does not gain control of its border with Syria. ISIS will go after Jerusalem when it feels strong enough to do so.

A good deal of the discussion, including Riccardo Alcaro’s enlightening introduction, revolved around the question of how stability might be brought to areas liberated from ISIS as well as the necessity of doing so. General Allen has only just begun the process of talking with the Iraqis about stabilization. There are no easy answers, but security, governance and essential services will need to be provided. We are a long way not only from defeating ISIS but also from ensuring that the war does not create vacua that even more radical groups might seek to fill.

If you think of the war against Islamic extremism as having begun with the US attack on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001, it is clear we have been more successful in fragmenting and spreading the enemy than in containing him, much less defeating him. That’s due in large part to stabilization failures, not only in Afghanistan but also in Iraq, Yemen, Libya and elsewhere. It would be better not to repeat that experience, though I have little confidence we have either the means or will required.

The war has displaced and impoverished many millions. Minorities are on the run. Relative majorities are frightened and distrustful. States are failing. Borders are evaporating. Extremism is reaping rewards. Moderation is fading. The Levant will never be the same.

 

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The road forward is civilian as well as military

I spoke this afternoon at on a “political analysts” panel at The Road Forward conference on planning the future of the Syrian American Community. Here are my speaking notes:

1. Let me start by saying the obvious. This comes from someone who would have preferred that you stick with nonviolent rebellion. But four years have passed and that is history.

2. Now you’ve got to do better on the military front. There is no substitute for that.

3. The regime’s relative success on the battlefield, with ample Iranian and Russian support, has made a political solution less feasible than in June 2012, when the Geneva communiqué was adopted.

4. If you want to get back to its provision for a transitional governing body with full executive powers, you are going to need somehow to threaten Bashar al Assad’s hold on power, making him feel that failure to agree puts him more at risk than agreeing. That is vital for a negotiated solution.

5. But it is only a necessary condition. It is not a sufficient one.

6. Today’s Syria is the scene of a devastating regional proxy war pitting Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran against each other, with the US and Russia only slightly more removed.

7. Syrians need to re-establish control over their own destiny.

8. The civilian dimension is as important as the military one.

9. One vital civilian dimension is diplomacy. The Syrian opposition did well at the Geneva 2 conference. But it failed to follow up on that triumph by uniting its factions.

10. That is still vital. Broad unity under a single umbrella would make the opposition a more serious negotiating partner not only for the regime but also for the Americans, Russians and Iranians.

11. A second important civilian dimension is governance. You cannot hope to be taken seriously unless you are serious about plans to govern effectively inside Syria. The “Back to Syria” idea was a good one, but it was never implemented.

12. It never even got out of the planning stage, so far as I know.

13. Even that would have an impact: a serious plan to govern protected areas in the north and south would give people sympathetic to your pleas for American help, like me, what they need to argue in your favor.

14. It is now ancient history, but in both Kosovo and Bosnia civilian governance during the wars weighted heavily with the international community. In Kosovo, the Albanians created institutions that provided health and education, in addition to a parliament and a presidency. In Bosnia, the collaboration of Croats and Muslims in the Bosnian Federation was vital to success at the Dayton peace talks.

15. The time is ripe in Syria. One way or another, Syrians trained in US-sponsored programs will begin to be inserted back into the country over the next year or so.

16. Failure to protect them from bombardment could lead to a Bay of Pigs fiasco.

17. No-fly zones, even with anti-aircraft weapons, are insufficient. The regime and extremists could well attack with artillery. What Syrians need are protected areas along the Turkish border and in the south, where American, opposition, Jordanian and Israeli interests converge.

18. These would not be “safe” areas. They would be target-rich environments in the view of both extremists and the regime.

19. On the ground, they will have to protect themselves. But air cover should come from Coalition countries, including Turkey and Jordan.

20. Military protection will not however make protected areas a success. Only if governance succeeds will they represent a serious step forward.

21. Success in governance will depend on planning and unity.

22. The national plans for The Day After and the Syrian Transition Roadmap have been overtaken by events. Nor is it sufficient for disparate administrative local councils to accomplish heroics here and there.

23. What you need is a plan for governance and enough performance to convince the powers that be that the opposition is a viable governing entity and a bulwark against extremism.

24. I have to admit that I voted twice for Barack Obama, who has made big mistakes in Syria. If you want him to correct those mistakes, you need to do better not only on the battlefield but also in diplomacy and governance.

25. This is a dark moment for the Syrian opposition, but also an opportunity: to write a serious plan for governing liberated areas of Syria.

26. I hope you’ll move in that direction. I pledge my personal support for such an effort.

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Sunnis don’t like ISIS

Munqith Dagher Wednesday presented at CSIS his latest findings on Iraqi public opinion concerning ISIS. A pioneer in public opinion polling in Iraq and CEO of the Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, Dagher challenged common narratives about ISIS as well as more conventional wisdom about terrorism and radicalization.

CSIS Fellow Anthony Cordesman reminded the audience that the Arab world plays the primary role in the campaign against ISIS. Arabs also remain the primary ISIS casualties: State Department data show an exponential increase in terrorist attacks in recent decades, from 300 major attacks yearly between 1998 and 2008 to 4700 in 2013. Neo-salafist extremist groups have been growing rapidly, by 60% in the last two years. Moreover, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) suffers social and economic deterioration, including rapid population growth and high unemployment – particularly among youth. These challenges must be overcome if ISIS and similar groups are to be defeated.

June 9, 2014 was a benchmark in the history of terrorism, Dagher argued. The takeover of Mosul and eventually 40% of Iraqi territory by ISIS was not entirely unexpected – in fact public opinion data had indicated deep problems in the Mosul area for years. In order to understand these problems more thoroughly, Dagher began a careful study of public opinion in Iraq and Syria, relying on a combination of nationwide face-to-face polling and in-depth interviews with opinion leaders from ISIS-controlled areas. The data provide tests for three alternative explanations of ISIS expansion: religion, poverty and lack of services, and political and social factors.

The first proposition is that ISIS represents Sunni religious sentiment in Iraq and Syria. Polling data however, point to disharmony between Sunni populations and ISIS: while 90% of respondents describe religion as important to their lives, only 13% of Syrians support ISIS, whereas 94% of Iraqi Sunnis describe it as a terrorist organization. There is also a strong ideological contradiction between the local population and ISIS: 81% of Iraqi Sunnis want separation of religion from politics. Dagher also pointed to the strong pride that Mosul Sunnis have for their history, which stands in contrast to ISIS’ destruction of cultural heritage. These recent actions may be less ideological imperative than ISIS response to recent controls put in place along the border that make smuggling historic artifacts more difficult.

A second explanation for the growth of ISIS is that it corresponds to high levels of poverty and failure of the state to provide services. This is often put forward as an explanation of radicalization more generally. However, Dagher could find no statistically significant differences between areas controlled by ISIS and areas outside of ISIS control in terms of unemployment. There is also no significant difference between Shia and Sunni household incomes.  Dagher also pointed to the growth of ISIS in Libya, a country that has long enjoyed a relatively high level of development, according to UN Human Development Reports.

Instead, Dagher suggested that political and social factors are key to explaining ISIS’ growth. A number of indicators point in this direction. In the months leading up to the takeover of Mosul, 83-91% of Sunnis believed that Iraq was going in the wrong direction, registering high levels of discontent, insecurity and distrust of the state and the justice system. Sunnis also reported a drastic decline in national sentiment: while 80 percent saw nationality as the primary basis for their identity in 2008, only 40 percent did the same in 2014. Distressingly, similar results of growing insecurity and distrust were found in recent opinion polls in Libya and Yemen.

While these numbers paint a somber picture of the political situation in Iraq and the region more generally, there are also hopeful indications. Since the Maliki government was removed, trust in government made a tremendous jump, from 4% to 47%. There is also significant support for the international anti-ISIS coalition. These figures should give impetus to Iraq’s allies to focus on tackling the underlying political and social factors that have contributed to the rise of ISIS.

Dagher cautioned about the destabilizing role of Shia militias and the influence of Iran in the current fight against ISIS. Among Sunnis, the view of the Shia militias is extremely negative. This is hardly a surprise – Shia militias have displaced, killed and imprisoned Sunnis throughout the areas they have conquered. There is good reason to be highly critical of the use of Shia militias to defeat ISIS. The current offensive against Tikrit is one example – according to Dagher the embattled Tikritis would prefer ISIS over the Shia militias. If we want Sunni communities to fight ISIS, we must help them overcome the pervasive political and social problems they are facing and persuade them there is in fact hope at the end of the tunnel.

Dagher’s slide presentation is available here.

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Still more on Free Syria

Dylan Clement, a Syria Program Assistant at the International Republican Institute, asked some good questions in responses to my pieces advocated Free Syria on protected areas inside the country. Here are his questions and my answers:

Q: Through its usage of chemical weapons, the regime has proven its willingness to break international norms and in particular defy the United States. With that in mind, how would the regime react when faced with the possibility an alternative Syrian government taking hold in these de facto no fly zones?

A: The regime would certainly test the will of those who say they will protect them. We would need to be prepared to respond with proportional force against whatever applied the test. The problem will be that the artillery, mortars or aircraft concerned may disappear, or be parked next to mosques or schools. Then we need to be prepare to widen the circle of targets. This might well lead to escalation that we would have to be prepared to match.

The elimination of the bulk of the regime’s chemical weapons is perhaps a better indicator of its response to threat than its continued use of chlorine.

Q: I’m not sure the opposition structures that exist, ie the SOC/SIG, are competent and cohesive enough to provide actual governance alternatives in these free areas inside the country…

A: I don’t think the SOC/SIG would in the first instance be responsible. It would have to be local councils. Their connections to the SOC/SIG are tenuous at best. It is their connections to local liberated communities that are important.

Q: What if [Jabhat al] Nusra takes refuge in these areas as well? Given the level of cooperation between Nusra and ‘moderate’ rebel groups up to this point (and the lack of precedent for civilian opposition leaders in denouncing al Qaeda), a situation may arise whereby the US is providing air cover for Nusra’s attacks against the regime. That would be awkward.

A: This is a serious question, as a successful protected area would necessarily attract Nusra or other extremists. The Syrian forces responsible for protection on the ground would have to take care of that issue. My understanding is that the US-trained forces are prepared to oppose Nusra and the Islamic State, and their logistic and financial train presumably provides the US with leverage to insist.

But we have to be careful. Treating all Islamists as enemies would only make things worse, and there is necessarily an area of ambiguity: is the guy with the beard who disapproves of women appearing in public Nusra, Islamic State or just a devout Muslim with conservative social views? There will be no way to avoid issues of that sort as things unfold in Syria.

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Authorizing military action against ISIL

Matt Melino, a master’s student in my post-war reconstruction and transition class at SAIS, reports:

The Woodrow Wilson event Monday on authorizing military action against ISIL focused on geography, strategy and unanswered questions.

Moderator
Jim Sciutto: Chief National Security Correspondent, CNN

Panelists
• Lt. General David Barno: Former First Commander for Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan and currently Senior Fellow, Center for New American Security
Jane Harman: Director, President and CEO, Woodrow Wilson Center
Jeffrey H. Smith: Former General Counsel, CIA and currently serves on the Department of Defense Legal Policy Advisory Board

Harman opened the discussion by emphasizing that it is the clear constitutional obligation of members of Congress to declare our wars. But since Vietnam four wars that have gone undeclared. With the president recently submitting a draft authorization for the use of military force (AUMF), Harman offered two pieces of advice for Congress. First, don’t duck – playing the blame game is bad policy and bad politics is hurting the reputation of the US. Congress has to face this issue head on, debate it, and vote on it. Second, avoid groupthink. This point as the major problem with the war in Iraq.

The language of the proposed AUMF includes the phrase “enduring offensive ground operations.” Sciutto noted that the President’s intention behind such a vague phrase is to avoid another Afghanistan or Iraq war, where the US deploys 150,000 troops to a major land war in the Middle East. He also noted there is a lot of leeway, because it is unclear what terms such as “enduring,” or “offensive” mean.

Barno added that the broadness of the phrase is helpful for military commanders who find it useful to have parameters set wide and guidance not too narrow. But  Smith believes the phrase is mischievous. The President is clearly trying to capture the sentiment of the US people who do not want another large ground war, but it is unnecessary because the President himself said he would not embark on such an operation. The vague language signals to our adversaries that we do not have a clear plan. Harman agreed that the President is trying to please a large majority of people, but the vagueness of the language displeases people who feel that a clear plan is lacking.

Sciutto asked the panel to comment on the fact that the President did not sunset the 2001 AUMF, which grants him authority to attack al-Qaeda and its associates. Smith thought it curious that the President did not recommend this. The President wants congressional approval on an ISIL authorization but also wants to hold on to the 2001 AUMF as justification for his ongoing actions if the new AUMF is not passed.

Harman wants Congress to come up with an authorization that replaces the 2001 AUMF. Barno argued that the President wants to achieve two aims that are difficult to combine. First is support from Congress and the American people to conduct military action against ISIL. Second is to retain the ability to attack al-Qaeda and its associates in the future. It will be difficult to win the support of Congress if he folds these two into a single AUMF.

Who is the target? Sciutto explained how difficult it is to answer this question because ISIL is spreading and many groups are simply rebranding themselves as ISIL without operational ties. Smith, quoting Senator Tim Kaine, defined ISIL associates as, “individuals and organizations fighting for, on behalf or, or alongside ISIL or closely related successors.” The President added the phrase, “in hostilities against the US or coalition partners.” The President is expanding the groups he can go after without naming them.

Smith believes there should be some mechanism to inform Congress of which groups he is going after. When those groups are named, they should be announced publically. This clarity is crucial because other countries will react to what we do, particularly the Russians and the Iranians. Harman added that the US needs to send a signal to the world that this country is united on a single mission and not just a vision described by President Obama.

Can Congress have the necessary debate to come up with a reasonable settlement considering the current political environment? Barno thinks an AUMF focused on ISIL has a reasonable prospect of agreement. Both sides of the aisle believe this is a serious threat that is getting worse. Harman is hopeful. She believes Congress cannot duck this issue because it affects everyone and it involves valuable resources, notably blood and treasure. Smith is cautiously optimistic but concerned about the fallout of failing to come to an agreement. Will the President go on with his current actions? If he does, what does that say about the authority of the President and Congress?

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