Tag: Nuclear weapons

Backfire

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu yesterday obliterated his own argument against the Iran nuclear deal. Let’s leave aside whether it is appropriate for a country that has clandestinely produced nuclear weapons to criticize others for attempting to do the same thing. Netanyahu presented evidence that before 2004 Iran had such a clandestine nuclear weapons program. This is well known and confirmed at the time by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is a major reason the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is needed: to stop and to some extent reverse Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons.

Netanyahu doesn’t like the JCPOA because some of its provisions expire in the 2020s and none of its provisions deal with ballistic missiles. What he has failed to explain is how the US withdrawing from the deal now would fix that or in any other way make Israel and the US better off. The Europeans have made it plain they will stick with the deal if the Iranians do. The Iranians are divided: some want to keep to it while others want to withdraw. If they continue the deal with the Europeans, US re-imposition of sanctions is unlikely to get Tehran to negotiate a follow-on agreement. The sanctions worked in 2015 because everyone was supporting them. If the Iranians withdraw, they can go hell bent for nuclear weapons immediately.

If US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal doesn’t benefit Israel, what then might Netanyahu be trying to achieve? One possibility is a crisis that would result in a US attack on Iran’s remaining nuclear facilities. Another is the worsening of Iran’s economic situation to encourage demonstrations and eventual regime change.

Both of these are dicey propositions. While the US certainly now has an excellent idea of precisely where the nuclear facilities are located (credit to the IAEA), any attack on them would precipitate Iranian retaliation against US forces  and civilians in the Gulf, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, in addition attacks on Israel from Gaza, Lebanon and Syria as well as from Iran. Trying to prompt regime change is always iffy, but especially so in an Islamic Republic that has weathered several episodes of mass demonstrations that might have brought down a less entrenched or less brutal regime.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Netanyahu is pushing for a withdrawal from the JCPOA without any clear notion of what the benefits might be. That however isn’t likely to phase Donald Trump, whose ability to reason things through is limited. He likes acting on impulse, especially when flattered by someone he thinks well of like Netanyahu. Sheldon Adelson’s campaign contributions are no doubt another factor in favor of withdrawal.

Fortunately, there will be some in the Administration who will argue against, noting that the US has already gotten most of the benefits withdrawal might produce: the Europeans are open to discussing a follow-on agreement that could encompass ballistic missiles and banks have hesitated to provide financing to Iran and those who want to do business there. The US, by contrast, continues to benefit from the IAEA inspections and the delay in Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Secretary of Defense Mattis has made it plain that Iran is complying with the JCPOA, which has ample provision for verification. He no doubt also understands that the prospects for a nuclear deal with North Korea, already dim, would evaporate entirely if the US walks away from the JCPOA.

So Netanyahu’s showy non-TED talk yesterday was unconvincing. I’d would say it even backfired. The US (and Israel) will be far better off if the US stays in the nuclear deal.

PS: A chat April 30 with someone well-informed about Israel suggested Netanyahu’s aim is to get the Europeans to re-impose sanctions, so that the Iran of the 2020s is far less resource-rich than it would be otherwise. Asked why the Europeans would do that, I was told they are more afraid of war with Iran than they are of reimposing sanctions. That game is called chicken and often ends in catastrophe.

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“Wicked” globalism

“Wicked” is the word wonks use to describe problems that are difficult to solve because they are so complex it is difficult to predict the impact of anything you do, which may cause consequences different from those you intend. That’s what is happening today: the US is facing nuclear issues with both North Korea and Iran that defy resolution in part because they may interact in both predictable and unpredictable ways.

This was not necessary. President Trump has chosen to schedule a decision for withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal for May 12, the date on which Congress requires him to certify whether continuing it is in the US interest. He refused to do that three months ago, without consequences. This time around he says he’ll withdraw if the deal isn’t “fixed” to include ballistic missile and eliminate the expiration clauses. There is no indication that can be done in the time frame available, though the Europeans are trying to back him down by committing to a follow-on agreement. The Iranians, however, show no sign of being interested in that.

Meanwhile, things are moving in the other direction with North Korea, which has expressed some interest in “denuclearization,” though what that means to Kim Jong-un is not yet clear. It almost surely doesn’t mean “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization” that the Americans want. The North Koreans have a long history of reneging on agreements with the international community, but the Trump Administration seems determined to ignore that and instead seek still another one. Trump has already given Kim a big prize: the promise of a meeting that will legitimize Kim’s regime, something he would have criticized ferociously had his predecessor done it. Any agreement will have to involve some concessions from the US, likely on the American military presence in South Korea and maybe elsewhere in Asia.

Israeli President Netanyahu today went on TV to demonstrate that Iran was lying when it claimed not to have a nuclear weapons program prior to 2004. That was already well known. How that is supposed to undermine the agreement concluded in 2015 known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not clear. The JCPOA committed Iran to international inspections that have so far confirmed there is no longer a nuclear weapons program, as well as dismantling of most of Iran’s centrifuges and one of its reactors. The JCPOA looks to many like a good antidote to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Netanyahu’s TV appearance confirmed that.

Trump has nevertheless indicated he will withdraw from it and reimpose unilateral sanctions. That will give Iran the option of sustaining the agreement with the Europeans (thus splitting them from the US and weakening the impact of sanctions) or withdrawing and going hell bent for nuclear weapons. Neither outcome would benefit the US. Withdrawal would also give North Korea good reason to doubt that any agreement with the US concerning its nuclear program will be maintained, though admittedly it already has ample reason for doubts. Iran racing for nuclear weapons would certainly give North Korea more than enough reason to hold on to its own.

This trifecta of likely bad outcomes has not been enough to convince Trump that he should override whatever promises he made during his election campaign. Most Americans support the JCPOA. But Trump isn’t interested in what most Americans think, only what his deep-pocketed donors like Sheldon Adelson think. That’s what Trump meant when he told French President Macron he would withdraw from the JCPOA due to domestic political pressure.

Netanyahu has also ordered airstrikes on Iranian facilities in Syria that reportedly store missiles for use against Israel. Tehran, including the Iranian Supreme Leader, has promised a response, while denying any Iranians were killed. Escalation of the tit-for-tat in Syria could well get out of hand, leading to a still wider war and even the Israeli ground invasion Syrians often warn of. The Americans have shown no interest in joining such an enterprise to drive the Iranians back from the Israeli border, but they likely aren’t saying a loud “no” to it either.

We are at one of those tipping points, like the eve of the Iraq war. The US can barge ahead on its current path, with some predictable negative consequences and likely many other unpredictable ones, though it is hard to think of positive outcomes. Or it can pause, rethink, and try to unravel the global interconnections that make its current course so likely to produce bad results. Globalism has its virtues, but it also has its exceedingly complicated, “wicked,” side. Clarifying problems so they can be solved is a lot better than muddying them, as Trump and Netanyahu both prefer to do.

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Crunch time

Pantelis Ikonomou, a retired IAEA inspector, writes:

For 25 years the international community with its competent institutions led by the world super powers failed to block the nuclear military program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and to impose adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Geostrategic miscalculations or leaders’ inability were probably the cause of the persistent failure. The US has done well to unblock the situation, but major obstacles lie ahead.

Here is a short but characteristic history of facts:

  • In 1992, IAEA inspectors found inconsistencies in DPRK’s nuclear declarations. The year after, DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. Just one day before the withdrawal was due, the US persuaded DPRK to suspend its decision.
  • In December 1993, the IAEA announced that it could no longer provide “any meaningful assurances” that DPRK was not producing nuclear weapons. A US initiative saved the situation again. An Agreed Framework was signed between the US and DPRK in Geneva and the IAEA had to monitor its implementation.
  • In December 2002, DPRK tampered with IAEA surveillance equipment. A few days later DPRK requested the immediate removal of IAEA inspectors from the country and announced its withdrawal from the NPT.
  • In April 2003, DPRK declared it had nuclear weapons. A renewed US initiative led to the six-party talks (USA, China, Russia, South Korea, Japan and DPRK) on solving the nuclear crisis.
  • In the following years, DPRK was repeatedly accused of violating the Agreed Framework and other international agreements. Several UNSC and IAEA resolutions were triggered with strong US leadership.

The upcoming May summit of Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un presents a unique opportunity to overcome a long-lasting failure. The political determination of both leaders is certainly the prerequisite for a decisive agreement on the “denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Hence, the US will have to deploy a serious negotiating team with technical experts. The successful implementation of a complex final deal will depend on the completeness and clarity of the comprehensive Plan of Action to be compiled. It should cover all issues related to nuclear, missile and sanctions, linked to relevant UNSC and IAEA resolutions, as well as mutual commitments on military presence in the area.  Notably, all these agreed actions ought to be verifiable and irreversible.

The partly analogous P5+1 Iran deal (JCPOA), although lacking the DPRK’s nuclear military dimension, offers a carefully elaborated model. Yet, at the same time it represents a time bomb: US withdrawal on May 12, as the President has presaged, would be just before the Trump/Kim summit. If that happens, why should Kim Jong-un trust his negotiating partner?

I would add this:

It makes no sense for the US to withdraw from the Iran deal, since that will trigger either renewal of Tehran’s nuclear weapons program (without IAEA inspectors present) or a dramatic breach with America’s European allies (and possibly both). Trump’s loud criticism of the deal has limited the economic benefits to Iran and gotten the Europeans to start talking about an expanded, follow-on version that would limit Iran’s missile program and extend the timeframe. Trump gains nothing more, and loses a lot, if he withdraws.

If, as this suggests, he stays in the Iran deal, that still does not guarantee Trump success with Kim, who has already gotten the audiences with Presidents Xi, Moon, and soon Trump that give him the legitimacy he craves. Kim’s promise of denuclearization is not new. He promised the same in 2005 and never delivered. The decommissioning of the DPRK’s nuclear test site will grab headlines in the next week or so, but keen observers believe the geology there is now so precarious due to underground nuclear tests that it is already unusable.

Meanwhile the US is reported to be talking with Asian allies about the future of its military presence in South Korea. It is precarious, since it is far too small and vulnerable to do much against a DPRK invasion, but serves as a tripwire for broader US intervention if it comes under fire. Kim will aim to eliminate it entirely once a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War is signed, something Trump may even welcome as he made it clear long ago he doesn’t want to be responsible for the security of our Asian allies and suggested they might want to get nuclear weapons of their own.

May is crunch time for the Iran deal and the Rocket Man/Dotard Summit. Hold on tight. It may be a wild ride.

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Peace picks, April 23 – 29

  1. Washington’s Shifting Syria Policy: Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations | Monday, April 23 | 11:00am – 12:30pm | Turkish Heritage Foundation | Register here |

As the Syrian civil war enters its eighth year, political dynamics are beginning to shift. On April 4, a tripartite summit to further discussions on the resolution of the conflict was held in Ankara between Turkey, Russia, and Iran – critical countries that once had deeply conflicting priorities in Syria. Notably absent from this high-level diplomacy is the U.S., whose priority in Syria remains fixated on defeating ISIS. On the same day that the presidents of Turkey, Russia, and Iran were meeting in Ankara, President Trump stated his intention to withdraw U.S. troops after the defeat of ISIS, raising questions and concerns about Washington’s long-term role in Syria. The Syrian civil war has heavily strained U.S.-Turkey relations, with Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch in Afrin against the YPG being the most recent example of the troubling rift between the NATO allies. The impact of the shift in Washington’s Syria policy and post-ISIS long-term role will determine the next phase of the relations between the U.S. and Turkey. Featuring Mariam Jalabi (Representative, Syrian National Coalition’s office at the UN), Bradley A. Blakeman (Former White House Senior Staff under President George W. Bush; Commentator, Fox News), Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Peter B. Zwack (Senior Research Fellow, Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies), Dr. Mesut Hakki Casin (Academic, Ozyegin University, Air Force and Turkish Military Academies), and Dr. Sahar Khan (Research Fellow, CATO Institute).

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  1. ISIS in North Africa: Past and Future Trajectories | Monday, April 23 | 12:15pm – 1:45pm | New America | Register here |

From 2013 through 2014 ISIS recruited thousands of fighters from North Africa to fight in Syria and established a fallback position in Libya. Today, ISIS has lost much of its territory both in Syria and in North Africa. How did ISIS emerge in North Africa and what is its future in the region? Featuring Sarah Yerkes (Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Aaron Y. Zelin (Richard Borow Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy), and David Sterman (Senior Policy Analyst, New America; Co-author, All Jihad is Local: ISIS in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula).

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  1. The Future of Political Islam: Trends and Prospects | Tuesday, April 24 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Brookings Institution | Register here |

Since the 2011 Arab uprisings, the progression of events in the Middle East has provoked new questions on the role of political Islam in the region. The Arab Spring offered Islamist parties the opportunity and challenge of governance, and the widely varying results led many observers to reconsider basic assumptions on political Islam. Lines drawn between ideology and politics have become blurred. Common conceptions of Islam and the nation-state as incompatible have come under review. As scholars and Islamists alike imagine the future of political Islam, these considerations and others will play a central role. Featuring Shadi Hamid (Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution), Peter Mandaville (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution), and Jocelyne Cesari (Professor of Religion and Politics, University of Birmingham; Senior Fellow, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, Georgetown University).

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  1. Public Protests and Prospects for Reform in Iran | Tuesday, April 24 | 1:30pm – 3:00pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |

Over the last few months, Iran has experienced a series of street protests in rural areas and social arenas once seen as the key support base for the Islamic Republic. Politically active youth are voicing their frustrations with the country’s political, social, and economic prospects. Many of these protests as well as online activism have been met with pushback from conservatives and crackdown from the government. What are the prospects for change in Iran’s existing political system? Is there a dynamic that might foster greater openness, pluralism and democratization? Who are the rising political figures who may lead such a change? How can the international community support a political shift in Iran that benefits its own society? The Middle East Institute is pleased to host Daniel Brumberg (Co-editor (with Farideh Farhi) of Power and Political Change in Iran), Azadeh Pourzand (Co-founder and executive director, Siamak Pourzand Foundation), and Shadi Mokhtari (Professor, American University) to examine the unfolding political struggles in Iran and their potential implications for the Islamic Republic. Alex Vatanka (Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute) will moderate the discussion. ___________________________________________________________

  1. The Battle for the New Libya | Tuesday, April 24 | 5:30pm – 7:00pm | Carnegie Endowment | Register here |

The death of Muammar Qadhafi in 2011 freed Libya from forty-two years of despotic rule, raising hopes for a new era. But in the aftermath of the uprising, the country descended into bitter rivalries and civil war, paving the way for the Islamic State and a catastrophic migrant crisis. What went wrong? Based on years of field reporting in Libya, Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey will discuss his new book, The Burning Shores: Inside the Battle for the New Libya, which tells the stories of Libyan lives upended by the turmoil, sheds new light on the country’s afflictions, and provides valuable lessons for the future. Longtime Libyan activist and medical doctor Laila Bugaighis will serve as a discussant and journalist Robert F. Worth will moderate. The discussion will be followed by a short reception, and copies of the book will be available for purchase. Featuring Frederic Wehrey (Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Laila Bugaighis (former deputy director general and CEO, Benghazi Medical Center), and Robert F. Worth (contributing writer, New York Times Magazine; author, A Rage for Order: The Middle East in Turmoil, from Tahrir Square to ISIS).

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  1. Iraq’s Upcoming Elections: Likely Outcomes and Impact on US-Iraqi Relations | Wednesday, April 25 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |

Please join the Atlantic Council for a conversation with a panel of experts to discuss Iraq’s upcoming parliamentary election, post-election dynamics, alliances to form a new government we may see emerge, what political and constitutional reforms the next government needs to adopt, and how the election may impact US-Iraq relations. Featuring Ambassador Feisal al-Istrabadi (Founding Director, Center for the Study of the Middle East, Indiana University, Bloomington), Ambassador Rend al-Rahim (Co-Founder and President, Iraq Foundation), Dr. Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council), Ambassador Ryan Crocker (Visiting Lecturer and Diplomat-in-Residence, Princeton University), and Ms. Vivian Salama (Political Reporter, NBC News) as moderator. With introductory remarks by Frederick Kempe (President and CEO, Atlantic Council).

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  1. New Year, New Strategy: Shifting Policies on North Korea in 2018 | Wednesday, April 25 | 1:30pm – 3:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |

After more than a year of escalating tensions over North Korea’s nuclear provocations and a war of words between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump, we have seen an abrupt shift in strategy on the Korean Peninsula. Declaring himself content with North Korea’s nuclear weapons arsenal in late 2017, Kim Jong Un began 2018 with a new approach: diplomatic outreach. A summit between Kim and ROK President Moon Jae-in inside the Demilitarized Zone will be held later this month, the first inter-Korean summit in more than a decade. On the eve of the summit between the leaders of the Koreas, several leading scholars will discuss this shift in strategy, including lessons from history, prospects for peace and reconciliation, and implications for the United States as President Trump prepares for his summit with Kim. Join the Wilson Center for a discussion that will provide background and context as a season of summits between the North Koreans and its Korean War foes unfolds. Featuring Abraham Denmark (Director, Asia Program, Wilson Center), Jean H. Lee (Director, Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy), Jung H. Pak (Senior Fellow, SK-Korean Foundation Chair in Korea Studies, Brookings Institution), and Jake Sullivan (Martin R. Flug Visiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School). With introductory remarks by Joonho Cheon (Minister, Embassy of the Republic of Korea).

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  1. Afghanistan in 2020: Is Peace Possible? | Wednesday, April 25 | 2:30pm – 4:30pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |

The search for peace has become a central focus of Afghanistan policy in Washington and for Kabul. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani offered the Taliban constitutional reform and status as a legitimate political party in late February on the condition that the group makes peace. In recent months, the Taliban have also publicly offered talks with the United States and prominent Afghan powerbrokers, and high-profile peace demonstrations in conflict-torn Helmand province have spread across much of the country. Featuring Ambassador Timothy Carney (Former U.S. Ambassador to Sudan and Haiti), John Wood (Associate Professor, National Defense University; former U.S. National Security Council Senior Director for Afghanistan), Johnny Walsh (Senior Expert, Afghanistan, USIP; former DOS lead for Afghan reconciliation), Courtney Cooper (International Affairs Fellow, CFR; former U.S. National Security Council Director for Afghanistan), Ahmad Mohibi (Founder and President, Rise to Peace), and Michael Sherwin (Assistant United States Attorney, DOS; former U.S. Navy Intelligence Officer) as moderator.

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  1. Iran: As Anti-Government Protests Continue, Can the U.S. Help Maintain Momentum? | Thursday, April 26 | 3:30pm – 4:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |

In January, the Iranian regime announced that the anti-government protests that unexpectedly swept through the country had successfully been suppressed. In truth, this struggle continues–if not in the streets, then on social media, on city walls, and in the private lives of citizens. In the eyes of the younger generation of the Shiite majority, who are the backbone of the protests, the mullahs are losing legitimacy. This discontent is not limited to economic grievances and has taken aim at the political and social leadership as a whole. Many of these protests have begun to target laws like mandatory headscarves. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, the mandatory headscarf for women has been the enduring symbol of the mullahs’ political control and of women’s restricted status. Foregoing the hijab in public is to risk arrest, job loss, lashing, reeducation classes or other punishments, so these protesters have resorted to posting photos and videos of themselves on social media. Featuring Masih Alinejad (Founder, My Stealthy Freedom), Mehrangiz Kar (Iranian feminist scholar), Mariam Memarsadeghi (Co-founder and Co-director, Tavaana), Nina Shea (Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Religious Freedom, Hudson Institute).

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  1. Investing in Iraq: Reconstruction and the Role of the Energy Sector | Thursday, April 26 | 5:00pm – 6:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |

On the heels of the Kuwait conference in February, and with an oil and gas bidding round and elections on the horizon, this wide-ranging conversation will focus on the state of investment in Iraq, including the role the energy sector can play in enabling recovery, and the challenges ahead in terms of rebuilding and recovery. Featuring H.E. Dr. Fareed Yasseen (Iraqi Ambassador to the United States), Majid Jafar (CEO, Crescent Petroleum), Ben Van Heuvelen (Editor in Chief, Iraq Oil Report), Ellen Scholl (Deputy Director, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council) as moderator. With introductory remarks by Frederick Kempe (President and CEO, Atlantic Council).

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Dare to dream

Alexandros Mallias, former ambassador of the Hellenic Republic to the US and now a special adviser to Eliamep, writes (based on his presentation to the 5th Hellenic High  Strategy Conference, March 29 -30: 

A process that runs from Tehran to Helsinki via Jerusalem?  Madness,  or surrealism? Call it utopia, but tomorrow it may become necessity. Allow me to identify six major problems and offer six proposals:

Mismatch between threats, military interventions and their consequences

The so-called “Arab Spring” is not simply a lost opportunity for the Arabs but also a great occasion missed by Europe and the United States as well. For the first time since the rise of “Arab nationalism” in the 1950s, the origin of the revolts did not target Europe, the United States, and Israel. What happened next was due also to our action, miscalculations or inertia and affects our own security and stability.

The unprecedented flow of refugees and migrants to Europe is the unavoidable “collateral damage.” The refugee and migration flows undermined the European integration process and pushed xenophobia and nationalism into mainstream politics. The refugee issue was the catalyst for the Brexit referendum. The European Union is losing a global politico-military partner and capabilities. I earnestly hope this trend will be reversed.

The EU was inadequate, divided and slow to assess the threat, to react, and to act. The lack of a common and integrated foreign policy as a functional common denominator is at the heart of the problem.

Proposal: prevention of population movements should be at the center of political decision-making

The following conditions need to be fulfilled before giving the “green light” for military power:

  1. Defining the problem: what threat was Libya’ s dictator Muammar Gaddafi to Europe’s security? Is today’s Libya a security provider for Europe?
  2. A clear political goal: what do we want to achieve? What does success consist of?
  3. A clear line between wishful thinking and what is possible: no early “mission accomplished” fireworks.
  4. Political objectives matched by appropriate economic, political, and military means.

Conflicts of interest of the Middle East actors

The vital interests of regional players diverge. They are part of the problem as well as of the solution.

Proposal:  a new regional security system covering the Middle East and the Mediterranean

The proposed arrangement might include all MENA States, Iran included, the five Permanent Members of the UNSC and the EU. This idea was floating in the UN Security Council Resolutions (Iran-Iraq cease fire) in the late 80’s.

Without a minimum understanding between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia, there is no possibility of establishing balanced, interest-based security in the wider region of the Middle East and North Africa.

Saudi Arabia is changing. The modernization policies are essential for the Kingdom’s stability and security. Potentially aggressive behavior by Iran during the implementation of Saudi Arabia’s welcome reforms must be prevented. But the stabilization process of the wider Middle East is not achievable without Iran.

Logic dictates that long-term balance of power and interests should allow establishing the terms for the inclusion of Iran, Saudi Arabia and at a later stage Israel in a  regional security arrangement, no matter how  impossible this perspective looks today. However, logic rarely becomes a mainstream practice in international relations.

We should remember that the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 cemented the era of détente and cooperation, before the end of the Cold War. It included recognition that: “The participating states are convinced that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole…”

We need to launch a process including the OSCE member-states and the MENA states. The participating states should undertake commitments similar to those adopted within the  Helsinki Process. China should also participate.

Nuclear proliferation

The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East is real. It will become unavoidable if Iran gets nuclear capabilities. Already, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and possibly Egypt are contemplating their own nuclear ambitions.

Egypt’s well-known proposal for the creation of a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Middle East sounds good.  However, Israel has its own reasons not to back the Egyptian plan.

Proposal: a phased multilateral treaty

First : The elaboration and adoption of a  binding multilateral  treaty for  the non-use of nuclear weapons in the greater Middle East (including Iran).

Second: the Treaty could include a clause that bans, within a defined time schedule (for example 20 years), nuclear weapons in the wider Middle East, establishing a nuclear-free zone. The Permanent Members (P5) of the UN Security Council and the European Union could also be contracting parties.

Ballistic missiles and conventional forces

Iranian ballistic missiles are a threat to Israel’s security. The anticipated improvements in their accuracy and delivery capacity will further increase Israel’s and others’ concern and need for security, deterrence and retaliation.

Proposal: a “Middle East Conventional Forces Control and Reduction Treaty”

This would require the proportional and simultaneous reduction of ballistic and other conventional armaments. It could take the shape of a legally binding instrument similar to the November 1990 Paris “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.”

We could foresee an intermediate set of Confidence Building Measures, including international  inspections and observation of military exercises.

Anachronism and dysfunction of the global collective security system

The UN is unable to discharge its duties as the global collective security system. Unilateral actions by the P5 without foresight actions are well illustrated through their involvement in the Syrian chaos.

Often acting at the margins of their mandate (mainly the UN Charter’s Articles 23 and 24 ) their acts are justified by self-interest.  Their motivations are geopolitical; about prevailing and expanding or containing influence.

Proposal: The UN Charter to be revised and the Security Council updated

Τhe post-war composition and the abuse of veto power do not match the present global  risks, balance of power and capabilities.

Conclusion

We need to dare to dream. Today’s impossible is tomorrow’s achievement. Peace in the Middle East is not beyond our reach.

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Russia should be job 1

Far be it from me to in any way align myself with John Bolton, but there are things he could get the Administration to do consistent with at least some of his stated positions that would be preferable to the hodge-podge of contradictory signals Washington is currently sending on foreign policy.

For the moment, President Trump has prioritized the Iran nuclear deal. He is trying to use his threat to withdraw as leverage to get the Europeans to agree to amend the deal in order to gain access to Iranian military sites, restrain Tehran’s missile program, and end the “sunset” (expiration) clauses. His self-imposed deadline is May 12, when Congress requires him to certify once again that the deal is in the US interest. He didn’t do that last time around and said he would withdraw if the agreement wasn’t fixed by the next deadline.

Withdrawing from the deal is patently not in the US national interest. Either Iran will also withdraw and re-initiate its nuclear program, giving it the potential for nuclear weapons within a year or so. Or Tehran and Brussels will decide to proceed without the US, splitting the Western alliance on a vital issue. US withdrawal would also spell the end of any distant hope (but see below) for a deal with North Korea, as Pyongyang would be correct to conclude that the US can’t be trusted to hold up its end, and strain relations further with China and Russia (who helped negotiate the agreement with Iran and continue to support it). There are simply no gains from withdrawal, only losses, unless you want to provide yourself with an excuse to go to war. That means risking the Sixth Fleet as well as numerous US bases and troops in the Gulf and Iraq, as well as attacks elsewhere in the Middle East and even inside the US.

Another apparent priority is North Korea. It already has nuclear weapons and credible if not certain means to deliver them, at least against US forces and allies in South Korea, Japan, and Guam. The odds of successfully negotiating “denuclearization” with Pyongyang are risible. There simply is no better protection for North Korea against an American attempt at regime change than Kim Jung-un’s nukes. Once again, the only real option to “denuclearize” is war. The consequences would be worse than catastrophic: at the very least a massive artillery barrage by the North against Seoul, killing tens of thousands, if not a nuclear exchange.

A third priority for Trump has been trade, in particular the North American Free Trade Agreement, (that is, Canada and Mexico) as well as China’s intellectual property expropriation and excess capacity in steel and aluminum. There is little hope of anything good coming of Trump’s unilateral measures (tariffs on steel and aluminum as well as on Chinese products), beyond the agreement already reached with South Korea (which has lots of reasons to be nice to the US these days). Tariffs are a blunt tool that has nothing to do with intellectual property theft, and the US doesn’t import much steel or aluminum from China. It does from Canada and Mexico, which have already been exempted from the tariffs, whose main impact will be to raise prices to American consumers (not only for steel and aluminum but for all the products in which they are used).

The remaining priority is Russia, which has distinguished itself in recent years by defying the norms of the liberal international order: murdering its opponents abroad and at home (including with nerve gas in a public place!), refusing to leave parts of other countries (Moldova and Abkhazia), annexing Crimea, invading Ukraine, threatening the Baltics as well as Sweden and Finland, meddling in democratic elections while making its own non-competitive, and intervening to slaughter the relatively moderate opposition as well as thousands of civilians in Syria while launching a mercenary attack on US troops and allies there. Moscow is the capital of a state that has gone rogue.

Bolton is no friend of Russia. He recognizes and has denounced most if not all of the offenses listed here. The problem is the President. While the Administration rightly boasts that it has done more against Russia (in expulsion of diplomats and sanctions) than Obama did (partly because Russia has done more against the US than in Obama’s time), President Trump has still not uttered a word of criticism against Vladimir Putin. Such consistency is not his normal habit and raises the question worldwide whether the US really speaks with one voice. That incoherence limits the impact of the modest moves made so far to counter Russia’s troublemaking.

It seems to me the right order of priorities is this:

  1. Russia: pushback worldwide, with a view to reaching a new, more balanced, modus vivendi
  2. Iran: no withdrawal from the nuclear deal but instead get it and its proxies out of Syria, where they pose a threat to Israel
  3. Trade: by using the WTO and other well-established multilateral mechanisms, not unilateral tariffs and exceptions that will shift imports but do little to limit them
  4. North Korea: deterrence is really the only option

More in a future post on how to accomplish at least 1 and 2.

 

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