Tag: Kurds
Opposition turmoil
Since our last post on the situation in northern Syria, everything has changed and nothing has changed. The world has witnessed terrorist attacks in Sinai, Paris, Beirut, San Bernardino, and elsewhere, which have contributed to increased international attention focused on ISIS and the crisis in Syria. Accusations, threats, ultimata fill the air, competing for space with French, Russian, British, US, and Turkish jets. Last week, in advance of the proposed next round of “Vienna” talks, an opposition conference was held in Riyadh, with representatives from a broad range of armed and political groups. The representatives agreed on a transition plan, following six weeks of negotiations and Assad’s departure, but it remains to be seen how much of it the regime and internationals will accept.
Neither the Kurdish PYD nor any of its affiliates were invited to Riyadh. They staged their own conference promising to begin a ‘Syrian Democratic Front’ in its liberated territories. Christian, Arab and Turkmen representatives also participated in the heavily Kurdish conference.
Meanwhile, on the ground in Aleppo, things continue to grind on. Villages have been taken and lost by all sides. Regime forces made gains under Russian air cover, taking the towns al-Hader and al-Eis south of the city, one day after they finally broke the siege on Kweiris airport to the east. Aleppo city’s opposition administrative council held elections mid to late November, with few problems and little disgruntlement. It continues to strain on a daily basis to provide services, especially water, with the limited resources available.
The Kurdish-dominated SDF has advanced in ISIS-held territory in the northeast, in a push toward Raqqa. But they are also operating in the countryside around Aleppo, reigniting tensions with opposition forces there. One analyst has called the stage on which these tensions are playing out, the A’zaz corridor, ‘the epicenter of the war’.
On November 18, fifteen groups allied themselves with SDF. Most are small and without much influence, but a couple stand out: Kurdish units local to Afrin Canton and an umbrella grouping named Jaysh al-Thuwwar now operate under the SDF banner. Jaysh al-Thuwwar is an amalgam including Jabhat al-Akrad (the Kurds’ Front), remnants of the Syrian Revolutionaries’ Army and the Hazm Movement, a few FSA brigades, Northern Sun, and the Turkmen Seljuks Brigade.
The details remain murky, but from November 27 clashes broke out between Jaysh al-Thuwwar and Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and FSA groups near A’zaz. Shots fired happened to coincide with Russian airstrikes, giving the advantage to Jaysh al-Thuwwar and intensifying the conflict, leading the Ahrar Syria Brigade to declare the Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood in Aleppo a military zone and shell Kurdish positions there.
There ensued clashes in the countryside, some villages exchanged hands and some civilians were killed before a ceasefire was signed in Kashta’ar at the urging of Aleppo’s Consultation and Reconciliation Council. It does not seem to have held. Afrin Canton in particular is in a tense position, isolated as it is from the rest of Kurdish-controlled Rojava, but the hostilities are mutual and simmering. The Kurdish security service, Asayish, on December 8 arrested several activists in Afrin.
PKK! set the civil activists and white helmets free #Syria #Kafranbel pic.twitter.com/PmZrbnNo7r
— Raed Fares (@RaedFares4) December 12, 2015
Some argue that the Russian intervention and subsequent increased support for rebel groups from the US and others is inducing the rebel factions to unite. But in the past five years rebel groups have created and disbanded alliances, operations rooms, and joint commands frequently. Some last longer than others. In the north, Ahrar al-Sham and the Levant Front have proved relatively effective.
But the ongoing hostilities in Aleppo province highlight the tenuous nature of these unions. Last week there were two mergers that bear mention. First, the brigades Fursan al-Haqq and 101 Infantry Division have joined together as the Northern Division (al-Firqa al-Shamaliyya). Second, the existing Sultan Murad Brigade, already heavily populated with Syrian Turkmen, expanded to include several other Turkmen groups, including Sultan Mehmet Fatih. Both fall under the nebulous umbrella of the FSA.
The latter merger in particular highlights the surprising re-entry of Syrian Turkmen groups into the battlefield. The ISIS advance through Aleppo province in 2014 had dispersed many of the Turkmen forces and caused most to retreat from the province. Now the Turkmen could be reasserting themselves; at the very least, they have become a useful rhetorical card for Turkey in opposing both Russia and the Kurds. Erdoğan has cautioned Russia about bombing Turkmen areas of the northwest, such as Jabal al-Turkman in Latakia. After Turkey shot down the Russian jet, some posited it was done to protect Turkmen populations.
The conflict among opposition forces in the north is not drawn on clear-cut ethnic or sectarian lines. Though armed groups and political parties often try to represent the situation as black-and-white, ethnic and sectarian categories still bleed into each other. Jaysh al-Thuwwar and the SDF count fighters from all three ethnicities in their ranks. In Hasaka, they are also allied with Assyrian and Syriac Christian groups. The FSA, though largely Sunni Arab, likewise includes Kurd and Turkmen fighters. The FSA has a nebulous quality – yet their presence and their effect in battles against the regime is nevertheless real. Both Jaysh al-Thuwwar and the SDF, as well as their current opponents, include members who have been or still count themselves as part of the FSA.
It was rumored that the commander of Jabhat al-Nusra, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, in an interview released on December 12th, claimed that there was no such thing as the FSA. (In fact, he stated ‘it is a group of factions that join under a name without any organizational links between them …. [the FSA] is not an army and it is not a group, but a banner and a name that have become common among the people’.) This sparked a reaction on a local level, as seen in the video below. No matter how nebulous, many Syrians on the ground are rooting for the FSA and identify with it.
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Beware the monopoly of power
To many in the West, the Kurds have long seemed the sanest group left in Syria, as well as the safest and most effective option as an ally in the fight against ISIS. They appear organized, united, secular, and pluralist, standing out against the backdrop of the fragmented factions of the Syrian opposition, including Islamist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.
However, the political situation within this community, and their ties to the rest of Syrian society, are more complex than this image suggests. Their dominance of the new ‘coalition’ of the Syrian Democratic Forces engaged in the offensive against Raqqa makes it important to elucidate this complexity.
The Syrian Kurdish party PYD (Democratic Union Party) is the entity that makes the news. It is running the show throughout the north and northeast of the country. Their affiliated militia, the People’s Protection Units (YPG, and the women’s equivalent, the YPJ), made headlines last summer in their battle for Kobani against ISIS, and then again in another border town, Tel Abyad, this summer.
The YPG is also leading the fight against ISIS in Raqqa now, with grudging cooperation from Sunni Arab groups. After the US decided to suspend its train and equip program, it airdropped ammunition with the intention of supporting an offensive against Raqqa, but the Sunni Arab groups participating in the newly-formed coalition, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), say they have seen none of this material aid. The YPG dominates the SDF.
Taking advantage of their military successes, the PYD established the Democratic Autonomous Government of Western Kurdistan (i.e. within Syria, as opposed to the well-established Kurdistan Regional Government inside Iraq) in January 2014, consisting of three cantons under a federated ‘Rojava’ government. Afrin canton lies to the northwest of Aleppo, Kobani on the Turkish border east of the Euphrates, and the third canton, Qamishli, falls in the northeast corner of Syria, bordering Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey. The PYD in addition claims towns in the region between Afrin and Kobani, including A’zaz, Manbij, al-Bab, and Jarablus, as parts of historical Kurdistan.
The PYD administers health, education, security, and the judiciary within their cantons. They operate under an umbrella coalition TEV-DEM (Movement for a Democratic Society), which runs civil society organizations and ‘peace councils’ – civil courts – in Kurdish population centers, and aids local poor. The ‘peoples’ courts’ in the cantons are staffed by PYD members and take an eclectic approach to established and codified law, like other opposition groups, selecting from Syrian criminal law, Swiss or German legal codes and customary law.
Though the PYD has been consolidating its control of these cantons, they deny that they are seeking an independent Kurdish state, stating their aim of remaining within a whole and united Syria, though one with a higher degree of regional autonomy than before. They have publicly expressed tolerance and inclusion of other ethnicities and sects.
Bassam Barabadi and Faysal Itani reported in August that both ‘Kurdish and Arab senior sources in northern Syria’ confirmed ‘joint or divided Arab-Kurdish rule’ in liberated territories, evidencing some degree of cooperation, which is crucial for stability. The recent move to annex Tel Abyad reflects the PYD’s intentions to unite the three cantons and maintain control throughout the contiguous territories along the Turkish border.
Divisions in the Kurdish community and antagonisms with other Syrians remain. TEV-DEM is not the only coalition on the Syrian Kurdish political scene. Other less militant or nationalist parties have combined to form the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which has joined the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) and is politically closer to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq than the radical Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey. The PYD accepts the PKK’s founder, Abdullah Öcalan, as their ideological leader.
One of the more prominent of the KNC parties is Yekiti (Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria), which has often criticized the PYD. In May, for instance, the PYD are alleged to have told two Yekiti members to leave their homes in Qamishli canton because they had criticized the PYD on TV.
In addition to earlier allegations of press intimidation and aggression against other Kurdish parties, last month the Rojava Student and Youth Union, also in Qamishli, raised concerns to local and international human rights organizations about the PYD using Kurdish-language instruction in primary schools for political and ideological indoctrination. Indeed, on Tuesday the KNC called for demonstrations in Hasaka governorate against PYD educational policies. The resulting turnout in Malikiyya (Derek) was forcefully dispersed by PYD’s internal security arm, the Asayış, which also made several arrests.
Meanwhile, Sunni Arabs and Syrian Turkmen have levelled accusations of ethnic cleansing and property confiscation directed at the YPG, after their battles with ISIS in the Kobani and Tel Abyad countryside and their consequent control of new territories. An investigation conducted by Amnesty International affirmed war crimes committed by the PYD in razing Sunni Arab villages.
Cooperation between the Kurdish cantons and rebel-held territories, or the YPG and rebel militant forces, is generally low. Rebel groups distrust the PYD and YPG because their primary goal is driving ISIS out of their territories – showing, in the rebels’ view, lack of dedication to the revolution. The YPG command has stated that they would work with Russia to combat ISIS if Russia were to present the opportunity, which garners further distrust from other opposition groups.
Kader Sheikhmous is the co-founder of an NGO, Shar for Development, which focuses on enhancing civil society, governance, and economic development in Kurdish areas of Syria. Much of its work promotes the unity and good relations of the Kurdish and Sunni Arab communities, including a bilingual magazine that is distributed in the towns of Hasaka.
Sheikhmous highlights the dangers of the international and regional actors offering support exclusively to armed groups, such as the YPG, without investing in civil society actors and economic development. USAID, for example, in 2014 sharply diminished support to Kurdish NGOs in Syria. That risks creating dependence on the YPG not just for security but for other services, in the absence of civil society, will increase the YPG’s tendency toward authoritarian behavior.
These concerns raise the question of the viability of PYD-run autonomous cantons, their suitability as a military or security ally for the US, and their role in a future Syrian state. Exclusive or excessive support for one party in the Syrian Kurdish regions will allow it to consolidate its monopoly on power and violence.
Syrians generally endorse the unity of their country and its people, regardless of ethnic or sectarian background. Kurds, Turkmen, Alawis, Sunnis, and others want to regain their normal lives and continue living together. Though the Kurdish autonomous regions have provided measures of stability and security for the civilians of the north, it will be counterproductive if it comes at the price of single-party rule and exacerbated social divisions.
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Kurdistan under pressure
I enjoyed a couple of hours serving on a panel this morning with Kurdistan Regional Government Representative in Washington Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, the Atlantic Council’s Nusseibeh Younes, and SAIS second year student Yael Mizrahi. Sasha Toperich of SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations and leader of its Mediterranean Basin Initiative moderated. I won’t even try to reproduce the nuanced and fine-grained presentations by Bayan, Nusseibeh and Yael, but here are the talking points I used:
1. I am, like most Americans, an admirer of Iraqi Kurdistan and what it has achieved, even if I wouldn’t say the democratic transition there is even near complete.
2. That’s not surprising: Kurdish national aspirations were frustrated in the aftermath of World War I. Even in recent decades, Kurdistan has seen oppression, war, expulsion, and chemical attacks.
3. It has taken a hundred years for a fraction of the Kurdish population—the part fortunate enough to live in Iraq—to gain some degree of self-governance.
4. Until recently, it looked to some people as if that self-governance might progress towards independence and sovereignty.
5. I had my doubts, not I hasten to add due to weakness in the Kurds case: they were treated at least as badly as Kosovo Albanians and arguably much worse.
6. But geopolitical pressure from Iraqi Kurdistan’s neighbors has made independence a dicey proposition. Ankara, though friendlier than ever with Erbil, does not want independence for Kurdistan. Tehran is dead set against it. Baghdad doesn’t want it either.
7. In the last year, the situation has become even more complicated.
8. Kurdistan is under pressure for three dramatic reasons:
• The fall of oil prices;
• ISIL’s successful takeover of most of Sunni Iraq;
• Its own internal political strife.
9. Let me consider these one by one.
10. Oil prices are now at less than half their level of June 2014. At $100/barrel, Kurdistan needed production of something like 500,000 barrels per day to replace its share of Iraq’s overall oil production.
11. I’m guessing, but it seems to me likely it now needs production of well over 1 million barrels per day to replace the money it expects from Baghdad.
12. Even 500,000 bpd was a stretch. A million is a much bigger stretch, even with Kirkuk production now in Kurdistan’s control.
13. Second, Kurdistan now has to defend about six hundred miles of confrontation line with the Islamic State, as well as something like two million displaced people and refugees it is hosting with international assistance.
14. That is a daunting battle front and a massive humanitarian requirement.
15. Third is the serious political strife within Kurdistan, which pits President Barzani and his PDK against Gorran and other dissenters from his desire to prolong his stay in the presidency. They want a more parliamentary and less presidential system.
16. Soldiers who are expected to fight ISIL will want to know who and what they are fighting for. There is more ambiguity and dissension about that today than there has been for many years.
17. I don’t see any of these pressures letting up soon.
18. Erbil is getting ready to return to Baghdad in an effort to restore the agreement on oil that was supposed to allow exports directly from Kurdistan in exchange for payment of what Baghdad owes Erbil.
19. Let’s hope that issue can be sorted out, but even if it is oil prices remain under $50 per barrel and are unlikely to go above $80, due to unconventional production enabled by US technology that is now spreading to other countries.
20. Oil is priced in a global market. Kurdistan now has little prospect of meeting its budgetary needs as an independent state.
21. ISIL is not going away. Even if it is forced to withdraw from Ramadi, as it has been forced to do from Tikrit and Bayji, it will be some time before Mosul is retaken. The Kurdish confrontation line with ISIL is likely to remain long for some time to come.
22. Even after ISIS is defeated, I would anticipate extremist attacks on the KRG, as have occurred in the past.
23. Nor is Kurdistan’s internal strife likely to go away. Barzani is standing his ground. So is Gorran, which has been suspended from the parliament and the coalition government. Even if things were to get patched up, the differences remain profound and the willingness to resolve them weak.
24. So Kurdistan faces some intractable problems, even without mentioning the complications that come from the war in Syria: Turkish attacks on the PKK inside Iraqi Kurdistan and the help Erbil has given to the Kurdish forces flying PYD/YPG banners, which Ankara resents.
25. So what looked like a natural slide towards independence a year or two ago now looks like a return to the 20th century: a Kurdistan hemmed in on all sides and unable to pursue the self-determination that its people unquestionably want.
26. What should the U.S. do?
27. It should certainly support the Kurds, both Syrian and Iraqi, in the fight against ISIS, so long as they are prepared to treat Arabs and other non-Kurds well.
28. It should also continue to provide generous humanitarian assistance.
29. And Washington should do what it can to help Erbil and Baghdad resolve their dispute over the distribution of oil revenue.
30. On the internal Kurdistan issues, we should want to see them resolved sooner rather than later, since later could mean disrupting the fight against ISIS.
31. But we also need to nudge our Kurdish friends in a direction that respects the rule of law and democracy.
32. No president is forever. No governing party is forever. Adherence to the constitution as well as fair and free competition for votes is what we should expect of our partners, no matter what the outcome for longstanding friends.
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The nine lives of Erdoğan
The day after the Turkish parliamentary elections last Sunday, the Brookings Institution hosted a panel to discuss the results, ‘Turkey’s Snap Elections: Resuscitation or Relapse?’ The panel featured Ömer Taşpınar, professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and nonresident fellow at Brookings; Kadir Üstün, executive director of the SETA foundation; Gönül Tol, director of the Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute; and former congressman Robert Wexler, currently president of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace. Kemal Kirişci, director of Brookings’ Turkey Project, moderated the discussion.
The election results proved a surprise to most observers, with the AKP winning nearly 50% of the vote after they had been expected to gain perhaps 43-44%. As Kirişci established, they took back about 4.5 million votes in 5 months, including 2-2.5 million from nationalist party MHP and 1 million from the ‘Kurdish’ party, HDP. This places the AKP in a position of strength similar to that of 2011.
Taşpınar highlighted the disappointment that followed the June elections upset, including the failure to negotiate and build a coalition. It had been thought that disappointed voters for the MHP would migrate to the other nationalist party, CHP, but instead they switched to the AKP. Taşpınar stated that the surge in AKP voters from all parties stemmed from Erdoğan’s strategy of ‘controlled chaos,’ demonstrating that failure to vote for the AKP would mean instability, violence, and economic decline.
Üstün agreed that the electorate decided only the AKP, out of all available options, could deliver on the central concerns of Turkish voters today: security, stability, and economic development. No other party presented a positive platform, only setting themselves up as anti-Erdoğan. The HDP in particular, as a Kurdish party, had promised to the people to become an all-Turkey party, but failed after June to distinguish itself from the PKK insurgency, especially after the ceasefire ended and conflict resumed.
Tol discussed the Kurdish dynamic of the elections: after Kobani, observers had assumed the Kurdish vote had deserted Erdoğan and the AKP. However, it is now clear that the current security situation, AKP’s local electoral strategies in Kurdish areas, and conservative Kurds’ disappointment in the HDP resulted in a resurgence of Kurdish votes for the AKP. The standing conflict with the PKK, Tol observed, hurts local Kurdish civilians the most. Nevertheless, these elections are still a win for the HDP, as they attained the 10% threshold for participation in parliament.
Wexler opined that Erdoğan had the chance, during the Gezi protests in 2013, to exhibit become a transformational leader for Turkey, but he failed. Now, Wexler believes that he has a second chance, but Erdoğan must improve his relationships with Israel and other US allies in the region before the US can offer more support.
Taşpınar sees the elections as free but not fair, since media expression is increasingly restricted and opposition voices curtailed. Indeed, just two days before the election several opposition newspapers’ offices were raided. However, Wexler disagreed outright that access to information through free media had any effect on voters’ opinions, stating that voters simply had come to the conclusion that the AKP was the best party to deliver on their central interest, security. Üstün saw a more general ‘sea change’ in public opinion, but he also disagreed that the media played a large role in the election and did not support Taşpınar’s view that censorship today is comparable to the situation under previous military dictatorships.
The unexpected election result refocuses attention on consolidation of AKP rule, with potential for a renewed push for a referendum to create a stronger executive power under a presidential regime, as Taşpınar sees it. Reconciliation with the PKK is crucial to the stability of the country, but Tol does not believe the AKP is interested in giving up the fight yet. Until that happens, it is also unlikely there will be new developments in Turkey’s foreign policy towards Syria especially.
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Kurdistan is simmering too
Last Wednesday I had the pleasure of discussing developments in Iraqi Kurdistan with Mustafa Gurbuz of George Mason University and the Rethink Institute and Namo Abdulla of Rudaw. Here is how it came out:
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New Turkish elections
On Wednesday, the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research in DC (SETA) hosted a conversation, ‘Turkey Ahead of the November Elections’, featuring Kılıç Kanat, research director at SETA; Ömer Taşpınar, non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution; and Andrew Bowen, senior fellow and director of Middle East Studies at the Center for the National Interest. The executive director of SETA, Kadir Üstün, moderated the discussion. Kanat has just published an analysis paper on the new elections, which have been called for November 1 because of the failure to form a ruling coalition after the June polling.
The June elections were the first in 13 years when no single party won enough votes to create a ruling majority government. Kanat laid out the reasons this occurred and the issues for the upcoming elections. In his view, the causes behind the decline of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) include:
- The ‘Kobani effect’: the battle for the northern Syrian town had a galvanizing effect on Kurds and non-Kurds who voted against Erdoğan, who was seen as wanting ISIS to win;
- Mobilization by smaller parties to pass the 10% threshold for inclusion in parliament;
- For the first time, diaspora Turkish nationalists were allowed to vote in general elections;
- Tactical voting: voters were certain the AKP would win the most votes, but attempted to decrease the margin in order to force a coalition.
Kanat evaluates the shift as a turn to the nationalist parties, whether Turkish or Kurdish: the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the conservative Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The HDP saw the biggest gains in support, from those dissatisfied with Erdoğan’s position vis-à-vis Kobani, and the Kurdish resolution process in general, as well as from diaspora voters.
The middle class has also been increasingly worried in a time of slowing economic growth, losing some confidence in the AKP. The AKP since the Gezi Park demonstrations has had to work hard to keep its support base, but the constant effort at mobiliztion may have resulted in election fatigue among some voters.
Going forward, Kanat stated, the upcoming elections will be determined by voters’ perception of who holds the responsibility for three things: resolving the Kurdish question, as well as dealing with PKK terrorism; maintaining public stability on a nation-wide level; and economic growth or decline.
Taşpınar zoomed out, examining two long-term trends that have contributed to the current political situation. First is the personalization of political power: political analysis and action stems from an understanding of Erdoğan’s plans. There are fewer enduring institutions in this post-Kemalist era, and no unified ideology undergirding the state.
Second, there is increasing polarization in Turkish politics. This has been driven by personalization, as well as the Kurdish question and the identity of Turkey as a country – will it be democratic or autocratic? The Gezi protest was a very real demonstration of this polarization, as was the failure after last weekend’s terrorist attack in Ankara for political leaders to produce a unified vocabulary to bring the nation together.
The theme of personalization ran through Bowen’s comments as well, in particular because of the personalistic nature of foreign policy decisions, for Obama as well as for Erdoğan. Theirs is a bad marriage. One of the key sticking points is the difference in the way they prioritize threats: for Erdoğan, the PKK takes pride of place, with ISIS far behind. Obama, on the other hand, urgently prioritizes defeating ISIS.
The Syrian crisis has drawn out many of the tensions in this relationship, which will be difficult to repair, even after the July agreement on air bases in Turkey. The US is perceived in Turkey as not standing by its allies, but new political leadership in both countries could change the situation, especially if the US focuses again on the Middle East.
According to polls, 15% of Turkish voters are still undecided about the November 1 elections. Only a few percentage points are required to re-cement the AKP’s position of power. The Ankara terror attack, depending on who is understood to be the perpetrator and how the government deals with the aftermath, could be decisive.
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