Tag: Lebanon
A difficult choice and an easy one
The questions of a “humanitarian pause” and an Israeli invasion of Gaza are often discussed separately. They are related.
No invasion means more bombing
We have to assume that Israel will not let Hamas off the hook. At a minimum, Israel is trying to destroy Hamas’ military capability. That can only be done by military means. If you want to see a “humanitarian pause,” the bombing will stop, but that increases from the Israeli perspective the need to go into Gaza to hunt Hamasniks. If you want Israel to stay out of Gaza, the bombing will have to continue and even intensify.
My own preference would be for the Israelis to stay out of Gaza. Urban warfare is difficult and deadly even without an extensive network of tunnels. Once in, the Israelis will likely find they will need to stay, unless they are prepared to see something like Hamas (or worse) return. The invasion, plus an occupation of a decade or more, will kill a lot more Israelis and Palestinians than the bombing.
An Israeli invasion of Gaza is also likely to trigger a wider regional war. Hizbollah in Lebanon, various Iranian proxies in Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen are capable of launching thousands of missiles at Israel. If the Israelis can’t handle that, they will turn to the United States to help out. Intense American attacks on Iranian proxies could trigger war with Iran. That scenario is a nightmare to be avoided, even if some hawks in the US might welcome it.
Of course there is an option for no bombing and no invasion. But that won’t satisfy popular opinion inside Israel. Nor would it help Prime Minister Netanyahu stay in power. He is responsible for the intelligence and preparedness failures that allows Hamas to do what it did. As soon as the military action stops, political accountability will begin. He will try to postpone that day.
Stop the abuse
The easy choice is on the West Bank. There the Israeli army and ultra-religious settlers have been harassing and killing Palestinians with impunity, not only since October 7. That behavior infuriates Palestinians and Arabs everywhere. From Israel’s own perspective, this is counterproductive. It could also be dangerous. The dog that hasn’t barked is Israel’s own Arab Palestinian population.
Here too Netanyahu is the fly in the ointment. He has been unwilling to reign in the extremists of his own coalition. Nor has the broadening of that coalition with a few opposition politicians compelled him to do so. The Americans are speaking up against Israeli behavior on the West Bank, but so far with little effect. They need to make it stick.
Get ahead of the political curve
At the moment, the Israelis are both intensifying the bombing and entering Gaza at will, without however yet trying to hold territory there. But humanitarian conditions are deteriorating rapidly and clearly require at least a bombing pause. Israel should combine that with a clear statement of restraint in the West Bank and a promise to deal with legitimate Palestinian aspirations once the fighting is over. But of course that would not help Netanyahu, so it is unlikely to happen.
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Stevenson’s army, October 17
– Mail-in voting rules may affect midterms.
– 28% of election-denier candidates are veterans, War Horse reports.
– Intercept reports on AIPAC election efforts.
– Belarus may be next Russian front, WSJ reports.
– Hill says Russia may conduct pre-election cyber attacks.
Charlie added later:
These can’t wait until Tuesday:
– New Yorker has excellent article on evolution of US support to Ukraine’s military.
– WSJ says US wants to keep B-52s in service.
– Max Boot says Israel-Lebanon agreement is a big win for Biden.
– Alice Hunt Friend says we don’t have standards on how civilians are supposed to do civ-mil relations.
– FP article details how JFK lied about Adlai Stevenson and the Cuba missile deal.
– National Security Archive has more on this.
A question for you: when did YOU learn that JFK had lied and actually made the Turkish missile removal part of the deal?
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To JCPOA or not to JCPOA is the question
The Biden Administration in the runup to the November 8 election has hesitated to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA aka Iran nuclear deal). This is understandable. In domestic US politics, return to the JCPOA carries no political advantage and considerable political risk.
The post-election dilemma
This hesitation sets up a post-election dilemma. During the past month, a serious protest movement has again emerged in Iran. The main focus has been rules on wearing the hijab, which is a highly visible symbol of the theological dictatorship. The protests have been widespread and growing. No doubt if the protesters succeed in overthrowing the Islamic Republic, the nuclear question would be seen in a different light.
But there is no telling whether that will happen within a relevant time frame. Iran has seen repeated episodes of public protest that the Islamic Republic has repressed brutally. Any one of the protest movements might have succeeded. They did not.
So immediately after the US election, President Biden will confront a choice. He can go ahead with a return to the JCPOA, or he can wait to see if the protest movement will succeed at displacing the Islamic Republic. If he proceeds with the JCPOA, that will give the Islamic Republic massive resources as well as sanctions relief and diplomatic prestige, thus enabling it to repress and buy off opposition. If he continues to hesitate, a vital opportunity could be lost to back Iran away from nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons or return to the JCPOA?
This is a serious dilemma. Nuclear weapons aren’t so useful in wartime, as their non-use the past 77 years demonstrates. But Iran can see from North Korea’s experience that they make other nuclear powers hesitate to destabilize a country. They also enable increased power projection in the region, which others will try to counterbalance. Iranian nuclear weapons would thus precipitate a regional arms race, with Turkey and Saudi Arabia the main contestants. The United States would not welcome that.
But return to the JCPOA will give the Islamic Republic a new lease on life as well as the resources it requires to remain in power. The gain in pushing Iran back from nuclear weapons would be a few months, not years. Once you know how to enrich uranium, the remaining technological obstacles are not great. Certainly the billions the US and others will need to return to Iran will be sufficient to ensure that nuclear weapons are only a few months in the future.
Make lemonade?
Someone might ask, if you have lemons why not make lemonade? Why not insist that Iran stop the internal crackdown as part of the price of returning to the JCPOA? While I might want Washington to try, I doubt that gambit would succeed. The negotiations are already overloaded with lots of non-nuclear issues. These include American prisoners in Iran and Iranian prisoners in the US, Iranian power projection in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and American encouragement of ethnic rebellion inside Iran. Getting back to the JCPOA will require ignoring most if not all of these. The main question is JCPOA or no JCPOA. And it isn’t an easy one to answer, even if like me you think Trump’s withdrawal was a stupid mistake.
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The time to remember has come
My esteemed Middle East Institute colleagues Paul Salem and Brian Katulis have set a low bar for President Biden’s trip to the Middle East this week. They want him to send a signal of renewed diplomatic commitment to the region.
There’s a hitch
It’s an important objective, but there is a hitch. It is the signs of reduced US commitment that have incentivized many improvements in relations among Middle Eastern countries. This is clear in Yemen. The current ceasefire came about in part because of US reluctance to continue supporting Saudi efforts to counter the Houthis. Iraq’s current role mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia would be inconceivable if the Americans hadn’t withdrawn most of their forces. The wars in Syria are calming partly because the Americans have mostly withdrawn. The remainder are limiting action exclusively to the Islamic State and Al Qaeda.
Israel’s newfound ambition to help guard Arab Gulf security is also a consequence of reduced American commitment. The Ibrahim/Abraham accords that President Trump initiated essentially trade Arab recognition for Israeli security assistance. The Arab Gulf monarchies regard that as better than American help. The Israelis don’t demand respect for human rights. Spyware and air defense have proven attractive propositions. Diplomatic recognition hasn’t proven costly to the Arab states that have done it so far (UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco), but the Saudis have hesitated.
And a fly in the Saudi ointment
That’s because of the fly in the ointment. Israel is refusing not only to make peace with the Palestinians but even to accept two states as the basis for a future peace. Israel’s current ambitions are clear: to keep the Golan Heights and all of Jerusalem as well as many of the settlements on the West Bank. The Palestinians would then get only a “state-minus.” That would lack not only an army but sovereign control over its very limited territory. Israel’s attitude is unlikely to change, even after its next election. Prime Minister Netanyahu is gone, but not his singular accomplishment: killing the spirit of Oslo.
Plus an elephant in the room
The elephant in the room is Iran. Negotiations for re-entry into the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) are faltering. If they fail, Iran will have the option within a year of producing enough enriched uranium to make several atomic bombs. Attacks on its nuclear facilities and personnel would only delay the inevitable, perhaps by years but more likely by months. They would also give Tehran reason to attack the Gulf states, either directly or through proxies.
The situation will improve only marginally if the JCPOA is revived. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will then use sanctions relief to reinvigorate their proxy military interventions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. That is precisely what the Gulf states don’t want.
Diplomacy>military
Paul and Brian rightly underline the good things American diplomacy could try to do: improve governance, encourage regional de-escalation and integration, and build civilian ties to the United States, both with citizens and institutions. But Washington has proven inept so far at beefing up diplomatic efforts once the troops are gone. Witness Iraq, where a mostly civilian-focused strategic framework agreement has languished after the military withdrawal. As Chas Freeman pointed out years ago, our diplomats have forgotten diplomacy without force. The time to remember has come.
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No sword dancing on treacherous terrain
President Biden’s op/ed in the Washington Post previews his visit next week to the Middle East. He will stop in Jerusalem, the West Bank, Jeddah (for a regional Arab meeting), and Riyadh. The piece has two audiences: the domestic one and the international one, especially in the Middle East but also in Europe and the Far East.
What the Americans want
There are four salient issues for Biden’s domestic audience: the Iran nuclear deal, support for Israel, oil prices, and human rights. America is split on the Iran nuclear deal. Half support Biden’s desire to re-enter it. The other half want to continue the so far unsuccessful effort to sanction Iran into submission, with the possibility of military action if that fails. On support for Israel’s security, there is overwhelming support. But Americans increasingly want accountability for Israeli abuses against Palestinians. Biden avoids that subject in the op/ed.
Most Americans want lower oil prices. Saudi Arabia has been reluctant to increase production, partly in retaliation for Biden’s criticism of human rights practices in the Kingdom, particularly the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. That is not a dinnertime conversation topic in the US. But there are many informed voices calling for accountability beyond the minimum the Saudis have so far done.
What the world wants: nuclear deal and Iran’s regional power projection
The rest of the world has a somewhat different set of priorities: not only Iran’s nuclear program but also its regional power projection as well as oil prices. Beyond the US, there is little concern for Israel’s security or human rights, apart from the plight of the Palestinians.
Most of the world would like to see the Iran nuclear deal operating once again. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have not, despite the risks to them of war if Israel or the US seeks to destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities. Biden should be aiming to understand their perspective better. My guess is they would be fine with re-entry into nuclear deal provided the US pushes back harder on Iran’s regional power projection.
That could mean doing more to weaken the Houthis in Yemen. It could also mean reducing Iran’s presence in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, where the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies are major players. Strengthening the nascent regional air defense system (see video above) or even Saudi entry into the Ibrahimic accords are other possibilities.
What the world wants: oil prices and Palestinians
On oil prices, the Saudis may seek some assurances on the downside while the Americans push for increased production. Europe and the Far East will wish the Americans success. Russia, Iran, Iraq, and other major producers will want prices to remain above $100 per barrel. That is what they all need to balance their budgets. No American president can promise sustained high oil prices. But the US is now a net oil and gas exporter. A nod to stability in the oil market is not out of the question.
While Biden will visit the West Bank, he has so far done little more than restore aid to the Palestinians President Trump had zeroed out. The op/ed fails to mention the two-state solution or Israeli responsibility for human rights abuses against Palestinians. It doesn’t even mention the rumored intention to re-open the US consulate in Jerusalem. That had acted for decades before Trump as a de facto embassy to Palestine. We can only hope Biden will be more forthcoming on those issues during his trip.
Treacherous terrain
The Middle East is treacherous terrain for any American president. Trump blundered by sword dancing with the Saudis, both literally and figuratively. He also wrote the Israelis a blank check (including for their territorial ambitions) and ended support for the Palestinians. Biden won’t commit those mistakes. He will try to build on the Ibrahimic accords that Trump initiated, strengthen and unify Arab defenses against Iran, and reach some sort of accommodation on oil production and prices. Odds are the trip will not be a brilliant success, but the ambitions are at least more realistic than his predecessor’s.
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Siyasa Podcast: Episode 2: The Lebanese Crisis — with Randa Slim
Second episode of podcast Siyasa, which discusses Middle East policy and politics. The first episode, with Vali Nasr, is here.
Host Ibrahim Al-Assil discusses with Dr. Randa Slim different dimensions of the Lebanese crisis, the domestic conditions, and the regional dynamics.
You can also listen to the podcast on:
Spotify
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