Tag: Syria
This week’s peace picks
Three Afghanistan events in within two days, two Iran events on successive days. Hard to believe the thinktanks are thinking hard about audience, but it’s an ample week:
1. Does Afghanistan’s Reconstruction Have a Future?, Monday February 4, 9:30 AM-10:30 AM, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, B1 A/B Conference Room, 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006
Speakers: John F. Sopko, Robert D Lamb
The CSIS Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation (C3) invites you to the launch of SIGAR’s Quarterly Report: “Does Afghanistan’s Reconstruction Have a Future? Hard Questions” by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Please join Special Inspector Sopko for a discussion about his recent visit to Afghanistan and SIGAR’s Quarterly Report launch to Congress. The observations from his trip mirror the message of the report: the United States faces very tough questions about the future of its reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. As the United States and allies prepare to transfer security and other responsibilities to the Afghan government, will civilian reconstruction efforts have the same security they need to continue? How will projects be monitored and progress measured? Above all, what are the objectives of civilian reconstruction and can the United States provide the support needed to achieve them?
To RSVP please email csima@csis.org
Follow live tweeting from @CSISC3 #SIGAR
Website: http://csis.org/event/does-afghanistan…
2. Afghanistan 2014: Planning for the Transition, Monday February 4, 12:15 PM-1:45 PM, New America Foundation
Venue: New America Foundation, 1899 L St., NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: Saad Mohseni, Peter Bergen
Many wonder if Afghanistan can succeed as a stable, self-sustaining country when NATO completes its combat mission at the end of 2014. Afghanistan continues to rely on massive amounts of foreign aid, and its fledgling security forces are now taking the reins of a tough military campaign against well-entrenched insurgents. But some Afghans remain confident that their nation will pull through. Saad Mohseni, Chairman of the Moby Group, is among those who are confident in the country. His company’s portfolio includes Tolo TV, the leading broadcaster in Afghanistan, and he has been described as Afghanistan’s first media mogul. Please join the New America Foundation’s National Security Studies Program for a conversation with Mohseni about the reasons for his bullishness on Afghanistan’s future.
Director, National Security Studies Program, New America Foundation
Website: http://www.newamerica.net/events/2013/…
3. The United States and Central Asia After 2014, Tuesday February 5, 4:00 PM- 6:00 PM, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Basement Level Conference Rooms A & B, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K St, NW, Washington, DC, 20006
Speakers: Jeffrey Mankoff, Thomas E. Graham, Frederick Starr, Andrew Kuchins
With the drawdown of international forces from Afghanistan in 2014, Central Asia will cease to be a region of pressing strategic focus in U.S. global strategy. This shift threatens to undermine the region’s precarious stability, which could in turn create new problems for the United States and the broader international community. Thus the United States must recast its strategy in Central Asia to address potential threats from within the region while also seeking productive engagement with other external players, including Russia and China.
The new report from the CSIS Russia & Eurasia Program, “The United States and Central Asia After 2014,” offers a number of useful recommendations grounded in regional realities that can help advance U.S. engagement in Central Asia and promote security cooperation, political stability, and sustainable regional economic growth.
Dr. Jeffrey Mankoff
Deputy Director and Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program at CSIS
Discussants:
Thomas E. Graham
Managing Director, Kissinger Associates, Inc.
S. Frederick Starr
Chairman, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
Senior Research Professor, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Moderated by:
Dr. Andrew Kuchins
Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program at CSIS
Website: http://csis.org/event/united-states-an…
4. Dealing with a Nuclear Iran, Wednesday February 6, 8:30 AM- 12:30 PM, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K St, NW, Washington DC 20006
Speakers: John Hamre, Olli Heinonen, James Cartwright, Jon Alterman, Andrew Kuchins, Haim Malka and more
Both the Bush and Obama administrations have attempted to end the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program. Most outside parties fear the implications of Iran growing closer to a real nuclear weapons capability, including how security is calculated throughout the Middle East. The prospect of an Iranian bomb is so daunting that several countries-including the United States-have indicated a willingness to use military action to set back the Iranian effort, and the consequences of such a strike could themselves shake the foundations of diplomatic and security relationships throughout the Middle East.
With the U.S. and Israeli elections over, and with Iranian elections looming, are there alternatives to a steady Iranian march toward a nuclear weapons capacity? Is it possible to envision a solution or process that could be acceptable to Iran, the United States and its allies, other permanent members of the UN Security Council and Iran’s neighbors? If so, what would it look like and how should it be pursued? What steps should be taken to make it more likely that it is part of a genuine process of de-escalation rather than merely marking time until Iran acquires a weapon?
Please join us on Wednesday, February 6th for a half-day forum with CSIS experts to consider what successful solutions might require from Iran, the United States and other key states.
Please RSVP to the Proliferation Prevention Program at PPP@csis.org or (202) 457-8768.
8:30am-8:45am
WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION
Dr. John Hamre, President and CEO, CSIS
8:45am-9:15am
A conversation with Dr. Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University and Sharon Squassoni, Director, Proliferation Prevention Program
9:15am-9:45am
A conversation with General James Cartwright (USMC, Ret.), Harold Brown Chair in Defense Policy Studies and Dr. Jon Alterman, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and Director, Middle East Program
BREAK
10:00am-11:00am
Middle East Equities (Moderated by Dr. Andrew Kuchins, Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program)
The view from Israel, Mr. Haim Malka, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, CSIS
The view from the Gulf, Dr. Jon Alterman, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and Director, Middle East Program
11:00am-12:30pm
Allies and Others (Moderated by Sharon Squassoni, Director, Proliferation Prevention Program)
Panelists:
European interests, Ms. Heather Conley, Senior Fellow and Director, Europe Program
Russian interests, Dr. Andrew Kuchins, Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program,
Sanctions impact and oil markets – Mr. David Pumphrey, Co-Director and Senior Fellow, Energy & National Security Program
Website: http://csis.org/event/dealing-nuclear-…
6. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Economic Reform to Prosperity for Fiscal Collapse and What to Do About It?, Wednesday February 6, 10:00 AM- 12:00 PM, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Venue: Bernstein-Offit Building, Johns Hopkins SAIS, 1717 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington DC 500
Speakers: Enes Cengic, Mujo Selimovic, Goran Nedic, Dominik Tolksdorf, Jonathan Moore, Daniel Serwer, Zivko Budimir
Enes Cengic, CEO of Energoinvest; Mujo Selimovic, CEO of MIMS Group; Goran Nedic, executive board member of the America-Bosnia Foundation; Dominik Tolksdorf, TAPIR and Security Fellow at the SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations (CTR); Jonathan Moore, director of the Office of South Central European Affairs at the U.S. Department of State; and Daniel Serwer (moderator), SAIS CTR senior fellow and senior research professor in the Conflict Management Program, will discuss this topic. Zivko Budimir, president of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, will deliver opening remarks.
Website: http://sais-jhu.edu/events/2013-02-06-…
7. Moving to Decision: US Policy toward Iran, Thursday February 7, 12:00 PM- 2:00 PM, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Venue: Stern Library and Conference Room, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW Suite 1050, Washington DC 20036
Speakers: Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Ambassador James F. Jeffrey
All signs point to 2013 being a year of decision on Iran. In particular, the Obama administration must crystallize its diplomatic and military options for confronting the challenge, which includes making the president’s “prevention” threat credible in the absence of clear redlines and addressing concerns that a pivot to Asia could leave America militarily exposed in a confrontation.
To help U.S. policymakers prepare for the weighty choices that will emerge in the coming weeks and months, The Washington Institute will release a new report assessing the diplomatic, military, and broader strategic response to Tehran’s nuclear activities.
To mark the publication of this study, the Institute will host a Policy Forum luncheon with Ambassador Thomas Pickering and the report’s author, Ambassador James F. Jeffrey.
Thomas Pickering is a former career U.S. diplomat who served with distinction for five decades. His many posts included undersecretary of state for political affairs and ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Nigeria, Jordan, and El Salvador, among other key assignments in Washington and abroad. Currently, he is vice chair of the international consulting firm Hills & Company.
James F. Jeffrey is a distinguished visiting fellow at The Washington Institute and former U.S. ambassador to Turkey (2008-2010) and Iraq (2010-2012). He also served as assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor in the George W. Bush administration.
Website: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pol…
8. The Battle for Syria, Friday February 8, 12:15 PM- 2:00 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave, NW Washington DC, 20036
Speakers: Karim Sadjadpour, Paul Sham, Frederic Hof, Henri Barkey, Emile Hokayem
As Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad mercilessly clings to power, proxy battles among neighboring countries-namely Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and Qatar-are helping determine which armed factions will emerge victorious from the rubble. What role are external powers playing in Syria’s political and humanitarian crisis, how is Assad’s unraveling affecting regional power dynamics, and what are the implications for U.S. policy?
Website: http://carnegieendowment.org/events/?f…
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Adagio
There is slow movement, adagio not andante, on two fronts, Syria and the Iran nuclear issue:
- Syrian opposition leader Moaz al Khatib’s proposal for conditional talks with the regime has elicited some interest on the part of Syria, Iran and Russia.
- The P5+1 (that’s the US, UK, France, Russia and China + Germany) have agreed to meet with Iran to discuss nuclear issues February 25 in Kazakhstan. The US and Iran are indicating willingness to meet bilaterally as well.
There is no breakthrough here. These are small steps forward at the glacial pace that often characterizes diplomatic moves. But given how frozen things seemed on both fronts even a few days ago, this is progress.
On Syria, Khatib’s proposal was a personal one, made initially on his Facebook page without approval of his Coalition. It reflects in part the view of the National Coordination Committee, which is an inside Syria opposition group that has long wanted to start a dialogue with the regime. The expatriate opposition was not pleased with the proposition. My guess is that the Americans are okay with it, even though they continue to insist that Bashar al Asad step aside.
Dialogue could lead to a split in the regime between hawks who want to continue the crackdown and doves who see promise in talking with the opposition. Of course it could also lead to a similar split in the opposition, with hardline Islamists opting to continue the fighting and relative moderates interested in talking. The key issue is whether Bashar is prepared to leave power. If not, dialogue with the regime is likely to become a snare and a delusion, wrecking the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces that Khatib leads.
On Iran’s nuclear program, the outline of a deal is increasingly clear:
- limits on uranium enrichment (e.g., an end to Iranian enrichment above 20%, shipment out of the country of stockpile uranium enriched beyond 5%, and likely also something restricting plutonium production, which has not been much of a public issue so far);
- a serious, verifiable and irreversible commitment not to develop nuclear weapons (including “coming clean” on past nuclear weapons-related activities);
- an end to American and multilateral economic and financial sanctions.
It is the sequencing of the many steps that need to be taken to get to this result that has caused so much difficulty. The Americans and Europeans want the nuclear commitments implemented up front. The Iranians want sanctions relief first. Lack of trust makes compromise difficult, but it would not seem completely out of reach, provided Iran is prepared to make a serious and verifiable commitment not to develop nuclear weapons.
What we’ve got here are two instances of coercive diplomacy, where outside powers are bringing pressure to bear in order to end one regime and to curtail fundamentally the options available to another one. The odds of success are not high, since the regimes involved have a good deal at stake (and are allied with each other). Bashar al Asad would have to come to the conclusion that his life is worth more than his position. Tehran would have to come to the conclusion that regime survival is more likely if it accepts limits on its nuclear program than if it rejects them.
On the other side, the key ingredient is credibility.
The Americans and Europeans need to convince Bashar that they are fully committed to end his rule. To do so, they need to back more fully and visibly Khatib’s Coalition, making it a serious governing alternative to the Syrian regime. This is more important now than arms supplies, which seem to be reaching the rebellion in substantial if not overwhelming quantities.
Washington and Brussels also need to convince Tehran that they will tighten sanctions further if there is no nuclear deal. And Washington needs to make the threat of military force more credible than it appeared at former Senator Hagel’s confirmation hearing last week.
Even if talks with the Syrian regime and with the Iranians begin soon, at this pace we still have a long way to go before we can be certain of acceptable outcomes on either front. But slow movement is better than none.
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Grasping at last straws
UN Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi is said to have offered the UN Security Council on Thursday a “Plan C” for Syria along the following lines:
1. Syria’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity must be preserved.
2. A recognition that ultimate objective is for Syrians to have a full say in the way they are governed.
3. The formation of a transition government with “full executive powers.” Brahimi says he believes that means President Bashar al Assad “would have no role in the transition.”
4. Both sides would need to be represented by broad group of opposition leaders and strong military-civilian delegation from the Syrian government.
5. Negotiations should occur outside of Syria, and conform with a timetable setting out a speedy path towards elections, constitutional reform, and a referendum. He raised the prospect of moving from a presidential system of government to a parliamentarian system.
6. He urged the U.N. Security Council to unequivocally express support for the right of each citizen in Syria “to enjoy full equality before the law irrespective of gender, religion, language or ethnicity.”
This is more a slight elaboration last June’s Geneva communiqué than it is a new plan.
The leader of the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, Moaz al Khatib, appeared open to this when he let it be known that he would be prepared to meet with Syrian government representatives in one of a number of Middle East capitals, provided political prisoners were released and Syrians abroad permitted to renew their passports. His Coalition was not happy though and has instructed him not to agree to anything without their approval.
So it is no surprise that meetings of some sort will occur on the margins of the “Wehrkunde” (Munich Security) conference on Saturday involving the al Khatib, Brahimi, the Russians and the Americans. But it would be foolish to express any optimism that a political solution will be found. The disappointments–Kofi Annan’s as well as Brahimi’s–have been many.
The vital question remains whether the Russians are willing and able to push Bashar al Asad aside and open the door to a democratic transition that he does not control. There are doubts on both scores. While Moscow officials often claim they are not trying to protect Asad, President Putin seems unwilling to give him a shove. This could reflect incapacity, or at least fear of it. But I doubt that. If the Russians were to cut off arms supply, financing and diplomatic support, Bashar would be unlikely to last long. More likely, it reflects Russian unwillingness to let the transition in Syria get out of Moscow’s grasp.
While nominally there is still a debate in Washington about intervention, I am still not seeing signs that the Obama Administration is seriously considering upping its game in Syria. I suppose we really need to see the new Secretaries of State and Defense in place before we can be sure, but both have given every indication in their confirmation testimony that they are likely to be at least as cautious about U.S. military action as their predecessors. Boots on the ground have long been ruled out, but Kerry and Hagel don’t seem likely to me to go for a no fly zone or even direct U.S. military supplies.
I still hope they will however see their way to strong political and financial support for the Syrian Coalition. Al Khatib has stuck his neck out in an effort to give Brahimi something to work with. The Americans and Europeans should be helping him to preserve his leadership role by giving him the resources needed to set up a transition government that can carry out the dialogue he said he was open to. If we fail to support him, we’ll regret it. The alternatives are far more hardline. And continuation of the war in Syria is not in our interest.
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Should the US save Syria?
While the situation in Syria worsens and the death-toll rises, there is no consensus in Washington on whether the US should intervene to put an end to the Syrian humanitarian crisis. The McCain Institute this week launched its “Debate and Decision Series” by gathering four experts on the Middle East and US foreign policy to debate “Should the United States Save Syria?”
The “yes camp,” which supported US intervention, included Robert Kagan and Leon Wieseltier. The “no camp,” which believed US intervention would be a grave mistake, included Joshua Landis and Aaron David Miller. CNN’s Elise Labott moderated and Senator McCain’s offered a short introduction, reiterating his belief that the Syria crisis will strong affect the region.
The “Yes Camp”:
Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at Brookings’ Center on Foreign Policy, member of the Foreign Affairs Policy Board of Secretary Clinton, and a regular columnist for the Washington Post, underscored the importance of the Syrian crisis to the US. While past US interventions were motivated either by strategic interests or on humanitarian grounds, Syria is a place where strategic interests and humanitarian purposes converge. If the US does not intervene, the cost will be very high since new threats to US national security will emerge. Failed states have become breeding grounds for terrorism:
the consequence to us [the American people], directly, of Syria becoming a failed state has huge costs.
Leon Wiesletier, the editor of The New Republic, said the US cannot afford Obama’s policy of transforming the US into a “non-internationalist state.” Not only does the Syrian crisis involve US responsibility to end a deep humanitarian crisis, but lack of intervention will also put US values into question. In strategic terms,
there could be no bigger strategic blow to Iran and its allies than the overthrow of the Assad regime.
The US should intervene to overthrow of the Assad regime and stop the genocide, prevent the jihadists from winning, and arm the secular opposition.
The “No Camp”:
Joshua Landis, Director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma and a frequent blogger on the Syrian crisis, strongly opposed US intervention on several grounds:
- America should not involve itself in what has become an ethnic war since “a new ethnic balance is taking place in the Middle East,” and it should not “pick winners especially in ethnic wars;”
- Only Syrians can save Syria from radicalization. The US failed in Iraq and Afghanistan when it tried to nation-build in those countries;
- If the US intervenes and then leaves, as in previous cases, the situation will just get messier;
- Decapitating the Assad regime now would destabilize Syria; it is not clear that earlier intervention would have avoided the current difficulties.
Aaron David Miller, former negotiator and advisor on Middle East issues in the Department of State under several administrations, said the US must realize that it cannot do everything and that it will be incapable of managing intervention in Syria. He highlighted the risks of getting itself in a crisis that might not end as planned:
there is a correlation between our miscalculated adventures and our own broken-house.
If Washington intervenes to ensure that a pro-US government emerges in Syria, this will delegitimize the new regime. The Arab Spring is legitimate because it is controlled by the Arabs themselves. Besides, Aaron said,
so much blood has flowed that it is impossible to think of a negotiated settlement now.
The Rebuttals and Conclusions:
Kagan found Landis’ argument that decapitating the Assad regime would “destabilize Syria” to be illogical since the situation is already unstable. He criticized the latter’s focus on US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan as a measure for future US failures. US history extends before 2001 and 2003; it has a “mixed record,” just as any great power does. Kagan rejected Landis’ claim that the ethnic nature of the conflict will inevitably mean American failure. US intervention in Bosnia has led to stability. Kagan claimed that doing something is better than nothing. The US should not wait till Assad deploys his chemical weapons against the Syrian people.
Wiesletier attacked Landis’ claim that the US should not get itself into a conflict that the Syrians should resolve by saying that “other powers are already in the middle:” Russia and Iran are already determining the outcome.
Landis rebutted the arguments of the “yes camp” by stating that contrary to Wiesletier’s claim that US intervention would prevent the jihadists and help advance the secular, pro-Western opposition, the US is incapable of placing whom it likes as the leaders of any new regime that will emerge. The Islamists are on top. The “Harvard-educated opposition” will not take the lead.
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Some good news
There is good news this morning: French forces in Mali have taken the northern town of Kidal, donors have pledged over $450 million for Mali and $1.2 billion for Syria. These are not small things, but they are not the end of the story either.
In Mali, there is now the question of Azawad, the largely desert area northwest of Kidal where Tuareg live. They have been seeking independence–it was their rebellion that touched off the Islamist insurgency that in turn precipitated the French intervention. The Islamists have not fought the French advance. Instead they have retreated northward. The question now is whether the Tuareg will help the French do them in, or at least expel them from Mali. France is already calling for the Mali government to talk with the Tuareg, hoping of course to keep them on side even if independence is out of the question.
A second important issue is deployment of African troops under UN command to Mali. The UN Security Council has already approved a mission, but organizing it, financing it and deploying it will be a big challenge. The French will presumably take the lead in trying to make this happen, as they would like out before anyone discovers that their troops might be an easy target. The Mali government and Tuareg insurgents are likely to want to keep the French in, each hoping that they will gain advantage in a negotiation over the north that is not likely to go smoothly.
In Syria, the gigantic pledges at yesterday’s donors’ conference in Kuwait are at least a sign that the world is appalled at what is happening, but humanitarian assistance is really not an adequate response to Bashar al Asad’s homicidal behavior. The head of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, Moaz al Khatib, is offering to meet the Syrian regime in various Middle Eastern capitals. That is an offer unlikely to be taken up. UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi is thought to be close to giving up on the search for a political solution, as Kofi Annan did before him.
What is needed in Syria is the kind of decisive move that France took in Mali. The trouble is no one has come up with what that might be. Boots on the ground aren’t going to happen. A no-fly zone might be a big help to the rebels, but President Obama is showing no appetite for it, fearing the Russians would retaliate by denying him support for the Northern Distribution Network for Afghanistan and the P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran. The Israelis yesterday reportedly attacked a convoy in Syria most likely thought to consist of missiles headed for delivery to Hizbollah in Lebanon. That kind of pinprick from that source is not going to make a difference.
Unequivocal support for a new government in Syria, appointed by the National Coalition, is about the best proposition out there these days. It will guarantee nothing, but at least it would signal determination to make the inevitable happen: the fall of Bashar al Asad.
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Costly and insufficient
President Obama today sharply increased humanitarian aid to Syria, by $155 million:
Welcome though it may be, increased humanitarian aid will do nothing to solve the real problem in Syria, which is at its heart political. The regime has decided to stay in power by using whatever force is necessary.
Fred Hof argues that what Syria really needs now is an alternative government. The National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces is trying to form one. But the Coalition is hesitating because it worries about failure. If the international community does not provide sufficient resources, a revolutionary government could demonstrate weakness rather than strength, ringing a death knell to the two-year struggle against Asad.
President Obama is rightly worried about getting involved militarily in Syria, a move that could endanger Russian cooperation on Afghanistan and Iran. But what Fred is arguing does not require American boots on the ground, Patriot missiles in the air or even boatloads of arms supplies. It would only require that Washington recognize a revolutionary government and supply it with financial resources, perhaps $50-100 million for its own first-year start up costs as well as channeling a good part of the humaniarian aid through whatever mechanisms it is able to gin up.
This to me is a no-brainer. If we’ve already accepted the National Coalition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, the government it forms must the legitimate government of Syria. I’m sure there are a thousand legal issues that would need to be resolved, but it makes no sense to allow those to stand in the way of making the political moves required to bring the regime in Syria to the earliest possible end. And political moves require some financial backing, albeit much less than feeding, sheltering and clothing millions of people.
President Obama obviously knows what is going on in Syria–he refers to some of the worst behavior of the regime in the White House video. And he must know how hollow his own presentation sounds to those who are suffering inside Syria. If not, he should count the thumbs down on his video. Now what he needs to do is put some money and political support behind an alternative Syrian government, before it is too late.
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