Tag: Libya
Where are the diplomats?
In Libya and Yemen, presidents are hanging on way past their “use by” date. Ali Abdullah Saleh appeared today on TV, both defeated and defiant. Muammar Gaddafi is defiant and seemingly delusional. In Syria, Bashar al Assad may not be quite as far along to perdition as the other two, but he seems to have chosen their path: hang on until physically removed from the scene (and in Saleh’s case even after being transferred to a hospital in Saudi Arabia).
Military means are not working well against Gaddafi or Saleh. This is not entirely surprising: Gaddafi obviously prides himself on personal resistance to the use of force and doesn’t give a hoot what happens to his country. Saleh seems like-minded. I wouldn’t even want to imagine what Bashar al Assad thinks: he no doubt was brought up to believe the use of force is vital to a ruler, and he is well on his way to imitating his father’s use of it. What is needed in all three cases is a stronger diplomatic effort.
It is hard to believe that the Saudis can’t deprive Saleh of enough money and other support to make him choose retirement over an attempt to return to Yemen. The question is why they don’t use the leverage they’ve got, and what can we do to get them to use it? The American Ambassador reportedly threw his support behind the Gulf Cooperation Council plan for transition in Yemen. My hope is that he is working assiduously to get it implemented.
Gaddafi seems to have stockpiled enough cash and gold to survive a long time, but he too should be realizing about now that the cause is lost. The British, African Union and maybe others have been sporadically engaged in trying to devise a plan to get Gaddafi out. They need to redouble those efforts, making it clear that any sweeteners will soon be irrevocably lost if he doesn’t grab hold tight now.
Republicans in Congress are asking for the recall from Damascus of Ambassador Robert Ford, certainly among the State Department’s finest Arabists. This is wrong-headed. They should be asking the Ambassador to do more, not less. His visit to Hama in support of the demonstrators today was a step in the right direction. Far better that he do enough of this kind of thing to get expelled rather than be withdrawn by Washington.
We should keep the lines of communication open to all these miscreant presidents. But there should be no doubt whose side Washington is on: the people of these three beknighted countries are asking their presidents to make way for more democratic societies. That’s what the diplomats should be helping to make happen.
PS: Here is the greeting Ambassador Ford got in Hama:
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Yemen will need the Americans
The end is near for Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and Bashar al Assad of Syria. They may last weeks or even months, but their regimes will never again be able to claim that they are factors for stability, and they are unlikely to risk the kinds of reforms that might satisfy at least some critics and enable them to remain on office. The regimes have suffered mortal wounds, as Saleh himself likely has.
The problem lies in what comes next. Libya at least has an interim National Transitional Council, recognized as a legitimate authority by some major countries. Syria has the beginnings of something similar, a “follow up” “consultative” group growing out of a meeting in Antalya, Turkey two weeks ago. In my way of thinking, it is important that the exile Syrians somehow maintain the momentum of that group and begin to lay concrete plans for how to govern in the aftermath of Assad’s fall, despite the obvious difficulty of coordinating their efforts with the protest leaders inside Syria. It is vital that Syria not succumb to sectarian and ethnic chaos if the revolution there succeeds. Protecting the Alawi and other privileged minorities from the wrath of people who have suffered under the Assad regime is not going to be easy.
Yemen is especially problematic.
The revolution there has several dimensions: students and youth (the “protesters”), political parties (the “opposition,” aka the Joint Meeting Parties), and tribes (especially it seems the al-Ahmar), not to mention a northern (Houthi) insurgency and southern secessionists. In addition, the Americans will be pressing for an “orderly” transition, in order to enable a continuing effort against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The Saudis, who were remarkably inept at exerting their considerable influence to get Saleh out, will nevertheless be big players if they choose to bankroll one competitor or another.
The competing visions of these often disparate and only occasionally harmonious forces will make transition particularly problematic in Yemen, where declining oil production, water shortages and shrinkage of the economy are creating the ideal conditions for state collapse. I am all in favor of the Europeans playing the major role post-war in Libya, and likely Syria as well, and I’d like to see some indication that they are preparing seriously.
But the Europeans are not much of a factor in Yemen. The Americans will feel they can’t afford to ignore Anwar al-Awlaki’s home base, or leave the matter entirely to the ineptitude of the Saudis. It is time for them to begin planning, if they haven’t already done so, for a major post-war effort to support whatever minimal state can be made to emerge from Yemen’s chaos.
Here are the basic categories of things they need to worry about:
- safe and secure environment: initially in Sanaa, but eventually also in the north, where armed resistance to the central government is endemic, and the south, where secessionist sentiment is strong, not to mention the terrorist threat from people taking haven in Yemen’s lawless interior;
- rule of law: likely more tribal than courtroom, but one way or another people need someplace to go to settle disputes;
- stable governance: the Gulf Cooperation Council agreement seems to depend essentially on the existing constitution, which may well be a good way to go since agreement on anything else would be difficult to obtain, but can reasonable elections really be held in Yemen under current conditions?
- sustainable economy: oil and water are key factors in determining whether Yemen can pull of its current economic tail-spin;
- social well-being: food, water, shelter are all in short supply, with a lot of people displaced by various conflicts; health and education are grossly inadequate.
The fixes will come only in the long term. Yemen is going to be a problem for a long time. And it is hard for me to see how the Americans escape at least some responsibility for the post-conflict reconstruction, if they continue to worry about containing Yemen’s terrorist potential.
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A star in my firmament wobbles
In a report out Monday, International Crisis Group calls for an immediate, unconditional ceasefire, deployment of peacekeepers and negotiations with Muammar Gaddafi, rather than continuation of the current NATO-led military effort against regime. Is this wise, or not?
First I should note that the bulk of the report is a first-rate history and analysis of the Libyan Jamahiriya, Gaddafi’s nominally unique “republic of the masses” that in the final analysis operated like other totalitarian regimes. This analytical part of the report covers the complex institutional setup of the Libyan quasi-state, the main pillars of regime support as well as the opposition, tribes, minorities, the evolution of the popular protests, the Interim National Transitional Council (even critics of the INTC in the east) and other background that I haven’t seen elsewhere. Even if I might quibble here and there, it is interesting, revealing, well-documented and well-written: all the things we have come to expect of ICG.
But I have come to expect something else as well from ICG: policy recommendations that are ill-crafted, only tenuously related to the careful analysis and all too often fundamentally flawed, with an obvious overoptimism about the prospects for negotiated solutions. This report is a textbook example.
Basically what ICG argues is this: continuation of the military effort means more civilian casualties, the UN authorized NATO only to protect civilians, ergo it should stop the military effort and begin to negotiate, thereby reducing civilian casualties. ICG then elaborates a two-phase ceasefire (first a truce then a cessation of hostilities), deployment of peacekeepers, a negotiated exit of Gaddafi and his sons from power that entails guarantees they will not be pursued by the International Criminal Court, and construction of a new Libyan state based on the rule of law that ensures political representation and pluralism.
But this is a false and misleading logic that compares the current situation with an imaginary, even delusional, future in which civilians are protected even though Gaddafi is still in place and his accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity made inoperable. Wishing won’t make it so. The idea that Gaddafi is going to play a “constructive role” in the short term, in exchange for relief from accountability for himself and his family is thoroughly delusional, even if the International Criminal Court were willing or able to follow ICG’s unlikely prescription for how to make it happen. Then there is some brief generic blah-blah about an interim executive that includes Gaddafites as well as the INTC.
There are many other things wrong with this four-page policy addendum to what otherwise is an interesting 40-odd page report. Where are the peacekeepers going to come from? Where would they be deployed and with what mandate? Why do we think that would be acceptable to the INTC or to the Libyan people? How would they prevent Gaddafi from brutalizing the people who live in the areas he controls?
Most of this policy addendum is just light-headed froth. ICG is wedded to a formula for negotiation that doesn’t take into account the real situation ICG describes in its own report, a failing that plagues other recent ICG products as well. Sad to see this star of my firmament wobble so.
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Where are the patriots?
If nothing else, these weeks of protest and repression are demonstrating how tenaciously autocrats cling to power. This is not surprising, since for the three currently in question–Gaddafi, Assad and Saleh–there really is no role for them if they leave power. Worse, they fear for their livelihoods, their families and their lives.
This occurs to me as I am in Ljubljana (Slovenia) for meetings, one of which will be with a former president. As is all too apparent in the U.S., former presidents play useful roles in democratic societies, whether in talking with the North Koreans (or me), raising support for earthquake-ravaged Haiti, or just as living examples of the possibility of losing power without losing your life. The U.S. even pays and protects them well, as I imagine Slovenia does too.
The problem with our Middle Eastern chiefs of state is of course that they did things during their time in power that might merit justice once they are out of it and available to the courts. Saleh was offered immunity but refused to sign the agreement that would have provided it. The International Criminal Court’s prosecutor has already asked for an arrest warrant for Gaddafi. It is hard to see how Assad is less criminal, though he may have succeeded in preventing much hard evidence getting into the hands of the ICC.
So what we’ve got is four–I’d like to throw in ICC indictee President Bashir of Sudan as well–blatantly criminal chiefs of state (or the equivalent, since Gaddafi claims not to have any official position in what he terms the “republic of the masses”). Military force isn’t yet working against Gaddafi, sanctions aren’t working against Bashir, and protests aren’t working against Assad. Only Saleh seems out of the picture, and that because of an artillery strike that was luckier than the many missiles thrown at Gaddafi.
We shouldn’t expect much better from these four. What I’m waiting for is someone in their respective entourages to take up the cudgels (admittedly something like that has happened in Yemen). All four seem determined not only to stay in power but to take their countries down with them. That’s what should embolden some of their followers: loyalty to their own country and people. Is that too much to ask?
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A brighter view of the Arab spring
I wrote yesterday about the pessimistic views of the Arab spring prevalent among experts at a Harvard/Carnegie Endowment event. They know a whole lot more about the Middle East than I do–that’s why I go to their events and write them up. But I think they are overly pessimistic. Why?
First, because I’ve seen things come out all right. I am not just talking South Africa, where admittedly Nelson Mandela’s leadership and stature counted for a lot, as did F.W. de Klerk’s. I am not seeing any Mandelas or de Klerks in the Middle East. Nor do there seem to be any Vaclav Havels or Lech Walesas. But in Serbia, Ukraine and Georgia protest leaderships that were notably lacking in vision and stature had at least temporary success and left their countries better off than they would otherwise have been.
Second, because it seems to me the protesters in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Yemen have shown a combination of nonviolent restraint and persistence that is laudable, and likely to lead in good directions. I am less convinced of the wisdom of the demonstrators in Libya and Bahrain, where it seems to me they fell victim to the temptations of violence and recalcitrance, respectively. But the Libyan Transitional Council shows at least some signs of promise. We’ll see if the Bahrainis can do better in the next “dialogue” phase.
Third, because I have more confidence in a bottom-up process than a top-down one. Here I disagree with Marwan Muasher, who explicitly prefers to see top-down reform. I don’t really know any place where that has worked terribly well in the transition from dictatorship to democracy, though obviously there are leaders like Gorbachev (or de Klerk for that matter) who made the process easier than it might otherwise have been. But people have to want democracy and freedom–it really can’t be given to them.
Nor do I think the consequences of the Arab spring will be quite as negative for U.S. interests as many of the experts say. Middle Eastern leaders who have to be more responsive to public opinion may be more supportive of the Palestinians, but they would be foolish to take their countries to war when the people they lead are looking for prosperity. So, okay, we’ll get Egypt opening the border with Gaza, but closing it was an approach that wasn’t worth a damn anyway. Hamas is likely to need to cut its margins on smuggled goods when they can enter more freely. Maybe an open border will serve American purposes better than the closed one.
I admit that it is hard to see how Yemen comes out of this anything but a basket case, which is where it was headed under Saleh anyway. Certainly it will be a while before any future government in Sanaa gets a grip on the provinces. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula may have a field day in the meanwhile, but they don’t appear so far to have been particularly effective at exploiting the chaos.
That said, the Arab spring is not about American interests, which will have to take a back seat for a while throughout the Middle East. It is however about American values. We should be happy to see them spreading among young Arabs willing to demand their rights. Let’s see where things go before we get too pessimistic.
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A soggy version of the Arab spring
Big Carnegie Endowment/Harvard discussion of Arab Spring yesterday. Outcome: pretty gloomy. But these are experts, who admittedly failed to see the budding of the Arab Spring and are unlikely to be able to predict its course either. They all acknowledged the many unknowns and the difficulties of prediction.
Marwan Muasher, who prefers reform from above, thinks doing nothing in response to the protests is no longer an option but also noted there is more “empire strikes back” (Libya, Yemen, Syria) and “buying time with money” (the Gulf) than “promises of reform” (thin in Jordan, a bit more serious in Morocco). And his criteria for successful reform from above were exacting: it has to be holistic and inclusive, power has to be shared seriously, it should be gradual and measurable. Nothing makes the cut yet.
No optimism from Marina Ottaway either. She noted that even in Tunisia and Egypt there are problems of political will to complete the reform process, that some of the politicians formerly associated with the ruling parties will be able to recycle themselves, that secular parties are weak and fragmented, that Islamists may be a bit stronger but also fragmented, with Salafi influence rising. It is not clear yet what the protesters will be able or willing to do politically, and it is too early to count the military out.
Tarek Masoud did not like what he sees in Egypt. He noted the intense conflict among political forces and between political forces and the military, with the military wary of democracy. They don’t want democratic oversight, fear the demand for justice and don’t want to break with past policy on Israel and the U.S. The military would like to reign without ruling, keeping out of the public eye and avoiding responsibility for governing. They have already made mistakes by scheduling the constitutional referendum, then having to fix the amended constitution with their own constitutional declaration. Early elections will favor Islamists, and opening the constitution to a constituent assembly will open the question of the relationship between state and religion, which is not a good idea. The future holds more discord.
So spring wasn’t so cheery. How about the U.S. policy response?
Nick Burns praised President Obama’s relatively rapid and thoroughly nuanced response in a difficult international situation. He was not too late to support the Tahrir protesters, correctly hesitated about Libya but signed on in response to the Arab League appeal in light of Gaddafi’s threat to Benghazi, and gave the Gulfies more slack because there was no rebellion to sign on to in Saudi Arabia, Oman or Qatar. Only under questioning did Nick state baldly that he could not understand why we hadn’t zapped Bashar al Assad earlier and admit that in Bahrain Washington had chosen interests over values. Nick urged that we focus on Egypt, decrease out focus on governments and security, increase our focus on development and outreach to people, move on Israel/Palestine and shift to a containment policy on Iran.
Agreeing that the case-by-case contextual approach was the right one, Steve Walt concluded that we would soon face Arab governments more sensitive to public opinion, that there would be no easy fixes for the problems of over-centralization and corruption in the Arab countries, Western governments are not flush and would find it hard to ante up, Israel’s position would be weakened as Egypt and Jordan became less compliant to U.S. wishes and that U.S. strategy in the region is obsolete even if its interests are the same as always: unhindered flow of oil and gas, nuclear nonproliferation, countering terrorism and protecting Israel. A more effective policy would pay more attention to Arab public opinion, embrace reform, sustain multipolarity in the region, get U.S. troops out (to an offshore balancing role, naturally, that would still prevent others from exerting control), internationalize the Israel/Palestine peace process (including encouragement of European support for the Palestine resolution at the GA and a possible settlement imposed by the Security Council). Most importantly: we need to stop threatening Iran, which gives Tehran incentives to build nuclear weapons and attempt more creative (unspecified) diplomacy. In response to a question, Walt said he also thought we need a residual force in Iraq to counter Iran.
Chris Boucek, focused mainly on Yemen, warned of economic meltdown, suggested we manage the Saudis better and noted that the youthful protesters are espousing our ideals.
There was a good deal more, but this gives you the flavor: the U.S. focus on stability, peace and democracy has failed: no stability, little prospect for peace and not much for democracy either. Burns and Walt, each in his own way, thought the U.S. could still play an important role, but no one was sanguine about the prospects for the Arab spring or U.S. interests in its aftermath.
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