Tag: Nuclear weapons
The 7 – 1 reality sitcom
That’s what is meeting in Quebec today. The odd one out at the G7 is the United States, which has managed to unite Canada, the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Japan in a display of pique against President Trump’s trade policy. That’s what you get for using spurious national security arguments to raise tariffs on steel and aluminum rather than pursuing your complaints through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and withdrawing from a nuclear deal with Iran that the other 6 view as vital to their security.
The vodka will be flowing in Moscow, which will be delighted to hear its Shanghai Cooperation Organization (that’s China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) compared favorably with the more venerable, more powerful, and in the past more effective G7. President Putin is getting his money’s worth: Trump is dismantling Washington’s relationship with its friends and allies in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, dramatically weakening the West and providing openings for Moscow and Beijing to fill the vacuums. Trump has even called for Russia to be invited back into the G7 (which for a time was the G8). If you find that hard to believe, watch it:
Trump is also claiming this morning that Iran has moderated its behavior due to his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal:
They’re no longer looking so much to what’s going on in Syria, what’s going on in Yemen and lots of other places. They’re a much different country over the last three months.
This is completely untrue. Iran has done nothing to withdraw or lessen its involvement in Syria, Yemen, and other places. It is not only the same country over the last three months, it is getting ready to start up a plant to produce advanced centrifuges for uranium enrichment.
And the President is vaunting his meeting next week with Kim Jong-un:
Obama, Schumer and Pelosi did NOTHING about North Korea, and now weak on Crime, High Tax Schumer is telling me what to do at the Summit the Dems could never set up. Schumer failed with North Korea and Iran, we don’t need his advice!
No Democratic president ever wanted to concede a summit with the North Korean dictator without getting something in return up front. Trump has done so, to no noticeable benefit to the US so far. Nor is there any sign he will get anything tangible in Singapore, though you can bet on his vaunting a fantastic triumph.
The simple fact is that Trump is finding it a lot easier to offend America’s friends and allies than to get anything from our adversaries, who recognize that he is a bullshitter who flogs flim-flam. It would all be laughable–a kind of reality sit-com–if it weren’t real. The G7-1 is however unified and represents an economy larger than that of the US. Trump may prefer a light-on-substance summit with Kim Jong-un, and he may want to falsely claim that Iran has moderated its behavior, but neither our friends nor our adversaries will be fooled. The only fool in this reality sit-com resides in the White House.
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Things aren’t getting better
I’m back from 10 days in Piedmont (that’s Italy, not Virginia), where the inhabitants are far better at ignoring their politics than most of us in DC. I didn’t have a single serious conversation about the government crisis there, which after weeks of uncertainty has produced a coalition that is almost as weird as the Freedom Caucus combining with the Green Party in the US. My Italian friends don’t like it, but they know their governments are highly constrained by the European Union, market forces, and a tradition of compromise. So let’s have lunch.
Here things are less felicitous. The food isn’t as good and the politics are less constrained. Here’s a quick summary of some changes while we were away:
- The Dotard/Rocket Man Summit is back on for June 12, but with an important difference: the President says it is the beginning of a process, not the precedent-shattering agreement on denuclearization he advertised once upon a time.
- The US is levying tariffs on European steel and aluminum and threatening them on luxury cars. These will all eventually be found to violate our obligations to the World Trade Organization, but the current Administration doesn’t care about that.
- The Europeans are trying to figure out how to ensure Iran continues in the nuclear deal by allowing it to reap economic advantages, which will require them to block US “secondary” sanctions.
- President Trump has declared himself above the law, not only on Twitter but in a letter sent by his lawyers in January to the Special Counsel claiming he can end the investigation or pardon himself. The last president to make such a bold claim was Richard Nixon. We know how that ended.
- Trump has also issued pardons clearly intended to signal to his former minions (Michael Cohen, Paul Manafort) that he has their back if they keep silent.
- Just yesterday, the Special Counsel accused Manafort of witness tampering in a case pending against him for lobbying for a foreign entity (namely the Russia-backed president of Ukraine) without proper registration. The evidence includes wire taps.
Senate Democrats are warning that they won’t lift sanctions for a quicky nuclear deal with North Korea, but there is precious little they can do on the other issues. The Republicans are remaining united in backing Trump in both the House and the Senate. If Trump fires Mueller or pardons his minions, all indications are nothing will be done about it in Congress, but it is becoming harder to see how the judicial investigations can be entirely shut down.
In other news, the President canceled a meeting at the White House with the Superbowl champion Philadelphia Eagles because some of them want to continue their kneeling protest during the national anthem.* This from a president who himself had to be reminded by his immigrant wife to put his hand on his heart during the national anthem:
*PS: I was wrong about this. It turns out the Eagles had never knelt, but quite a few of them refused the invitation to the White House. Trump canceled the event in order to avoid being embarrassed, then scheduled another event at which he demonstrated he does not know the words to either the national anthem or “America the Beautiful.” Impossible to make this stuff up,
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Get serious
Pantelis Ikonomou, a former IAEA inspector and nuclear security consultant, writes:
President Trump’s sudden decision, two months ago, to meet the DPRK’s Kim Jong-un was enigmatic in its cause and ambiguous to its goal. Some observers regarded it as opportunity while others as trap. Then through a polite letter to his counterpart few days ago, the President announced his decision to cancel their summit. Yet, preparations are still currently in process.
Would the swinging between ‘’summit,’’ “no summit,’’ and again “summit” result in new disappointments or in relief? As long as question-marks are hanging over the summit, uncertainty grows, as does danger.
What is the summit’s attainable goal? Do both sides have the same understanding of “denuclearization”? What is the “no summit” follow-up plan? What is this pendulum’s driving force? Is there inability to comprehend the complex nature of a nuclear crisis? It is worth recalling Obama’s confession to Bob Woodward on his thoughts during a sensitive nuclear briefing he was given at a secure facility in Chicago: “It’s good that there are bars on the windows here because if there weren’t, I might be jumping out.”
Summit or no summit, proper consideration of some key facts is paramount for the peaceful solution of DPRK’s nuclear crisis:
- Pursuing denuclearization by force is impossible. A nuclear holocaust would be the result.
- The DPRK giving up its nukes completely and effectively, within a reasonable time and in an agreed, verifiable and irreversible manner, would be an improbable expectation. As the most recent Worldwide Threat Assessment says:“ Pyongyang’s commitment to possessing nuclear weapons …. while repeatedly stating that nuclear weapons are the basis for its survival, suggests that the regime does not intend to negotiate them away.”
- States who acquired nuclear weapons outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), like India, Pakistan and allegedly Israel, never abandoned them. They were and remain their strongest deterrence. The exception of South Africa in 1991 was forced by the end of apartheid.
- Nuclear weapons outside the international legal frame constitute a well-defined global threat. The global nuclear security architecture would be severely undermined by accepting new nuclear weapons owners.
- Mitigation of risks related to nuclear threat is a top priority task, according to IAEA’s nuclear security guidelines and to any serious national security response plan.
Political determination is the precondition for a successful agreement. Erratic decisions detached from comprehensive planning and expert advice would not engage the DPRK nuclear crisis at the level of its complexity and with the importance it deserves.
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Peace picks, May 28 – June 3
- The Malaysian Election Tsunami: What Happens Next? | Wednesday, May 30 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
The CSIS Southeast Asia Program is pleased to present ‘The Malaysian Election Tsunami: What Happens Next?’ a panel discussion featuring Dr. Meredith Weiss (Professor and Director of International Programs, University of Albany’s Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy) and Ambassador Joseph Y. Yun (US ambassador to Malaysia, 2013-2016). They will discuss the outcomes of 14th Malaysian general election, and what the election means for the state of democracy in Malaysia and the region.
- Asserting Taiwan’s International Space: The Challenges Ahead for Taipei’s Leadership | Wednesday, May 30 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | Wilson Center | Register Here
Taiwan’s unique status in the world has come under greater pressure in recent months as China steps up efforts to challenge Taipei’s global standing. Taiwan remains a leading Asian economy and a vibrant democracy. Yet strained cross-Strait relations have made it increasingly difficult for Taipei to ensure its standing in the international arena. Join us for a discussion on the political, security, and social challenges ahead for Taiwan, and how Taiwan may be able to overcome some of its vulnerabilities to ensure a stable and prosperous future. Panel includes Irene Wu (Fellow, Wilson Center), Ian Reston (Research Fellow, Project 2049 Institute) and Gerrit van der Wees (Editor, Taiwan Communique and Lecturer, George Mason University).
- Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments | Wednesday, May 30 | 2:30 pm – 4:00 pm | US Institute of Peace | Register Here
In the past two years, the world has witnessed multiple crises in regions where nuclear weapons are present: the Korean peninsula saw heightened tensions throughout 2017; China and India were involved in a major border crisis; violence between India and Pakistan on the Line of Control in Kashmir has been the highest in 15 years and the U.S. and its partners in the Middle East now face a highly uncertain future vis-à-vis Iran.
The U.S. has an innate interest in preventing nuclear war around the world. Along with other strong powers, the United States has been proactive in managing crises in nuclearized regions, most notably in South Asia, which has seen repeated bouts of escalated tensions since the end of the Cold War. Yet, as great power competition resurges and U.S. interests in Asia pit it against actors like Iran, Pakistan, and increasingly China, the U.S. role in crises in nuclearized regions may become more complicated. What implications could this have for the probability of conflict and for U.S. influence as other strong powers compete more aggressively with Washington in these theaters, including possibly using crises as opportunities to overshadow the traditional U.S. role as crisis manager?
Join the U.S. Institute of Peace on May 30 for a discussion on the opportunities, challenges, and risks of crises in regional nuclear contexts and policy options for U.S. diplomacy. Panel includes Amb. Joseph Yun (Senior Advisor to the Asia Center, US Institute of Peace), Lora Saalman (Vice President, East-West Institute), Feroz Khan (Research Professor, Naval Postgraduate School), Moeed Yusuf (Associate Vice President, Asia Center at US Institute of Peace), and Gregg Zoroya (USA Today Editorial Board).
- Turkey’s Snap Elections and the Impact on U.S. – Turkey Relations | Thursday, May 31 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm | Turkish Heritage Organization | Register Here
On June 24, Turkey will go to the polls for snap presidential and parliamentary elections that will mark the country’s transition to the new presidential system that was approved in an April 2017 referendum.
These elections come at a time when Turkey’s relationship with the U.S. – its NATO ally and foremost security partner – is facing numerous challenges. Turkey and the U.S. remain at odds over the latter’s support of the YPG in Syria, which Ankara considers to be a terrorist organization. Meanwhile, various pieces of recent Congressional legislation have proposed bans on weapons sales to Turkey in response to Ankara’s purchase of Russian military equipment and the continued imprisonment of American citizens in Turkey.
How will this critical turning point in Turkey’s domestic governance affect its vital relationship with the U.S.?
Join THO on May 31 for a discussion with Turkish and American experts on how developments surrounding these snap elections and Turkey’s transition to a presidential system could impact the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship. Panel includes Richard Leiby (Editor and Writer, The Washington Post), Ragip Soylu (Washington Correspondent, Daily Sabah), Shawn Turner (CNN National Security Analyst and Director of Communication, Center for a New American Security), Yusuf Erim (Turkey Analyst, TRT World) and Guy Taylor (National Security Team Leader, The Washington Times). Moderated by Prof. Herbert Reginbogin (Advisory Board Member, Turkish Heritage Organization).
- Military Challenges in the Asia Pacific: US Responses to Regional Competition | Friday, June 1 | 9:00 am – 10:30 am | American Enterprise Institute | Register Here
The Asia Pacific security environment is more contested today than at any time since World War II. China’s increased assertiveness and North Korea’s unpredictability are not symptomatic of America’s decline, nor do they necessarily signal great power conflict. Rather, recent developments demand a close look at the changing terms of regional competition and America’s responses to it. In this hypercompetitive environment, how will the US and its allies and partners ensure regional stability?
Join AEI as a panel of security experts discuss how the US can keep its competitive edge in the Asia Pacific. Panel includes Roger Cliff (Center for Naval Analyses), Thomas Donnelly (American Enterprise Institute), Nathan Freier (United States Army War College) and Lt. Gen. Wallace (Fmr. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs). Moderated by Philip Lohaus (American Enterprise Institute).
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Played
The Iran nuclear deal was an exchange: relief from sanctions in exchange for a halt and partial reversal of Iran’s uranium enrichment and plutonium capabilities. While President Obama made it clear the US would no longer actively seek overthrow of the Islamic Republic, there was no guarantee of that policy’s continuity. Nor was there a deal on Iran’s regional behavior, though Obama clearly hoped that would moderate as Iran’s economy recovered from sanctions and its people stopped rallying around the flag and instead sought rising living standards and more foreign contact.
That process had barely begun–with economic protests and criticism of Iran’s foreign adventures–when President Trump withdrew the US from the deal earlier this month. The protests are petering out as Iran seeks some way of continuing the nuclear deal with Europe, Russia, and China.That will be difficult because US “secondary” sanctions will force most major European companies to abandon business with Iran. But so far at least the EU seems determined to find a way. There is no reason to believe that Moscow, Beijing, and importantly New Delhi (India is a major importer of Iranian hydrocarbons) will not find a way of continuing to do business with Tehran.
Secretary Pompeo has announced the US list of demands to renew negotiations, with the aim of full diplomatic recognition, which is code for no more efforts to overthrow the regime. No one thinks Iran will even begin thinking about meeting those conditions. The US tried for decades to torpedo the Islamic Republic. There is no reason to believe the Trump Administration’s efforts in that regard will strike fear into the hearts of the ayatollahs. Quite to the contrary: the Supreme Leader thrives on American hostility. Trump is doomed to failure in dealing with Iran: either the nuclear deal will be maintained because the Europeans find a way to defy US sanctions, or Tehran will return to pursuing all the technology it needs to build and launch nuclear weapons.
He is heading in the same direction with North Korea. Once again, he is offering guarantees of regime survival and economic prosperity in exchange for “denuclearization.” The trouble is both National Security Adviser Bolton and Vice President Pence have hinted that without an agreement the US will pursue a Libya option, which the North Koreans interpret not unreasonably as Kim Jung-un meeting the same fate as Muammar Qaddafi, who was slaughtered after giving up his rudimentary nuclear program by Libyan rebels who had Western support. Not to mention one other difficulty: Kim is one of the most brutal dictators on earth. Does the US really want to be guaranteeing his permanence in power? Trump obviously doesn’t mind, any more than he minds offering the Islamic Republic the same deal.
Of course Kim would have no reason to believe any US guarantees, even with an American ambassador in Pyongyang. The change in US approaches to Iran and North Korea between Obama and Trump as well as the Trump Administration’s incoherence and inconsistency would make even a fool hesitate to rely on Washington. Kim is no fool. He will do nothing irreversible to his nuclear and missile programs, knowing full well that Trump can guarantee nothing. So when he yesterday blew up at least part of his country’s nuclear testing facilities in front of Western TV crews, you can be sure whatever was destroyed was now worthless to him.
Kim will propose a phased approach to “denuclearization.” If the phases include giving up his existing nuclear weapons, that will only be at the end of a long process, which he can ensure will never be reached. In the meanwhile, Kim will achieve many of his objectives. He has already put himself on a par with the President of the United States. Any early meeting, next month or thereafter, will confirm his equal status and legitimacy, both internationally and domestically.
While mumbling about a possible postponement, Trump appears desperate for a meeting to give him a chance to claim his first foreign policy success. Hence his touting rumors of a Nobel Prize that the Norwegians will not be interested in giving him. The North Koreans know a sucker when they see him. Kim is playing Trump, successfully.
PS: Somebody got Trump smart. Less than an hour after I published this, he withdrew from the Dotard/Rocket Man Summit. That was the best he could do: he was in way over his head.
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Up a creek without a paddle
A Wilson Center panel yesterday considered recent developments with Iran, particularly Trump’s groundbreaking decision to exit the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, aka Iran nuclear deal). With the Wilson Center’s Aaron David Miller as moderator, panel members Michael Singh of the Washington Institute, Tamara Coffman Wittes of the Brookings Institution, Robert Litwak of the Wilson Center, and Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations discussed the JCPOA, the American departure from it, and future prospects.
Singh argued that Trump’s decision had both political and substantive roots. The President decided to use a problematic model of “maximum pressure” to create a new Iran deal. Where there was once convergence with foreign allies and partners on the way forward with Iran, with diplomatic efforts creating a multilateral sanctions campaign, there is now divergence, which makes Trump’s strategy of “maximum pressure” harder to implement.
Next steps, Singh believes, should include:
1. Heal the rift with European allies and reach a US-E3 agreement, at least an agreed roadmap on the way forward.
2. Nest the withdrawal from the JCPOA in a more comprehensive Iran strategy, as sanctions alone are not enough.
There is no real Administration strategy on Iran, Singh suggested. It talks tough but is reluctant to get dragged into the Middle East. Iran is a revisionist state and the only way to confront it is with commitment to the Middle East and the use of every policy tool.
Wittes understands Trump’s JCPOA decision as based on a desire to fulfill campaign promises and cater to domestic policy and interests. But it was reckless. Iranian influence, opportunities, and gains since 2011 have expanded as they compete with Sunni states and Israel for power. This unfortunately comes at a time of US pullback from the Middle East, which troubles US allies concerned more about Iran’s regional behavior than nuclear weapons, and a turn of foreign policy focus towards Asia. Wittes does not see how a new US-Iran agreement can happen. She does believe, however, that in the current Israel-Iran standoff, both sides are sending careful and calibrated messages as neither side seeks escalation, although it could still happen.
Litwak thinks the exit from the JCPOA is a departure from the US grand strategy of exerting power via international institutions. The US, not Iran, is being seen as the foreign policy issue and outlier state. America First is turning into America Alone. The JCPOA had a transactional, not transformational, basis as it sought to constrain Iran’s nuclear program, which has existed for over 40 years. Without the JCPOA, it is harder to address other Iran issues. The re-imposition of US sanctions could lead to a trade war with Europe should it take a defiant stance. It also strengthens Iranian hardliners and opens the door for Iran to leave the deal and restart its nuclear program. The exit from JCPOA could make it more difficult to negotiate a nuclear deal with North Korea. Trump’s transformational goal for a new Iran deal is over-reach. Litwak believes the US should be more pragmatic.
Takeyh anticipates that the US and Iran will eventually return to negotiations, considering the dearth of unofficial dialogues with Iran. The JCPOA was seriously flawed, especially the sunset clauses. A new deal with Iran must be permanent, a treaty approved in the Senate with minority party support. Ultimately, arms control will need to be an aspect of Iran policy, not the totality of it.
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