Tag: Jordan
Iraq’s election: a mixed bag is better than a mess
My Middle East Institute colleagues have already elegantly parsed the October 10 Iraqi election results and their implications. It’s a mixed bag: Moqtada al Sadr, who already controls more seats than anyone else in parliament gained, as did former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki; Shia militia politicians, more moderate Shia, and Sunni Islamists weakened; Sunni secularists, independents, regional advocates, and both the leading Kurdish party and a newish one gained. Turnout was low, due in part to a boycott encouraged by activists who had previously campaigned for the early poll. What it all means for election of the President, Parliament speaker, and Prime Minister won’t be known for weeks if not months.
Just as interesting to me is the process: it came off pretty well, with little violence and intimidation by Iraqi standards. Almost two decades after the American invasion, Iraqis have grown accustomed to something like a democratic regime, albeit more than a little tainted with lack of voter enthusiasm, corruption, patronage, sectarianism, and armed groups only nominally under state control. Politics is a rough sport in Iraq, but not now a deadly one, unless you are a demonstrator fired on by sectarian militias.
The main issues are now economic. The American presence, down to a couple of thousand troops plus contractors, is no more discussed than Iranian influence, exercised in part through the Popular Mobilization Forces and their politicians. Kurdistan’s independence aspirations have faded but still simmer. Even with oil prices at a 7-year peak, the new government will face big challenges in maintaining and growing oil and gas production while steering the economy towards non-hydrocarbon development and adjusting to global warming, which threatens to make parts of the country uninhabitable.
If the next government can even begin to meet those challenges, Iraq could play an important role in a Middle East that is adjusting to the prospect of reduced American attention. As a Shia and Arab majority country with a large Kurdish population and many other smaller minorities, a prosperous Iraq could be a multivalent force for stability and coexistence, helping to bridge divides among Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. The current Prime Minister has made some good but still tentative steps in that direction. It is no secret that the Americans and Europeans will hope he is able again to form a government, unlikely as that may seem in a volatile political environment. They also liked his two predecessors, both of whom are, at least for now, down and out.
It is hard to be optimistic about the prospect of serious economic reform in Iraq, which has so far failed to turn its oil wealth into benefits–or even electricity and water–for ordinary citizens. Moqtada’s minions have not governed in the past in transparent and accountable ways. The country lacks an independent judiciary and much of its press is under the control of major politicians. But if law and order prevail, the next government will have an enormous opportunity both domestically and internationally to enable Iraq to benefit both its own citizens and the region. A mixed bag is better than a mess.
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Stevenson’s army, October 4
– Hungary burnished its image with lobbying campaign.
– Foreign leaders like King Abdullah of Jordan bought prime Malibu real estate.
– Where the money won’t go, because of the CR.
– In speech today USTR will show little thaw in trade war with China.
– Paul Pillar says Afghanistan isn’t good real estate for terrorists.
– Punchbowl News says parliamentarian tells Senators debt limit can be changed using reconciliation without jeopardizing Biden program.
– My former colleague and Mint Director Philip Diehl makes the case for the platinum coin.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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No good options for Syria
The Assad regime is undertaking yet one more effort to suppress resistance in the southern Syrian city of Daraa. The brutality will no doubt be extreme, as it has been through more than 10 years of war against the civilian population. The question is Lenin’s: “What is to be done?”
Syria presents Washington with a quandary: American administrations from President Obama onwards find President Assad’s attacks on his own citizens odious and criminal, but they don’t see a risk to US national security that would justify putting American troops at risk to stop it. Once in a great while, Presidents Obama and Trump have used cruise missiles, which entail no risk to Americans, in response to Assad’s egregious use of chemical weapons, but without much effect.
American troops were sent to Syria, and remain there, to fight Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, not Assad. The Americans have sent lots of humanitarian assistance, but that does nothing to weaken or punish Assad. In fact, the portion of that assistance that goes through UN agencies via Damascus helps him a good deal. The Russians have been persistent in making it hard for aid to get to Syrian opposition-held areas from Turkey.
Anyone with even a modicum of human feeling would want to do more to save Syrian civilians from Assad’s depredations. So Josh Rogin and Andrew Tabler call for more, hoping an ongoing policy review will produce at least a special envoy. But a special envoy could be meaningless without a purpose, which Andrew would like to define this way:
a coherent political strategy, supported by the U.S. intelligence community, to isolate Assad and his regime’s facilitators and limit the malign influence of Iran and Russia.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-07-27/search-syria-strategy
How realistic is that?
More sanctions can be imposed–there is rarely a limit to those, but Assad and his enablers are not wanting to travel to the US or Europe and presumably know how to keep their finances under cover. The Syrian economy is already a shambles. Even if Assad is successful militarily, he will be unable to do any significant reconstruction. Iran and Russia already own him and will use their influence in ways the US and Europe consider malign.
The Americans can cause some discomfort to both by maintaining their small military presence in eastern Syria, which supports the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) there. But the Americans have been unable and unwilling to do much to stabilize the situation even where they are present, as that requires risk-taking they want to avoid. Hope that the SDF might develop into a serious military and political challenger to Assad seems to have expired quietly.
Just maintaining Assad’s current isolation requires a good deal of diplomatic heavy lifting. Some Arab countries–most notably Jordan and the United Arab Emirates–have wanted to ease up on Assad. To bolster its lagging economy, Jordan would like to open its border and allow trade with Syria. The UAE sees Assad as a bulwark against the Islamists that Abu Dhabi dreads and loathes. Greece, anxious to avoid another outflux of Syrian refugees, has sent its Ambassador back to Damascus as an “envoy.” Other Europeans may be tempted, or blackmailed, to do something comparable.
The UN political process for Syria, focused on a committee that is supposed to be writing a new constitution, is essentially moribund. Initiative for years has fallen instead to the “Astana powers” (Iran, Russia, and Turkey), none of which are prepared to push for a political solution. All three are relying on their military forces to get what they want in Syria. Iran gets a bridge to Lebanese Hizbollah as well as a new confrontation line with Israel, Russia gets its bases and a foothold in the Middle East, and Turkey gets to repress the Syrian Kurds, some of whom have supported insurgency inside Turkey.
I am not appealing for inaction, just highlighting how difficult it is to think of anything that can be done to affect the situation in a serious way. That is even before we come to discussing Biden Administration priorities, which include reentering the Iran nuclear deal, withdrawing at least some US forces from the Middle East, and refocusing on strategic competition with Russia and China while managing the challenges posed by North Korea, Venezuela, and other bad actors. Never mind the domestic priorities. Syria looks distant in Biden’s perspective.
So sure, a special envoy if you like, but what will s/he do? Talk is cheap, and not bad. But there are no good options for Syria.
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Peace Picks | July 26 – August 1, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Past as Prologue: Revisiting Bernhard-Henri Levy’s 2002 Report on Afghanistan | July 26, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | The Middle East Institute | Register Here
In spring 2002, French philosopher and human rights activist Bernard-Henri Lévy traveled to an Afghanistan newly freed from Taliban control at the request of the French president to assess the conditions on the ground and determine how France could contribute to Afghanistan’s rebirth as a nation. In his subsequent report, Lévy pressed for France to take on a key role in areas ranging from strengthening the rule of law and women’s rights to helping to restore the country’s cultural heritage.
Much has changed over the past two decades and as the U.S. and its international partners prepare to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan, MEI is pleased to announce the launch of a new book, Past as Prologue: Revisiting Bernard-Henri Lévy’s 2002 Report on Afghanistan. The book includes Lévy’s original report (translated into English for the first time) along with a foreword by General (ret.) David Petraeus and an introductory essay by Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum. Following remarks by General (ret). Petraeus and Lévy, a panel of experts will discuss Lévy’s 2002 report and what has happened in the years since. What was once hoped and envisioned for the country? What has actually happened on the ground over the past two decades? How are Lévy’s recommendations relevant in today’s context?
Speakers:
Gen. (ret.) David Petraeus
Former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan; former director, Central Intelligence Agency
Bernard-Henri Lévy
Philosopher, journalist, filmmaker, and public intellectual
H.E. Javid Ahmad,
Ambassador of Afghanistan to the United Arab Emirates; non-resident senior fellow, Atlantic Council
Marvin Weinbaum,
Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, MEI
- Transitioning to Non-Oil Economies in the Gulf: Successes, Failures, and the Path Forward | July 27, 2021 | 8:00 AM EST | The Arab Gulf States Institute | Register Here
Economic diversification strategies to wean Gulf economies away from a dependence on hydrocarbon revenue have existed for decades. Ongoing state-led investments in strategic non-oil industries have produced varied results. Recent development initiatives involving culture, renewable energy, and technology-oriented industries appear promising; however, the return on investment is neither immediate nor guaranteed. Proceeds from the oil and gas sector continue to constitute the majority of public sector revenue in Gulf Arab states.
Are overlapping initiatives to develop non-oil industries in the region opportunities for cooperation or competition? With a steady rebound in oil prices since the oil price shocks of 2020, will oil- and gas-producing countries in the Gulf relax economic diversification efforts? Do protests in Oman signal a wider dissatisfaction with the fiscal adjustments implemented since 2020? What does this reveal about the rentier state theory and the nature of economic reform and development in the Gulf?
Speakers:
Talik Doshi
Visiting Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore
Kate Dourian
Non-resident Fellow, AGSIW; Contributing Editor, Middle East Economic Survey; Fellow, Energy Institute
Robert Mogielnicki
Senior Resident Scholar, AGSIW
Clemens Chay
Research Fellow, Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore
- Report Launch: Mapping the Human Rights Risks of Facial Recognition Technology | July 27, 2021 | 12:00 PM EST | Register Here
Thanks to a decade of rapid progress in the field of computer vision, facial recognition technology (FRT) has become a commercial product available to almost any government or business in the world. Organizations ranging from law enforcement agencies to independent retail outlets are beginning to integrate FRT into their operations. Proponents hope that facial recognition may support public safety initiatives and improve access to services, but the risk of errors and abuse mean that FRT deployments carry substantial risks to a variety of fundamental rights and freedoms. This is particularly true in the case of nations with weak rule of law.
Speakers:
Marti Flacks
Director and Senior Fellow, Human Rights Initiative
Amy K. Lehr
Senior Associate (non-resident), Human Rights Initiative
- Prospects for Peace and Security in Zimbabwe | July 28, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | The Brookings Institution | Register Here
After 37 years of dictatorship, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe finally resigned on November 21, 2017. For many, his departure and Emmerson Mnangagwa’s rise signaled hope for the politically and economically devastated and once pariah state of Zimbabwe. Today, the increasing political violence and polarization, as well as economic emaciation serve to undermine the ruling administration and highlight the enduring legacies of Mugabe’s reign, even after his death on September 6, 2019.
On July 28, the Africa Security Initiative will host a discussion on U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe and future political course of action. Following the discussion, the panel will take questions from the audience.
Speakers:
George F. Ward
Adjunct Senior Research Analyst, Institute for Defense Analyses
Michelle Gavin
Senior Fellow for Africa Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Dew Mavhinga
Director, Southern Africa, Human Rights Watch
Piers Pigou
Senior Consultant, Southern Africa, International Crisis Group
Michael E. O’Hanlon (moderator)
Director of Research, Foreign Policy; Co-Director, Center for Security, Strategy and Technology, Africa Security Initiative; Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology; The Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair
- The Convention on Refugees at 70: A Conversation with Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield | July 28, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | The United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
On July 28th, the world will mark the 70th anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations’ 1951 Refugee Convention, a historic multilateral agreement that clarified the rights of refugees under international law and the obligation of host countries to provide for their protection. The principles enshrined in the Refugee Convention set precedents for the rights, repatriation, and resettlement of refugees that still resonate to this day.
However, these precedents are increasingly under strain amid a changing global context. Driven by violent conflict and insecurity, the world is facing a new displacement crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated displacement trends, pushing healthcare infrastructure to the brink and creating dire economic conditions as countries struggle to contain the virus. Meanwhile, climate change uprooted more than 30 million people—the highest figure in a decade.
Speakers:
Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Lise Grande
President am CEO, U.S. Institute of Peace
- How Modern CIOs Innovate for Impact | July 28, 2021 | 12:00 PM EST | The Atlantic Council | Register Here
Modern Chief Information Officers (CIOs) today drive transformation, connecting the dots between customers, and the tools and infrastructure needed to support them. Not only do they have legacy systems that needed stabilizing, but also, customer demands are accelerating, along with the pace of and changes in technology. In order to cope, modern CIOS will need to address concerns with a matrix of technology, people, and customer needs in mind.
Join us for a GeoTech Hour, co-hosted by David Bray and Jamie Holcombe discussing how to drive cultural change for enterprises and discuss what it is like to steer, lead, and shape IT and organizations in the federal realm.
Speakers:
Sally Grant
Vice President, Lucd AI
Nagesh Rao
Chief Information Officer, Bureau of Industry and Security, United States Department of Commerce
David Bray, PhD
Director, GeoTech Center, Atlantic Council
Jamie Holocombe
Chief Information Officer, United States Patent and Trademark Office
- Nuclear Security Policy in an Era of Strategic Competition | July 28, 2021 | 1:30 PM EST | The United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has relied on diplomacy and the maintenance of its nuclear enterprise as a means of strategic deterrence. However, 30 years later, Russia and China are pursuing the maintenance and modernization of their nuclear weapons and systems — and the current U.S. construct is ill-suited to this new, complex geopolitical environment.
The Congressional Nuclear Security Working Group, co-chaired by Rep. Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE) and Rep. Bill Foster (D-IL), is a bipartisan caucus dedicated to facilitating awareness and engagement on the urgent threats posed by the prospect of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. The caucus goals include strengthening nuclear safeguards, securing fissile material and preventing the misuse and spread of sensitive nuclear materials and technologies.
Speakers:
Rep. Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE)
U.S. Representative from Nebraska
Rep. Bill Foster (D-IL)
U.S. Representative from Illinois
Lise Grande, moderator
President and CEO, U.S. Institute of Peace
- Jordan’s Digital Future: A Conversation with Jordanian Minister of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship | July 29, 2021 | 9:00 AM EST | The Wilson Center | Register Here
Join the Middle East Program for a conversation with His Excellency Ahmad Hanandeh, Minister of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship in Jordan, who will describe Jordan’s journey to becoming a regional tech leader, and strategy to using digital transformation as a means of recovering form the coronavirus pandemic.
Speakers:
Ahmad Hanandeh
Minister of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
- Unlocking the Potential of U.S. Offshore Wind | July 29, 2021 | 12:45 PM EST | The Bipartisan Policy Center | Register Here
Achieving domestic and international climate goals will require a dramatic expansion of energy production from zero-carbon resources. Offshore wind has an important role to play in that expansion and a robust domestic industry will create jobs, advance manufacturing and tap a growing global market. Realizing this potential, however, will not be easy for a host of reasons, some of which are common to the early large-scale deployment of most new energy technologies and some of which have to do with the unique characteristics and demands of offshore wind.
Speakers:
David J. Hayes
Special Assistant to the President for Climate Policy
Bobby Jindal
Former Governor of Louisiana
Bill White
Vice President, Offshore Wind, Avangrid
Lesley Jantarasami (moderator)
Managing Director, BPC Energy Program
- Is the U.S. Really Leading the World in Hypersonic Munitions? | July 29, 2021 | 2:00 PM EST | The Heritage Foundation | Register Here
Hypersonic weapons travel more than five times the speed of sound, enabling them to close on targets in ways that could significantly impact the next major armed conflict. Realizing their potential, Russia and China have well-developed programs and have likely fielded operational hypersonic weapons. In contrast, the U.S. has yet to complete testing on its first such munition.
Join Dr. Mark Lewis, one of America’s leading experts in this field, as he confronts the offensive potential, defensive challenges, and myths surrounding hypersonic munitions.
Speakers:
Dr. Mark Lewis
Executive Director, Emerging Technologies Institute, NDIA
John Venable
Senior Research Fellow for Defense Policy
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The pandemic weakened the weakest governments and social groups
The Middle East Institute June 15 hosted a seminar discussing the impact of COVID-19 on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This was in collaboration with the recently released 6th wave of the Arab Barometer, an expansive regional survey. Using the results from this survey and analysis from the Brookings Doha Center, the panel assessed the pandemic’s effects on the region and the perceived efficiency of government responses. As the survey was held in three rounds throughout 2020-2021, the Arab Barometer could also register changes over time. Bottom line: the pandemic exacerbated the region’s existing problems and the hardest hit were the most vulnerable communities (refugees, the poor, and women).
The speakers were:
Yasmina Abuzzuhour
Visiting fellow
Brookings-Doha Center
Salma Al-Shami
Senior research specialist
Arab Barometer
Shala Al-Kli
Non-resident scholar
MEI
Deputy regional director
Mercy Corps
Karen Young (moderator)
Senior fellow and director, Program on Economics and Energy
MEI
Exacerbating existing problems
Shahla Kli COVID has worsened existing issues, particularly for IDPs and refugees. She highlighted two of these structural weaknesses in particular:
- Lack of institutionalization: This is manifested in weak healthcare systems and social welfare programs. COVIC pushed these to their limits. Furthermore, some countries (such as Syria or Lebanon) lack well-structured recovery and vaccination plans, exacerbating and lengthening the crisis.
- Unemployment/the ‘youth bulge’: Problems in the labor market abound in the MENA region. Many of its youthful populations work in informal, day-to-day jobs. This is particularly true for migrants and refugees. Often these jobs disappeared during lockdowns. Conversely, many poor citizens and migrants had no choice but to continue working despite the pandemic, potentially falling ill themselves.
Public opinion
Salma al-Shami outlined the relevant results of the Arab Barometer on this topic. The Barometer gathered data on seven countries (Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) due to financial and access constraints. She summarized the findings in five main points:
- Concern for COVID is still high in these countries, but it is significantly higher among women than among men.
- The loss of education for children and increased cost of living were the the number one and two concerns. In Jordan some 140 days of education were lost according to UNESCO, and even more in Iraq.
- Public opinion on government response to COVID varies with the assessment of the healthcare system and inflation control. If these are positively rated, the government’s response also tends to be. This is the case in Morocco and Tunisia for example, while Lebanon and Iraq lack such public confidence. Morocco was also the only country where significant relief packages were deployed. Some 49% of respondents in that country indicated they received some form of aid, where that number didn’t top 20% in any of the other countries.
- Concerning vaccines, there is still some hesitancy. Where trust in government is high, so is the willingness to take a vaccine, as in Morocco which has already seen an exemplary vaccine rollout compared to its neighbors. However, in Jordan, Algeria, Iraq, and Tunisia, only 35-42% indicate they are willing to take a vaccine. Abouzzouhour added that in Jordan conspiracy theories surrounding the vaccines are rampant, and that the government is often not the public’s primary source of information.
- The survey data also indicates that COVID has exacerbated issues of income inequality and unemployment. Few respondents indicated they lost their jobs because of COVID-related lockdowns, although many did experience a temporary job interruption. Women and migrant labor in general suffered greater consequences.
Government responses
Adding to the statistics related to government response to COVID, Abouzzouhour commented that governments overpromised and underdelivered. The first wave saw major lockdowns and task forces with health experts, leading to a comparatively strong performance. However, the initial best cases (Tunisia and Jordan) failed to follow through on their success because they favored opening up for their economies. Additionally, relief packages and strong vaccination drives often faltered, despite government promises. In general, countries that previously underinvested in healthcare (as a percentage of their GDP) suffered high mortality rates.
Two interesting cases emerged from her story. Once again, Morocco was underlined as a strong performer in vaccination compared to its neighbors. Algeria is less clear-cut. It has some of the lowest infection rates in the region. However, its mortality rate is comparatively high, indicating that case numbers are likely underreported more than in other countries. Algeria was also criticized for failing to set up significant relief packages, despite the nation’s hydrocarbon resources.
Watch the recording of the event here:
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One state, two states, three states, four are all possible
Friends ask: what does the latest Gaza war portend for the two-state solution? Is it dead? Is a one-state solution now inevitable? Are there other possibilities?
It is clearer than ever that Prime Minister Netanyahu is an opponent of the two-state solution. The West Bank settlements and related infrastructure, evictions of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, and unequal treatment of Palestinian citizens of Israel make his preference clear: one state with more rights for Jews than for Arabs. Some call this “apartheid,” which was the more formalized South African system of segregation. Call it what you will, it is not democratic. The days when Israel could be regarded as the only democracy in the Middle East are long gone.
One state with equal rights is conceivable, but in practice impossible. Arabs and Jews are already pretty much equal in numbers between Jordan and the Mediterranean. Even secular Israeli Jews want their state to be Jewish. It can’t be Jewish if there is only one state. Nor are the Palestinians likely to afford Jews equal rights in a one-state Palestine after having been deprived of them for 75 years in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.
There is another version of the one-state solution that Netanyahu and other Israeli Jewish leaders like. They would be happy to see Egypt take Gaza back and Jordan take the West Bank back. The problem is neither Cairo nor Amman wants the Palestinians or the territory they occupy. Egypt has enough trouble in the Sinai peninsula with Islamist extremists. It has no interest in hosting Hamas, which originates in the Muslim Brotherhood. The Jordanian monarchy figures it already has enough Palestinians, who make up about 50% of the population. Governing the Palestinians in their enclaves on the West Bank would be an enormous challenge for Amman.
There is of course the possibility of a three state solution: Gaza, Israel, and the West Bank. Gaza’s political development for more than a decade has been independent of the Palestinian Authority, whose writ is largely limited to the West Bank. The two Palestinian proto-states are very different: Gaza is a contiguous, crowded, territory without Israeli on-the-ground presence while the West Bank is a Swiss cheese of Palestinian communities surrounded by armed Israeli settlements and the Israeli army. The current situation is close to this model, which in many respects is difficult to distinguish from the one-state solution with unequal rights.
Four states? That would be Gaza, Jewish Israel and West Bank, Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, and West Bank Palestinians. This, too, bears some resemblance to the current situation, because Palestinians with Israeli citizenship are not afforded equal rights or benefits, but they lack their own governing structures. Creating such structures with executive and legislative authority would be a gigantic problem for Israel, but it is the natural course of action now that the latest Gaza war has awakened the political consciousness of Palestinians who live in Israel proper. Judging from my conversations over the years with them, they would not accept governance by Hamas or the Palestinian Authority.
Anyone can have their preferences among these options, and there may be more. I favor the simpler of solutions over the more complicated ones, because life is already complicated. Equal rights is a simple solution. One state won’t work. That makes me conclude two states with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians in both. But I admit it is getting harder than ever to picture the route to this outcome.
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