Tag: North Korea
Counterproductive
The loss of a large part of Notre Dame de Paris is profoundly sad. There is little I can say to amplify what so many others have already written. But sadder still is a President of the United States who can’t keep his mouth shut and always seems to choose the most destructive course of action. In this case, he suggested:
So horrible to watch the massive fire at Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris. Perhaps flying water tankers could be used to put it out. Must act quickly!
What neither he nor I knew was that dumping water on an ancient stone building can weaken its mortar and cause even more damage than the fire, perhaps even collapse of the whole structure.
This is Trump’s modus operandi. He is unable to acknowledge that he may not know better than others, which requires that he surround himself with yes-people. They encourage his self-aggrandizement, preventing any reevaluation or self-correction. So Trump cancels US assistance to Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, hoping that will somehow block their citizens from leaving. No one can say him nay. But that move is pretty much guaranteed to make conditions in those three countries worse and cause more asylum-seekers to arrive in the US, not fewer.
Ditto policy on Iran. Trump’s tight squeeze there without support from Europe, China, or Russia is strengthening Iran’s hardliners and making even extension of the Iran nuclear deal, which begins to “sunset” in just a few years, more difficult. National Security Adviser Bolton has even begun to lay the foundation for a military attack on Iran, by claiming it could be done under the existing Congressional Authorization to Use Military Force. One more Middle East war: precisely what the world needs right now. Iraq and Afghanistan haven’t yet cost enough.
Double ditto on North Korea, where the President has lurched from threatening (nuclear) war to befriending one of the world’s worst tyrants and meeting with his good friend (shall I say lover?) twice to no good effect. Now the Administration is contemplating a third meeting. What’s that saying, attributed to Einstein, about doing the same thing and expecting a different result?
Triple ditto on the Israel/Palestine conflict, where Trump is trying to squeeze the Palestinians by denying them humanitarian and law enforcement assistance. There aren’t enough desperate young Palestinians ready to take up the cudgels?
In none of these situations is it difficult to imagine the Trump Administration’s decisions making things go from bad to worse. And there are others:
- the decision in Syria to withdraw, then not to withdraw, but still to withdraw;
- the President’s comment that US troops should stay in Iraq to keep an eye on Iran, which makes it more difficult for Iraqi politicians to give the necessary approval;
- telling the world the US isn’t interested in Libya, which opened the door to a military push on Tripoli likely to re-ignite the civil war there, or possibly lead to re-imposition of a military dictatorship;
- threatening military action in Venezuela, where everyone understands there is no serious military option, thus reducing the US to a paper tiger;
- continuing to cozy up to President Putin despite Russian behavior in Ukraine and the Sea of Azov, not to mention interference in US politics on a daily basis;
- the threat to close the Mexican border, which would devastate the US and Mexican economies.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the President is incorrigible, mainly because he doesn’t abide correction. His response to criticism is to double down on failed policy and hope that will work, or turn 180 degrees and hope that will. It doesn’t. The more this shambolic Administration continues, the more the rest of the world, friends and enemies, will adjust by hedging that reduces American influence. Trump is destined to be remembered as not just ineffective but also counterproductive.
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Pompeo midway to failure
Secretary Pompeo in testimony todaycited the Administration’s foreign policy priorities:
- Countering Russia and China,
- Denuclearization of North Korea,
- Venezuela,
- Iran,
- and supporting allies and partners.
So how are they doing?
The only serious effort to counter Russia has come from the Congress, which has levied several layers of sanctions on Moscow for interference in the 2016 US election, and from the State Department, for Moscow’s murder of a defector in the United Kingdom. President Trump has still not said an unkind word about President Putin and continues to cite him as more reliable than the American intelligence community, without acknowledging Russian electoral interference.
On China, the Administration has been walking on eggshells, since it needs Beijing’s cooperation both on North Korea and on trade. There is little to no sign of a serious strategy to contain or compete with China (in anything but trade). China continues its buildup of military bases in the South China Sea, where it has also escalated its challenges to US naval vessels.
The North Korea talks are at a standstill after the failure in February of the second Kim/Trump summit in Vietnam. Trump is demanding immediate denuclearization in one step while the Pyongyang has maintained its vague commitment to a phased process whose endpoint is unclear. All those promises of Trump-like hotels are not going to convince Kim Jong-un that he should abandon his regime’s only real guarantee: its nuclear arsenal and ballistic missiles.
Venezuela is grinding to a stalemate, with the Russians deploying troops there and no sign of the military defections required to seat President Guaido’ in President Maduro’s chair. A US military intervention would have to be massive and long-term. Nothing short of that seems to be working. Venezuelans are voting with their feet by leaving the country, but that does not help bring down Maduro.
Sanctions on Iran have so far had little visible impact, other than giving the Europeans an incentive to find a way to continue to expand trade with Tehran. China and Russia will also find the ways and means. The Iranian economy is a mess, not only because of sanctions. The Administration hopes to compel the Iranians back to the negotiating table or to precipitate regime change. Neither outcome is visible on the horizon. In the meanwhile, hardliners have gained strength and continue to pursue regional interventions.
Support for allies and partners is a lot easier than dealing with adversaries, but the Trump Administration has been selective about it. The ultranationalists who govern Hungary and Poland and the Brexiteers in the UK get Trump’s blessing. France, Germany and the European Union get kicked hard. Israel gets endorsement of whatever it wants (so far, recognition of Jerusalem as its capital and of the annexation of the Golan Heights, not to mention a green light for killing Gaza demonstrators), leaving crumbs for the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia gets American top cover for Mohammed bin Salman against charges that he was implicated in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.
To add insult to injury, Pompeo said this about the State Department, whose budget the President has proposed to cut back by 23%:
And I take it as a personal mission to make sure that our world-class diplomatic personnel have the resources they need to execute America’s diplomacy in the 21st century.
Trump’s cuts target especially the State Department’s cooperation with the military in stabilizing conflict situations like Syria and Afghanistan, which is a required prelude to the withdrawals he has rashly announced.
I suppose I need to give Pompeo an incomplete rather than an F, since it is possible the next 22 months will provide better results than the last 26. Real diplomacy does take time. But there is precious little sign of real diplomacy on the priorities Pompeo identifies.
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Peace Picks March 25-29
1.The Contours of global security: Border line, critical security | Tuesday, March 26, 2019 | 1:30 am – 3:45pm | The Wilson Center | 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Washington, DC 20004-3027| Register Here |
As debate rages in Washington over President Trump’s characterization of the situation at the southern U.S. border as a national security emergency, the risks and stakes in several hot-spot regions around the world are far less open to question.
Agenda
1:30-2:30 pm: Borders as a National Security Crisis
Laura Dawson, Director of Canada Institute at Wilson Center
Rachel Schmidtke, Program Associate, Migration Policy, Mexico Institute, Wilson Center
Duncan Wood, Director, Mexico Institute, Wilson Center
Moderator:
The Honorable Earl Anthony Wayne,Public Policy Fellow; Advisory Board Co-chair, Mexico Institute, Wilson Center
2:45-3:45 pm: Hot-Spot Security Round-Up
Venezuela: Cynthia J. Arnson, Director, Latin American Program, Wilson Center
North Korea: Jean H. Lee,Director, Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy, Wilson Center
Iran and Syria: Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow
Moderator: John Milewski, Director of Digital Programming, Wilson Center
2. Constraining Iran’s nuclear and Missile capabilities| Thursday, March 28, 2019 | 2:00 am – 3:30pm | Brooking Institute |1775 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here|
The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure campaign” is putting Iran under great stress, but it is unlikely to compel Tehran to accept its far-reaching demands. The United States needs a new strategy for constraining Iran’s future nuclear capabilities as well as its missile program. Two new Brookings monographs—“Constraining Iran’s Future Nuclear Capabilities” by Robert Einhorn and Richard Nephew, and “Constraining Iran’s Missile Program” by Robert Einhorn and Vann Van Diepen—provide recommendations for addressing the challenges to regional and international security posed by Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.
Agenda
Speakers
Vann H. Van Diepen, Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Richard Nephew, Nonresident Senior Fellow at Center for 21st Century
Discussant
Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow – Center for Middle East Policy
Moderator
Robert Einhorn, Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy,Center for 21st Century
3. The MENA Region: from Transition to Transformation | Thursday, March 28, 2019 | 4:00 am – 5:30pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace|1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036-2103| Register Here |
Eight years after the Arab Spring and the collapse of commodity prices, full stabilization in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region remains elusive. Many countries have yet to enact the deep structural reforms deemed necessary to achieve economic transformation that yields sustainable, inclusive growth and employment opportunities.
Through its updated MENA strategy, the World Bank Group aims to pursue a two-pronged approach to promote peace and stability through economic and social inclusion. This approach builds on the four pillars of the World Bank’s 2015 MENA strategy, which includes renewing the social contract, strengthening resilience to shocks, supporting regional cooperation, and supporting recovery and reconstruction in conflict-affected countries.
Speakers
The vice president for the Middle East and North Africa at the World Bank Group.
Maha Yahya, Director of the Carnegie Middle East Center.
Rabah Arezki, Chief economist for the Middle East and North Africa at the World Bank.
4. A New Parliament in Iraq | Friday, March 29, 2019 | 11:30 am – 12:30pm | United States Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037
| Register Here |
As Iraq’s new parliament and government come to power, the country has seen significant political, social, and economic pressures. While challenges remain, fresh leadership presents Iraq with the opportunity to overcome these obstacles and make progress by developing its economy, increasing security, and strengthening governance and social services. Speaker al-Halbousi, who will be meeting with senior Trump administration officials and Congressional leaders during his visit to Washington, will lead the Council of Representatives as it grapples with all of these issues and navigates the many challenges of Iraq’s democratic process.
Speakers
Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace
His Excellency Mr. Mohammed Al-Halbousi, Council of Representatives, Republic of Iraq
5. The Outlook for Europe after EU elections| Tuesday, March 26, 2019 | 2:30 pm – 3:30pm | The Heritage Foundation |214 Massachusetts Ave NE Washington, DC 20002 | Register Here |
Europe remains in flux. The implications of populism, political fragmentation, and the upending of traditional political paradigms in many countries are not yet fully understood. The United Kingdom is leaving the European Union, and the continent continues to grapple with the repercussions of large-scale migration and the return of great power competition. Threats from Russia and terrorism remain potent, while Europe has only begun to grapple with rising Chinese assertiveness and economic investments. Upcoming European Parliamentary elections in May could be a defining moment. Join us as our panelists assess how EU elections could affect the future of Europe. How are shifting political dynamics in the EU influencing competing visions for Europe’s future? How will the role of the nation state in Europe likely evolve? What do changes to Europe’s political makeup mean for transatlantic relations? What areas of synergy should U.S. policymakers focus on for maximum impact?
A panel discussion featuring
Zsolt Németh, Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee Parliament of Hungary
Nile Gardiner, Director, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom
Peter Rough, Fellow, The Hudson Institute
Hosted by
James Jay Carafano, Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy
6.The Case for US Foreign Assistance | Thursday, March 26, 2019 | 1:30 am – 3:00pm | Center for Strategic and International Study | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036| Register Here|
The Marshall Plan and other initiatives that followed (such as the Alliance for Progress and USAID) were created in the context of great power competition. We are perhaps returning to an age of renewed great power competition. The developing world today is much richer, freer, and has more options. In this context, American foreign assistance is still needed, but in a radically changed world.
Foreign assistance in the United States has always operated in the context of enlightened self-interest. In Senator Vandenberg’s time there were significant critics of assistance who doubted the effectiveness of foreign aid just as there are today. How do we make the case for American foreign assistance in this new era? What are the major global challenges and opportunities that we might take advantage of by investing U.S. foreign assistance dollars?
Speakers
Senator Thomas A. Daschle, Former U.S. Senator (D-SD)
Senator Norm Coleman, Former U.S. Senator (R-MN)
Daniel F. Runde, Senior Vice President; William A. Schreyer Chair and Director, Project on Prosperity and Development
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Right move, wrong reasons
President Trump’s walking away from his summit with Kim Jong-un has won praise from many, including Democrats and me. Trump was unwilling to give Kim the sanctions relief he wanted for the limits Kim was willing to accept on North Korea’s nuclear program. All eminently reasonable. Certainly Kim was offering far less than what the Iranians agreed to, in a deal Trump condemned and from which he withdrew.
But there is a problem. Trump is still thinking he can get Kim to give up all his nuclear weapons, in exchange for economic benefits, especially foreign investment. Neither proposition is credible.
Nuclear weapons are Kim’s guarantee of regime survival. That’s why the US intelligence community has been doubting he would ever give them up. South Korea and the US need to be extra cautious in dealing with him so long as Kim has the capability of using them. Precisely what Kim was offering is unclear, but it definitely was not the surrender of all his nuclear capabilities. He hasn’t even provided the inventory of his nuclear infrastructure required to begin a serious conversation.
Just as important: Kim has no interest in opening the Hermit Kingdom to the kind of foreign investment Trump has been offering. He doesn’t want Trump-style hotels, American tourists, or sharply increased standards of living for the North Korean worker. His is a totalitarian regime that demands loyalty above all, not economic development or free media. His visit with the Vietnamese after the Hanoi summit signaled his real interest: maintaining his personal monopoly on politics while allowing limited private enterprise. It’s the Chinese model, more or less, of authoritarian capitalism, but without foreign direct investment.
The US needs to keep Kim’s goals in mind as it gets ready for another try at an agreement. He has his red lines. While Kim still holds absolute power in North Korea, we are not going to get the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization (CVID in the trade) we ultimately seek. At best we’ll get some limits on future production of nuclear weapons and missiles in exchange for limited sanctions relief, in the context of a process that has more far-reaching goals.
Even that may be more than we can hope for unless the sanctions regime is restored to its previous strength and tightened further. That would require Chinese and Russian cooperation that has been evaporating. Beijing isn’t going to get back on board until the tariff war is ended. Trump will soon be accepting much less than he hoped for on that front. Moscow is a tougher case: Putin will want a price for any enhanced cooperation on North Korea. Relief from sanctions on Russia will surely be on the table in that negotiation, but the Congress stands in the way of the loosening Trump would like to provide to Putin.
I doubt though that Trump will be looking any time soon for an agreement on the North Korean nuclear program. More likely he’ll hope that we forget Pyongyang has nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them to the US. He hyped that threat when he thought doing so could give him an easy win. Now that Kim is happy with the domestic and international legitimacy he achieved by meeting twice with the President of the United States, it will be much more difficult to achieve any agreement. Trump made the right move but for the wrong reasons. Kim outplayed him.
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Failure is what he does best
I agree with Susan Rice. President Trump did the right thing to walk away from his talks with Kim Jong-un in Hanoi:
The problem is Trump shouldn’t have been in Hanoi at all. Kim got what he needed, the photo-op that shows his people he can deal with he President of the United States on an equal basis:
Trump claims Kim has promised to continue his moratorium on nuclear and missile testing, but development efforts will certainly continue without international inspections or even an inventory of materials and equipment. The US will keep the sanctions in place, but they have been fraying. Neither Russia nor China is likely to be maximally cooperative on sanctions against North Korea given their parlous relations with the US.
But the problems with the deal Trump is trying to cut go deeper. Trump has been dangling economic development based on foreign investment as bait for Kim to give up his nuclear program. Kim knows that foreign investment would require far-reaching judicial and economic reforms impossible in a totalitarian state. He is doing far better on his own by allowing the gradual evolution of private economic activity while maintaining the repressive apparatus that keeps him in power. Even small moves like allowing private gardens have had a dramatically positive impact on food supply.
Kim also returned home from Hanoi with a presidential reprieve for the murder of a US citizen:
Did Trump press Kim on holding someone responsible for Warmbier’s death? Not at all.
Trump is once again reduced to distracting us from failure: he claimed before leaving Hanoi that the US had somehow intervened to cool escalating tensions between India and Pakistan and that Jared Kushner’s phantom Middle East peace plan would emerge soon, because the US has cut off aid for the Palestinians. Neither claim is credible.
Yesterday was a bad day for Trump not only in Hanoi but in Washington, where his former personal lawyer Michael Cohen made all to clear who and what the President is: racist, conman, and cheat. Republicans are busily attacking Cohen’s credibility, as he has pleaded guilty to lying to Congress previously. But they are not discussing the merits of Cohen’s charges, which would require a defense of Trump that would be difficult to mount.
Trump will now try to cut a trade deal with China. The tariff war he triggered is causing real pain in rural America, where part of Trump’s base lives. He also needs Beijing’s help with Pyongyang. He will cave on the tariffs and claim victory, then try to distract attention, maybe with an effort to begin to build his unneeded but much wanted wall on the southern border, triggering a raft of lawsuits and screams from whichever department of government he takes the money from. That effort too will fail, but Trump will move on to something else. Failure is what he does best.
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Good and bad news
The good news is that the UK Labour Party is signaling it will back a second Brexit referendum. The bad news is that Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif, partly responsible for negotiating the nuclear deal, has resigned.
Brexit: It has been apparent for some time now that the United Kingdom will be far worse off after it leaves the European Union. In fact, it is unlikely even to remain the United Kingdom, as Scotland and Northern Ireland could have good reasons for breaking up Her Majesty’s realm. Factories and financial institutions are fleeing. It is inconceivable that London can get a better trade deal with the US–or anyone else–acting alone rather than as a part of a more than 500-million person free trade area. Britain’s geopolitical weight is also vastly magnified inside the European Union compared to what it would be outside.
The problem has been how to cancel Brexit without defying the 2016 advisory referendum that launched it. Prime Minister May has been promising to deliver what the vote asked for by a margin of about 3.5 percentage points. Polls now indicate that Brexit might well be defeated in another referendum, if only because of demographic changes in the last three years. But a lot also depends on wording and the (unpredictable) political and economic circumstances in which a second referendum takes place. Nor is it clear yet whether Labour has the support in parliament to call a new referendum, though the defection of members from both Labour and the Conservatives in recent days increases the odds.
Zarif: The Iranian Foreign Minister resigned the same day he failed to appear in a video of Bashar al Assad meeting with the Supreme Leader. Whether that caused the resignation, or he had already resigned, is not clear, but Zarif was the relatively outward-looking face of the Iranian regime. His resignation will raise doubts about whether Iran intends to continue to comply with the nuclear deal, despite the American withdrawal and the failure of Europe to deliver the economic benefits anticipated. With Zarif out, a move by Tehran to abrogate the deal entirely is a step closer.
Some Americans would welcome that, as it might enable Washington to get the Europeans back in line and squeeze Tehran harder with sanctions. But it also opens the possibility of an Iranian push to develop nuclear weapons, sooner rather than later. Certainly anyone watching how well President Trump treats nuclear-armed Kim Jong-un could argue that Iran would be better off with a nuclear deterrent. The problem with that notion is Israel, which not only has nuclear weapons but might be inclined to use them to prevent Iran from getting close to a deployable nuclear weapon. Yes, it is possible that a deterrence relationship might emerge, but in the meanwhile the world could become a very dangerous place.
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