Tag: United States
Battlefield to conference room
Today’s US/EU/Russia/Ukraine Joint Diplomatic Statement aims to de-escalate a conflict that has been spiraling for weeks. The steps it proposes are straightforward:
All sides must refrain from any violence, intimidation or provocative actions. The participants strongly condemned and rejected all expressions of extremism, racism and religious intolerance, including anti-Semitism.
All illegal armed groups must be disarmed; all illegally seized buildings must be returned to legitimate owners; all illegally occupied streets, squares and other public places in Ukrainian cities and towns must be vacated.
Amnesty will be granted to protesters and to those who have left buildings and other public places and surrendered weapons, with the exception of those found guilty of capital crimes.
The Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) is to provide monitors, as had been hoped in Crimea (but Russia did not permit it, preferring to annex the peninsula).
Like many diplomatic statements, this one is well-intentioned but riddled with ways to wriggle out. There will always be violence, intimidation or provocation on which one side can base its own violence intimidation or provocation against the other. Disarmament of armed groups generally requires a superior force to undertake the task. Which building and other seizures are illegal is in the eye of the beholder. Where are those who allegedly committed capital crimes to be tried and by whom?
Whether the statement is a turning point will depend on political will. It is difficult for me to imagine that President Putin is ready to de-escalate. He has been on a winning wicket both in Ukraine and in Syria. Why would he want to stop now? The statement presumably forestalls further EU and US sanctions, but he knows as well as everyone in the DC and Brussels press corps that agreement on those was going to be difficult. Ukrainian military and police action to counter Russian-sponsored takeovers in the east has so far failed. I suppose Putin knows even better than this morning’s New York Times that Russia’s economy was on the rocks even before the Ukraine crisis. It will get worse, but since when did Putin or Putinism worry about the economy? Oil prices around $100/barrel are all he has needed to get Russia up off its knees. Crisis helps keep the oil price up.
So I’ll be surprised if this agreement holds, or even begins to change the perilous direction Ukraine is heading in. But the statement includes an important bit that should not be ignored:
The announced constitutional process will be inclusive, transparent and accountable. It will include the immediate establishment of a broad national dialogue, with outreach to all of Ukraine’s regions and political constituencies, and allow for the consideration of public comments and proposed amendments.
The Ukraine crisis, like the Syrian one, is fundamentally a political crisis: it is more about perceptions of legitimacy and distribution of power than about who military balance or who speaks which language. We’ve seen in Libya, Egypt and Syria the results of failure to conduct an inclusive and transparent discussion of the kind of state their people want and how its leadership will be held accountable. It is very difficult to move from violence to the negotiating table unless one side is defeated or both sides recognize they will not gain from further violence. Tunisia and Yemen have done it, but they are the exceptions, not the rule.
The odds of successfully moving from the battlefield to the conference room in Ukraine are low. But that is the challenge our diplomats now face, along with the OSCE monitors. I can only wish them success, no matter how unlikely that may be.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Pulitzers don’t make Snowden a hero
Monday’s Twitter blizzard of Pulitzer congratulations has given way to questions yesterday about the significance of Pulitzer prizes going to reporters who published the Edward Snowden revelations about the National Security Council.
I have no problem with the Pulitzers. All professions celebrate themselves: diplomats do it, the intelligence community does it, universities do it, business does it. Why shouldn’t media give themselves awards? Certainly the revelations made big headlines and generated much discussion, both within the US and abroad. What is news about if not big headlines and lots of talk?
Here is where I dissent: Barton Gellman, one of the Pulitzer recipients, said this on NPR yesterday morning:
Our publication of material that Snowden gave us was our judgment that Snowden did the right thing by telling us what he told.
The Washington Post is entitled to its view on whether Snowden did the right thing, but there is really no need for them to make that judgment in order to publish the material. They only needed to find it newsworthy. Nor is there any need for me to accept their judgment.
It is not the media or the Pulitzer committee that should judge what Snowden did. The main judgment should come from the courts, which are now considering what the government was up to in its collection programs and should also consider what Snowden did. You may think Snowden a whistle-blower, but the only way of knowing whether he is or not is for him to return to the US and face a jury of his peers. He may continue to refuse to do that, and prefer to be sheltered by a government whose behavior he surely knows is at least as bad as that of the one he fled, but that doesn’t make him a hero. It makes him a fugitive.
Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the journalists involved did anything wrong. The government is responsible for protecting its own secrets. The press in the US is entitled to publish them. I might wish they had shown more discretion, but they have a right to decide what to publish and what to withhold, which need have nothing to do with whether they thought Snowden justified or not.
Even if he does not return to the US, Snowden will eventually be judged by history, when we know more about why he did what he did rather than pursue other channels available as well as what his relationship has been to the foreign governments that have hosted and protected him. I obviously have suspicions on those scores–I don’t claim to be neutral in the matter. I wish the journalists involved had pursued these questions more vigorously than they have. But I am willing to wait for my answers.
The issue of Snowden’s justification, or not, has nothing whatsoever to do with the Pulitzers, Barton Gellman or other journalists. They did their job well by the standards of their profession and should be left to enjoy the prizes that come their way. But they should not tell me that Snowden did the right thing. That’s for you and me, courts of law, and history to decide.
PS: To help with your decision about how Snowden is to be judged, here is what President Putin and Edward Snowden had to say today (April 17):
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Shooting yourself in the foot
I’ll be on Al Hurra this afternoon discussing the American failure to give an Iranian diplomat a visa to come to New York to represent his government at the UN. Yesterday, Eli Lake and I exchanged barbs on the subject:
An Iranian diplomat participated in hostage taking in 1979, 35 years later he can’t get a visa. Typical neocon, guilt-by-asociation smears.
What if the Vietnamese had taken your approach to Pete Peterson as US ambassador there? Would you have supported Hanoi?
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
What to do about whoppers
The Russian Foreign Ministry tweeted this today:
#Lavrov: Active Russian involvement in European affairs has always brought long periods of peace and growth to all European countries.
He must have lived through a different Cold War than the one I experienced, along with millions of Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians. Not to mention Ukrainians. In another whopper, he denies that there are Russian agents in southeast Ukraine.
NATO today gave the lie to Moscow’s claims that it has not built up military forces on the Ukrainian border by publishing satellite photos. Moscow appears to be hesitating to use them, because it knows as well as any Ukrainian that invasion (and its aftermath) will not be a cakewalk. Instead it is bargaining for a federal Ukraine, one that affords the eastern and southern provinces a wide degree of autonomy. That is not the worst idea I’ve heard, but Kiev will have to be careful to ensure that the result is not a kind of stealth independence. Americans may have forgotten where and what Republika Srpska is, but the Russians know and no doubt see it has an attractive model. They are even offering it hundreds of millions in euro loans.
But Ukraine is different from Bosnia. Residents of eastern Ukraine identify as Ukrainians even if relatively few say it is easier for them to speak Ukrainian than Russian. A pre-crisis Bertelsmann Foundation study of language, identity and politics in Ukraine found:
Nothwithstanding any linguistic, political, or cultural differences, the vast majority of Ukrainians consider Ukraine their motherland. Even in the south of the country, 88% believe that Ukraine is their home country. This conviction is even more popular among residents of the allegedly pro-Russian east–93% share this belief, in comparison to the traditionally patriotic west and centre (99%).
Nor is there much difference between Russian and Ukrainian speakers in Ukraine on the importance of democracy (both rank it close to 8 on a 10-point scale) or satisfaction with how democracy has performed in Ukraine (4.6 on a 10-point scale). Crimea was “poles apart” from the rest of the country on whether Ukraine should favor a Russian or European orientation.
The question is what can be done to prevent a Russian invasion and to make one unsuccessful if prevention fails. Moscow is working hard to polarize opinion in eastern and southern Ukraine, trying to ween Ukrainians from their Ukrainian identity and promote the Russian alternative. Kiev has to be careful not to make that task easier. This means caution in dealing with Russia-supporting protesters, who are occupying government buildings in several eastern cities. It also means avoiding legislation or other moves that would infringe on existing rights to speak and use Russian. The right posture if Ukraine wants to avoid invasion is one that is welcoming and friendly to Russian speakers, ensuring as much as possible that they retain their Ukrainian identities.
But invasion may not be avoidable. Some have talked of an armed insurgency against any Russian takeover in the east or south. The trouble with that idea is that insurgencies take a long time and are far less often effective than nonviolent struggles, as Maria Stephan and Marciej Bartkowski discuss this morning. Nonviolent resistance succeeds quicker, better and more often, regardless of the character of the regime against which it is used. Violence would compel Russian speakers in Ukraine to make a choice between speaking Russian and being Ukrainian. That’s what Moscow wants. Kiev, as well as Brussels and Washington, should not.
Lavrov’s whoppers are advantageous. The more he says things that can be readily and definitively disproved, the less appealing the Russian alternative will be. If Moscow invades, presumably claiming to protect Russian speakers from alleged abuse, the West and Kiev will need enormous self-control to avoid making things worse. Washington should be supporting pro-Western civil society groups in eastern and southern Ukraine even now. They will be the nucleus of any nonviolent resistance that emerges later.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Requirements for a final Iran nuclear deal
Although Iran and the P5+1 seem to be adhering to their Joint Plan of Action, both sides face pressure to reach a final nuclear deal before the end of the six-month interim agreement, which began implementation in January. On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted a panel discussion to discuss the Iran nuclear negotiations. The panelists were Senior Fellow Robert Einhorn, former special advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; Dennis Ross, counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and Frank N. von Hippel, professor of public and international affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. Brookings Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, moderated.
Robert Einhorn: It is important to ask ourselves what the main goal of the agreement ought to be. Some argue that the main goal of an agreement should be to eliminate Iran’s capability to produce nuclear arms. Given its technical knowhow, experience, and resources, Iran already has a nuclear weapons capability.
An agreement could however deter Iran’s leaders from ever making the decision to acquire nuclear weapons. Such an agreement would have three basic requirements:
- It would provide confidence that any steps by Iran to break out of an agreement and move towards nuclear weapons, whether at covert or at declared nuclear facilities, would be detected quickly.
- It would ensure that the period of time between initiation of breakout steps and the production of enough fissile material for a single nuclear weapon would be long enough to enable the international community to intervene decisively to stop Iran.
- As a result of actions taken outside an agreement, Iran would get the clear message that any attempt to break out and make nuclear weapons would be met with a firm international response, including military force.
Each of these points is discussed in Bob’s Preventing a Nuclear-Armed Iran: Requirements for a Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement.
Reaching an agreement that meets these three requirements will not be easy. Both President Obama and President Rouhani face strong domestic opposition that will limit their room for maneuver. No agreement that emerges from current negotiations will be ideal.
The true test for any agreement is how it compares to alternative approaches for dealing with the challenge of Iran’s nuclear program. One alternative is to ratchet up the sanctions until Iran makes major concessions. Another alternative is use of military force. Before we turn to these, we should make every effort to achieve an agreement that deters Iran by making the pathway towards acquiring nuclear weapons as detectable, lengthy, and risky as possible.
Dennis Ross: Bob’s report made a reference to the possible military dimensions of the Iranian program. He also mentioned the difficulty of getting Iranians to admit their weapons program. It is critical to expose what has been done in the past. It is difficult to forge an agreement if there are certain aspects of the program that are hidden. The Iranian narrative claims it is a peaceful program. It is not. If the deal does not take place, this should be part of the Western narrative: all along the Iranians had a program that was not peaceful. That will help to justify some of the steps we may take.
Bob makes the case that this is going to be an agreement where Iran will be able to enrich uranium in a limited way. This is important because in the event that diplomacy fails, we must demonstrate to the international community that what we offered was credible. If the Iranians turn the offer down, it will mean they are not satisfied with peaceful nuclear energy. We need to be in a position to unmask the Iranians if diplomacy fails.
Another way to affect the Iranians and strengthen deterrence measures is to lengthen the breakout time. If extended to twelve months, their program would be set back far enough that the steps they have to take would be daunting. A longer breakout time will reduce their temptation to cheat.
To deter the Iranians from cheating, the consequences of cheating need to be clear. Bob mentioned a Security Council resolution, IAEA involvement, and Congressional authorization for the president to use force. The clearer we are on the consequences of cheating, the greater likelihood we will produce an agreement.
The key for the negotiations to be successful is to demonstrate to the Supreme Leader the consequences of not reaching an agreement. Historically, the Islamic Republic has only adjusted its behavior when the costs were high. The Supreme Leader needs to realize that the economic costs would be intolerable and the failure of diplomacy would trigger the use of force.
Frank von Hippel: The monitoring of Iran’s centrifuge production is not a traditional part of safeguards, but it is critical. As the US intelligence community says, a sneakout is more likely than a breakout. A sneakout would involve the production of extra centrifuges and installing them in an undeclared location. We need confidence in the IAEA’s ability to keep track of all the components and centrifuges.
Iran’s enrichment program is symptomatic of a more general problem with the current nonproliferation regime. Centrifuge enrichment plants are inherently dual purpose. As long as it is considered legitimate for countries to build and control them nationally, the potential for nuclear weapons breakouts will spread to more countries.
Confrontation and negotiation between Washington and Tehran are only part of the story. There are also parallel confrontations and negotiations within Washington and within Tehran. Those who are working for a diplomatic solution have to be aware of the domestic political constraints of their counterparts on the other side. Compromise will be necessary.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Is Syria like the Balkans?
I have long resisted parallels between the Balkans, in particular Bosnia, and Syria. Here are the notes on the subject I prepared for a recent presentation on the subject:
1. Context counts. One sense in which the context is similar is that the Balkans and Syria were once part of the Ottoman Empire. Their populations were not homogenized into nation states. They preserve distinct ethnic and sectarian characteristics to a far greater extent than in Western Europe.
2. But otherwise the context really is different
• Ethnic nationalism was a cause of the war in Bosnia, among the most important of them. Heightened sectarian and ethnic feeling is a consequence of the war in Syria.
• In Bosnia, the neighbors were actively trying to divide the territory. In Syria, the neighbors are supporting proxies but still trying to avoid getting too involved and fearing division of the territory.
• Russia is supplying and financing the regime in Syria. It was not playing nearly so active role in supporting the Serbs in Bosnia.
• Russia was Yeltsin’s, not Putin’s: it was retreating from the world stage, not trying to force its way on.
• The United States in the 1990s was at the peak of its unipolar moment. Today it faces serious challenges throughout the Middle East and in Asia and war fatigue at home.
3. The Dayton negotiations produced a territorial division of Bosnia along ethnic lines and saved the Serbs from defeat.
• Milosevic came to Dayton suing for peace, because he feared a mass exodus of Serbs from Bosnia along the lines of what had happened a few months before in Croatia.
• The Americans compelled President Izetbegovic to agree to a settlement he regarded as unjust.
• Almost 20 years of effort has not reversed the ethnic cleansing and separation caused by the war, whose territorial dimension is a major barrier to peace implementation.
4. If there is a parallel to Syria in the Balkans, it is Kosovo, not Bosnia.
• There Milosevic was trying to assert control over territory that belonged to Serbia.
• He violated even minimal standards of decency by attacking civilian populations, chasing people from their homes and rendering something like half the population refugees.
• The US took advantage of the unipolar moment to launch a war without UN Security Council approval. Milosevic was indicted at The Hague Tribunal during the war.
• The outcome in Kosovo was not ethnoterritorial, except for a small portion in the north that is now being reintegrated with the rest of the territory.
• Ethnoterritorial separation may look desirable to end a war, but it creates conditions in which a real peace process is difficult if not impossible to implement within the context of a single sovereign state.
5. The military intervention against Yugoslavia was a vital prelude to the Kosovo settlement.
• Serbia became concerned that damage to its infrastructure from NATO bombing would be irreversible, making it difficult for Milosevic to remain in power.
• The Serbian army withdrew from Kosovo, Belgrade lost all control of the situation there, and the refugees returned en masse.
• Though defeated militarily, Milosevic remained in power for another year or so, until his own people brought him down at the polls.
• He fell at an election, having allowed local observers and vote counting at the polling places.
6. Nothing like these conditions exist today in Syria.
• Assad is winning, not losing. From the opposition perspective, leaving him in power is not an option. From the regime perspective, removing him is not an option.
• Military intervention by Iran and Russia continues. Any definitive military intervention on behalf of the opposition seems far off.
• An election in Syria today would unquestionably produce an outcome favorable to Assad, with many people not voting and the polling far from free and far.
7. (only if needed) A quick word also about Crimea.
• President Putin’s playbook there is not borrowed from the Americans in Kosovo, as he sometimes implies.
• The US did not in Kosovo unilaterally occupy and annex a province. There was no quicky referendum, but rather a well-coordinated declaration of independence after eight years of UN administration and several years of UN-led negotiation.
• Kosovo is now recognized by over 100 sovereign states.
• Putin’s playbook is copied from Milosevic, who used military force claiming to protect co-nationals and re-establish full control over territory he regarded as rightfully his own.
RSS - Posts
