Tag: Kyrgyzstan

Reconciliation: a new vision for OSCE?

I am speaking at the OSCE “Security Days” today in Vienna on a panel devoted to this topic.  Here is what I plan to say, more or less:

Reconciliation is hard.  Do I want to be reconciled to someone who has done me harm?  I may want an apology, compensation, an eye for an eye, but why would I want to be reconciled to something I regard as wrong, harmful, and even evil?

At the personal level, I may be able to escape the need for reconciliation.  I can harbor continuing resentment, emigrate, join a veterans’ organization and continue to dislike my enemy.  I can hope that my enemy is prosecuted for his crimes and is sent away for a long time.  I don’t really have to accept his behavior.  Many don’t.

But at the societal level lack of reconciliation has consequences.  It is a formula for more violence.  We remain trapped in the inner circle of this classic diagram, in a cycle of violence.  Victims, feeling loss and desire for revenge, end up attacking those they believe to be perpetrators, who eventually react with violence:

What takes us out of the cycle of violence and retaliation?  The critical step is acknowledging wrong doing, a step full of risk for perpetrators and meaning for victims.  But once wrong doing is acknowledged, victims can begin to accept loss, manage anger and confront fears.  This initiates a virtuous cycle of mutual understanding, re-engagement, admission of guilt, steps toward justice and writing a common history.

What has all this got to do with OSCE?  Some OSCE countries are still stuck in the inner cycle of violence, despite dialogue focused on practical confidence-building measures that moves the parties closer.  But the vital step of acknowledging wrong has either been skipped entirely or given short shrift.  Conflict management is a core OSCE function.  The job will not be complete until OSCE re-discovers its role in reconciliation.

I know the Balkans best.  We aren’t past the step of acknowledging wrongdoing in Bosnia and Kosovo.  Even Greece and Macedonia are trapped in a cycle that could become violent.  The situation is less than fully reconciled in Turkey, the Caucasus, Moldova and I imagine other places I know less well.  Is there a good example of Balkans reconciliation?  The best I know is Montenegro’s apology to Croatia for shelling Dubrovnik.  That allowed them to build the positive relationship they have today.

Should reconciliation be a new OSCE vision?  Its leadership and member states will decide, but here are questions I would ask if I were considering the proposition:

  1. How pervasive is the need for reconciliation in the OSCE?
  2. Would it make a real difference if reconciliation could be established as a norm?
  3. If it did become a new norm, how would we know when it is achieved?
  4. What would we do differently from what we do today?

I was in Kosovo earlier this month.  There is little sign there of reconciliation:  it is difficult for Belgrade and Pristina to talk with each other, they have reached agreements under pressure that are largely unimplemented, OSCE and other international organizations maintain operations there because of the risk of violence.  There is little acknowledgement of wrong doing.  The memorials are all one-sided:  I drove past many well-marked KLA graveyards.  We have definitely not reached the outer circle yet.

Would it make a difference if there were acknowledgement of wrong doing?  Yes, it would.  It would have to be mutual, since a good deal of harm has been done on both sides, even if the magnitude of the harm differs.  Self-sustaining security in Kosovo will not be possible until that step has been taken.  I would say the same thing about Bosnia, Kyrgystan, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Turkey and Armenia.  Your North African partners might benefit from focus on reconciliation.

Dialogue is good.  Reconciliation is better.  Maybe OSCE should take the next difficult but logical step.

 

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What threatens the United States?

The Council on Foreign Relations published its Preventive Priorities Survey for 2012 last week.  What does it tell us about the threats the United States faces in this second decade of the 21st century?

Looking at the ten Tier 1 contingencies “that directly threaten the U.S. homeland, are likely to trigger U.S. military involvement because of treaty commitments, or threaten the supplies of critical U.S. strategic resources,” only three are defined as military threats:

  • a major military incident with China involving U.S. or allied forces
  • an Iranian nuclear crisis (e.g., surprise advances in nuclear weapons/delivery capability, Israeli response)
  • a U.S.-Pakistan military confrontation, triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations

Two others might also involve a military threat, though the first is more likely from a terrorist source:

  • a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
  • a severe North Korean crisis (e.g., armed provocations, internal political instability, advances in nuclear weapons/ICBM capability)

The remaining five involve mainly non-military contingencies:

  • a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil, water supply, banking and finance, transportation, and emergency services)
  • a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
  • severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attacks
  • political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
  • intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis that leads to the collapse of the euro, triggering a double-dip U.S. recession and further limiting budgetary resources

Five of the Tier 2 contingencies “that affect countries of strategic importance to the United States but that do not involve a mutual-defense treaty commitment” are also at least partly military in character, though they don’t necessarily involve U.S. forces:

  • a severe Indo-Pak crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by major terror attack
  • rising tension/naval incident in the eastern Mediterranean Sea between Turkey and Israel
  • a major erosion of security and governance gains in Afghanistan with intensification of insurgency or terror attacks
  • a South China Sea armed confrontation over competing territorial claims
  • a mass casualty attack on Israel

But Tier 2 also involves predominantly non-military threats to U.S. interests, albeit with potential for military consequences:

  • political instability in Egypt with wider regional implications
  • an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Syria, with potential outside intervention
  • an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Yemen
  • rising sectarian tensions and renewed violence in Iraq
  • growing instability in Bahrain that spurs further Saudi and/or Iranian military action

Likewise Tier 3 contingencies “that could have severe/widespread humanitarian consequences but in countries of limited strategic importance to the United States” include military threats to U.S. interests:

  • military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
  • increased conflict in Somalia, with continued outside intervention
  • renewed military conflict between Russia and Georgia
  • an outbreak of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, possibly over Nagorno Karabakh

And some non-military threats:

  • heightened political instability and sectarian violence in Nigeria
  • political instability in Venezuela surrounding the October 2012 elections or post-Chavez succession
  • political instability in Kenya surrounding the August 2012 elections
  • an intensification of political instability and violence in Libya
  • violent election-related instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
  • political instability/resurgent ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan

I don’t mean to suggest in any way that the military is irrelevant to these “non-military” threats.  But it is not the only tool needed to meet these contingencies, or even to meet the military ones.  And if you begin thinking about preventive action, which is what the CFR unit that publishes this material does, there are clearly major non-military dimensions to what is needed to meet even the threats that take primarily military form.

And for those who read this blog because it publishes sometimes on the Balkans, please note:  the region are nowhere to be seen on this list of 30 priorities for the United States.

 

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Civilian stabilization efforts in Kyrgyzstan

Please visit the writeup of Ambassador Robert Loftis’ presentation Monday at Johns Hopkins/SAIS, where he talked about civilian whole-of-government efforts at stabilization in Kyrgyzstan.

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The end is nigh…

Not really, but 2010 is coming to a close.  Never easy to look ahead a year, but let me give it a try.  It’ll make for a nice mea culpa post a year from now.  And if I cherry pick a bit maybe I’ll be able to claim clairvoyance!

  • Iran:  the biggest headache of the year to come.  If its nuclear program is not slowed or stopped, things are going to get tense.  Both Israel and the U.S. have preferred sanctions, covert action and diplomatic pressure to military action.  If no agreement is reached on enrichment, that might change by the end of 2011.  No Green Revolution, the clerics hang on, using the Revolutionary Guards to defend the revolution (duh).
  • Pakistan:  it isn’t getting better and it could well get worse.  The security forces don’t like the way the civilians aren’t handling things, and the civilians are in perpetual crisis.  Look for increased internal tension, but no Army takeover, and some success in American efforts to get more action against AQ and the Taliban inside Pakistan.  Judging from a report in the New York Times, we may not always be pleased with the methods the Pakistanis use.
  • North Korea:  no migraine, but pesky nonetheless, and South Korea is a lot less quiescent than it used to be.  Pretty good odds on some sort of military action during the year, but the South and the Americans will try to avoid the nightmare of a devastating artillery barrage against Seoul.
  • Afghanistan:  sure there will be military progress, enough to allow at least a minimal withdrawal from a handful of provinces by July.  But it is hard to see how Karzai becomes much more legitimate or effective.  There is a lot of heavy lifting to do before provincial government is improved, but by the end of the year we might see some serious progress in that direction, again in a handful of provinces.
  • Iraq:  no one expects much good of this government, which is large, unwieldy and fragmented.  But just for this reason, I expect Maliki to get away with continuing to govern more or less on his own, relying on different parts of his awkward coalition on different issues.  The big unknown:  can Baghdad settle, or finesse, the disputes over territory with Erbil (Kurdistan)?
  • Palestine/Israel (no meaning in the order–I try to alternate):  Palestine gets more recognitions, Israel builds more settlements, the Americans offer a detailed settlement, both sides resist but agree to go to high level talks where the Americans try to impose.  That fails and Israel continues in the direction of establishing a one-state solution with Arabs as second class citizens.  My secular Zionist ancestors turn in their graves.
  • Egypt:  trouble.  Succession plans founder as the legitimacy of the parliament is challenged in the streets and courts.  Mubarak hangs on, but the uncertainties grow.
  • Haiti:  Not clear whether the presidential runoff will be held January 16, but things are going to improve, at least until next summer’s hurricanes.  Just for that reason there will be more instability as Haitians begin to tussle over the improvements.
  • Al Qaeda:  the franchise model is working well, so no need to recentralize.  They will keep on trying for a score in the U.S. and will likely succeed at some, I hope non-spectacular, level.
  • Yemen/Somalia:  Yemen is on the brink and will likely go over it, if not in 2011 soon thereafter.  Somalia will start back from hell, with increasing stability in some regions and continuing conflict in others.
  • Sudan:  the independence referendum passes.  Khartoum and Juba reach enough of an agreement on outstanding issues to allow implementation in July, but border problems (including Abyei) and South/South violence grow into a real threat.  Darfur deteriorates as the rebels emulate the South and Khartoum takes its frustrations out on the poor souls.
  • Lebanon:  the Special Tribunal finally delivers its indictments.  Everyone yawns and stretches, having agreed to ignore them.
  • Syria:  Damascus finally realizes that it is time to reach an agreement with Israel.  The Israelis decide to go ahead with it, thus relieving pressure to stop settlements and deal seriously with the Palestinians.
  • Ivory Coast:  the French finally find the first class tickets for Gbagbo and his entourage, who go to some place that does not recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (no, not the U.S.!).
  • Zimbabwe:  Mugabe is pressing for quick adoption of his new constitution and elections in 2011, catching the opposition off balance.  If he succeeds, the place continues to go to hell in a handbasket.  If he fails, it will still be some time before it heads in the other direction.
  • Balkans:  Bosnians still stuck on constitutional reform, but Kosovo gets a visa waiver from the EU despite ongoing investigations of organ trafficking.

If the year turns out this way, it won’t be disastrous, just a bumpy downhill slide.  Hard to see it getting much better than that, but I could have made it much worse:

  • Iran:  weaponizes and deploys nukes.
  • Pakistan:  finally admits it can’t find two of its weapons, which have likely fallen into AQ hands.
  • North Korea:  goes bananas in response to some provocation, launches artillery barrage on Seoul.
  • Afghanistan:  spring Taliban offensive sweeps away Coalition-installed local institutions; Kandahar falls.
  • Iraq:  Kurds and Arabs fight, without a clear outcome.
  • Israel/Palestine:  Israel attacks Hizbollah in Lebanon, third intifada begins with Hamas suicide bombings inside Israel.
  • Egypt:  Muslim Brotherhood challenges Mubarak in the streets, prevents orderly succession process.
  • Haiti:  hurricanes, food riots, political strife, reconstruction blocked.
  • Al Qaeda:  big hit inside the U.S., thousands die.
  • Yemen/Somalia:  both go south, with AQ establishing itself firmly on both sides of the Bab al Mandab.
  • Sudan:  post-referendum negotiations fail, fighting on North/South border, chaos in Southern Sudan.
  • Lebanon:  Hizbollah reacts with violence to the Special Tribunal indictments, taking over large parts of Lebanon.  Hizbollah/Israel war wrecks havoc.
  • Syria:  succeeds in surreptitiously building nuclear facilities on commission from Iran, Israeli effort to destroy them fails.
  • Ivory Coast:  Gbagbo tries to hold on to office, imitating Mugabe’s successful effort.  Ouattara plays ball and accepts the prime ministry, pressured by internationals who don’t want to do what is necessary to airlift Gbagbo out of there.   A real opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of international solidarity is squandered.
  • Zimbabwe:  Mugabe succeeds, Tsvangirai is out, state in virtual collapse.
  • Balkans:  the EU unwisely begins implementing the acquis communitaire in Republika Srpska due to delays in formation of a national Bosnian government, investigations in Kosovo drag on and make progress towards the visa waiver and other EU goodies impossible.

There are of course other places where we might see bad things happen:  Venezuela, Burma, Nigeria, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Russia–but I’ll leave the imagining to you.

Happy New Year!

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ISO

a graduate student to write up Carnegie’s event on Kyrgyzstan 12:15-2 pm November 23.  Any takers?  I can’t find the event on their website, but I can forward the email invitation if you are interested.  Just ask daniel@peacefare.net

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