Tag: Nuclear weapons
What Iranians want to know
Mohammed Ataei of the Iranian Republic News Agency last week asked some questions. I answered. The interview was published in Farsi today:
1. President Trump asserted that his decision to abandon the JCPOA had already changed Iran’s regional policies. Do you think his statement is based on any factual evidence or is it just a political statement in response to internal and international criticisms of his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement?
A: I know of no factual evidence for this. Iran remains forward deployed and engaged in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and Bahrain. Much as I might hope that Tehran would pay more attention to the welfare of Iranians and less to its military adventures in the region, I don’t think it is happening.
2. Since the election of President Trump, we have seen many reports about Israeli and Saudi lobbying campaign to undermine the Nuclear Agreement with Iran. They openly welcomed President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the agreement. To what extent was Trump’s decision influenced by Benjamin Netanyahu and Bin Salman?
A: I think both Netanyahu and MbS were influential, even if I don’t understand what either one gains from the withdrawal.
3. President Obama always said that he had been able to create an international consensus against Iran. Now some observers argue that President Trump’s unilateral policies have unwittingly brought Russia, China and India closer together. How would you see the efficiency of the US sanctions on Iran in the context of the US unilateralism in international affairs? Do you think Secretary Pompeo can persuade the international community to rebuild the sanctions coalition against Iran?
A: In a word: no. Even if the Europeans are compelled by secondary sanctions to observe the U.S. restrictions, China, Russia, India and others will not. There will be no voluntary international consensus, as there was in the lead-up to the JCPOA.
4. President Trump said that he would target any third party which violates the US sanctions against Iran. There are reports that the EU has threatened to take the US to the World Trade Organization. Don’t you think that Trump is isolating the US rather than isolating Iran?
A: He is definitely isolating the U.S. more than he is isolating Iran, as you saw yesterday at the G7 Summit. But the WTO is a slow mechanism and big European companies are not likely to defy the U.S.
5. How would you explain the challenge of the US extraterritorial sanctions to international agreements and the UN Security Council’s resolutions such as 2231?
A: I’m not a lawyer, but I do think the U.S. has the right to limit use of its own financial system. It just isn’t wise to do so. The U.S. is clearly in violation of UNSC res 2231. But who is going to enforce it?
6. The EU vowed to stop European companies from leaving Iran despite the renewed threat of U.S. sanctions. However, major European companies have already announced that they would end business with Tehran. Do you think that the European leaders have done enough to save the JCPOA?
A: Not yet. They will have to be very tough with the U.S. to save it. Iran will also need to be flexible.
7. How does the US withdrawal from the JCPOA affect the worldwide nuclear disarmament? How would you see the future of NPT?
A: U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA undermines nuclear non-proliferation efforts worldwide. We’ll have to wait and see what Iran does, but if it proceeds now with its nuclear program without restraints, we could also see quite a few other countries proceed in the same direction.
PS: Mohammed followed up with a phone call in which he asked about the differences between a treaty and other executive agreements, how the Europeans might maneuver around secondary sanctions, as well as a few other things.
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Bamboozled
President Trump’s continuing self-adulation for his meeting with Kim Jong-un is tiresome. The only real result was legitimization of a brutal dictator. America is no safer. Kim retains the missiles and nuclear weapons needed to attack the US. He’ll refrain for now from further testing, but there is little comfort in that, since he has the missile and nuclear capabilities he wants. The slick video Trump showed him of a capitalist North Korea will be of no interest to Kim, who wants to maintain a dictatorial regime. Kim may want US diplomatic recognition, an embassy, and maybe a Trump hotel he can hold hostage in Pyongyang, but he isn’t going to open up North Korea.
Trump also retreated on three important points. First, he agreed to a phased process, which is what the North Koreans have wanted, because they don’t intend to complete it. Then he failed to get the North Koreans to agree to “verifiable and irreversible” denuclearization and accepted instead in the summit communique “complete denuclearization.” Secretary of State Pompeo embarrassed himself on this point yesterday. Trump also promised suspension of “war games,” by which he seems to have meant military exercises that the US conducts with the South Koreans.
The net result is “freeze for freeze.” The North Koreans will stop testing missiles and nuclear weapons in exchange for a freeze of US military exercises while a lengthy negotiation starts. The outcome is necessarily uncertain, but no one who knows the nonproliferation business thinks the Administration will come out with something better than the Iran nuclear deal from which Trump has withdrawn. Inspection anywhere in North Korea upon evidence presented of nuclear activities? A commitment not only to get rid of the nuclear weapons but to back up enriched uranium and plutonium production so that the “breakout” time required to produce a nuclear weapon is lengthened to one year? A permanent commitment to never again seek nuclear weapons? Not even in Donald Trump’s wild imagination.
I doubt the Administration has either the will or the capability to negotiate a detailed and verifiable agreement with North Korea. The bureaucracy will try, because that’s what it does when the president commits to something. But the Administration has already set the bar low: it wants the North Koreans to act by 2020, presumably after the November election that year. Trump will be uninterested, the negotiations will bog down, and sooner or later the North Koreans will decide they are better off ditching the process. In the meanwhile, they will be deploying the nuclear weapons and missiles in their arsenal, so that when the negotiations fail they are in a position to threaten the US.
Trump needed a diplomatic triumph to boost his always needy ego. The North Koreans used it to bamboozle him.
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Flim flam
President Trump today tweeted:
Donald J. TrumpVerified account@realDonaldTrump2 hours ago
Before taking office people were assuming that we were going to War with North Korea. President Obama said that North Korea was our biggest and most dangerous problem. No longer – sleep well tonight!
Just landed – a long trip, but everybody can now feel much safer than the day I took office. There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea. Meeting with Kim Jong Un was an interesting and very positive experience. North Korea has great potential for the future!
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Giving away the store for a photo op
President Trump today agreed to suspend US military exercises with South Korea during negotiations with the North and to provide Pyongyang with unspecified security guarantees in exchange for an equally vague commitment to denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. He and Kim Jong-un also got their photo op, which featured a stunning array of American and Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea flags.
The quid pro quo is clear: the US will be guaranteeing the permanence of one of the most brutal dictatorships on earth and reducing its commitment to its South Korean allies in exchange for some still-to-be-determined constraints on North Korean missile and nuclear weapons capabilities. The joint statement contains no reference at all to human rights issues or North Korean abductions, though it does refer to repatriation of the remains of prisoners of war and those missing in action from the Korean War. All you need to know about this deal is what the Republicans would be saying if President Obama had negotiated it.
Kim also got a lot from the photo op, which portrayed him as the equal of the President of the United States. The handshake was a de facto acknowledgement of North Korea’s nuclear power status, legitimizing both the regime and its acquisition of nuclear weapons. It will strengthen Kim both at home and abroad. Trump has no problem with that: he seems to relish relations with dictators and disdain democrats.
Trump will also benefit from the photo op, though less than Kim. He’ll use it to assert effectiveness in foreign policy, an arena in which the Administration has had absolutely no success and a number of significant failures, not the least at the G7 meeting in Quebec last weekend. The Atlantic alliance is a shambles, relations with European and Pacific allies and trading partners have been upended, and Russia continues its occupation of part of Ukraine as well as its marauding in Syria. America is more alone in the world, and less able to exert its will, than it has been in decades.
I don’t expect Trump’s supporters to understand or acknowledge this. Their enthusiasm for Trump is unconditional. I do hope that others can see through the photo op to what it really amounts to: Trump has given away the store in exchange for very little. He is a lousy negotiator. He put himself in the unenviable position of having no alternative to this premature and ill-advised meeting. The only hope left is that now some serious American negotiators will get busy making lemonade out of Trump’s lemons.
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Peace picks, June 11 – June 17
- Avoiding Nuclear War – A Discussion with the Mayor of Hiroshima | Monday, June 11| 10:00 am – 11:30 am | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
Nuclear war remains the top man-made threat to global stability and the dramatic diplomacy around North Korea’s nuclear program highlights the challenge of averting it. Cities are mobilizing to counter this threat, including Hiroshima—a city which has already borne the brunt of nuclear conflict.
Join Carnegie for a discussion with the mayor of Hiroshima, Kazumi Matsui. Mayor Matsui will describe what the people of Hiroshima and other cities are doing to reduce risks of nuclear war. An expert discussion on diplomatic progress with North Korea and broader disarmament issues will follow, with Mayor Matsui commenting from the perspective of a municipal government. Panel also includes Jon Wolfsthal (Director, Nuclear Crisis Group) and James L. Schoff (Senior Fellow, Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
- Shaping a New Balance of Power in the Middle East: Regional Actors, Global Powers, and Middle East Strategy | Tuesday, June 12 | 9:00 am – 3:00 pm | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register Here
The Gulf and the Middle East are suffering a paroxysm of conflict involving virtually all the regional states as well as the US and Russia and many different non-state actors. What dynamics are driving this chaos? What can be done to contain or reverse the damage? How might a new balance of power emerge? Conference schedule and speakers:
9-9:30: Registration
9:30-9:45: Opening Remarks
- Ezzedine Abdelmoula, Manager of Research, Aljazeera Centre for Studies, Aljazeera Media Network
9:30-11:00: Dynamics of Political Geography in the Middle East
- Chair: Daniel Serwer, Director, SAIS Conflict Management Program
- Ross Harrison, Non-resident Senior FellowMiddle East Institute
- Kadir Ustun, Executive Director, SETA Foundation
- Khalid al Jaber, Gulf International Forum
- Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director, Foreign Policy Program and Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy and Energy Security and Climate Initiative, Brookings Institution
11:00-11:15: Coffee Break
11:15-12:45: Non-State Actors and Shadow Politics
- Chair: Paul Salem, Senior Vice President for Policy Research & Programs, Middle East Institute
- Randa Slim, Director of Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues Program, Middle East Institute; Fellow, SAIS Foreign Policy Institute
- Fatima Abo Alasrar, Senior Analyst, Arabia Foundation
- Crispin Smith, Harvard Law School
- Anouar Boukhars, Non-Resident Scholar, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Associate Professor of International Relations, McDaniel College
12:45-1:30: Lunch
1:30-3:00: New Balance of Power
- Chair: Mohammed Cherkaoui, Aljazeera Centre for Studies, and George Mason University
- Jamal Khashoggi, independent writer
- Terrence Hopmann, Professor of International Relations, SAIS, Conflict Management Program
- Camille Pecastaing, SAIS, Middle East Studies
- Hussein Ibish, Senior Resident Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
- Denuclearization or Deterrence? Evaluating Next Steps on North Korea | Tuesday, June 11 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
Negotiations to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program remain highly uncertain. While diplomacy plays out, the United States and its allies in Asia will continue strengthening their deterrence capabilities to hedge against future threatening North Korean behavior. Yet, these actions could further exacerbate tensions in East Asia.
Please join the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for an expert panel discussion on denuclearization diplomacy, the potential Trump-Kim summit, and Plan B options to deter North Korean coercive behavior. At the event, Carnegie will release a new report, “Security Spillover: Regional Implications of Evolving Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.” Panel includes Chung Min Lee (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Narushige Michisita (executive advisor to the president and director of the Security and International Studies Program, Strategic Studies Program, and Maritime Safety and Security Policy Program at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo), Tony Zhao (Fellow, Nuclear Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), and Toby Dalton (Co-director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
- The Trump Administration’s Post-JCPOA Iran Policy | Wednesday, June 12 | 10:30 am – 12:00 pm | The SETA Foundation at Washington DC | Register Here
On May 8, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Iranian nuclear accord crafted by his predecessor. The withdrawal came after efforts by US allies in Europe to keep the US in the deal, and suggests division between the US and some of its closest partners in the years to come.
In a recent speech at the Heritage Foundation in Washington DC, Mike Pompeo, Trump’s newly appointed Secretary of State and a well-known critic of the Iran deal, declared that the Trump administration will take steps to punish the Iranian regime for regional aggression and impose stiff financial penalties. However, Pompeo also suggested that the administration is open to a new deal that addresses what it sees as the JCPOA’s failings. Under the guidance of Secretary of State Pompeo and Trump’s new national security advisor John Bolton, the Trump administration seems to be charting a much more confrontational policy towards Iran.
Please join the SETA Foundation at Washington DC for an insightful discussion with our panel of experts on this major turning point in US foreign policy as we discuss what it means for US relations with its allies in Europe and the Middle East and what US-Iranian interactions may look like moving forward. Panel includes Hussein Ibish (Senior Resident Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington), Reza Marashi (Research Director, National Iranian American Council), Sigurd Neubauer (Middle East Analyst and Columnist), Barbara Slavin (Director, Future of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council), and Randa Slim (Director of Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues Program, Middle East Institute). Moderated by Kilic B. Kanat (Research Director, SETA Foundation at Washington DC).
- Raising the Curtain on the 2018 NATO Brussels Summit | Wednesday, June 13 | 2:00 pm – 5:30 pm | Atlantic Council | Register Here
One month ahead of the July meeting, this event will serve as a primer for the Summit, highlighting many of the top issues on the Alliance’s agenda. The discussions will focus on priorities for strengthening collective defense and deterrence in Northern Europe and beyond, including US proposals to improve capabilities, readiness, and decision-making. The conference will also explore the Alliance’s broader agenda on the road to Brussels, including the way forward for NATO’s southern flank and what the Alliance must do to address terrorism, hybrid threats, and capacity-building in the region.
Convening senior officials, military leaders, top experts, business executives, and media from across the Euro-Atlantic policy community, the conference will provide a unique platform to discuss critical issues for the NATO alliance at a time when the threats have never been more pressing. Speakers include H.E. Raimundas Karoblis (Minister of National Defense, Republic of Lithuania), Dr. Richard Hooker (Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia, US National Security Council), Hon. Michael Turner (OH-10), (Head of the US Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and Member, US House of Representatives), Gen. Frank Gorenc, USAF (Ret.), (Fmr. Commander, US Air Forces in Europe and Africa and NATO Allied Air Command), Amb. Alexander Vershbow (Fmr. Deputy Secretary-General, NATO and Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council), Laura Rosenberger (Director and Senior Fellow, Alliance for Securing Democracy, German Marshall Fund), and Dr. Fabrizio Luciolli (President, Atlantic Treaty Association and President, Italian Atlantic Committee).
- America, Russia, and Vladimir Putin: Russian Opposition Perspectives | Thursday, June 14 | 2:30 pm – 4:00 pm | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
As of May 7, Vladimir Putin has begun his fourth term as the President of the Russian Federation. The next six years seem poised to be pivotal, with U.S. foreign policy in flux, the world responding, and Russia redefining its roles and responsibilities. Yet, one trend that continues unabated is a downward spiral in tensions between Moscow and Washington. Many western experts see Putin himself as the reason for problems past and present. What, then, does his continued rule mean for U.S. Russian relations, and how might each country adjust its policies to better further domestic, foreign policy, and security goals? Join us in this conversation with past Russian government and opposition leaders regarding what Moscow and Washington can do, and what they are likely to. This event is organized in cooperation with the Institute of Modern Russia (IMR). Panel includes Andrei Kozyrev (Fmr. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation from 1991-1996), Vitali Shkliarov (Russian Political Strategist, Fmr. Senior Campaign Advisor to Ksenia Sobchak), Vladimir Kara-Murza (Vice Chairman, Open Russia and Fmr. Deputy Leader of the People’s Freedom Party), and Olga Oliker (Senior Adviser and Director, Russia and Eurasia Program).
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Atlantic alliance shattered, Pacific next stop
Having trashed the G7 summit in Quebec, President Trump is now getting ready to meet with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un on Tuesday. Last week President Trump said
I don’t think I have to prepare very much. It’s about attitude.
He might be right, because he has defined down the goals of the summit:
I think it’s going to be a process. But the relationships are building, and that’s a very positive thing…a beginning and a getting-to-know-you meeting-plus.
While Secretary of Defense Mattis is still declaring the American goal to be “compete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization” (CVID in the trade), the President has retreated from achieving that. Under cover of the furor caused by his temporary cancellation of the meeting, he has lowered the bar. Now he is even saying he’ll know within a minute whether the summit will be successful.
CVID is not going to happen. Kim Jong-un is not giving up his nukes or his missiles, though he may limit the number of the former and the range of the latter. He’ll want in return not just relief from sanctions but also withdrawal of at least some American forces from South Korea. There is simply no better guarantee of his regime than holding on to a limited number of nukes and missiles, which ensure no invasion and no US effort at regime change.
The question is whether those possible limits can simultaneously satisfy the US, South Korea, and Japan. It doesn’t look likely. South Korea and Japan aren’t interested in limiting the range of the missiles, since that decouples their security from the US: the US will feel safe but they won’t. Nor will they be interested in US withdrawal from South Korea, since the American forces there provide a vital tripwire to ensure that the US is prepared to intervene with force if the South is invaded.
There is no way such difficult issues can or should be resolved in a meeting where Seoul and Tokyo are absent. The best Trump can do is to initiate a negotiation that will likely take years to complete. The outcome cannot be nearly as satisfactory as the Iran nuclear deal, which set back Tehran from nuclear weapons and included a permanent commitment to the international safeguards required to prevent any future nuclear weapons program. North Korea is going to remain a nuclear power with significant missile capabilities.
The worst Trump can do is sell out our South Korean and Japanese allies by agreeing to withdraw US troops from Korea and accept Pyongyang’s nuclear status. This cannot be entirely ruled out. The man is desperate for a win and cares not a whit about allies. He admires dictators and likes to break crockery. Kim Jong-un has so far played him like a fiddle. Trump might well be vulnerable to flattery and the prospect of the Nobel Prize the Norwegians will never give him. They are not as dumb as he is.
Trump did serious damage to the Atlantic alliance in the past couple of days. Let’s hope he doesn’t repeat the disaster in the Pacific.
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