Tag: Libya

Syria is in good company in the Arab League

Towards the end, I trust she meant Sudan and Syria, not Saudi Arabia, were on the agenda in Cairo

The Arab League decided yesterday in Cairo to readmit Syria. The League had suspended Syria’s membership in response to its violent crackdown on demonstrators in March 2011. President Assad will presumably attend the May 19 Summit in Riyadh. This comes on top of several bilateral normalization moves, including by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

Conditions aren’t likely to be fulfilled

The readmission is supposedly conditional. Though I’ve been unable to find the official statement, press reports suggest the conditions include allowing humanitarian assistance and return of refugees, clamping down on Syria’s burgeoning Captagon drug exports, and the beginnings of a political process called for in UN Security Council resolution 2254.

I’ll be surprised if much of that comes to pass. Assad could and should have done all those things long ago. Preventing humanitarian assistance, blocking return of refugees, financing his regime with drug smuggling, and blocking any transition are all part of his strategy. Readmission to the Arab League is unlikely to change his behavior, which aims at restoration of his personal authority on the entire territory of Syria.

Fighting abates but conflict continues

That is still far off. The mostly Islamist remains of Syria’s opposition control parts of northwestern Syria while Turkish troops control several border areas, where they have pushed hostile Kurdish forces farther east and south. Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces control a large part of the east, with support from the U.S. Damascus requires Iranian and Russian support to maintain sometimes minimal control over the west and south. Israel continues to bomb Syria pretty much at will, to move Iranians and their proxies away from its border and to block military supplies to Hizbollah in Lebanon.

None of these conflicts is settled, but fighting has abated from his heights. None of the forces involved has the will and the wherewithal to change the current situation. Assad no doubt hopes that normalization with the Arab world will solve his economic problems and enable him to mount the effort required to regain more territory. He may negotiate to regain territory from Turkey in exchange for promises to clamp down on the Kurds. He’ll wait out the Americans, who aren’t likely to want to remain in Syria much longer.

Autocracy restored

If Assad is successful in restoring his autocracy, he won’t be alone in the Middle East. It is a long time since the Arab Spring of 2011. Tunisia’s fledgling democracy is gone, as is Egypt’s. Bahrain’s democratic movement was snuffed out early. Yemen’s and Libya’s “springs” degenerated into civil war. Sudan is headed in the same direction. Iraq has suffered repeated upheavals, though its American-imposed anocracy has also shown some resilience. Saudi Arabia has undertaken economic and social reforms, but driven entirely by its autocratic Crown Prince. The UAE remains an absolute monarchy.

Only in Morocco and Qatar have a few modest reforms survived in more or less stable and relatively open political environments. They are both monarchies with a modicum of political participation. Though Qatar allows nothing that resembles political parties, there is limited room for freedom of expression. Morocco is a livelier political scene, but the monarchy remains dominant whenever it counts.

America has already adjusted

The Biden Administration has already adjusted. It is treating democratic values as tertiary issues with any Middle Eastern country with a claim to good relations with the US. There is no more talk of Saudi Arabia as a rogue state. Washington is silent on the restorations of autocracy in Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain. The Americans want to see negotiated solutions in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan. Those are more likely to restore autocracy, or something like Iraq’s power-sharing anocracy, than any sort of recognizable democratic rule.

The Americans are not joining the Syria normalization parade. They are not blocking it either. Washington no doubt figures the conditions are better than nothing. We’ll have to wait and see if that is true.

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Strategic failure has consequences

9/11 produces lots of reflections. Here are mine.

Tactical success, strategic failure

The Al Qaeda attacks using commercial aircraft were largely successful. Three of four hit their intended targets and killed lots of people. But that tactical success did not lead to strategic victory. The Americans and others have hunted Al Qaeda for 20 years, killing not only its two leaders and many foot soldiers but destroying much of its organizational capacity.

But that tactical success has also not led to strategic victory. Al Qaeda has splintered and metastasized, spinning off the Islamic State and other extremist jihadi insurgents fighting in many more countries than two decades ago. This includes not only the imploded Middle Eastern states of Syria and Yemen, but also the African states of Libya, Mali, Mozambique, and Somalia.

Thus the prospect of tactical success tempts those with the capacity for violence into enterprises that end in strategic failure. This happened to the US in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We invaded because we could. Tactical success however saddled us with burdens we did not want. It took 10 years to extract most US forces from Iraq, and 20 from Afghanistan. The failure of state-building in Afghanistan has vitiated most gains from the initial military success. In Iraq, the failure is not complete, but the costs have been high.

It’s Russia’s turn

The Russians are now facing their own consequences of strategic failure. Their initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was largely successful. They annexed Crimea and occupied most of Luhansk and Donetsk using proxies. But President Putin wanted more. This year he tried to take Kyiv, complete the conquest of Donbas, and expand Russian control in the south. The Ukrainians fought off the attack on their capital and are now pushing the Russians back rapidly in Kharkiv province as well as more slowly around Kherson.

The ultimate military outcome is still uncertain. The Ukrainians could over-extend themselves. The Russians could succeed in regrouping and stop the Ukrainian advances or even return to territory they have lost in the past week.

But the strategic failure is already apparent. The Russian army, air force, and navy are in tatters. A reinvigorated NATO is expanding to Finland and Sweden as well as the troop presence on Russia’s borders. Sanctions are sapping the Russian economy. Europe is weaning itself rapidly from Russian oil and gas. States on Russia’s periphery are looking for opportunities to expand ties with the West. Nationalists in Russia who advocated the Ukraine war are turning on Putin. The war is solidifying Ukrainian national identity, increasing support for President Zelensky and the Ukrainian state even among Russian speakers.

The lesson

What should we learn from these strategic defeats of great powers? Confident of their military superiority, they go to war for reasons they think worthy. But war is a political as well as a military enterprise. Tactical military superiority makes it difficult to consider the consequences of strategic failure. Strategic failure is however always a possibility even if you win a war, as the Americans did in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Russians did in 2014 in Ukraine. This failure to take into account the real possibility of strategic failure is a major source of the blunders that lead to war.

Apply it to Iran

A quick footnote on applying this lesson to Iran. Israeli and American military superiority is overwhelming. But Iran is a big country, more or less the size and population of Iraq and Afghanistan combined. No one should be thinking about an invasion. Even hawkish thinking is limited to attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities and supporting infrastructure. Tactical success in that enterprise is not certain, as the Iranians have put a lot of their enrichment facilities deep under ground.

But strategic failure is almost certain. An Iran that has suffered an attack on its nuclear facilities will surely redouble its efforts to get nuclear weapons, as that would make repeat of the attack unthinkable. Sure, the attack could be repeated ad infinitum, “mowing the grass” as the Israelis say. But sooner or later Tehran would succeed in getting nuclear weapons. What then? Tactical success guarantees nothing. Strategic failure has consequences.

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Stalemate isn’t very ispirational

A post about why I haven’t been writing a post is odd, but here it is.

Reason one:

I’m working on a book. It focuses on a particularly strong set of international norms that have achieved global legitimacy despite frequent controversy. For more than 85 years, the world has accepted the recommendations of a non-governmental group with no legal authority as definitive. Why and how does that happen? The norms in question protect you and me from ionizing radiation. More on that as the work progresses.

Reason two:

I’ve pretty much exhausted what I have to say about the two wars I am most interested in. Syria’s multi-sided war reached stalemate a couple of years ago. The Russians, Turks, Americans, Israelis, and Iranians all lack the will to push harder against their adversaries. All can live with the present situation, at least for a while. The Syrian regime lacks the capacity to do what it wants: exert its control over the entire country.

The Ukraine war is not so much stalemated as grinding on, with the Russians consolidating control over some areas and the Ukrainians winning back others. Ukraine’s acquisition of better artillery and Russia’s prevention of Ukrainian agricultural exports via the Black Sea are the two big deciding factors at the moment. Russia’s army has proven inept at best, but its navy still controls the sea, despite the sinking of its flagship. In the meanwhile, civilians suffer. Watch the video above.

Reason three:

Stalemate also characterizes the Balkans. Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti are both unwilling to take the steps required to normalize relations between the two countries. Even smaller agreements and their implementation are not moving ahead rapidly. In Bosnia, Serb and Croat leaders have frozen the legislative and electoral processes, in order to gain political advantages for their ethnic nationalist political parties. Croatia and Serbia are doing nothing to help improve the situation. Even people who know a lot about the Balkans do not have a lot of ideas what to do, though they do have some good ones.

To make matters worse, EU member Bulgaria is still preventing North Macedonia from starting the process for EU accession. There, too, the problem is ethnic nationalist claims to history and language. Stalling North Macedonia also stalls next-in-line Albania, which in turn demoralizes Bosnia and Kosovo.

Reason four:

The Iran nuclear talks are also stalled. The ostensible reason is US refusal to remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from its sanctions lists, but my guess is that the IRGC is none too happy with the prospect of return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Tehran is now much closer to having the material it needs for nuclear weapons than when the agreement was signed in 2015. Why go backwards? Tehran has improved its sanctions evasion, oil prices are high, and Israeli military action would rally Iranians to defend a government that many of them dislike.

Not much to be said

But there are moments when there isn’t much to be said. We need to hope diplomats are trying to resolve all these stalemates in a positive way. The best we can do is await developments, publishing whenever a decent idea comes across the neurons. Stalemate isn’t very inspirational.

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Libya is taking baby steps in the right direction

Wolfgang Pusztai writes:

In order to end the conflict and to achieve security and stability in Libya as a basis for peace and state-building, first and foremost an executive – a government – and a legislative – a parliament – legitimated by credible elections are required.

There was nothing really new at [last week’s] International Libya Stabilization Conference, which was organized by Libya’s Foreign Minister Najla Al Mangoush. There was not even a common final statement, because the delegations could not agree about some key points like the withdrawal of foreign forces. However, the final drive to the elections must now come from the Libyans themselves anyway.

On the security side reliable supervision of the ceasefire is necessary, but I doubt that 60 civilian UN observers will be sufficient. A secure environment must be also established in the greater capital area, where there is fighting between the various militias (who are all considered part of the GNU’S security forces) almost every week.

On the political side regionalization and an agreement about the distribution of the oil revenues between the central state and the three historic provinces are without any realistic alternative.

Security and political stability should help to stabilize the oil and gas production, but Libya still needs foreign know-how and foreign investors. Most companies are still very hesitant to return. Therefore Libya also needs to build credibility, honor obligations from the past and find settlements with the many companies who lost a huge amount of money during and after the revolution (not only with the Turkish ones). Such agreements should help to build trust again.

Fortunately there is a drive towards the elections. Several persons have announced officially to run for presidency. Fathi Bashagha, ex-Minister of the Interior and promising presidential candidate from Misrata committed already to accept the outcome of the elections. The others should follow his example to ensure a broad acceptance of the election results.

Libya really needs a man of integrity as president, well-rooted in Libyan tradition, but with good connections to international actors and who stayed preferably out of day-by-day politics in Libya during the last years.

Wolfgang also discussed the Libya situation with last night on VoA with Mohamed Elshinnawi.

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The pandemic weakened the weakest governments and social groups

The Middle East Institute June 15 hosted a seminar discussing the impact of COVID-19 on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This was in collaboration with the recently released 6th wave of the Arab Barometer, an expansive regional survey. Using the results from this survey and analysis from the Brookings Doha Center, the panel assessed the pandemic’s effects on the region and the perceived efficiency of government responses. As the survey was held in three rounds throughout 2020-2021, the Arab Barometer could also register changes over time. Bottom line: the pandemic exacerbated the region’s existing problems and the hardest hit were the most vulnerable communities (refugees, the poor, and women).

The speakers were:

Yasmina Abuzzuhour
Visiting fellow
Brookings-Doha Center

Salma Al-Shami
Senior research specialist
Arab Barometer

Shala Al-Kli
Non-resident scholar
MEI
Deputy regional director
Mercy Corps

Karen Young (moderator)
Senior fellow and director, Program on Economics and Energy
MEI

Exacerbating existing problems

Shahla Kli COVID has worsened existing issues, particularly for IDPs and refugees. She highlighted two of these structural weaknesses in particular:

  • Lack of institutionalization: This is manifested in weak healthcare systems and social welfare programs. COVIC pushed these to their limits. Furthermore, some countries (such as Syria or Lebanon) lack well-structured recovery and vaccination plans, exacerbating and lengthening the crisis.
  • Unemployment/the ‘youth bulge’: Problems in the labor market abound in the MENA region. Many of its youthful populations work in informal, day-to-day jobs. This is particularly true for migrants and refugees. Often these jobs disappeared during lockdowns. Conversely, many poor citizens and migrants had no choice but to continue working despite the pandemic, potentially falling ill themselves.

Public opinion

Salma al-Shami outlined the relevant results of the Arab Barometer on this topic. The Barometer gathered data on seven countries (Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) due to financial and access constraints. She summarized the findings in five main points:

  • Concern for COVID is still high in these countries, but it is significantly higher among women than among men.
  • The loss of education for children and increased cost of living were the the number one and two concerns. In Jordan some 140 days of education were lost according to UNESCO, and even more in Iraq.
  • Public opinion on government response to COVID varies with the assessment of the healthcare system and inflation control. If these are positively rated, the government’s response also tends to be. This is the case in Morocco and Tunisia for example, while Lebanon and Iraq lack such public confidence. Morocco was also the only country where significant relief packages were deployed. Some 49% of respondents in that country indicated they received some form of aid, where that number didn’t top 20% in any of the other countries.
  • Concerning vaccines, there is still some hesitancy. Where trust in government is high, so is the willingness to take a vaccine, as in Morocco which has already seen an exemplary vaccine rollout compared to its neighbors. However, in Jordan, Algeria, Iraq, and Tunisia, only 35-42% indicate they are willing to take a vaccine. Abouzzouhour added that in Jordan conspiracy theories surrounding the vaccines are rampant, and that the government is often not the public’s primary source of information.
  • The survey data also indicates that COVID has exacerbated issues of income inequality and unemployment. Few respondents indicated they lost their jobs because of COVID-related lockdowns, although many did experience a temporary job interruption. Women and migrant labor in general suffered greater consequences.

Government responses

Adding to the statistics related to government response to COVID, Abouzzouhour commented that governments overpromised and underdelivered. The first wave saw major lockdowns and task forces with health experts, leading to a comparatively strong performance. However, the initial best cases (Tunisia and Jordan) failed to follow through on their success because they favored opening up for their economies. Additionally, relief packages and strong vaccination drives often faltered, despite government promises. In general, countries that previously underinvested in healthcare (as a percentage of their GDP) suffered high mortality rates.

Two interesting cases emerged from her story. Once again, Morocco was underlined as a strong performer in vaccination compared to its neighbors. Algeria is less clear-cut. It has some of the lowest infection rates in the region. However, its mortality rate is comparatively high, indicating that case numbers are likely underreported more than in other countries. Algeria was also criticized for failing to set up significant relief packages, despite the nation’s hydrocarbon resources.

Watch the recording of the event here:

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Russians love their tsars, until they don’t

Russian President Putin is all about power: getting it, exercising it, holding on to it. He also knows when he meets it.

That is what happened with President Biden in Geneva today. Unlike his predecessor, Biden was clear and forceful about Russia’s malfeasance, both internationally (especially the invasion of Ukraine) and internally (especially the jailing of Alexei Navalny and restrictions on the press). The result was a relatively productive confrontation leading to future meetings on strategic weapons, cybersecurity, and prisoner exchanges. Putin did his usual “what about malfeasance in the US” for the TV cameras to broadcast back home, and he got the formal respect he always seeks and responded in kind. But this meeting was a win for Biden: the contrast with President Trump’s embarrassing performance in Helsinki is striking. Trump got nothing. Biden got Russia into conversations the US favors.

Biden claims persistently that personally knowing other world leaders is vital to foreign policy. But his description of his own side of conversations often contrast dramatically with this notion. He is all about convincing other leaders to think about their own country’s interests, not about their personal relations with him. He denies being “friendly” with Xi Jinping, only claiming to know him well. He has consistently downplayed his own remark about Putin being a killer and ignores Putin’s support for Trump. Biden wants the relationship to be about the interests of the two states, not the two leaders. Instead of flattery, he warns that Russian malfeasance could end hopes for foreign investment, in particular if Navalny were to die in prison. He tries, not always successfully, to cast what he wants in terms his adversary might be able to accept. Putin couldn’t care less that blocking cross-border humanitarian aid to rebel-held territory in Syria will cause humanitarian problems.

But Putin did not come to this meeting his usual braggart self. Russia’s economy is in bad shape, he is unpopular after so many years in power, and China is rapidly becoming the superpower he would like Russia to be. Moscow is bogged down in Syria and losing in Libya. Putin needs a better relationship with the US at least as much as Biden needs what he terms a more “stable and predictable” relationship with Russia. Putin also needs the US not to reciprocate interference in the 2016 and 2020 American elections with Washington interference in his re-election effort in 2024. Closing down a few cyberhackers and allowing some independent media might be a reasonable way to try to prevent that. Nor is Putin any more anxious than Biden to spend billions more on strategic nuclear weapons. If they can agree to stand down and focus on getting China to do likewise, Putin won’t be unhappy.

No one should expect a sea change in Putin’s behavior. He is a murderer, as Biden once said, and won’t hesitate to do it again if he thinks it will serve his interests and he can get away with it. Putin is Putin, not Yeltsin. The US should think less about Putin and more about what comes next. As one Muscovite put it to me, Russians love their Czars, until they don’t.

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