Tag: Syria

Middle East: less grand, more strategy

Middle East Institute intern Aya Fasih, recently arrived from Cairo, writes in her debut on peacefare:

With the re-election of President Obama and massive transformations ongoing in the region, the Middle East Policy Council’s 71st Capitol Hill Conference focused Wednesday on “U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East: Is There One?” Related questions included:

  • Is it even possible to formulate a grand strategy for the region amidst all the turbulence it is witnessing?
  • Were past U.S. grand strategies for the region successful in achieving their objectives?

The prestigious panel, comprised of Chas Freeman Jr., William Quandt, Marwan Muasher and John Duke Anthony (moderated by Thomas Mattair), identified five main points of discussion: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran, the Arab uprisings, the Syrian crisis, and the political-economic security of the Gulf Cooperation Council states.

Chas Freeman Jr., Chairman of Projects International, former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and President of the Middle East Policy Council, said the two main U.S. policies in the Middle East, unconditional support to Israel and strategic partnership with pre-revolutionary Egypt and the rentier Gulf states, were contradictory and therefore precluded any grand strategy.  Freeman underscored the costs associated with U.S. support and protection of Israel; he said that U.S. support for irresponsible and immoral policies of Israel has undermined U.S. strategic interests in the region and potential cooperation with the region’s other powers:

America may have Israel’s back, but no one has America’s back.

Continuation post-revolution of an American-Egyptian partnership is in doubt. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, Afghanistan, and “abandonment” of the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians, the U.S.-Saudi relationship has weakened and become more “transactional.”  It should no longer be taken for granted.   In Freeman’s view, U.S. policies preclude formulation of grand strategies and leave room for only limited cooperation.

William Quandt, Professor at the University of Virginia and former staff member of the National Security Council, started by expressing suspicion of grand strategies.  The Bush 41/Clinton dual containment of Iraq and Iran failed, as did the Bush 43 strategy of replacing certain Arab regimes, starting with Iraq, with pro-Western ones. Quandt, like the other three fellow panelists, thought the U.S. needs to revise its policies, starting with the realization that “we are not all-powerful.”   A revised strategy should include:

  1. an end to U.S.-Iran animosity, which would avoid a dangerous war and benefit Iraq, Syria and Lebanon;
  2. maintenance of positive relations with NATO ally Turkey, which will also benefit Iraq and Syria;
  3. friendly relations with Egypt because of its geo-strategic importance and influence over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
  4. greater attention to Saudi Arabia, which faces a difficult generational transition;
  5. a negotiated end to the Syrian conflict;
  6. a renewed effort to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

John Duke Anthony, Founding President of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, discussed mainly the six Gulf Cooperation Council states, highlighting the vital strategic importance of the GCC for the region’s security and U.S. energy supplies.

Marwan Muasher, Vice President for Studies at Carnegie Endowment and former Jordanian Foreign Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and Ambassador to the United States, highlighted how the U.S. must change its approach by assessing the new governments and players in the region not based on their ideology but rather on their performance. U.S. influence will not be decisive in the process of transition.  Events on the ground and competition for power among local actors will determine the outcomes.  It is crucial that the US start differentiating between different Islamist actors and parties and realize that serious differences exist among them. The clock is ticking on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Unless the U.S. chooses to sponsor it now, peace may never be an option again.

All four panelists agreed that U.S. policies toward the vital region must undergo serious reassessment if the U.S. wants to secure its strategic interests.  The U.S. should exert extraordinary effort to solve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, re-engage with Iran and work quickly to ensure a negotiated settlement in Syria.

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This week’s peace picks

The holiday season has ended.  Monday is particularly busy:

 

1. A Bleak Winter:  Providing Needed Aid to Those Fleeing Conflict in Syria, Monday January 14, 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM, Migration Policy Institute

Venue:  Migration Policy Institute, 1400 16th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 300 (third floor), MPI Conference Room

Speakers:   Mort Abramowitz, George Rupp, Fadi al Khankan, Kathleen Newland

The humanitarian crisis in and around Syria is intensifying as more people are forced to flee their homes in the face of continuing violence. More than half a million Syrians have left the country, at least two million are internally displaced, and many more have seen their normal lives and livelihoods destroyed. As winter sets in, stocks of food and fuel are dwindling. The strain on neighboring countries is testing their ability to keep borders open to Syrian refugees and international assistance is not keeping up with the growing needs. No one seems to expect an early end to the displacement, even if the Assad regime falls in the near future.

A delegation of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) visited Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq in late November to discuss the humanitarian crisis with refugees, officials from host and donor governments, representatives of international humanitarian organizations and local nongovernmental agencies; and to get a firsthand look at the work of IRC partners and staff who are directly involved in providing assistance to the refugees and to Syrians trapped inside the country.

Please join MPI and IRC on January 14 to discuss the delegation’s report, augmented by the perspective of Dr. Al Khankan, representing the Syrian Expatriates Organization, an organization of Syrian professionals who are raising funds, sending critically needed supplies, and providing direct humanitarian assistance within Syria. The discussion will be moderated by MPI’s Kathleen Newland, who is an IRC overseer and was a member of the delegation that produced the report.

Register for this event here.

 

2.  Conference on Israel’s 2013 Election, Monday January 14, 10:00 AM – 3:30 PM, Georgetown University

Venue:  Georgetown University, 37th and O Streets NW, Washington, DC 20057, Copley Hall, Copley Formal Lounge

Speakers: Moran Stern, Natan Sachs, Natasha Mozgovaya, Ghaith Al-Omari, Dennis Ross, Dan Schueftan, Robert Lieber, David Makovsky, Robert Wexler

A conference examining the upcoming general election in Israel, scheduled for January 22, 2013. Experts will discuss the issues that will be factors influencing Israelis as they prepare to go cast their ballots.

This all-day conference in Copley Hall’s Formal Lounge will feature three panels examining domestic politics, regional politics, and Israel-US relations.

Domestic Politics, 10:00 am-11:30 am
Moran Stern (Georgetown, moderator); Natan Sachs (Saban Center at the Brookings Institution); Natasha Mozgovaya (Haaretz Daily Newspaper)

Regional Politics, 11:40 am-1:00 pm
Moran Stern (Georgetown, moderator); Ghaith Al-Omari (American Task Force on Palestine); Amb. Dennis Ross (Georgetown); Dan Schueftan (Georgetown); Gunol Tol (Middle East Institute)

Israel-US relations, 2:00 pm-3:30 pm
Robert Lieber (Georgetown, moderator); David Makovsky (Washington Istitute for Near East Policy); The Honorable Robert Wexler (S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace).

Register for this event here.

 

3. A Kingdom’s Future:  Saudi Arabia Through the Eyes of its Twentysomethings, Monday January 14, 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM, Wilson Center

Venue:  Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, 5th Floor

Speaker:  Caryle Murphy

The “Arab Awakening” has focused the world’s attention on young people in the Arab world, where they have been agitating for political reform. But what about young Saudis, who have not taken to the streets like many of their peers? Have they been affected by the “Arab Awakening?” A Kingdom’s Future: Saudi Arabia Through the Eyes of Its Twentysomethings explores the self-image of young Saudis and what they want when it comes to education, marriage, politics, religion, and personal liberties. It is based on research during Murphy’s three-year reporting tour in the kingdom, as well as scores of interviews while a public policy scholar at the Wilson Center.

Register for this event here.

 

3. Turkey Rising:  Challenges and Prospects for the New Administration, Monday January 14, 12:30 PM, Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Venue:  Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 1050, Stern Library and Conference Room

Speakers: Ross Wilson, James F. Jeffrey, Soner Cagaptay

With a booming economy and improving ties with the United States and NATO, Turkey now has a real chance to become a regional power. Yet formidable challenges remain, such as resolving the Kurdish issue, competing with Iran, and easing domestic political friction. To assess these issues and their impact on U.S. policy, The Washington Institute invited Ambassador Ross Wilson, Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, and Soner Cagaptay to address a Policy Forum luncheon in Washington, DC, on Monday, January 14, 2013, starting at 12:30 p.m. EST. The speakers will also discuss Dr. Cagaptay’s new report on Turkey.

Register for this event here.

 

4. What’s Next for Syria:  Humanitarian and Political Perspectives, Monday January 14, 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM, Brookings Institution

Venue:  Brookings Institution, 1774 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Falk Auditorium

Speakers: Ross Wilson, James F. Jeffrey, Soner Cagaptay

With a booming economy and improving ties with the United States and NATO, Turkey now has a real chance to become a regional power. Yet formidable challenges remain, such as resolving the Kurdish issue, competing with Iran, and easing domestic political friction. To assess these issues and their impact on U.S. policy, The Washington Institute invited Ambassador Ross Wilson, Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, and Soner Cagaptay to address a Policy Forum luncheon in Washington, DC, on Monday, January 14, 2013, starting at 12:30 p.m. EST. The speakers will also discuss Dr. Cagaptay’s new report on Turkey.

Register for this event here.

 

5.  The International Development Assistance Ecosystem of the U.S.:  A Development and Foreign Policy Strategic Asset, Monday January 14, 3:00 PM – 5:00 PM, CSIS

Venue:  CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington DC, 20006, B1 Conference Room

Speakers: Carol Lancaster, Paul O’Brien, Tessie San Martin, Susan Reichle, Asif Shaikh, Daniel Runde

Since the end of the Cold War, the method by which the United States delivers foreign aid to the developing world has changed considerably. During this time, as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) saw large-scale staff reductions coupled with an increase in programs, a large base of U.S for-profit and nonprofit organizations grew up to implement projects and programs in the developing world. Although the budgetary situation reversed beginning in 2002, staffing levels at USAID remained low and a need to engage the U.S. implementer community continues. Concurrently, a broader discussion occurred over the effectiveness of development assistance by major donors. This effort, which resulted in the Paris Declaration of 2005 and later agreements at Accra in 2008 and Busan in 2011, enshrined the notion of country ownership—that the developing world must drive its priorities to ensure sustainability. The Obama administration launched its USAID Forward agenda to re-establish USAID as the premier development agency in the world. A central aspect of this agenda are reforms designed to reduce the Agency’s dependence on contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements with U.S. development implementers and shift to a greater use of government to government support and local organizations.

The report argues that the current U.S. ecosystem of international development assistance should be treated as a strategic asset that plays an important role in meeting U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. As with all systems, it can and should be improved; however, it should be strengthened, not weakened. This system, while imperfect, delivers a level of accountability and transparency for the U.S. government that is vital to continued political support for foreign assistance. The development implementers must do more to evolve to meet the changing nature of how the U.S. government sees development and the broader trends in the field. However, there are significant risks associated with USAID’s proposed reforms, which, if fully implemented, may not achieve the results desired.

Please join us for a panel discussion of this timely report. Copies will be available at the meeting and online the day of the event.

RSVP for this event to ppd@csis.org.

 

6.  Two Years Later:  Assessing Tunisia’s Progress since the Jasmine Revolution, Monday January 14, 5:30 PM – 7:30 PM, Johns Hopkins University

Venue:  Johns Hopkins University, Bernstein Offit Building, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 500

Speakers: Leila Chennoufi, Eamonn Gearon, Stephen McInerny, Samia Msadek, Mohamed Malouche, Daniele Moro

On January 14, 2011, Ben Ali was forced to leave Tunisia by a popular uprising commonly known as the Jasmine Revolution. This historic event triggered mass protests that would sweep the Arab world, forcing other longstanding authoritarian leaders from power and potentially transforming the region. Since that time, Tunisia has witnessed the country’s first free and fair elections, the emergence of new political parties and coalitions, and the many difficulties of maintaining stability amid an uncertain political transition. On the second anniversary  of this historic moment, it is important to assess Tunisia’s progress in its difficult transition to democracy and examine the prospects and challenges that lie ahead.

Register for this event here.

 

7.  U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East:  Is There One?, Wednesday January 16, 9:30 AM – 12:00 PM, Rayburn House Office Building

Venue: Rayburn House Office Buidling, Washington, DC 20515, Gold Room (2168)

Speakers: Chas W. Freeman Jr., William B. Quandt, Marwan Muasher, John Duke Anthony, Thomas R. Mattair

The Middle East Policy Council invites you and your colleagues to our 71st Capitol Hill Conference. Live streaming of this event will begin at approximately 9:30am EST on Wednesday, January 16th and conclude around noon. A questions and answers session will be held at the end of the proceedings. Refreshments will be served.

RSVP for this event to info@mepc.org.

 

8.  The Iran Nuclear Challenge:  Explore Policy Options, Wednesday January 16, 12:30 PM – 1:30 PM, American Security Project

Venue: American Security Project, 1100 New York Ave, NW Washington DC, Suite 710W, Conference Room E

Speakers: William Fallon, Frank Kearney, Lawrence Wilkerson, Stephen Cheney

Join us for a discussion with retired military leaders on U.S. military options towards Iran. The discussion will begin promptly at 12:30 p.m.  Please arrive by 12:15 p.m. for registration.
We hope you can join us.

RSVP for this event to events@americansecurityproject.org.

 

9.  Freedom in the World 2013 Launch, Wednesday January 16, 1:30 PM – 3:00 PM, Council on Foreign Relations

Venue: Council on Foreign Relations, 1777 F Street NW, Washington DC, 20006

Speakers: David Kramer, Mark Lagon, Arch Puddington, Jill Dougherty, Larry Diamond, Tamara Wittes

Please join us as we release the findings of Freedom in the World 2013, the latest edition of Freedom House’s annual assessment of political and civil rights. This event will feature an in-depth discussion of advances and setbacks in freedom over the past year and the challenges these trends pose for American foreign policy.

Register for this event here.

 

10.  The Way Forward in Afghanistan, Friday January 18, 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM, Heritage Foundation

Venue: Heritage Foundation, 214 Massachusetts Avenue NE, Washington, DC 20002, Lehrman Auditorium

Speakers:  Lisa Curtis, Thomas Donnelly, Bill Roggio, Steven Bucci

The United States is moving into a new phase of engagement with Afghanistan as it draws down its combat presence in the country. During last year’s presidential campaign, President Obama declared a goal of bringing American troops home and focusing instead on “nation building” here in the U.S. But a hasty U.S. troop withdrawal and a failure to remain seriously engaged with the Afghans in other ways risks sacrificing everything the U.S. has fought for over the last decade.

What are the best options for the pace and scope of withdrawal over the next two years? What level and type of U.S. troop presence should remain in Afghanistan post-2014 to ensure the country does not revert to its previous status of terrorist safe haven? What are the realistic possibilities for reconciling with the Taliban in a way that preserves democratic and human rights gains?

Join us as a distinguished group of experts addresses these and other questions related to the future of U.S. engagement with Afghanistan.

Register for this event here.

 

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Light where we can, heavy when we must

Today’s New York Times declares victory for those in the Obama Administration who favor a light footprint abroad.  The members of the new national security team–Hagel, Kerry and Brennan–each leans in that direction.  Though Hagel voted as a senator for the Iraq war, he later became a doubter.  His Vietnam experience and Kerry’s make both new cabinet members hesitant about the use of American military force abroad.  Brennan, while always talking a good line in favor of a more comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism in Yemen, is the brains behind the canonical light footprint drone war there against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

The light footprint approach is also getting a boost in Afghanistan, where the White House is leaning towards leaving fewer troops after 2014 than some would like.  Zero is even a possibility.  The leaks to this effect are all too clearly intended to get President Karzai, who is visiting Washington this week, to stop his mouthing off against the American presence and to convince the Taliban that they can get half a loaf if they come to the negotiating table.  But feints in diplomacy have a way of becoming reality.  America’s parlous fiscal situation will make many members of Congress look benignly on cutting back the U.S. presence in Afghanistan.

I need hardly mention that the Administration has already taken a light footprint approach to Syria–maybe more like a no footprint approach.  It provides humanitarian assistance through nongovernmental organizations and as well as political support to the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, now recognized as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, and other Syrian opposition organizations.  It is also setting up Patriot batteries in Turkey and turning a blind eye to arms flowing from Qatar and Saudi Arabia.  The results so far have fallen well short of the goal of ending the Asad regime and risk letting Syria fall into the hands of Sunni extremists.  But the burden on the United States is mainly diplomacy and foreign assistance, not the far more expensive military.

I find it hard to fault the Administration for trying to limit commitments and save money at a time of serious fiscal strain.  But it is a mistake to think we will always want to avoid the heavier footprint:  troops and civilians on the ground to establish a safe and secure environment and plant the seeds for governance in states that may fail in ways that endanger vital American interests.  The problem I see so far is not so much the President’s preference for the light footprint, but rather the assumption that it will ever be thus.  Each and every president since the end of the Cold War has tried to avoid state-building efforts abroad.  Each and every one has concluded that they were needed in one place or the other.  This includes President Obama, who has quietly and correctly (if not alway successfully) indulged in civilian statebuilding to prevent violence in South Sudan since independence (the troops are cheap since they come from the UN).  Obama also tried statebuilding in Afghanistan, where it was not a brilliant success.

We need to maintain the capacity to do heavier footprints, civilian as well as military, even as we try to avoid situations in which they are likely to be needed.  This is the equivalent of asking the U.S. government to walk and chew gum at the same time.  It has a hard time doing that.  It is much more inclined to dismantle the extensive apparatus and experience built up during more than 10 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan than to husband and sustain it.  The Civilian Response Corps President George W. Bush established, after declaring as a candidate his disdain for “a nation-building corps,” is already gutted.  We’ll be reinventing that wheel if ever there is intervention in Syria, Mali, Iran or half a dozen other places where it might be needed in the next decade.  This is not wise or economical.

Our mantra should be:  light where we can, heavy where we must.

PS:  David Rothkopf hopes what he calls the “disengagers” will redouble diplomatic efforts.  Would that it be so.

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Alas, poor Bashar

Today’s “sermon” by President Asad, delivered it is said at the Damascus Opera House, is worth a glance.  It tells us something about the mindset and current thinking of a man who has led his country into the slaughter of more than 60,000 of its citizens.

Bashar views Syria–which he implicitly identifies with himself–as the victim of foreign intervention.  Takfiris and the Western powers are together attacking his country. Sure some Syrians have joined those efforts, but basically this is an international conspiracy against Syria’s independence and territorial integrity.

He continues to imagine that reforms he initiates will meet the legitimate demands of Syrians:

Such war is confronted through defending the homeland in parallel with a reform that is necessary to all of us, which may not change the reality of war, yet it strengthens us and reinforces our unity in the face of the war…Reforms without security is like security without reform. No one will be successful without the other…Those who keep parroting that Syria has opted for a security solution do not see or hear…We have repeatedly said that reforms and politics go in one hand and eliminating terrorism in the other.

He then presents a confusing (at least in English) series of numbered steps focused on national dialogue to produce a new constitution approved in a referendum, followed by elections and formation of a broadened government.

Of course something like this is precisely what the opposition in Syria is asking, but it will not accept doing it with Bashar al Asad still in power.  Therein lies the giant anomaly.  By his use of the security forces to try to repress the rebellion, Bashar has made himself the main issue in Syria.  Of this he seems unaware, though he clearly is not feeling cheerful:

…out of the womb of pain, hope should be begotten and from the bottom of suffering the most important solutions rise, as the dark cloud in the sky conceals the sun light, but it also carries in its layers rain, purity and hope of welfare and giving….These feelings of agony, sadness, challenge and intention are huge energy that will not get Syria out of its crisis unless it turns this energy into a comprehensive national move that saves the homeland from the unprecedented campaign hatched against it.

The notion that Syrians will accept him as the leader of a “comprehensive national move” is so far-fetched that it hardly bears notice, except as evidence of the self-delusion still ensconced at the top of the regime.

Bashar’s appeal to Syrian nationalism is, I think, as sincere as it is delusional.  He imagines that the war he is fighting will strengthen Syria:

The blood of martyrs protected and will protect the homeland and the region, and will protect our territorial integrity and reinforce accord among us, while at the same time purify our society of disloyalty and treason, and keep us from moral, human and cultural downfall, which is the strongest victory…When the homeland triumphs, it does not forget those who sacrificed for its sake.

There follows after this the requisite thanks to his armed forces.

So this is the thinking of the Syrian president after nearly two years of using his military and security services to kill his citizens and destroy their homes:  we are purifying our society and will be stronger for it.  He will not compromise, but if his opponents will lay down their arms he offers to lead a process of reform that will broaden political participation, but implicitly not so far as to affect his powers.

I don’t expect the opposition, which is doing well militarily, to agree to anything except Bashar al Asad’s departure from power.  He is not only a dead man walking, but one unlikely to walk much farther.  Alas, poor Bashar:

a fellow
of infinite jest, of most excellent fancy….now, how
abhorred in my imagination it is! my gorge rims at
it. Here hung those lips that I have kissed I know
not how oft. Where be your gibes now? your
gambols? your songs? your flashes of merriment,
that were wont to set the table on a roar? Not one
now, to mock your own grinning? quite chap-fallen?

PS:  State Department was no more impressed with the speech than I was, though they failed to quote Shakespeare in response.

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Syria is getting what Assad wants

A Syrian reader, Hashem al Shamy (whom I know only as an occasional commenter on peacefare.net) writes (with some small edits by me):

Dear Mr Serwer,

Thanks a lot for taking the time to respond to my comment, which I hope you did not find aggressive. I only wanted to point out what I think of your blog which brings the experience of a seasoned diplomat to the realm of international relations.

The fact that I am Syrian should not discredit my dispassionate analysis, since covering the political risk and violence in Syria is part of my job. However, my experience as a Syrian is still valuable because I attended Syrian schools, studied its heavily propagandist curriculum, wore the green uniform to school, had to chant for the late President and the Baath Party. I also was a senior member of the Youth Lead Vanguard of Revolt Council in my high school, and a member of the Baath Party, and worked with senior government officials until six months before the start of the unrest.

Unfortunately, I have lost many friends since the start of the unrest in Syria because of their support of the grass roots movement, providing shelter and medicine to fleeing civilians and opposing the regime’s policy publicly. Recently, two of my friends have been referred to the “Terrorism Court” set up by the regime last year after remaining incommunicado for months, which most likely [will] culminate in their execution on charges of undermining the authority of the state and supporting terrorists.

I dont want to summarise the events of the past 22 months, which I am sure you are fairly acquainted with. I just would like to clarify some misconceptions that have been distorting the narrative of the Syrian conflict, including some comments posted by your readers.

The Assad dynasty since it took power in 1970 never had NO interest in negotiating or even recognising any opposition individuals and groups. Most recently, the moderate opposition initiatives such as the Damascus Spring in 2001 and Damascus Declaration 2005 resulted in imprisonment of most of its members. The Syrian regime embodied in the Assad family has been preparing itself for the moment its people decide to revolt.

The people on the other hand knew very well the limitless repression and the heavy price they will pay once they openly declare their opposition to the regime. When I was asked after my return from Syria in February 2011, one month before the start of the uprising, about the prospects of a similar movement to the ones in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, I was dismissive of any potential event. The reasons were the overconfidence of the regime and the firm grip of its security apparatus on the country, the absence of a grass roots effort to mobilise people on the ground, the division of the political opposition, and most importantly the capability of the regime to inflict a very heavy price on civilians and entire cities. Nevertheless, I never imagined that the regime would write off whole cities and region and would be willing to inflict catastrophic damage on the country as a whole to preserve its power.

In your response, you said that focusing on the community level is a crucial factor which is widely overlooked. The regime, from day one, made its policy to target peaceful demonstrators and their leaders. They embarked on a policy of detaining activists calling for non-violent protests, torturing them and returning them dead to their communities to intimidate people, create a vacuum of potential community leaders, and give prominence to extremism on the streets. This is exactly what happened, when the increasing level of bloodshed accompanied by increasingly brutal techniques of the regime generated a reaction of violent response and emphasized demands of revenge and proactive killings in order to save civilians. This dynamic brought the “opposition” to the regime’s turf where it will be able to set the terms of the game and generate a spiral of violence to scare everyone off.

On top of that, the regime has always been good at creating divisions and then exploiting them to create a fertile ambiance of uncertainty to advance its policy. Domestically, it allowed the existence of regime-sanctioned opposition groups who called for regime-led reform.  Their job was to invalidate the external opposition rather than focusing on the regime’s performance and actions. It also labeled the protestors and later the rebels as “Islamists, extremists and terrorists” to present minorities with an existential threat and lock them into “us or Fundamentalists” narrative.

When the regime had failed to quell the protests, turning into an armed insurrection, it sought to involve regional rivals as it usually does to increase the stake for regional countries for its potential demise. Banking on its initial portrayal of protestors as extremist fundamentalists, it exploited the increasing friction between Sunnis and Shiites in the region. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey on the side of “the opposition” and Iran, Iraq and Lebanon on the side of the government. This strategy unleashed the latent forces in the region and managed to blemish the opposition even more as being aided by countries whose sole aim is to destroy “modern and secular” Syria and replace it with stalwarts of the monarchies in the Gulf.

The intense Post-Cold War divisions between the US and Russia have helped the Regime keep the international community paralysed over its response to the Syrian crisis. The US, under the Obama Administration, has sought from the beginning to engage with the “Reformist” Bashar Al-Assad, giving him a maneuvering space when protests broke out. Russia, on the other hand has no interest in dropping a faithful country since the 1960s for the sake of promoting democracy. The triple veto at the UNSC has been a convenient pretext for major countries not to intervene and to blame the international stalemate on the rogue behaviour of Russia and Iran.

These dynamics have given the Syrian regime the sense of impunity and the ability to make rational decisions to intensify its response and destroy entire cities, knowing that no one will limit its free hand. The convenient illusion and wishful thinking that the regime will negotiate its own demise and exit (the ultimate departure of the President is imminent) have produced a negative response to ending the Syrian conflict.

In conclusion, if the regime is not presented with a “credible threat” there will be no change in the regime’s behaviour and more lives and cities will be destroyed, making Syria ungovernable Post-Assad, which is exactly what the regime wants. Any solution that maintains Assad in power will be highly unsuccessful both in the medium and long term.

I have so many much to say, but I just wanted to give a brief overview of how the Regime has properly evaluated its environment and gradually pushed the red lines in the sand to keep itself in power at the expense on Syria as a nation.

Best,

Hashem Alshamy

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Syria needs a good negotiated settlement

I have generally appreciated the work of Andrew Tabler and his colleagues on Syria.  It is hard-hitting, clever and up to date.  But their piece on “No Settlement in Damascus,” which opposes a negotiated solution, is not up to standard.

Bilal Saab and Andrew Tabler reject the idea of a negotiated outcome, ignoring the nature of that outcome.  They implicitly discount the possibility that  at some point Bashar al Assad will decide he has had enough.  If that day arrives, in my view it will be far preferable for him to negotiate his exit and a turnover of power than to depart from the country, leaving the state to collapse and the country to find its own equilibrium.

A negotiated solution does not necessarily mean a power-sharing arrangement, as Saab and Tabler assume, though inclusivity is an important characteristic of regimes that survive over the long term.   A surrender is also a negotiated outcome, one that the Americans unwisely did not bother obtaining in the most recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The Syrian revolutionaries would be making a serious mistake not to accept a negotiated transfer of power that genuinely leads to Assad’s ouster and the end of the regime.

Saab and Tabler are unimpressed with the record of negotiated settlements in civil wars.  Their appreciation of the examples they cite is faulty.  I know the Balkans ones best.  Negotiated settlements in Bosnia and Macedonia (both power-sharing arrangements) have certainly been frustratingly difficult to implement, but they saved both countries from almost certain fragmentation and much more death and destruction.  They also cite renegotiation of settlements in Africa as evidence of failure.  While power-sharing does not correlate with post-election peace in Africa, renegotiation of agreements does.

Their description of the reasons for preferring no negotiated outcome includes this:

At a time when no legitimate government and no legal institutions exist to enforce a contract, warriors are asked to demobilize, disarm, and prepare for peace. But once they lay down their weapons, it becomes almost impossible to enforce the other side’s cooperation or survive attack. Adversaries simply cannot credibly promise to abide by such dangerous terms.

In fact, warriors are not always asked immediately to demobilize and disarm in a negotiated agreement.  Good agreements have often recognized the need to allow belligerents to keep their arms, at least for a transition period.  This is something that a thorough-going defeat at the hands of their enemies will not allow and a principal reason why belligerents will sometimes negotiate.

Saab and Tabler offer a flat statement about rebel victories:

More durable than negotiated solutions are rebel victories. Monica Duffy Toft, an associate professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, has argued that rebels typically have to gain significant support from fellow citizens in order to win. Once in government, rebels are also more likely to allow citizens a say in politics to further bolster their legitimacy.

Tell that to the Rwandans, or to anyone living in a country where the rebels or the government takes on a sectarian or ethnic tinge.  In Syria you are going to have a hard time convincing the Alawites and other die-hard supporters of Bashar al Assad that their say in politics will be greater after this revolution.  There are  losers in revolution–the question in this one is whether they will be slaughtered en masse or get a chance to survive.

The specific issues Saab and Tabler raise with respect to Syria are not, unfortunately for their argument, only issues that arise in negotiated settlements:

  1. Assad may well escape rather than be captured or killed, so the complete victory the rebels seek may be frustrated even without a negotiated settelement.
  2. Trust will be hard to come by, but that is going to be true in the absence of a negotiated settlement as well.
  3. Enforcement of a negotiated settlement is a big issue, and I entirely agree that 10,000 UN peacekeepers are unlikely to be sufficient.  But who is going to prevent atrocities in the aftermath of a rebel victory?
  4. Yes, a negotiated settlement would require allowing Iran a place at the table, but that will be necessary without a negotiated settlement too, witness Iraq and Afghanistan.

The main trouble with their argument is that Saab and Tabler simply don’t acknowledge the very real horrors that are likely to occur without a political settlement.  I’d definitely want one that ends the regime and definitively removes Bashar al Assad from power and from Syria.  But so long as it does, a negotiated settlement is far preferable to the violence absence of one will bring.

PS:  Here’s a message sent by a Syrian colleague:

This arrived as a link attached to following message:

Last year was full of tragedies for me, as I lost some of my closest friends when they were killed by Assad soldiers.  I was also detained and tortured, my house was destroyed, and my family was forcibly displaced.  I dreamed that the end of the year would bring a glorious freedom to the Syrian people, the freedom for which I and my people have sacrificed a lot.  Instead, the end of the year brought new massacres, which should not occur in the 21st century.

Despite all this, I recall some bright aspects in the past year, among them getting to make many friends around the world who may not share my race, religion, or language.  However, they share with me common human values for which we started our Revolution in Syria.

I am very proud to have met each one of you, and what I have seen of you of compassion to help my people and to promote the common noble human values in which we believe.  I hope you had a Merry Christmas and wish you a happy new year filled with joy.  However, please do not forget your brothers and sisters in humanity who are dreaming of being able in the coming year to restore basic rights, to which you have already gotten.  They desperately need your help and support.

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