

12/3/2010

Summary of Responses

Dear Colleagues,

We would like to thank everyone who contributed and followed the e-discussion on the UN Review of International Civilian Capacities. The e-discussion was launched on November 3rd and in that time 35 responses were received from field practitioners, headquarters staff and policy experts. You will find below (and attached) the final summary of the responses received. Additionally, this summary of responses and the recommendations will be presented to the UN Civilian Capacities Review Team for input to the final report.

Thank you for sharing your ideas, observations and experiences.

With best regards,

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Responses were received, with thanks, from:

1. David Azutoru / Environmental Aid
2. Cedric de Coning / African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) & the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
3. Charlene S. Brown / Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), U.S. Department of State
4. Clare Lockhart / Institute for State Effectiveness (ISE)
5. Necla Tschirgi / University of San Diego
6. Francis O. Onditi / International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC)
7. Grace Kang / Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) , U.S. Department of State
8. Adolphe Kilomba Sumaili / University for Peace
9. Rachel Dore-Weeks / United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)
10. Arthur Ekoutou / Centre de Recherche d'Etudes Politiques et Stratégiques (CREPS)
11. Sarah Olmstead / Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), U.S. Department of State
12. Peyman Pejman / Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), U.S. Department of State
13. Hideaki Shinoda / Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center (HPC) and Hiroshima University
14. Hanne Gam / Department for Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
15. Kamilla Heden Henningsen / Department for Stabilisation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
16. Hannelore Valier / Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)
17. Anita Janassary / Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)
18. Ambassador (ret.) David C. Litt / Center for Stabilization and Economic Reconstruction (CSER)
19. Yasmine Sherif / United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
20. Bernardo Arévalo de León / UNOPS Joint Programme Unit for UN-Interpeace Initiatives
21. Enrique Sánchez / UNOPS Joint Programme Unit for UN-Interpeace Initiatives
22. Susan Manuel / United Nations Department of Public Information (UNDPI)
23. Barbara Piazza-Georgi / United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
24. Capt. Pierpaolo Sinconi / Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU)
25. Ambassador (ret.) David C. Litt / Center for Stabilization and Economic Reconstruction (CSER)
26. Richard Ponzio / Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), United States Department of State
27. John Crosby / Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
28. Martin Fischer / Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC)
29. Francis James / UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)
30. Nick Hartmann / UNDP Democratic Republic of the Congo
31. Jeffrey Stacey / Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), U.S. Department of State
32. Erin McCandless / The New School Graduate Program of International Affairs
33. Andrew Tomlinson / Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO)
34. Camilla Campisi / Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO)
35. Moudjib Djinadou / African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

Summary of Responses to Part One and Part Two of a Thematic e-Discussion on the UN Review of International Civilian Capacities

Co-Hosted by the Stabilization and Peacebuilding Community of Practice and
UN Peacebuilding Community of Practice

Part One - Question 1: What are the major gaps and key challenges in recruiting civilian expertise for international peace and stability operations?

I. Civilian Recruitment Systems

a. Secondment Challenges

- i. *Civilian Capacity Gap:*** Recruitment systems that rely on secondments from an existing pool of civil servants find that managers are reluctant to release their staff for international service, especially their best staff.
- ii. *Uneven Investment in Preparing Civilians for Deployment:*** The EU and European country experience emphasizes investing more in preparing and seconding civilians than other parts of the world. The inequalities among EU member states in their ability and willingness to devote resources and attention to civilian capacity are then reflected in the composition of civilian personnel available for international deployment.¹

b. Challenges with Open Market Hiring

- i. *High Vacancy Rates:*** While the UN is overwhelmed by applications, it is slow to fill new vacancies, resulting in high vacancy rates (22% average but as high as 40-50% in some missions such as in the Sudan). It is also poor at retaining staff, and it does not seem to be good at “keeping the best and shedding the rest”.

Key Recommendations:

- Technical solutions for processing large numbers of applications, as well as innovative systems for speeding up hiring processes, are needed urgently.
- Posts that are not filled over several months (and sometimes years) demand more pressure from UN member states. At the same time, focusing on essential posts in a mission is often more supportive to achieve the mission's mandate.
- The deployment of civilian experts should combine two components. The first component could involve a standby team of persons who may hold regular employment but who have jobs that allow them to be deployed to a mission within 48 hrs (e.g. European CRTs²). The second component could be national or regional rosters that enable sending organizations to deploy civil experts to missions within four to eight weeks.
- The UN's direct hiring system has managed to recruit a body of civilian peacekeeping personnel that are approximately 60% from the Global South. This system has also resulted in UN peacekeeping having more civilian women than most national civil services (approximately 30%). In doing so, the UN has been effective at overcoming many of the structural deficiencies of the secondment system.

¹ http://ecfr.3cdn.net/3af9563db3c7ab2036_ecm6buqyw.pdf

² The European Council Secretariat initiated in 2005 the creation of Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) with the aim of supporting the start-up of new missions or reinforcing existing ones.

II. Competition with the Private Sector for the “Best”: The availability of the very “best” civilian experts is hampered by the fact that most talented experts are employed in the private sector where they can earn significantly more money.

Key Recommendation:

- The willingness to serve in a mission, often in difficult and even hostile environments, demonstrates enormous commitment by civilian peacebuilders. This kind of motivation, combined with one’s professional level of knowledge, skills, and experience, should be the criteria to identify the "best."

III. Slow Recruitment Time: Traditional government recruiting processes take up to a year, while the needs of a fluid, complex operating environment are immediate.

Key Recommendation:

- POs are not fully calculable; nobody knows how many personnel and which professions are needed a year in advance. While there should always be set human resource procedures in place, these procedures should not hamper our flexibility and creativity in recruiting and deploying persons to peace missions.

IV. Link between Training, Rostering, and Recruitment: These three communities must work more closely together and to see each other as interdependent parts of the same value-chain in order to improve the relevance of the training, the effectiveness of the rosters, and the efficiency of the recruitment systems.

Key Recommendations:

- Any institution of training in Peace Support Operations (PSO) should work with rostering agencies following training courses in order to have a reliable database of trained experts in various PSO fields. In turn, any agency in need of civilian staff must use these rostering agencies for trained and qualified personnel.
- More synergies are needed between UN/EU/NATO and member states related to the different rosters and coherence in the areas of recruitment, training, deployment and lessons learning.

V. Vague Work Descriptions: The work requirements for deployments to places such as Afghanistan must be broad and somewhat vague in order to encompass the range of duties a civilian might be expected to perform. Vagueness of the work description, in combination with uncertainty of the location of deployment, has discouraged some civilians, who might otherwise be very qualified, from deciding to apply.

VI. Competencies for Recruitment: The UN (Secretariat and peace operations) recruitment system relies too heavily on generalized UN "competencies" and on written tests and interviews to the detriment of both area experts and (some) experienced and well-performing staff who may not test/interview well.

VII. Diversity of Organizational Cultures, Values & Visions: The UN is no longer the only organization undertaking peace operations. International civilian organizations in post-conflict environments will generally operate in some form of contractual or voluntary relationship with other specified organizations. Post-conflict environments are usually flooded with these networks,

whose component organizations are often incapable or unwilling (or both) of communicating, let alone cooperating, with one another outside of their specific contract or task-- even when the need to do so is dire. The reasons usually involve prejudice and lack of trust, but also lack of initiative, prior planning or infrastructure.

Key Recommendation:

- Educational and training opportunities that focus on organizational openness, including breaking down mutual prejudices, building trust, developing new synergies to exploit each other's comparative advantages, and doing so in a "neutral, non-threatening" learning environment should be expanded.

VIII. National Capacity Development: Unless the commitment to national capacity development is put front and center, strengthening international civilian capacities is bound to contribute to the perpetuation of existing gaps. The current focus on Southern experts and South-South cooperation tends to distract attention from the fact that the problem is not primarily the country of origin of the expert but his/her substitution of a national from the host country.

Key Recommendations:

- Extensive and careful labor market studies to assess the skills-base and profile of the national population across key skill-sets. Following the study, an initiative (or plan) should be developed to address these gaps, again from among host country nationals.
- Investment in scholarship programs abroad, especially in the region concerned, and also starting key training institutes and colleges for the required skill sets.
- Launch a follow-on task force or review named the "UN Review of National Civilian Capacities" to complement the current initiative.
- Identify a national university, research center, government agency or think tank to serve as the designated "center of excellence" for capacity needs assessment and appropriate skills development for nationals to be able to work with international actors.
- Strengthen university-level, as well as graduate, education in peacebuilding in conflict-affected countries. Northern universities, think tanks, and research centers specializing in peacebuilding should establish formal partnerships and twinning arrangements to strengthen the study and practice of peacebuilding in national, sub-regional and regional universities and educational institutions in conflict-affected countries.
- Attract international candidates who not only have the right technical skills/substantive knowledge but also the skills and personal competences to act as advisers and capacity builders.

IX. Developing Human Resource Capacity and Strategies to Foster National Capacity Building:

The challenge is to mobilize international civilian capacities that are able to foster national capacities—hardware and software. “Hardware” refers to the concrete institutional and legal frameworks that can create functional states and just and peaceful societies—security provision, justice services, health and education. “Software” refers to the relationships of trust and legitimacy that underpin interactions in society, and between state and society.

Key Recommendations:

- For “hardware” capacities, an ability to strengthen and develop national capacities through context-adequate skill-transfer methodologies (training, mentoring, etc).

- For “software” capacities, an ability to develop operational strategies that allow the emergence of elements of trust, legitimacy, etc.
- Integrate national capacities into capacity-building strategies. This would require: (1) the capacity to develop comprehensive capacity-building strategies that identify and focus existing national needs at the “hardware” and “software” levels, and (2) a capacity to provide the pre-deployment screening / training focusing both on the relevant specific technical skills, and the set of interpersonal skills and practical methodologies necessary for a national capacity fostering function.

X. Differences between International and National Strategies: International organizations are focused on “getting the job done” while promoting national ownership. National organizations establish national initiatives for longer-term political goals, while “getting the job done” in compliance with international standards.

Key Recommendation:

- Organize strategic discussions around advancing availability, deployability, and appropriateness of civilian capacities between national and international actors.

XI. Getting the Right People for the Right Jobs: Due to the volume of civilians required, and the pressure to recruit quickly, some individuals recruited are not necessarily the best fit for a position. There is also a shortage of candidates who possess the right “integrator” skills (i.e. between the development, political and security aspects of a mission) and appropriate language skills.

Key Recommendations:

- Use of psychometrical technology to identify the required IQ and aptitude.
- Utilizing talent development and management firms might be required to identify individuals with certain intrinsic values and specialized technical skills.

XII. Expertise Gaps: There are gaps of civilian “Rule of Law” experts (including police, justice, civilian administration, customs, border monitoring, correctional, and other related profiles). Some regions are flooded with experts on human rights but suffer from a scarcity of technical experts in specific sectors such as water management or establishing a vocational training school.

Key Recommendation:

- UNDP’s crisis response and peacebuilding efforts aim to plug these gaps by deploying staff before and during the actual conflict - so to lay the ground for peace as early as possible. The priority is timing as well as focus on empowering local civilian capacities.

XIII. Relevance of Training: Feedback reports from trainees indicate that mission support demands are a radical departure from the course contents, which implies that there exists a lopsided relationship between training and actual deployments in the field.

Key Recommendation:

- Improvements in the links between training, rostering and recruitment should aim to meaningfully improve the relevance of training, the effectiveness of rosters, and the efficiency of recruitment systems.

XIV. Importance of Gender Balance: It is commonly recognized that bureaucracies are not gender neutral.³ Evidence shows that predominantly male bureaucracies often exhibit ingrained biases (intentional or unintentional) against women with negative effects.

Key Recommendations:

- Increase the number of women who are deployed to international peace and stability operations.
- Increase the number of deployable staff with gender expertise (men and women).
- Ensure that mission plans and structures are gender responsive.
- Recruit more women by looking at career cycles and understanding when women are more likely to be willing and able to work in the field; adapt missions to allow for more flexible policies around accompanying children and partners; and support employment opportunities for spouses.
- Review UN sexual harassment and gender discrimination policies to ensure that they adequately address the concerns of women working in the field, and that the structures set-up to support these policies are responsive to complaints.
- Tangible technical gender expertise (for example, gender and conflict analysis specialists, gender and mediation specialists, gender and security sector reform specialists) are understood as 'hard skills' - sought after as essential for staff deployed in international peace and stability operations.
- Deploying more people with gender expertise, among both men and women. This involves revising TORs to include gender expertise, reviewing staffing plans and staffing tables to identify where gender expertise is needed, and then ensuring that they are made available.
- Ensure mission/agency/fund and program plans and structures are gender responsive.
- Include in the immediate deployment of staff, planning staff with gender analysis and data collection expertise (just as human rights officers are now a central fixture to all DPKO/DPA missions).
- In countries where patterns of conflict-related sexual violence are emerging, include, in cooperation with the office of the SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the immediate deployment of staff with gender and rule of law expertise to begin tackling issues of impunity and access to justice.

Part One - Question Two: What kind of a planning process exists in your organization for determining the development of civilian capacities, and on what kind of capacity needs assessment(s) and forecast(s) is the planning process based?

I. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) (United States): The size of the Civilian Response Corps (both full-time Active and on-call standby components) and

³ <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/commentary/steinberg-the-united-nations-and-women-walking-the-walk-on-empowerment.aspx>

the range and density of required skill-sets were predicated on the need for the CRC to be able to handle a range of missions simultaneously. The Reconstruction and Stabilization Interagency Policy Committee (IPC), chaired by the State Department and the National Security Council, provide guidance and direction regarding the development and employment of the CRC. S/CRS is also currently wrapping up a Force Review to ensure that the range and density of skills currently in the CRC, and programmed to be added to the CRC, are appropriate to current and anticipated future missions as the organization hires to a force of 200 Active component members in 2011. S/CRS will make adjustments to the hiring of future CRC Active members, as well as identification of future Standby component members, on the basis of this review and in consultation with USG partners.

- II. *UN Department of Public Information (UNDPI):*** UNDPPI has been working with the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support on policy guidance, job descriptions, and vacancy announcements and "benchmarking" of all public information posts. In addition, over the past seven years we have been offering an annual week-long workshop for field public information officers to exchange best practices and develop or tweak policy and guidance and ultimately planning. Theoretically, capacities could be improved and needs identified through this and the annual field mission visits we undertake. However, "benchmarking" has proven to be a time-consuming challenge and unrealistically generic.
- III. *SOS Justice (Democratic Republic of Congo):*** SOS Justice intervenes for the purpose of reconciliation between local communities. The organization is still seeking ways to further enhance the local capacities in peace building in the South-Kivu province. This plan has two target populations: members of civil society and the leaders of local communities.
- IV. *Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center (HPC) (Japan):*** There are significant human resources available for peace operations, but there is a sense that we do not maintain sufficient knowledge about ongoing strategies for peace operations. We study UN (operational and recruitment) policies and make efforts to comply with them to enhance contributions to peace operations. However, there is a sense that we are not competent enough to fully understand the strategies of peace operations.
- V. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Denmark):*** An annual audit has been conducted in the autumn with input from relevant Danish missions, embassies and country offices determining the demand for civilian experts, in terms of numbers, profiles and particular political priority areas. However, with increased Danish engagement in fragile states and an enhanced focus on "whole-of-government approaches," it has become even more important for Denmark to be able to deploy a broad range of civilian experts on short notice. Therefore, we are currently going through an extensive process of reviewing and strengthening Danish civilian capacities in areas relevant for stabilization and fragile states.

Part One - Question Three: What are recurring bottlenecks that impede the rapid deployment of civilian expertise for peace and stability operations? Please share a practical lesson, for example how your organization addressed a specific bottleneck?

- I. *Bureaucratic Obstacles:*** The Active component of the United States Civilian Response Corps (CRC-A) can deploy within 48 hours notice. However, sometimes this rapid deployment capability meets with obstacles with bureaucratic processes. Beyond this, there are many overarching lessons to be learned from S/CRS experiences in working with the military and

international community in post-conflict settings, including: developing a shared understanding of the operating environment and critical dynamics that builds on local understanding and information, defining shared objectives across the United States government and coordinating with other actors, monitoring and assessing progress towards those outcomes, improving communication and information sharing among the many actors that operate in post-conflict settings, conducting joint planning and training, and developing doctrine to institutionalize and operationalize lessons learned.

- II. **En Route to Conflict Zones:** "SOS Justice", located in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, finds that bottlenecks often occur during travel to the place in question due to the general insecurity in the conflict area. It also encounters challenges in staging evacuations when conflict re-escalates.
- III. **Lengthy Recruitment Time and other Impediments:** In some international organizations, slow recruitment processes can impede some people's decision to accept a contract offer (they simply take up other posts before the recruitment process is finalized).
- IV. **Absence of Logistics Self-Sustainability for the Civil Component:** While military and SPUs can be self-sufficient and can deploy where they need to be deployed, civilians rely on other organizations for accommodations or find them on their own. They are forced to be placed where "board and lodging" is available as opposed to where the scenario requires.
- V. **The Security Environment:** Civilians cannot take care of their own security and they cannot react in self-defense in the event of an attack. Only when and where the military component can assure an adequately safe and secure environment and the police component can provide a minimum respect of the rule of law is it possible to deploy civilians.
- VI. **Emergency Planning:** UN Headquarters planning for emergency response (except OCHA) of personnel seems to have gone off the front burner. It is very difficult to deploy staff on an urgent basis without straining existing rules and procedures, as was done successfully in the Haiti post-earthquake emergency.

Part Two – Question One: How can civilian response interoperability between multilateral and bilateral actors be improved in the field (e.g., through possibly secondments or joint standards)? And what are the potential practical benefits from enhanced partnership?

- I. **Practical Benefits from Partnerships:**
 - a. **Benefits of Bilateral Partnerships for the UN:**
 - b. **Specialized Personnel:** Bilateral governments often maintain specialized expertise among their (often highly trained) personnel. Multidimensional character of UNPKOs has appeared to be increasingly demanding in terms of specific expertise, which often are not available among most UN personnel (i.e. -Civil Affairs require experts in the field of governance, institutional support, and even negotiations, whereas background of most civil affairs officers is not that specific).
- Benefits of Multilateral Partnerships for Bilaterals:**
 - i. **UN's Policy of Neutrality:** The UN is often trusted as a neutral institution by the host government and may therefore be able to facilitate bilateral cooperation.
 - ii. **Linkages to the Host Government:** Bilateral government civilian personnel embedded in the UN can serve as a constructive bridge between both the UN and a host government and their home government colleagues operating in a host country (this channel of

communications can be particularly valuable in mitigating mistrust and misunderstanding; it must also be managed effectively to avoid misuse).

- iii. **Avoid Poor Coordination Pitfalls:** Investing in the UN's efforts in a fragile or conflict-affected state (through bilateral government secondments to the UN) has shown to increase coordination with donor countries which helps avoid duplication, competition or working at cross-purposes and decrease the transaction costs placed on a host government from having to manage concurrently relations with and the reporting requirements of multiple donors with competing interests and capabilities.
- iv. **Increase Effectiveness:** Increase effectiveness through more targeted and finely honed peace and stability missions that benefit from the comparative advantage that certain partners may have over others.

II. Challenges and Potential Pitfalls of “Interoperability” (UN as the beneficiary of non-UN Capacities):

- a) **Homogenous Demographic Characteristics:** OECD member state nationals (mostly men in crisis countries) invariably dominate the partnership/secondment scene.
- b) **Vetting Partners:** There is little if any vetting of the capacities or intentions of those chosen for the functions, either for lack of due diligence by the UN, pressure from a specific partner, or just little choice given the crisis context.
- c) **Lack of Personnel with Necessary Skill-Sets:** Experts often have little experience in-country and are often not able to speak the local language.
- d) **Integrating Personnel:** There is difficulty in integrating an experienced foreign practitioner into a program managed by a senior national, the latter being a UN imperative to put nationals in leadership positions.
- e) **Organizational Learning Curve:** The complicated nature of UN operations and jargon does not lend at all itself easily to someone helping out for six months or a year.
- f) **Availability for Deployment:** Practitioners who are pre-vetted but rarely available, and if so, not released by their management, and rarely for the time required to be effective on the ground.
- g) **Allocating Time for Teambuilding:** Strains on management to ensure that the unit works effectively.
- h) **Security:** Security issues are a concern for persons who are not actual staff.

III. Examples of Interoperability

- a. **United States Government:** U.S. Government secondments (and joint deployments) into and alongside multilateral operations include: USG through the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, the U.S. embedded a three-person strategic planning / technical team within a UNDP/UNAMA support mission for the Government of Afghanistan's Afghanistan National Development Strategy (from June 2009 until January 2010). In 2010, S/CRS seconded a security sector reform expert into MONUC/MONUSCO, and this cooperative effort is expected to continue in 2011.
- b. **OSCE:** When it comes to procedures/working practices, exchange of letters, memoranda of understanding and other forms of co-operation agreements concluded at the Secretariat level are often deliberately vague and merely intended to offer a framework for co-operation and co-ordination. How such co-operation and co-ordination should be done in practice is largely

left to the individual field operation (FO), particularly as the procedures will usually have to be tailored to the specific circumstances. Additionally, over the years, the OSCE has worked closely with many multilateral and bilateral actors - through political consultations, staff-to-staff talks and practical co-operation in the field.

- c. **UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB):** Bilateral actors often have different agendas than the UN: some harbor parochial interests, others carry colonial baggage. The Dutch government seconded two of their staff to BCPR/UNDP with very positive results since the two were seen to the outside world as UNDP staff, not Dutch diplomats.
- d. **International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative:** A major thrust of this effort is demonstrable with the decision by the U.S., Canada, the UK, and Germany to launch the International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative (ISPI). This e-discussion is part of ISPI's Community of Practice. The other major element of ISPI is its International Working Group, in which 21 partners have technical working level experts beginning to work together on three initial Technical Sub-Groups. ISPI's overall goal is collectively to figure out how to become field interoperable, for that is where all of us will ultimately be judged for our work.

Part Two - Question Two: How can international actors more effectively draw on the skills of women and experts from the Global South for peacebuilding and stability operations? What are the best practices for leveraging highly specialized or context-specific skills (e.g. languages) from the region?

- I. **Model Programs that Enhance National Capacity:** One approach that has leveraged highly specialized and culturally (including linguistically) sensitive skills from the region neighboring a host country is that of Capacity Development Facilities (CDFs). Introduced by the UN Development Program, CDFs train and place short-term (1-3 years) international and Diaspora coaches and mentors in support of senior and middle-level managers in key government ministries and agencies.
- II. **Recognize Organizational Obstacles:** Some organizations (such as the OSCE) have a restriction that its international and local staff must be citizens of one of its member/parting states – ergo the net can't be widened even regardless of how desirable to do so.
- III. **Tap into Existing Networks such as the Angie Brooks Centre and WIPNET.**
- IV. **Build on the Experiences and Stories shared during UN Global Open Days.**
- V. **Implement 'Do No Harm' Approaches:** Be aware of permanent damage to local capacity when recruiting the best local staff into international agencies or as a result of sudden influx of substantial financial support for civil society which may lead to the mushrooming of organizations solely seeking financial support without actual commitment to any cause.
- VI. **Identify Local Partners:** At the start-up phase of a mission, international staff should ensure that appropriate local partners are identified. Ensure that appropriate local partnerships are maintained through the peacekeeping-peacebuilding transition.

- VII. Capacity Development as a Skill:** Understanding that capacity development is *in itself* a skill, separate from other political, economic, human rights and other expertise that the international civilian actors might have.
- VIII. Move Beyond Building State Capacity:** Local capacity is more than Government capacity: if the exercise is to be effective, it is the capacity of the society as a whole that needs to be built, not just of national government

Part Two – Question Three: What are 1 or 2 lessons or recommendations that you can share on enhancing international civilian capacities and practical forms of cooperation among multilateral and bilateral actors?

- I. Establish Coordination Mechanisms/Processes between Donors:**
- a) **Donor Coordination Meetings:** The purposes of such coordination meetings are twofold: (i) sharing information about activities to avoid duplication and (ii) to agree broadly on a division of labor. The meetings are important for sharing information, discussing possible joint activities and ensuring a coherent approach to tackling certain issues.
 - b) **Liaison Officers:** The use of liaison officers can significantly improve the scope and effectiveness of coordination between IOs.
 - c) **Planning Cooperation:** Organizations in the field should undertake more preparatory work prior to donor or cluster coordination meetings, and also share information at the earliest possible stage (i.e. the planning stage). The sharing of reports between organizations in the field could be improved.
- II. Enhancing Cooperation from Headquarters:**
- a) Headquarters should regularly monitor cooperation in the field to find out whether/where strategic level co-ordination is needed and also to ensure co-operation in the field remains in-line with the political intent of participating States/members
 - b) Improving interoperability between actors must be addressed at the policy as well as procedural/working practices level.
 - c) Getting your organization's internal house in order, i.e., singing from the same song sheet, before engaging other multilateral and bilateral actors.
 - d) Form and support actors that can provide integrated support on a thematic basis that should include: (1) Roster (2) Standardization of training products (3) Facilitation of a Community of Practice that includes an online component (4) Identification and sharing operational best practices through guidance notes (5) Specialized consultancy services for capacity building
 - e) Leverage full spectrum of actors involved in sectors (i.e. cooperation between the International Security Sector Advisory Team [ISSAT] and Association for Security Sector Reform Education and Training [ASSET]) to facilitate roll-out of training products.
- III. Establish National Coordination Mechanism:** In some countries, the host government has established its own department with responsibilities for co-coordinating contributions from the international community. IOs' should assist the host government, including by advising of its functioning and by providing secretariat support.

IV. UN: Enhancing Institutional Partnerships with Service Providers:

- a) **MoUs:** MoUs with service providers should be developed and shared amongst UN entities. There should be a central repository that allows for all agencies working in a crisis context to access these, develop their own Terms of Reference and MoUs with them, or piggyback on existing ones. Each service provider and UN beneficiary will have their own terms and conditions of service. Perhaps a central body (PBSO?) could convene a forum whereby such partnerships are solicited, and also review performance as part of an after-action review. The Terms of Reference between the partners would clearly spell out as to what is expected in collaboration with the UN agency, and would likely focus on higher-level issues such as supporting improved coordination and the management of results, and not conditions of service, security arrangements, etc.
- b) **Global South and Women:** Partnership with organizations claiming to have the ability to deploy women and experts from the Global South for peacebuilding and stability operations should be solicited.

Responses in Full:

"E-Discussion: UN Review of International Civilian Capacities"

UN Review of International Civilian Capacities, a key element from the 2009 Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, aims to improve the international response to countries emerging from conflict, by strengthening the availability, deployability, and appropriateness of civilian capacities for peacebuilding. The Review considers both UN system reforms to deliver better on mandates in support of conflict-affected countries, as well as ways to enhance interoperability between the UN, Member States, and regional organizations, with a particular emphasis on leveraging capacities from the Global South and among women.

To discuss challenges and lessons from civilian responses in post-conflict scenarios, the Stabilization and Peacebuilding Community of Practice (International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative) and the Peacebuilding Community of Practice (UN Peacebuilding Support Office) were jointly invited to participate in an online consultation on the SP-CoP and PB-CoP networks that began on 3 November and finished on 3 December.

The e-discussion was designed to give peacebuilding practitioners and policy experts the opportunity to share their experiences and insights on key issues to be considered in the Review, with a special focus on field-based experiences. The responses will be used to inform the recommendations of the final report of the Review of International Civilian Capacities, to be issued in early 2011.

In the first phase of the e-discussion (November 3 to November 17), members were asked to consider the following questions on the deployment of civilians to peace and stability operations:

1. What are the major gaps and key challenges in recruiting civilian expertise for international peace and stability operations?
2. What kind of a planning process exists in your organization for determining the development of civilian capacities, and on what kind of capacity needs assessment(s) and forecast(s) is the planning process based?
3. What are recurring bottlenecks that impede the rapid deployment of civilian expertise for peace and stability operations? Please share a practical lesson, for example how your organization addressed a specific bottleneck.

In phase II of the e-discussion (November 17 to December 3, 2010), members responded to the following questions related to interoperability among international peacebuilding actors:

1. How can civilian response interoperability between multilateral and bilateral actors be improved in the field (e.g., through possibly secondments or joint standards)? And what are the potential practical benefits from enhanced partnership?
2. How can international actors more effectively draw on the skills of women and experts from the Global South for peacebuilding and stability operations? What are the best practices for leveraging highly specialized or context-specific skills (e.g. languages) from the region?
3. What are 1 or 2 lessons or recommendations that you can share on enhancing international civilian capacities and practical forms of cooperation among multilateral and bilateral actors?

The views expressed below reflect the views of practitioners and do not necessarily represent the views or opinions of the organizations they represent. Organizations are listed for identification purposes

1. David Azutoru / Environmental Aid

Dear Sir,

The method used for sourcing personnel is a major challenge for peace and stability operations. Most training institutions prefer to send nominations for training through Ministries of Foreign Affairs in respective countries where such nominations end up. Some Ministries will send staff for training for peace support operations (PSO) who are not interested in working in missions killing such chances for those who are willing. In effect, these trained staff from ministries will not be deployed and even if deployed will not show any commitment.

I have been of the view that any institution of training in PSO should use rostering agencies after each training in order to have a reliable database of trained experts in various PSO fields. In turn, any agency in need of civilian staff must use these rostering agencies for trained and qualified personnel.

I have noticed that the African Union prefers asking Ministries of Foreign Affairs to second civilian staff for any specific mission which kills trained and qualified experts. NGOs are another reliable source where staff are willing to take up challenges with trained and qualified civilian personnel.

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2. *Cedric de Coning / African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) & the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)*

Dear colleagues,

Thank you for arranging this e-discussion. The UN Review of International Civilian Capacities provides us with an important opportunity to address the challenges we face in the civilian dimension of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Unfortunately, there are so many pressing issues that the UN system is unlikely to focus on this set of issues again for perhaps another decade. This means that we only have a limited window in which to meaningfully address these issues - perhaps only the next 6 to 12 months - before our collective attention shifts to the next important topic. I thus hope that this e-discussion will play an important role in focusing our attention on those challenges that we can address in this time-frame.

I agree with David that there seems to be an interesting difference between those civilian recruitment systems that primarily rely on secondment from member states, and those that hire individuals directly. Those that prefer secondment generally report a civilian capacity gap. The EU experience (see for instance Korski & Gowan's 2009 review of Europe's civilian capabilities) is that some countries invest more in preparing and seconding civilians than others, and that the inequalities among member states in their ability and willingness to devote resources and attention to civilian capacity are then reflected in the composition of civilian personnel available for international deployment. Systems that rely on an existing pool of civil servants also find that managers are reluctant to release their staff for international service, especially their best. Those most sought after internationally, for instance senior women, are typically also in short supply in national systems. In short, the secondment system is generally dependent on what member states can offer, and national shortcomings are thus reflected in what is available for international service.

In contrast, those that hire civilian personnel in the open market, like the UN, seem to have a different set of challenges. However, before we focus on those, let's highlight the positive. Despite the dynamics that David highlights, and despite the fact that most civilian training opportunities and most rostering systems are based in the North, the UN's direct hiring system has managed to recruit a body of civilian peacekeeping personnel that are approximately 60% from the Global South. This system has also resulted in UN peacekeeping having more civilian women than most national civil services, approx. 30%. It seems their direct hiring approach has thus been effective at overcoming many of the structural deficiencies of the secondment system.

However, the UN's peacekeeping recruitment system has its own challenges. It is overwhelmed by applications, it is slow to fill new vacancies, resulting in high vacancy rates (22% average but as high as 40-50% in some missions), it is poor at retaining staff, and it does not seem to be good at keeping the best and shedding the rest. Fixing these problems are partly operational - they require technical solutions for processing large numbers of applications, and systems innovation for speeding up hiring processes - but mostly political: member states need to understand the challenges, and they need to generate the political momentum necessary to bring about change in

the system, including allocating more resources to the human resources dimension. They need to understand that the best investment we can make in the UN is an investment in getting and retaining the quality personnel.

The challenge for the Review is thus partly to better articulate the practical issues, and to hint at possible solutions, but most importantly to generate member state interest and momentum so that they can decide on, and take concrete steps aimed at improving the current system.

David also touches on another important issue that goes beyond the agency of member states: the potential for improving the link between training, rostering and recruitment. If we can get these three communities to work more closely together and to see each other as interdependent parts of the same value-chain, then we should be able to meaningfully improve the relevance of the training, the effectiveness of the rosters, and the efficiency of the recruitment systems.

Cedric de Coning
Research Fellow
ACCORD & NUPI

3. *Charlene S. Brown / Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), U.S. Department of State*

Thank you for offering us the opportunity to contribute to this topic.

I work in the Office of Interagency Provincial Affairs at U.S. Embassy Kabul, and my portfolio deals with civ-mil planning for the deployment of USG civilians to the field in Afghanistan. We are trying to synchronize placement of civilians with our strategic priorities, and also work with Embassy Human Resources, Management, Field Support Unit, and Washington Office of In-Processing at the State Department. Based on my experience in this position, here are some thoughts on the questions:

What are the major gaps and key challenges in recruiting civilian expertise for international peace and stability operations?

The principal challenge to recruiting civilian expertise for the USG in Afghanistan seems to be that traditional government recruiting processes take up to a year, while the needs of a fluid, complex operating environment are immediate. As a result, it's difficult to plan and predict one year in advance what mix of skill sets, level of experience, and even location will be needed.

Further, unlike specific positions at an Embassy with tailored work requirements, the work requirements for deployments to Afghanistan must be broad and somewhat vague in order to encompass the range of duties a civilian might be expected to perform. Vagueness of the work description, in combination with uncertainty of the location of deployment, has discouraged some civilians, who might otherwise be very qualified, from deciding to apply. In addition, due to the volume of civilians required, and pressure from Washington to recruit quickly, the hiring process itself does not include in-person interviews, which has led in some cases to recruitment of individuals who are not the best fit for the position.

Another difficulty is that, unlike the military, civilian agencies do not generally have large reserves of civilians with the experience needed to perform stability operations - most civilians are already deployed at posts abroad, thus requiring civilian agencies to recruit personnel from outside the U.S. government. While the civilian recruits may be skilled in operating in conflict zones, they might not have previous experience operating within the agency hiring them and may not have the knowledge of the organizational culture and bureaucratic functioning. As a result, it adds to the organizational challenges of operating in a civ-mil AND interagency environment. Although the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) at the State Department (my home office) has a Civilian Response Corps with about 150 active members and nearly 1000 reservists, the CRC is not mainstreamed into hiring processes set up by various USG civilian agencies for deployment to Afghanistan. As a result, this body of civilians experienced in reconstruction and stabilization is not being leveraged to the fullest extent.

What kind of a planning process exists in your organization for determining the development of civilian capacities, and on what kind of capacity needs assessment(s) and forecast(s) is the planning process based?

Regarding the development of civilian capacities, civilians deployed to Afghanistan undergo at least five weeks of pre-deployment training, which includes skills in working with the military, first aid and driving skills, as well as substantive briefings on Afghanistan and the USG mission there. The Office of Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA) at Embassy Kabul does provide input to some of this training and is currently participating in revisions to the content of these courses to ensure field staff receives necessary training. I am not sure that there is a specific planning process used to determine what capacities are needed.

However, in terms of competences needed and numbers of civilians needed, the planning process is based on a review of current strategic priorities geographically (Key Terrain Districts) for the clear-hold-build-transfer strategy, and a prioritization of those geographic areas against key nation-wide civilian stabilization programs, such as the District Delivery Program (DDP), Afghanistan Social Outreach Program (ASOP) or the Village Stabilization Operations (VSO) program, and other programs. In addition, each individual agency evaluates the proportion of civilians recruited with certain sector experience, based on the general distribution of programs on health, education, agriculture, etc. Currently there are a set number of expected civilians for Afghanistan, but pending the Transition process and needs for the evolution of PRTs, we may do a forecast for requesting additional civilians.

What are recurring bottlenecks that impede the rapid deployment of civilian expertise for peace and stability operations? Please share a practical lesson, for example how your organization addressed a specific bottleneck.

The majority of the pre-deployment process takes place in Washington. I cannot provide direct examples, but I understand USAID developed some innovative recruitment mechanisms to speed up deployment time. Perhaps a member of the Cop from USAID hiring for Afghanistan can provide an example.

Thanks again for the opportunity to reply.

Best regards,

Charlene S. Brown

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4. *Clare Lockhart / Institute for State Effectiveness (ISE)*

It is encouraging to see the focused attention of policy makers, including through the UN Review of International Civilian Capacities, on the issue of strengthening civilian capacities for peace-building.

While this may not be directly within the scope of this initiative, a key imperative and challenge in weak states and post-conflict environments is identifying civilian capacities from within the national population. All too often the assumption is "there is no national capacity" and that capacity must be "brought in." This is not often the case: the national population will possess a high degree of capacity from within its population both living within the country and the Diaspora, even if they are serving in different jobs from those which they are qualified to perform.

A first recommendation is that an initial, and then soon after, an extensive and careful labor market study is undertaken to assess the skills base and profile of the population across key skill sets (ranging from nursing and doctors to engineers, financial officers and construction workers), in parallel to an organizational and institutional assessment of where the administrative system and key services are well-functioning and where there are gaps. Until this is done, it is difficult to estimate where external expertise might be required. If the survey demonstrates a high and extensive skills base, a first requirement before identifying and importing labor would be to craft a strategy to attract and maintain labor in the key positions required to build peace and institutions.

In situations where domestic capacity has been decimated by years of war and/or lack of investment, this study may demonstrate that there are key gaps in trained personnel across skilled and unskilled positions. A second recommendation is that an initiative (or plan) is developed to address these gaps, again from among the national citizenry. This could include investment in scholarship programs abroad, especially in the region concerned, and also starting key training institutes and colleges for the required skill sets, being mindful that the feeder system for the training college (from primary through tertiary) must also exist, which requires investment in secondary education as well as primary. The initiative should be informed by the numbers of required personnel across demographics and sectors, as informed by the labor market study.

At present, Institute for State Effectiveness (ISE) findings show that in most challenging environments, while primary education has rightly received a vast amount of attention, secondary and vocational training is often neglected.

Unless efforts to identify how to preserve and invest in domestic skills in operators, leaders and managers to complement investment in international professionals, we will continue to find situations where hundreds of millions of dollars are spent on building up and maintaining an international presence and the transition to domestic leadership, ownership and sustainability proves elusive. An option could be to launch a follow-on task force or review named the "UN Review of National Civilian Capacities" to complement the current initiative.

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Clare Lockhart
Executive-Director
Institute for State Effectiveness
Washington, D.C.

5. *Necla Tschirgi / University of San Diego*

Thank you for this important initiative and for engaging the NGO sector-including the academic and practitioner communities. Strengthening international civilian capacities for peacebuilding is clearly an issue of pressing international concern. However, it also carries serious risks ranging from attracting people ill-suited to work in difficult peacebuilding contexts to creating a standing pool of itinerant international experts in search of well-paid jobs in fragile countries. The identification, recruitment, compensation, training, certification, deployment, on-the-job support and post-deployment circulation of international civilian experts all require serious attention. I am only going to focus on the imperative to ensure that the heightened focus on international civilian experts does not inadvertently undermine national capacity development. Peacebuilding is, in the final analysis, enhancing national capacities to deal with a complex web of problems that require long-term solutions in a particularly fragile post-conflict environment.

Any major new initiative that aims to strengthen international civilian capacities for peacebuilding should be explicitly linked to "knowledge and skills transfer" at the national level. There is never a shortage of human capacity in post-conflict contexts. There are only shortages of specific skills, expertise and technical knowledge which can be transmitted through an explicit strategy of on-the-job training, mentoring, and steady professional advancement of designated national counterpart(s). This should be the lasting contribution of any international expert and should be included in his/her job description as a time-bound commitment. Unless the commitment to national capacity development is put front and center, strengthening international civilian capacities is bound to contribute to the perpetuation of existing gaps. Research on nationally-led reconstruction processes demonstrates that nationals with limited experience can successfully assume high responsibilities if they are not relegated to playing supporting roles to external experts. The current focus on Southern experts and South-South cooperation, unfortunately, tends to distract attention from the fact that the problem is not primarily the country of origin of the expert but his/her substitution of a national.

Besides the commitment to "nationalizing" international civilian positions through a targeted "on-the-job training" program, one practical approach to capacity building is to identify a national university, research center, government agency or think tank to serve as the designated "center of excellence" for capacity needs assessment and appropriate skills development for nationals to be able to work with international actors. In the case of the PBC and PBF countries, the Peacebuilding Fund would be ideally-placed to commit a small portion of its resources to support a national institution to become such a partner. The national institute would not be directly involved in strategic planning or policy development. Instead, it would be a research and education center with the primary responsibility to provide short-term training programs on the conceptual and operational skills needed to implement the country's peacebuilding strategy. Courses would include planning methods and tools in public sector management and public finance, fundamentals of monitoring and evaluation, use of ICTs for planning, etc. from a peacebuilding perspective. These skills are essential to enable nationals to work with international actors in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the full-range of donor-driven programs in key priority areas such as SSR, DDR, RoL and economic recovery. Such an institute

could, over time, also become the specialized training/orientation center for incoming foreign civilian experts where they would take specialized courses introducing them to the country, its culture, institutions and public administration thereby providing a useful platform for cross-cultural as well as professional learning.

Finally, the importance of strengthening university-level as well as graduate education in peacebuilding in conflict-affected countries cannot be over-emphasized. Currently, in many post-conflict countries, there are no research or training institutions that have the capacity to analyze the multi-faceted challenges of peacebuilding or to provide rigorous training to enable nationals to develop the skills to participate actively in their country's reconstruction. As a result, students who want to contribute to peacebuilding in their own countries end up going abroad to get degrees in peace studies, peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction and development. There is a great opportunity for Northern universities, think tanks, research centers specializing in peacebuilding to establish formal partnerships and twinning arrangements to strengthen the study and practice of peacebuilding in national, sub-regional and regional universities and educational institutions in conflict-affected countries. This would eventually alleviate some of the pressure for international civilian expertise. UNU can play particularly important roles in nurturing such arrangements by undertaking systematic capacity and needs assessments in different countries and regions and raising the profile of this issue with donors.

I look forward to the input of other participants in this e-discussion.

Necla Tschirgi
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Human Security and Peacebuilding Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies
University of San Diego

6. Francis O. Onditi / International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC)

This forum comes at the very moment African continent is in dire need for a self sustaining group of individuals without uniforms, but who are enthusiastic about civilian peacekeeping operation. The UN Review of International Civilian Capacities project is therefore a timely evaluation initiated to tackle this challenge amidst opportunities towards the development of a civilian database. Training, deployment, and recruitment are three different terms that cannot be used interchangeably. Training stands out as the first stage in the cycle that culminates into peacekeeping missions. The question here is to what extent does a peacekeeping training institution keep track of trained personnel? To complicate the debate further, one may even question the possibility of developing such a system considering the dynamic nature of civilian labour market (compared with the military and the police who work within a narrow line of duty and who hold allegiance to their employer-government). The ordinary labour market, particularly in capitalistic societies, dictates that a willing worker seeks the opportunity to secure employment under competitive environment. Therefore, the luxury of waiting for a peacekeeping opportunity to arise in Darfur or Mogadishu slims rapidly. Stint plans for post-training personnel management has been explored by some centres of excellence without much success. The challenges facing recruitment of civilians is complex and the start (training) does not necessarily determine the end (recruitment). The complexity is affected by factors which may not necessarily be within the military domain. From the East African perspective, I see the following as key gaps to recruitment of civilians as it relates to training:

- A. The fact that peacekeeping operation is a unique field operating outside the ordinary labour market and thus inflexible to undertake formal recruitment or even rostering. A Liaison office for UN and the labour market firms are required.
- B. Feedback reports from trainees in various courses indicate that mission support demands are a radical departure from the course contents. The implication of this is that there exists a lopsided relationship between training and deployment. The UN recruitment may not necessarily get the right people for the current vacancy. For instance, some regions are flooded with experts on Human Rights but suffer from a scarcity of technical experts in the field of civil engineering.
- C. The lag time between the training period and deployment has proven unreasonable and unrealistic and is the cause for trained individuals to move towards alternative livelihoods.
- D. Peace support training operations (PSO) verses professional attributes: for a reliable database of peacekeepers, stakeholders urgently need to define the status of PSO in line with requirements of a professional body.
- E. Getting the right people for the right jobs: the PSO environment has proven demanding. Therefore, there is a need for aptitude testing in order to capture the right people.
- F. Lack of knowledge on peacekeeping training institutions: these institutions have long been a reserve for the military. The perception aspect of the would peacekeepers requires remodification to allow the transition
- G. Talent development: Peacekeeping training institutions need to plan for long term training of an individual interested in PSO work by identifying the right candidates, training them, and then exposing the qualifiers to a model PSO environment. Services of a talent development

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and management firm might be required to identify individuals with certain intrinsic values. Use of psychometrical technology to identify the required IQ and aptitude is pertinent for this exercise.

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7. *Grace Kang / Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), U.S. Department of State*

What are the major gaps and key challenges in recruiting civilian expertise for international peace and stability operations?

In the United States, I think the civilian agencies must hire civilian experts in a manner far more analogous to the military and devise ways to use them effectively when they are not deployed, so that large numbers can be ready to go on very short notice. These civilians must be able to deploy as responsively as the military. The lack of a streamlined, single-chain-of-command-type mechanism for deploying civilians to international peace and stability operations is a major gap. The key challenge is to break through bureaucratic obstacles to create such a mechanism. To be employed by the U.S.'s Civilian Response Corps-Active component, each member must sign a document that obligates him or her to deploy within 48 hours if asked. So although theoretically the U.S. has civilian experts who can move quickly, old bureaucratic ways apparently dominate the deployment process.

What kind of a planning process exists in your organization for determining the development of civilian capacities, and on what kind of capacity needs assessment(s) and forecast(s) is the planning process based?

I am not involved in this aspect of my organization. I am aware of a Force Review project that is being conducted by outside consultants but how it will be used has yet to be determined.

What are recurring bottlenecks that impede the rapid deployment of civilian expertise for peace and stability operations? Please share a practical lesson, for example how your organization addressed a specific bottleneck.

I can share only my own experience - that my efforts to let appropriate people know that I was ready to deploy immediately to certain places did not lead to a deployment. I believe my organization needs a far more transparent mechanism for selecting civilians to be deployed. Transparency is a way to reduce bottlenecks.

8. *Adolphe Kilomba Sumaili / University for Peace*

What are the major gaps and key challenges in recruiting civilian expertise for international peace and stability operations?

I think it is important to examine the key role of civilian experts and recognize that their expertise is just as important as military expertise. In international peace and stability operation, it's important to keep in mind that civil expertise is integral in helping the mission become accepted by the inhabitants of the concerned area. A civilian can easily integrate into a society devastated by conflict and war. Security is not limited to dealing with soldiers and weapons of mass destruction. To provide any area with security does not always require an army with a particular capacity of deterrence. In speaking about stability, it goes without saying that the mission is located in the realm of peacebuilding.

The question is how to work together to build a sustainable peace? A lot is expected of civilians in peacebuilding operations, including establishing dialogue within the local communities. They can easily initiate a real dialogue between communities. Such a dialogue has a greater chance to see everybody involved since the local population can accept to be involved without prior conditions, etc. Civilian experts also encounter many challenges, *inter alia*, their capacities to fulfill correctly and efficiently the mission that they were entrusted, the capacity to intervene in an escalated conflict without eliciting retaliation from belligerents, their capacity to challenge the insecurity when the need of intervention occurs, their willingness to run the risk for peace, and to have a psyche to withstand verbal or physical threats from some parties in the conflict

What kind of a planning process exists in your organization for determining the development of civilian capacities, and what kind of capacity needs assessment and forecast in the planning process based?

In my organization, "SOS Justice" located in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, we usually deal with conflicts based on mineral resources. In addition to dealing with warlords who permeate the whole area, we usually intervene for the purpose of reconciliation between local communities. We empower local leaders in peacemaking and peace-building. We have done some interventions in *Shabunda an Mwenga [South-Kivu province in The Democratic Republic of Congo]*. Such missions are aimed at empowering chiefs of villages in peace making and peace building. How do we build a sustainable peace thereupon the peace keeping mission insured by the UN Mission in Congo? We are still seeking ways to further enhance the local capacities in peace building in the South-Kivu province. This plan has two targets population: the members of civil society and the leaders of local communities.

The recurring bottlenecks often occur during travel to the place in question due to the general insecurity in the conflict area. We also encounter challenges of evacuation when the conflict is re-escalating. My organization faced this problem in Shabunda. When we planned to do a workshop in *Matili [the periphery of shabunda]*, it was very risky. On the way to Matili, our officers were arrested by the militia called "Raia Mutomboki" ("people in revolution"). They robbed our

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officers of their cameras and money but eventually allowed them to travel to Matili. The situation was frightening, but our officers fulfilled the mission it notwithstanding the situation.

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9. Rachel Dore-Weeks / United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)

UN Women has been tasked with supporting the UN Senior Peacebuilding Group to implement the Secretary General's action plan on women's participation in peacebuilding, which includes the commitment that 'civilian capacity will include specialized skills to meet women's urgent needs and expertise in rebuilding state institutions to make them more accessible to women and girls and less prone to gender-based discrimination'. Our submission therefore focuses on gender equality, and the role it plays as a key driver for effective civilian capacity response.

From our analysis, mainstreaming gender equality into civilian capacity response necessitates prioritizing the following three objectives:

- a) Increasing the numbers of women who are deployed to international peace and stability operations,
- b) Increasing the number of staff with gender expertise (men and women) deployed,
- c). Ensuring mission plans and structures are gender responsive.

These three objectives will be addressed in this submission, and we look forward to hearing from discussion members from the field on their experiences in developing, supporting and delivering gender-responsive civilian capacity.

Why gender-responsive civilian capacity?

It is commonly recognized that bureaucracies are not gender neutral - and the UN is no exception (<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/commentary/steinberg-the-united-nations-and-women-walking-the-walk-on-empowerment.aspx>). Public officials rarely simply implement policies that are formulated by policy makers, planners and appointed/elected politicians. Evidence shows that predominantly male bureaucracies often exhibit ingrained biases (intentional or unintentional) against women with negative impacts.

Therefore, gender-equal and gender-responsive approaches to UN civilian capacity enables the UN to be more responsive to social needs and better placed to support national peace and stability efforts. Gender-responsive structures and women's equal participation enhances the legitimacy of the UN's work (political, development, humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacebuilding) and helps to ensure that missions, agencies, funds and programmes address women's and men's needs equally. Women in decision-making and service delivery positions are well placed to facilitate a supportive environment for women's participation throughout society, serving as role models and influencing policy. And as providers of technical assistance or in the delivery of goods, women are able not only to improve services for women, but in many areas such as education or agricultural extension can improve benefits for all recipients, including men.

What is gender responsive civilian capacity?

A UNIFEM/PBSO commissioned study on Gender-Responsive Civilian Capacity found that the standard response to the question of how to meet women's needs through the deployment of civilian capacity was a) the deployment of Gender Advisors and b) the organisation of gender training. While both of these things are very useful mechanisms, they are not enough to ensure that UN civilian capacity, national and international, is gender responsive. This submission therefore focuses on a three pronged approach, as outlined in the introduction.

1. Recruiting more women. The single most important strategy that can counteract institutional bias is by increasing the number of women to a critical mass. Critical mass can help change the culture of and create an enabling environment for women employees, who are then able to take up issues in favour of women users. These women do not need to have gender expertise, but should be employed throughout all areas of work.

How do we support the recruitment of more women?

- a. Positive action. This includes looking at career cycles and understanding when women are more likely to be willing and able to work in the field; adapting missions to allow for more flexible policies around accompanying children and partners; supporting employment opportunities for spouses.
 - b. Reviewing UN sexual harassment and gender discrimination policies to ensure that they adequately address the concerns of women working in the field, and that the structures set up to support these policies are responsive to complaints.
 - c. Tangible technical gender expertise (for example, gender and conflict analysis specialists, gender and mediation specialists, gender and security sector reform specialists) are understood as 'hard skills' - sought after as essential for staff deployed in international peace and stability operations.
2. Deploying more people with gender expertise, men and women. This involves revising TORs to include gender expertise, reviewing staffing plans and staffing tables to identify where gender expertise are needed, and then ensuring they are made available. Informal rules could be used - e.g. all projects over 1 million dollars must have at least a P3 level officer with gender analysis and mainstreaming skills and gender monitoring and report obligations; all projects over 3 million dollars must include a P3 gender officer, and so on.

In finding these skills, as other contributors have emphasized, it is critical to seek out existing national gender expertise. Equally, the UN should actively seek to build national capacities in this area by, for example, supporting higher education (and affirmative action policies on higher education to increase the numbers of women completing tertiary level education) and working with the public administration to ensure they are actively recruiting, supporting and promoting women (as these women become tomorrow's pool for civilian capacity response).

3. Ensuring mission/agency/fund and programme plans and structures are gender responsive. Plans and structures must be shaped before deployment to prioritize gender equality as a central foundation to peacebuilding. Examples of how this can be done include:

- Include with the immediate deployment of staff, planning staff with gender analysis and data collection expertise (just as a human rights officer is now a central fixture to all DPKO/DPA missions);
- In countries where patterns of conflict-related sexual violence are emerging, include, in cooperation with the office of the SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the immediate deployment of staff with gender and rule of law expertise to begin tackling issues of impunity and access to justice.

In closing, the Report of the Secretary-General on Women's Participation in Peacebuilding called for the UN to ensure that; 'civilian capacity will include specialized skills to meet women's urgent needs and expertise in rebuilding state institutions to make them more accessible to women and girls and less prone to gender-based discrimination. UN leaders will ensure that missions and humanitarian planners revise their procedures to improve the UN's ability to address women and girls post conflict needs'.

We look forward to working with the review team, as needed, to deliver a report that provides tangible recommendations for meeting this goal.

10. Arthur Ekoutou / Centre de Recherche d'Etudes Politiques et Stratégiques (CREPS)

Hello, I would like to provide you with a few comments in relation to the first question. The recruitment of civilian experts has now become more than a necessity in peacekeeping operations for one fundamental reason: The nature of the new wars and new threats to international security and to the security of the State point to the fact that war is no longer exclusively the business of the military. Civilians have burst into the battlefield, revolutionizing warfare methods and weapons of war. Similarly, the motives for going to war have changed drastically, putting in jeopardy the success of intervention missions and peacekeeping operations. The military having been trained to handle arms should in such circumstances give way to the civilian and diplomat who excels in the art of negotiation.

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Bonjour, je voudrais donner quelques éléments de réponse à la première question. Le recrutement des experts civils est plus qu'une nécessité aujourd'hui dans les opérations de maintien de la paix pour une raison fondamentale: Les nouvelles guerres et les nouvelles menaces à la sécurité internationales et celle des Etats nous renseignent sur le fait que, la guerre n'est plus exclusivement l'affaire des militaires. Les civils ont fait irruption dans les champs de bataille, révolutionnant les méthodes de combat et les armes de guerre. De même, les motifs de la guerre ont radicalement changé, hypothéquant à cet effet, le succès des missions d'interventions et les opérations de maintien de la paix. Le militaire étant formé pour manier l'arme, doit dans ce cas d'espèce céder la place au civil et au diplomate qui excelle dans l'art de la négociation.

Arthur Ekoutou

Centre de Recherche d'Etudes Politiques et Stratégiques de l'Université de Yaoundé II
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11. Sarah Olmstead / Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), U.S. Department of State

At least two previous participants (Grace Kang and Charlene Brown) have spoken to some extent about the Civilian Response Corps at the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, an interagency, expeditionary force of reconstruction experts at the State Department.

Below is a little bit more about the S/CRS planning processes and lessons learned.

What kind of a planning process exists in your organization for determining the development of civilian capacities, and on what kind of capacity needs assessment(s) and forecast(s) is the planning process based?

The size of the Civilian Response Corps (both full-time Active and on-call standby components) and the range and density of required skillsets were predicated on the need for the CRC to be able to handle a range of missions simultaneously. The Reconstruction and Stabilization Interagency Policy Committee (IPC), chaired by the State Department and the National Security Council, provide guidance and direction regarding the development and employment of the CRC. S/CRS is also currently wrapping up a Force Review to ensure that the range and density of skills currently in the CRC, and programmed to be added to the CRC, are appropriate to current and anticipated future missions as we hire to a force of 200 Active component members in 2011. S/CRS will make adjustments to the hiring of future CRC Active members, as well as identification of future Standby component members, on the basis of this review and in consultation with USG partners.

What are recurring bottlenecks that impede the rapid deployment of civilian expertise for peace and stability operations? Please share a practical lesson, for example how your organization addressed a specific bottleneck.

As Grace Kang mentioned, the Active component of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC-A) can deploy within 48 hours notice. However, sometimes this rapid deployment meets with obstacles with bureaucratic processes, especially when multiple bureaucracies are involved. For instance, one CRC-A member was seconded to a UN organization but was deployed so quickly that he did not have any papers, only a verbal agreement that he was authorized to be using UN resources. While this did not impair working relationships, it could have been problematic in using UN vehicles or other resources.

Beyond this, there are many overarching lessons to be learned from S/CRS experience in working with the military and international community in post-conflict settings, including on the subject of:

- Developing a shared understanding of the operating environment and critical dynamics that builds on local understanding and information,
- Defining shared objectives across the USG and coordinating with other actors,

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- Monitoring and assessing progress towards those outcomes,
- Improving communication and information sharing among the many actors that operate in post-conflict settings,
- Conducting joint planning, training and developing doctrine to institutionalize and operationalize lessons learned.

Sarah Olmstead

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12. Peyman Pejman / Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), U.S. Department of State

Thank you for offering this important forum. One issue that must receive more attention is aligning the human resources process with actual needs on the ground.

Currently, larger organization- be it the UN or the USG- have an almost unacceptable turnaround time for offering jobs to qualified people. In the case of the USG, especially if one includes the security clearance process, it can run to more than a year. The UN bureaucracy is not much better. In cases where crisis is either occurring or anticipated, by the time organizations are able to dispatch qualified personnel on the ground, either it is too late (the crisis has had its worst affect), or the potential employee is no longer available or interested.

Furthermore, many smaller organizations that rely on USG or UN funding have traditionally been hesitant to expedite their HR process until they actually receive the funds for a given project, another lengthy process. Again, in many cases, by the time those funds are made available, the expertise is no longer as available as it would have been months before.

The bottom line is that if the international community and large donors/partners are interested in having the desired impact and have their monies count more, internal reorganization should receive a higher priority.

Peyman Pejman
Planning officer/ SCRS
U.S. Dept of State

13. Hideaki Shinoda / Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center (HPC) and Hiroshima University

My comment on the above e-discussion.

The issue of civilian capacities involves both technical and political problems. I would like to avoid agendas already familiar with us, but explore some more extensive topics in line with facilitator's requests. I do so by taking note of my position of leading the program for human resources in Asia for peacebuilding on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
What are the major gaps and key challenges in recruiting civilian expertise for international peace and stability operations?

I would say that one of the major gaps exists at the strategic level. I highlight some structural problems concerning the issue of civilian capacities for peace operations in the 21st century. First, there are gaps among various organizations involved in peace operations in terms of their cultures, values, visions, etc. Let's say, UN is no longer the only organization for peace. It is difficult to promote well-balanced recruitments in the entire picture of peace operations. We not only have "integrated mission" or "hybrid-mission" or "lead-nation" or "donor coordination mechanisms," but also alliances with de-fact extra-systemic donors or actors, etc. In order for us to develop the best possible way of advancing availability, deployability, and appropriateness of civilian capacities, we need to organize a lot of strategic discussions. Second, there is a fundamental strategic discrepancy between internationals and nationals. What is required for international organizations is to get jobs done properly and swiftly, while promoting national ownership. National organizations establish national initiatives for longer-term political goals, while getting jobs done complying with international standards. We need different people for different purposes with different nuances in a complex but expectedly coherent strategy, which is a challenge. Third, there is a gap between seconded permanent staff and ad-hoc recruits. While the former is acquainted with bureaucratic procedures, organizational cultures, overall operational needs, etc., the latter provides indispensable expertise without which no operation is possible. They do not necessarily work contradictorily of course, while they easily misunderstand each other. It is difficult to identify and determine who should recruit whom and how to deploy. In short, we need such divergent civilians with complex organizational relations to be positioned according to a coherent strategy despite highly complex realities often without knowing who should be responsible for the strategy.

What kind of a planning process exists in your organization for determining the development of civilian capacities, and on what kind of capacity needs assessment(s) and forecast(s) is the planning process based?

A country like Japan may be defined in the above context as follows; people with capacities without strategies. There is an enormous amount of human resources very useful for peace operations. But there is a sense that we do not know well about ongoing strategies of peace operations. We study UN (operational and recruitment) policies and make efforts to comply with them to enhance contributions to peace operations. However, due to the sense that we are not

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competent enough to handle strategies of peace operations, people might abstain or simply cannot be cultivated or even motivated.

What are recurring bottlenecks that impede the rapid deployment of civilian expertise for peace and stability operations? Please share a practical lesson, for example how your organization addressed a specific bottleneck.

I would say bureaucracy and domestic political calculations are the bottlenecks.

Hideaki Shinoda
Director, HPC

- 14. Hanne Gam / Department for Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark**
15. Kamilla Heden Henningsen / Department for Stabilisation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

Dear David, Sarah and other colleagues,

Thank you very much indeed for the opportunity to comment on these pertinent issues. Denmark very much welcomes the UN Review of Civilian Capacity and looks forward to seeing the report in due course.

What are the major gaps and key challenges in recruiting civilian expertise for international peace and stability operations?

Although many countries and international organisations have built up their capacity since the 1990s to recruit, train and deploy civilians, serious gaps remain in the quantity of staff available, notably for stabilisation missions in non-permissive environments such as Afghanistan and Somalia. Moreover, there also remain serious quality gaps with respect to management and speed of deployment of high-quality personnel. In other words, the challenge is not just to add personnel to rosters but to put in place more systematic human resource management processes and seek ways of reducing duplication with international partners.

In terms of more specific challenges and gaps, we would like to highlight the following:

- Shortage of candidates who possess the right "integrator" skills (i.e. between the development, political and security aspects of a mission).
- Attracting candidates who not only have the right technical skills/substantive knowledge but also the skills and personal competences to act as advisers and capacity builders
- Shortage of relevant candidates with appropriate language skills.
- Gaps in "Rule of Law" profiles (including police, justice, civilian administration, customs, boarder monitoring, correctional, and other related profiles)
- Gender gap
- Roster members availability on request (not always available for speedy deployment due to other assignments)
- Finally, more synergies are needed between UN/EU/NATO and member states related to the different rosters and coherence in areas of recruitment, training, deployment and lessons learning.

What kind of a planning process exists in your organization for determining the development of civilian capacities, and on what kind of capacity needs assessment(s) and forecast(s) is the planning process based?

Up until now, an annual audit has been conducted in the autumn with input from relevant Danish missions, embassies and country offices determining the demand for civilian experts the following year in terms of numbers, profiles and particular political priority areas. However, with increased Danish engagement in fragile states and enhanced focus on whole of government approaches, it has become even more important for Denmark to be able to deploy a broad range of civilian experts on short notice. Therefore, we are currently going through an extensive process of reviewing and strengthening Danish civilian capacities in areas relevant for stabilisation and fragile states. This includes identifying current shortfalls in civilian expertise more broadly and exploring possibilities for better including and attracting appropriate candidates from both within and outside the civil service through e.g. more focused rosters, better incentive structures and training and protection measures. Denmark will also engage in ongoing international efforts to improve regional and global civilian pools for stabilisation and peace-building in fragile states and conflict-affected areas, including support for civilian capacity-building in the global South. We agree with Clare Lockhart's observation that it is important not to assume that "there is no national capacity" - or rephrased as a note to donors: "Don't assume what works at home works abroad".

As an important element in our review process, Libra Advisory Group recently finalised a report commissioned by the MFA on "Reviewing and Upgrading Denmark's Civilian Capacity." Although the report focuses on Denmark, we believe the recommendations and considerations in the report could be relevant to many other actors too. Therefore, we attach the report to this e-mail for everybody's information.

3. What are recurring bottlenecks that impede the rapid deployment of civilian expertise for peace and stability operations? Please share a practical lesson, for example how your organization addressed a specific bottleneck.

Apart from what has already been captured in our answer to question one, it is worth mentioning that lengthy recruitment processes in some international organisations impede some people's candidatures (they simply take up other posts before the recruitment process is finalised). It also leads to a waste of resources on behalf of member states, when candidates are ultimately dismissed not because of their qualifications but due to their nationality or for other political reasons.

Kind regards,

Hanne Gam
Minister Counsellor
Department for Security Policy
Danish MFA

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and

Kamilla Heden Henningsen
Head of Section
Department for Stabilisation
MFA

16. Hannelore Valier / Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)

17. Anita Janassary / Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)

Dear Colleagues,

Many national pools list only civil servants as potential civilian experts for seconded positions in international peacekeeping operations. Yet, this ignores the fact that there is another group of experts which should be considered as seconded personnel: persons from the open market. The German expert pool, administrated by ZIF*, focuses on recruiting those experts because they are more flexible and mobile then civil servants. Once assigned, experts recruited from the open market often stay in mission longer then civil servants. As a result, they oftentimes have more experience and familiarity with the mission environment than civil servants who are only there for some months or a year due to their specific deployment conditions. Some might say that it is not possible to recruit the "best" from the open market since there the "best" experts are immediately employed in the private sector where they can earn more money, or that the "best experts" are already deployed. In our view, this is a misconception of what it means to be the "best"!

The willingness to serve in a mission, often in difficult and even hostile environments, demonstrates enormous commitment to peacekeeping tasks. This kind of motivation, combined with one's professional level of knowledge and skills, should be the criteria to identify the "best."

One of the key challenges in the field of civil personnel for peace operations is, of course, rapid deployment. Even the best maintained roster of experts cannot guarantee that well qualified and prepared civilians are deployed to a mission within two days (this should be considered a fact). Therefore, the deployment of civil experts should be a combination of two components. The first component could be a standby team of persons who may hold regular employment but who have jobs that allow them to be deployed to a mission within 48 hrs (e.g. European CRTs**). The second component could be national or regional rosters that enable sending organizations to deploy civil experts to missions within 4 to 8 weeks.

Peacekeeping operations (POs) are always exceptional situations. It is counter-productive to aim for totally deliberated and planned deployment procedures. POs are not fully calculable; nobody knows how many personnel and which professions are needed a year in advance. While there should always be set procedures in place, these procedures this should not hamper our flexibility and creativity in recruiting and deploying persons to peace missions. This also means that we need to ask questions like 'why doesn't the UN use national or regional rosters to fill their vacancies?' The argument that this would jeopardize the UN's impartiality seems to be weak. In fact, the use of such rosters may even lead to more diversity amongst mission international staff. We should also understand that those posts that are not filled over months and years might not really be necessary. Focusing on essential posts in a mission is more supportive to achieve the mission's mandate. Success in regards to civil personnel is more often a matter of quality, not just quantity.

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* The Center for International Peace Operation (ZIF) in Berlin is a non-profit agency funded by the German Government. Its mandate is to prepare, train and recruit civil experts for international peace operations.

** The European Council Secretariat initiated in 2005 the creation of Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) with the aim of supporting the start-up of new missions or reinforcing existing ones.

Hannelore Valier & Anita Janassary

18. Ambassador (ret.) David C. Litt / Center for Stabilization and Economic Reconstruction (CSER)

International civilian organizations in post-conflict environments will generally operate in some form of contractual or voluntary relationship with other specified organizations, e.g., UN specialized agencies and their private or voluntary sector implementing partners; corporations providing a contractual service to militaries; NGOs working with local NGOs and host nation governments. However, post-conflict environments are usually flooded with these networks, whose component organizations are often incapable or unwilling (or both) of communicating, let alone cooperating, with one another outside of their specific contract or task-- even when the need to do so is dire. The reasons are usually prejudice and lack of trust, but also lack of initiative, prior planning or infrastructure.

Learning to operate across these organizational cultures is a capability that we must incorporate across these cultural divides -- military to civilian, government to private sector, indigenous governments to foreign experts. Rarely do educational and training opportunities focus on this kind of organizational openness -- breaking down mutual prejudices, building trust, developing new synergies to exploit each other's comparative advantages, and doing so in a "neutral, non-threatening" learning environment.

The same deficiencies apply to responding to post-disaster scenarios; but there is usually little warning in advance of a disaster. Conflicts, on the other hand, usually provide responders with ample time to organize, communicate, and recommend potential cooperation opportunities, well in advance of civilian deployments. Proper education and training across organizational cultures can improve this capacity.

I also strongly agree with the comments of Clare Lockhart in a separate posting that too little attention is given in post-conflict response to utilizing, promoting, and developing host nation capabilities, whether governmental (especially local-level governing structures) or civil society. The discourse frequently is all about "us" and only secondarily about "them."

We as an international community must improve our crisis-response educational facilities in these directions. Our institution is trying to do just that.

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19. Yasmine Sherif / United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Dear David and Colleagues,

Many thanks for organizing this timely e-net discussion. Below are a few observations. While based on UNDP's experience, these are also relevant across the UN.

In peacebuilding contexts, UNDP shoulders a major responsibility to support capacity development for conflict prevention, rule of law, governance and economic recovery - all geared at consolidating peace, prevent resumption of conflict and advance basic human rights enshrined in the MDGs.

Finding the right people with the right set of skills and experience is one chief challenge. Another one is the understanding of 'deployment of civilian capacities.' A couple of points to this end:

In finding the right people, UNDP has learnt from experience that technical skills, alone, are not sufficient. We know that simply being a lawyer or an economist will not suffice in building sustainable peace in conflict-affected environments. We need people who are well-rounded. We need professionals who possess a combination of field-experience, technical skills, political astuteness and practical programming skills. We need people who are able to engage in positive policy dialogue and to serve as catalysts for national ownership and local efforts of resilience. And, we need staff with a vision, courage and commitment. Most relevant civilian capacities with this experience and background are already in the UN – not on rosters.

Thus, since peacebuilding is a process in need of well-rounded professionals, the Organization will benefit more from investing in such capacities in a timely manner – well before the peacebuilding phase. It is only by working with war-affected people and host-governments for a considerable period time – and during their darkest hours - that such capacities and skills can evolve and mature. It is thus fair to assume that staff who have spent a substantive time in-country before and during a conflict are better prepared to assist the country to recover in the aftermath of the conflict.

This is where UNDP's experience comes in – an experience we share across the UN system - Our civilian capacities are often deployed well before a peace agreement, which allows them to develop multiple skills required for a given peacebuilding setting, such as understanding the context, establishing trust with national partners and putting in place crisis-sensitive programmes. While there is always scope for improvement of human resource skills, the main challenge is that of financial resources.

The rule of law, justice and security sectors are good examples of lacking in resources – human and financial - which is also acknowledged by the SG's Peacebuilding report. UNDP's crisis response and peacebuilding efforts aim to plug both of these gaps by deploying staff before and during the actual conflict - so to lay the ground for peace as early as possible. The priority is timing as well as focus on empowering local civilian capacities.

Thus, civilian capacity review may benefit from considering the following two factors:

1. The timing for deployment and the duration required for developing the necessary skillset among staff.

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2. The need to identify local civilian capacities and empower these to take charge of ending the conflict and building the peace.

Kind regards,
Yasmine

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20. Bernardo Arévalo de León / UNOPS Joint Programme Unit for UN-Interpeace Initiatives**21. Enrique Sánchez / UNOPS Joint Programme Unit for UN-Interpeace Initiatives**

Dear Friends and Colleagues,

We'd like to contribute to this debate with some considerations on the relationship between the deployment of international capacities in peacebuilding contexts, and the development of national capacities for peace that has been already introduced by Necla Tschirgi.

1. Applying a peacebuilding lens to international civilian capacity deployment requires shifting the focus from stop-gap “stabilization” efforts, to emphasize the development and strengthening of national capacities that can sustain peace.
2. For peacebuilding/statebuilding, these capacities are of two different categories. To use graphic language, they are about
 - a. the “hardware”: the concrete institutional and legal frameworks that can create functional states and just and peaceful societies –security provision, justice services, health and education, etc.- ,
 - b. and about the “software”: the relationships of trust and legitimacy that underpin interactions in society, and between state and society.

Often, little attention is placed on the second category.

3. The development of national capacities that can sustain peace is therefore not only about technical skills. While a wide range of technical capacities necessary for peacebuilding are amenable to be “transferred” through methods such as training, mentoring, etc. others cannot. But in the case of capacities that cannot be “transferred”, they can be “fostered”: identifying and developing concrete interventions that can enable the emergence of such intangibles as trust, legitimacy, etc.
4. And this can often be done in the context of the development of “hardware” technical capacities: how an agricultural policy is developed, for example, can add or subtract from the perceived legitimacy of the state; how policing is done in a community can add or subtract trust between population and authorities, etc.
5. From this perspective, the challenge is to mobilize international civilian capacities that understand the need and are able to foster national capacities –hardware and software. This is an important nuance: deployment of international capacities without such a focus can lead to unsustainable interventions due to:
 - a. The marginalization and disempowerment of national capacities necessary to sustain concrete achievements,
 - b. The development of hardware capacities without attention to software capacities, that makes achievements at the level of “hardware” unsustainable due to relapse into conflict, political instability, arbitrary changes in policy, clientelistic practices in Government, destruction of government property, etc.
6. International capacities that can foster national capacities require, beyond the concrete technical skills necessary in a given context, some additional components:
 - a. An ability to identify existing national capacities, active and potential.
 - b. For “hardware” capacities, an ability to strengthen and develop national capacities through context-adequate skill-transfer methodologies (training, mentoring, etc.)

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- c. For “software” capacities, an ability to develop operational strategies that allow the emergence of elements of trust, legitimacy, etc.
 - d. An ability to effectively integrate, as early as possible, national capacities into its own capacity-building strategies
7. In terms of the delivery side of such assistance, this would require:
- a. The capacity to develop comprehensive capacity-building strategies that identify and focus existing national needs at the “hardware” and “software” levels, and
 - b. A capacity to provide the pre-deployment screening / training focusing both on the relevant specific technical skills, and the set of interpersonal skills and practical methodologies necessary for a national capacity fostering function.

With best regards,

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22. Susan Manuel / United Nations Department of Public Information (UNDPI)

1. *What are the major gaps and key challenges in recruiting civilian expertise for international peace and stability operations?*

In an effort to build rosters of professional field staff as well as to build a "global Secretariat," the UN (Secretariat and peace operations) recruitment system is undergoing a transformation. Some feel this new regime relies too heavily on generalized UN "competencies" and on written tests and interviews to the detriment of both area experts and (some) experienced and well-performing staff who may not test/interview well.

Increasingly, the chances for deploying expertise in a specific geographic area are being reduced. This is a general UN Secretariat trend, the aim of which seems to be to build a competent and fair global civil service and to build in field experience as part of a UN career. While all admirable, whether this new corps can respond quickly or with sufficient specific expertise to tackle problems and objectives of particular international peace and stability operations is yet to be seen.

This system also favors capabilities in English (and French) drafting and competency-based interviewing--using quite generic competencies--over other possible skills.

How to factor in experience and performance of existing field staff may have to be somehow determined. In addition, the innovation, flexibility and adaptability to different environments required for effectiveness on some missions may not be adequately assessed in this new system.

2. *What kind of a planning process exists in your organization for determining the development of civilian capacities, and on what kind of capacity needs assessment(s) and forecast(s) is the planning process based?*

The UN Department of Public Information has been working with the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support on policy guidance, job descriptions, vacancy announcements and "benchmarking" of all public information posts. In addition, over the past seven years we have been offering an annual week-long workshop for field public information officers to exchange best practices and develop or tweak policy and guidance and ultimately planning. Theoretically, capacities could be improved and needs identified through this and the annual field mission visits we undertake. However, we have also gotten bogged down in a lengthy "benchmarking" exercise requiring detailed descriptions of scores of posts down to the work hours in every conceivable size and calendar of a mission. While there can be no argument against rationalizing posts, the current exercise is both time-consuming and unrealistically generic. As veteran peace operations chief Ian Martin wrote in a recent piece for the "Review of Political Missions 2010," missions do not lend themselves to generic templates. Only so much planning can go on for a generic peace operation before creativity and adaptability are lost.

3. *What are recurring bottlenecks that impede the rapid deployment of civilian expertise for peace and stability operations? Please share a practical lesson, for example how your organization addressed a specific bottleneck.*

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UN Headquarters planning for emergency response (except OCHA) of personnel seems to have gone off the front burner. It is very difficult to deploy staff on an urgent basis without straining existing rules and procedures, as was done successfully in the Haiti post-earthquake emergency.

While the Field Central Review Body (FCRB) process takes hold, deployment has slowed and mission vacancy rates have grown. However, missions may employ staff on temporary contracts; the FCRB rosters are gradually being filled, and the capacity for more rapid deployment should grow with them.

For the time being, human resources capacities are under-resourced for this transition. More personnel from various specialized departments (i.e. other than DFS) need to be devoted to this crucial task with top-level blessing so that personnel work is not just an extra burden outside the normal departmental work plan and mandate.

Some fear that flexibility in hiring is going to be greatly reduced in favor of those who succeed in the roster system. There is reason for concern that competent potential staff as well as competent currently deployed staff is not all getting on the rosters, as a result of not passing a written test or interview. Other forms of measurement are needed. Otherwise, we may end up with a field staff of English (and French) marketing majors.

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23. Barbara Piazza-Georgi / United Nations Population Fund (UNPFA)

Dear All,

I will not add a long contribution, as we have already had such a rich discussion. I would just like to draw the attention of the group - and of future researchers and report writers - to the experience of Burundi with the Peacebuilding Fund, in 2006-2009. It was the beginnings of the Peacebuilding Fund, and it was the first time that the need to empower and encourage women and young people in peacebuilding and community recovery, was duly recognized - and funded.

Two of the largest projects approved by the PBF - quite similar to each other in concept and underlying principle - were to empower (a) rural women, and (b) disadvantaged rural youth, with cash-for-work, training, business counselling and microcredits. Many of the principles that have been raised in this discussion were put into practice in these two projects.

Both projects were carefully targeted to communities, and activities, that would have the largest effect on recovery and reconciliation.

The youth project, in particular, emphasised labour-intensive cash-for-work projects that would benefit the local community, such as restoring roads, planting trees and terracing hills, in order to give the young people a sense of contributing to rebuilding their communities. At the same time, the young people were trained in life skills such as peaceful communication, entrepreneurship, gender relations and healthy lifestyles; and a select number benefited from microcredits and vocational training and business counselling to set up sustainable livelihoods for themselves. It is important to note that the young beneficiaries were chosen with proper gender balance in mind, and to include a certain number of demobilised soldiers and returning rebels. The idea was to have a safe, productive place for these groups to integrate and communicate. Also, the projects and the beneficiaries were chosen by the communities themselves, the UN agency establishing and monitoring the criteria.

In the women's project - with which I am less familiar - there was a component of sensitizing the community against gender-based violence, and of care and support to victims.

I left Burundi almost two years ago, and both projects are now closed; anyone interested can contact UNIFEM (who implemented the women's project) and UNPFA (who implemented the youth project) in Burundi to obtain more information. I think it will be worth your while! They were the two of the most innovative and exciting projects I have ever been involved in.

Barbara Piazza-Georgi

24. Capt. Pierpaolo Sinconi / Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU)

Dear colleagues,

I would like to share a couple of ideas related to question number 1 and number 3. I am not directly involved in the issue of strengthening the availability, deployability, and appropriateness of civilian capacities for peacebuilding but I hope that also these basic ideas could be beneficial to the e-discussion.

1. With reference to question number 1: Based on my observations from visiting the civilian PSO training centers in Africa, the main problem in recruiting adequate personnel for PSOs is the absence of a roster. There is, in fact, no database of civilians with specific experience and skills who can be deployed at short notice. Additionally, unlike military and police who belong to a wide organization that can plan the activities of the members in the long term, civilians are from different organizations such as universities, NGOs, governmental organizations, and agencies, etc. Once (rarely) a roster is created and a civilian is requested to deploy, problems arise with the organization he is a part of, or he is already deployed somewhere else.

2. With reference to question number 3: a bottleneck is the absence of logistics self sustainability for the civil component. While military and SPUs can be self-sufficient and can deploy where they need to be deployed, civilians rely on other organizations or find accommodations on their own. This is to say that they are forced to be placed where "board and lodging" is available as opposed to where the scenario requires.

Maybe the possibility to host civilians in military or police infrastructures should be investigated further. Additionally, a typical bottleneck is the security environment. Civilians cannot take care of their own security and they cannot react in self-defense in the event of an attack. Only when and where the military component can assure an adequately safe and secure environment and the police component can provide a minimum respect of the rule of law is it possible to deploy civilians. Therefore, in extremely challenging scenarios (such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, DRC, etc...), which would benefit from an integrated/comprehensive approach, there are no conditions that permit civilians to properly work on the ground.

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25. Ambassador (ret.) David C. Litt / Center for Stabilization and Economic Reconstruction (CSER)

Dear Colleagues:

Capt. Sinconi of CoESPU rightly raises the complex issue of logistics sustainability. Beyond lodging and security are a wide range of supply-chain considerations that we should address as soon as possible for building international civilian capacity. Some of these include short-notice sharing of civil aviation cargo space, warehousing at the destination, inventory management and accountability, and in-country distribution. Haiti is unfortunately experiencing many of these bottlenecks in trying to marry, for example, existing supplies of medicines and medical supplies in warehouses, with immediate needs for cholera victims in distant infected regions. The frustrations involving government regulation, and government capacity to move quickly, are very real, but the legal and regulatory frameworks of distressed nations cannot be just ignored. Haiti might be an exceptional case, but the underlying logistical issues in crisis zones are very relevant to all those organizations who are trying to help. Understanding and improving these conditions should be integral parts of education, training, exercises, and experimentation.

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26. Richard Ponzio / Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), United States Department of State

Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to this thematic e-discussion.

- How can civilian response interoperability between multilateral and bilateral actors be improved in the field (e.g., through possibly secondments or joint standards)? And what are the potential practical benefits from enhanced partnerships?

For decades, many governments have sought to work effectively alongside multilateral peace and stability operations, including in countries such as Afghanistan, Haiti, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia, and the Sudan. Two recent examples of US Government secondments (and joint deployments) into and alongside multilateral operations include:

* Through the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, the US embedded a three-person strategic planning / technical team within a UNDP/UNAMA support mission for the Government of Afghanistan's Afghanistan National Development Strategy (from June 2009 until January 2010). From February 2010 until present, this same team continued to work closely alongside UNDP and UNAMA in the preparation of the July 2010 Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan and its follow-up and monitoring of progress.

* In 2010, S/CRS seconded a security sector reform expert into MONUC/MONUSCO, and this cooperative effort is expected to continue in 2011.

Based on these and similar experiences elsewhere, some of the "potential practical benefits from enhanced partnerships" include: i) besides contributing financially to costly field operations, bilateral governments often maintain specialized expertise among their (often highly trained) personnel that can be of benefit to the activities of UN peace and stability operations; ii) As the UN is often trusted as a neutral institution by the host government, a higher level of host country access is often granted to bilateral government staff operating within or directly alongside the UN; iii) Bilateral government civilian personnel embedded in the UN can serve as a constructive bridge between both the UN and a host government and their home government colleagues operating in a host country (this channel of communications can be particularly valuable in mitigating mistrust and misunderstanding; it must also be managed effectively to avoid misuse); and iv) besides the technical expertise wielded by the UN and its perceived neutrality, investing in the UN's efforts in a fragile or conflict-affected state (through bilateral government secondments to the UN) has shown to increase coordination with donor countries and to decrease the transaction costs placed on a host government from having to manage concurrently relations with and the reporting requirements of multiple donors with competing interests and capabilities.

- How can international actors more effectively draw on the skills of women and experts from the Global South for peacebuilding and stability operations? What are the best practices for leveraging highly specialized or context-specific skills (e.g. languages) from the region?

One approach that has leveraged highly specialized and culturally (including linguistically) sensitive skills from the region neighboring a host country is that of Capacity Development Facilities (CDFs) innovated in Kosovo, Serbia, and Afghanistan. Introduced by the UN Development Programme, CDFs train and place short-term (1-3 years) international and Diaspora coaches and mentors in support of senior and middle-level managers in key government ministries and agencies. The coaching methodology employed focuses on the transfer of "soft" leadership skills as much as "hard" technical skills. But, to date, the success of this approach has derived more from the talent, experience, and commitment of the individuals recruited than from the, albeit

important, training offered and methodologies adopted. In short, advisors from neighboring countries to a conflict maintain enormous advantages in the critical areas of connecting with and transferring fundamental capacities to a host country population. Through their knowledge of the local language and sensitivity to the culture, politics, and history of a society, neighboring country coaches and mentors are also well positioned to build trust and foster reconciliation among erstwhile enemy groups, a key element of effective peacebuilding. They are often more cost-effective too. Despite the known risks inherent in such an approach (e.g., neighboring country governments and their citizens can be negatively embroiled in what, on the surface, may appear as an essentially internal, intrastate conflict), the multiple benefits from CDF approach merit further study and support by international peacebuilding organizations, particularly following the early peacebuilding (or stabilization) phase of an external support effort for a conflict-affected country (when financial constraints among other pressures tend to intensify).

- What are 1 or 2 lessons or recommendations that you can share on enhancing international civilian capacities and practical forms of cooperation among multilateral and bilateral actors?

One recommendation, with reference to my response to the previous question, is for international donor partners to financially support more initiatives that adopt CDF-like approaches which emphasize the sourcing of capacity from the Global South, such as the new Civilian Technical Assistance Programme in Afghanistan. Alternatively, donors would be wise to invest in developing further civilian expertise in the Global South by opening up their training programs, supporting comparable training programs in the Global South, providing equipment, and sponsoring directly the participation of civilian experts from the Global South in multilateral and regional peace and stability operations (e.g., the UN and African Union).

A second recommendation, to enhance practical forms of cooperation among multilateral and bilateral actors involved, is to forge unifying goals that encourage the adoption of similar, yet flexible principles and standards (including minimum standards for interoperability) for peace and stability operations. The ongoing International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, engaging a diverse number of committed countries and international agencies, can aid this effort. The unifying goals or objectives for which consensus is built through this process could be reinforced subsequently through time-bound, concrete, and measurable benchmarks (and corresponding indicators) that can be tailored and voluntarily agreed to by (and to ensure enhanced accountability of) individual host countries coming out of violent conflict and their international partners.

Richard Ponzio
Senior Strategy and Policy Officer
S/CRS (U.S. Department of State)

27. John Crosby / Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

How can civilian response interoperability between multilateral and bilateral actors be improved in the field (e.g., through possibly secondments or joint standards)? And what are the potential practical benefits from enhanced partnership?

Improving interoperability between actors (which I take to mean the ability of different actors to operate in synergy to produce a result not obtainable by any actor working independently) must be addressed at the policy as well as procedural/working practices level. From an OSCE perspective, the policy is set out in the 1999 Platform for Co-operative Security adopted at the Istanbul Summit of the same year; operational modalities are also included. When it comes to procedures/working practices, exchange of letters, memoranda of understanding and other forms of co-operation agreements concluded at the Secretariat level are often deliberately vague and merely intended to offer a framework for co-operation and co-ordination. How such co-operation and co-ordination should be done in practice is largely left to the individual field operation (FO), particularly as the procedures will usually have to be tailored to the specific circumstances. Especially for a decentralized organization like the OSCE, the scope and success of co-operation and co-ordination with other actors in the field depends on the mandate of a field operation as well as on personalities involved. Additionally, over the years, the OSCE has worked closely with many multilateral and bilateral actors - through political consultations, staff-to-staff talks and practical co-operation in the field. This has enabled the OSCE to derive some lessons upon which the field operation can also draw - see part 3 below.

How can international actors more effectively draw on the skills of women and experts from the Global South for peacebuilding and stability operations? What are the best practices for leveraging highly specialized or context-specific skills (e.g. languages) from the region?

I would refer readers to a recent OSCE publication 'Gender Matters in the OSCE' which has much pertinent information (http://www.osce.org/publications/gen/2010/09/46000_1534_en.pdf). As for drawing on the skills of experts from the Global South, some organizations (such as the OSCE) have a restriction that its international and local staff must be citizens of one of its member/parting states – ergo the net can't be widened even regardless of how desirable to do so. But in the spirit of the drawing on the Global South, I would point out that all OSCE field operations include a local staff component (which is always larger in the number than the internationals), including to support the principle of local ownership and we all know how important that is. I'm sure there may be room to increase the number professional local staff, however constraints on doing so are sometimes set by the host country.

What are 1 or 2 lessons or recommendations that you can share on enhancing international civilian capacities and practical forms of cooperation among multilateral and bilateral actors?

Good practices:

- Co-ordination between OSCE field operations and IOs in the field is usually done through donor co-ordination meetings (often per sector of activities), bilateral meetings and joint activities, including projects. The purposes of such co-ordination meetings are twofold: (i) sharing information about

activities to avoid duplication and (ii) to agree broadly on a division of labour. Although the meetings do not always achieve the latter, the meetings are important for sharing information, discussing possible joint activities and ensuring a coherent approach to tackling certain issues.

- In some countries, the host government has established its own department with responsibilities for co-ordinating contributions from the international community. In the early stages of setting up such a department, IOs' assistance to the host government, including by advising of its functioning and by providing secretariat support, helps considerably in ensuring local ownership works efficiently and effectively.
- Co-operation is easier if the mandates of the IOs are clear and allow for a division of labour.
- The use of liaison officers can significantly improve the scope and effectiveness of co-ordination between IOs.

Areas for Improvement in Co-ordination and Co-operation in the Field

- Projects in the fields could still be better co-ordinated. Too often, overlap exists and/or one IO implements a project without informing or involving other relevant IOs working in the same area. Organizations in the field should, therefore, undertake more preparatory work prior to donor or cluster co-ordination meetings, and also share information at the earliest possible stage (ie the planning stage).
- The sharing of reports between organizations in the field could be improved. Some are more transparent when it comes to sharing reports and this can lead to resentment against those who are less open, in addition to increasing the likelihood of duplication or gaps arising in international support and prejudicing the chances of all having good situational awareness.
- HQ-level/Secretariat should regularly monitor co-operation in the field to find out whether/where strategic level co-ordination is needed and also to ensure co-operation in the field remains in-line with the political intent of participating States/members.

Regards,
John Crosby
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

28. Martin Fischer / Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC)

Question 1: How can civilian response interoperability between multilateral and bilateral actors be improved in the field (e.g., through possibly secondments or joint standards)? And what are the potential practical benefits from enhanced partnership?

The linkages between debates on the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus and the review of civilian capacities must be explored further. Moreover, it is important to further clarify the relationship between the UN family's civilian elements' peacebuilding role and role of other civilian multilateral and bilateral actors.

Question 2: How can international actors more effectively draw on the skills of women and experts from the Global South for peacebuilding and stability operations? What are the best practices for leveraging highly specialized or context-specific skills (e.g. languages) from the region?

- Tap into existing networks such as the Angie Brooks Centre and WIPNET.
- Build on the experiences and stories shared during UN Global Open Days.
- Implement 'Do No Harm' approaches when working toward strengthening the local civil society sector. More precisely, be aware and attempt to mitigate creation of harmful incentives. For example, the sudden influx of substantial financial support for civil society may lead to the mushrooming of organizations solely seeking financial support without actual commitment to any cause.
- At the start-up phase of a mission, international staff should proceed with caution and patience in order to ensure that appropriate local partners are identified. Peacebuilding contexts may offer the necessary time frame more readily than peacekeeping contexts. Ensure that appropriate local partnerships are maintained through the peacekeeping-peacebuilding transition.
- Be aware of permanent damage as a result of recruiting the best local staff into international agencies which leaves little expertise left for local civil society.
- There is a direct relationship between the multilateral/bilateral agencies' high staff turnover and the ability to identify and cooperate with appropriate local expertise.

Question 3: What are 1 or 2 lessons or recommendations that you can share on enhancing international civilian capacities and practical forms of cooperation among multilateral and bilateral actors?

From the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre involvement with ISSAT (the International Security Sector Advisory Team), the following lessons have been learned:

- 1) Form and support actors that can provide integrated support on a thematic basis that should include:
 - Roster
 - Standardization of training products
 - Facilitation of a Community of Practice that includes an online component
 - Identification and sharing operational best practices through guidance notes
 - Specialized consultancy services for capacity building
- 2) Leverage full spectrum of actors involved in sectors, for example cooperation between ISSAT (the International Security Sector Advisory Team) and ASSET (Association for Security Sector Reform)

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Education and Training) to facilitate roll-out of training products

3) For the UN, it is important to avoid duplicating efforts and formalize partnerships with existing mechanisms and leverage support.

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29. Francis James / UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)

Dear David, Sarah and colleagues:

Thank you for launching this important and relevant e-discussion. I've enjoyed following the debate and now join the discussion a bit late in the game, as we've been busy with the transition and downsizing priorities here in Burundi. Here are two manager's perspectives based on the experience from an integrated mission setting (BINUB) that has transitioned from (DPKO) peace-building /peace consolidation to (DPA) elections to one now focusing on economic development, institutional capacity building, and political tutelage.

First, it's clear that recruitment and retention is an on-going challenge in any mission - even more so in a post-conflict, peace building scenario. DPKO/DFS's recruitment procedures are painfully slow. Much has been made of its new expedited procedures, but the fruits of that process appear to be some time in the future. What can be done in the meantime? As missions such as BINUB downsize, I am struck by the wealth of practical institutional knowledge and substantive experience -on both the international and national level - that is not fully exploited, utilized, or managed. This 'reservoir of knowledge' and experience base with PBF funding, joint programming, integrated approaches, how to think out of the box, how to manage M&E, UNDAF, PRSP processes, is slipping through our fingers. Managing this talent pool, before it disperses to other missions or disappears altogether, is crucial. As we downsize, we should be increasing our support to HR/recruitment and outplacement management services via specified rostering. Those with integrated management/ UN Country Team experience should be 'highlighted,' targeted, prioritized, or shared with other peace building targeted countries such as CAR, Timor Leste and Guinea Bissau or other missions. I can't help get the feeling that the integrated Sierra Leon or Burundian experiences will be forgotten in a few years time. What an investment it has been, what good intentions, what lessons learned. And what lost potential?

Second, as we all grapple with economic cutbacks and realities confronting us, strengthening interoperability (is there such a word?) between multilateral and bilateral actors is quite simply good business sense, if not mandatory. I recall a very positive experience where the Dutch government seconded two of their staff to BCPR/UNDP with very positive results. But, importantly, the two were seen to the outside world as UNDP staff, not Dutch diplomats. Bilateral actors often have different agendas than the UN. Some harbor parochial interests, others carry colonial baggage. What is key however, is strengthening coordination, synergy, and collaborative mechanisms to avoid duplication, competition or working at cross-purposes. Again, I can't help but think that BINUB's integrated experience has, in effect, been a dry run strengthening 'interoperability' between and amongst all UN agencies, funds and programmes. It is an important first step to get our internal UN house in order, i.e., singing from the same song sheet, before engaging other multilateral and bilateral actors. But yes, let's indeed enlarge the choir; otherwise, we'll be out of step and out of tune with the economic realities of today.

With best regards,

--Francis

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30. Nick Hartmann / UNDP Democratic Republic of the Congo

Dear Community Members,

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this thread, which is indeed at the heart of most of the problems we face on a regular basis. I have read the comments with interest, and below are my ten cents from my 15 years at UNDP and the Secretariat working on peace operations and UN reform.

My overall case here is for an institutional partnership based on quality, scale, adaptability, independence in deployability based on a clear division of roles and expectations. We should not be spending time on managing individual secondees or freelancers unless in the rare exceptional senior advisory level or for strategic reasons.

There are not only benefits, but also practical pitfalls from greater “interoperability.” While there are many good experiences on sharing capacities between UN and bilateral actors, overall, it is a very messy business. My comments below relate to the UN a beneficiary of non-UN capacities.

My most frequent reservations with the many current capacity partnerships are:

1. OECD member state nationals (mostly men in crisis countries) invariably dominate the partnership/secondment scene;
2. There is little if any vetting of the capacities or intentions of those chosen for the functions, either for lack of due diligence by the UN, pressure from a specific partner, or just little choice given the crisis context;
3. Often little former experience in-country of the persons available, and often not able to speak the local language (Congo being French-speaking is a case in point);
4. There is much difficulty in integrating an experienced foreign practitioner into a programme managed by a senior national, the latter being a UN imperative to put nationals in leadership positions;
5. The complicated nature of UN operations and jargon (“peacebuilding”, “statebuilding”, “early recovery”, “community security”, “civilian protection”, “SGBV”) does not lend at all itself easily to someone helping out for six months or a year, and the strain it places on the office to integrate such persons for a short time;
6. The general difficulty of maintaining a relevant roster of practitioners who are pre-vetted but rarely available, and if so, not released by their management, and rarely for the time required to be effective on the ground.
7. These are serious strains on management to make sure that the unit works effectively while capitalizing on the person who has been offered, and requires a significant investment in follow-up and handholding. Even without external HR support, your average existing group of UN colleagues requires a good deal of teambuilding and repositioning of roles and responsibilities in a fast-paced crisis environment to stay focused and on the ball on a multitude of issues.
8. Security issues are always a grey and dangerous area and a concern for persons who are not actual staff, but work for e.g. for NDP, with significant tensions regarding access to security assets, never mind consequences in the case of evacuation.

But assuming that the above are taken into account, there certainly are capacities to be seized, and suggest the following, again based on an approach to institutions, not individuals in principle:

1. MoUs with service providers should be developed and shared amongst UN entities. For example, UNDP has standing arrangements with government-funded entities (service providers) such as MSB (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency) (<http://www.msb.se/>) (excellent work for UNDP in Haiti), NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council), DRC (Danish Refugee Council) and others, and these as entities have been prevetted. I don't suggest that there should be a central coordinating entity for these partnerships, but there should be a central repository that allows for all agencies working in a crisis context to access these, develop their own Terms of Reference and MoUs with them, or piggyback on existing ones. Each service provider and UN beneficiary will have their own terms and conditions of service. Perhaps a central body (PBSO?) could convene a forum whereby such partnerships are solicited, and also review performance as part of an after-action review. Joint standards may be a good idea, but that should be agency-developed and enforced.
2. The important part here is that the onus of quality and scale. On quality, by virtue of having a standing MoU with prevetted and qualified organizations, we don't get involved in seeking or reviewing the quality of individuals. Dismissing incompetents is but a matter of informing the provider, and it's not a complicated UN HR process or a sensitive partnership issue with a secondee from a donor. On scale, when a crisis demands it, it is understood that a group of persons (not one or two) would be deployed, for which an induction process and management attention to integration becomes worthwhile.
3. The capacities offered by our partners should not present any legal, HR, or management concerns, and would be deployed on the terms of the agency who selected them. The Terms of Reference between the partners would clearly spell out as to what is expected in collaboration with the UN agency, and would likely focus on higher-level issues such as supporting improved coordination and the management of results, and not conditions of service, security arrangements, etc.
4. Similarly, for women and experts from the Global South for peacebuilding and stability operations, partnership with organizations claiming to have the ability to deploy such profiles should be solicited. I am sure that the type of entities mentioned in Point 1 would welcome the suggestion that they introduce greater diversity in their offerings, just as Belgium and France finance Junior Professional Officers from the Global South. But it is important that the partners be vetted and ensure quality; we should get out of the business of hand-picking, hand-vetting, and micromanaging individuals and ensure scale.
5. Partnerships are good and beneficial, but ideally they should not be there for the purpose of filling the competency gaps that we should resolve. The UN D-SG's Management Committee, DOCO (Development Operations Coordination Office), and the Executive Boards of the various UN bodies need to continue to push for the most important aspect, which is enabling the UN entities to implement fast-track procedures to guarantee value for money and effectiveness in conflict contexts. UNDP has implemented a slew of fast-track procedures over the last three years that have allowed us to deploy staff more quickly (albeit with mixed results for the reasons mentioned under reservations), set up and close suboffices in conflict-affected provinces with little bureaucracy, procure more rapidly, and much more. Despite attempts by the High-Level Panel on System-Wide Coherence in 2006, these efforts are often agency-specific, and by necessity need be as long as the Member States wish to maintain the many UN entities, funds and programmes as they are for which risk appetites and ability to manage resources differ.

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In summary, as long as our “interoperability” is founded on the improved and needed ability of the UN entities to respond quickly with the right persons at the right time, agencies themselves must be able to account for the quality, relevance and timeliness of the persons provided. Given existing gaps, partners can complement capacities to be enshrined in a partnership framework or MoU that focuses on the quality, scale and adaptability of their capacities to a range of UN operations, underpinned by a clear separation of roles and responsibilities in which the partner assumes the ability to deploy and support operations on the ground with minimal need for the UN to provide for such conditions.

Thanks again for the opportunity to comment and contribute.

Best regards,

Nick

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31. Jeffrey Stacey / Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), U.S. Department of State

Question 1: How can civilian response interoperability between multilateral and bilateral actors be improved in the field (e.g., through possibly secondments or joint standards)? And what are the potential practical benefits from enhanced partnership?

It has become conventional wisdom in this field that coordination problems on the ground have worsened in recent years, as there has been a double increase: not only in the number of failed and failing states, but also the number of actors engaged in stabilization or conflict prevention around the world (in other words, peacebuilding). For decades the UN engaged in these efforts practically alone, primarily with a peacekeeping approach. Then the EU initiated its ESDP missions in the 1990s, now referred to as CSDP missions in the 2000s. But in the 2000s bilateral actors also began to develop peacebuilding capabilities, including my own office inside the U.S. Department of State. Most donor countries now either possess this capability or have made a serious commitment to develop one. And as the bilaterals are beginning to launch peace and stability missions abroad, the field is getting crowded such as in the DRC. For this reason among others, the UN Civ Cap Review is both timely and welcome.

From the U.S. perspective, we have been working hard on making serious commitments to multilateralism in recent years. A major thrust of this effort is demonstrable in our decision to join with Canada, the UK, and Germany to launch the International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative (ISPI). This e-discussion is part of ISPI's Community of Practice. The other major element of ISPI is its International Working Group, in which 21 partners have technical working level experts beginning to work together on three initial Technical Sub-Groups: Lessons Learned, Training and Exercises, and Roster Recruitment and Management. Each TSG's members are examining the question of how to become interoperable within their technical area. ISPI's overall goal is collectively to figure out how to become field interoperable, for that is where all of us will ultimately be judged for our work. If 40% of all countries emerging from conflict revert to it within 10 years, all of us working in this sphere will know we are succeeding when that percentage begins to drop.

A new term has been bubbling up in peacebuilding circles, namely comprehensive interoperability or CINT. Drawing on common terminology like comprehensive approach, the term basically means no more than becoming field interoperable. It has occurred to a great many individuals and organizations that we will not become more effective at local capacity building and transfer to local ownership until we can streamline how well we all coordinate with each other in the field. One of the most common mantras heard these days is how it is not sufficient to find each other in the field and figure out ad-hoc ways to work together; it may be pragmatic, but overall the international coordination problem persists. The mantra calls for "strategic" coordination, i.e. capital to capital or headquarters to headquarters to engage in some form of closer coordination in line with best practices *before* deploying to the field.

If we as the international community of peacebuilding get closer to CINT, this will allow us all to begin to not only save money and reduce duplication but also increase effectiveness through more targeted and finely honed peace and stability missions that benefit from the comparative advantage that certain partners may have over others. The U.S. for example is very new at this, with our Civilian Response Corps only halfway built; we are well aware that we have much more experienced partners such as the

UN, EU, and OSCE. We are pleased to see that the African Union, an ISPI partner, like us is also beginning to add a civilian component to its Standby Force.

Could ISPI be doing things better or be well advised to take on additional activities? Are there other routes besides this one to improving the field performance of the international community?

Question 2: How can international actors more effectively draw on the skills of women and experts from the Global South for peacebuilding and stability operations? What are the best practices for leveraging highly specialized or context-specific skills (e.g. languages) from the region?

Numerous ISPI partners and other governments already fund peacebuilding training centers in the Global South. Many of them are doing very good work. Not only could these efforts be augmented by either funding/funder increases, but specific lines of funding could be tied to tangible efforts made to recruit a larger number of female peacebuilding experts. This and other ideas were discussed last summer in G8 preparation meetings, where our Canadian colleagues put forth a very sound proposal for funding increased training of Global South peacebuilders (ISPI partners are beginning to consider this proposal in a serious way). As we understand it, ISPI is also open to the participation of Global South peacebuilding training centers in its IWG.

One question we in the peacebuilding sphere need continually to ask ourselves is where gaps in capacity building exist in the field. One major gap already identified but not sufficiently filled is that of sex and gender-based violence or SGBV. In certain regions and countries this problem is massive and far from being under control. The EU for example is one actor working on filling this gap, to its great credit. But more efforts need to be made, and in sync with the CINT horizon goal it behooves us all to try to do this in close coordination with one another. Perhaps a new kind of more substantive type of ISPI TSGs could be set up, TSGs that would bring together land mine of SGBV working level experts.

Do these suggestions make sense? Could the UN in its coming report devote a special section to this question?

Question 3: What are 1 or 2 lessons or recommendations that you can share on enhancing international civilian capacities and practical forms of cooperation among multilateral and bilateral actors?

As I mentioned before, we welcome the UN's review and hope the UN—the natural field coordinator in the peacebuilding sphere—will take the opportunity to write a report that will point the way forward on how to solve the problems that the international community is facing, starting with the coordination problem but also concerning other key problems as well. None of us need to be reminded of how crucial this work is, for not only are there national interests of the doers of peacebuilding at stake, but the national interests of the receivers of peacebuilding efforts. Ultimately, the stakes move beyond the material and merge with the ethical and even the moral. We have a profound duty to make improvements for the benefit of all.

I conclude by paraphrasing a leader in this field, Mr. Jean-Marie Guehenno, no less than the chair of the panel of advisors of the UN Civ Cap review itself. On numerous occasions Mr. Guehenno has called for peacebuilding actors to improve their cooperation and coordination, using the metaphor of each actor making sufficient changes in its approach so that all peacebuilding actors have docking stations that can

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achieve CINT if not by becoming exactly like one another in form and approach, at least allowing us to fit together with interlocking docking stations so as to achieve improved outcomes on the ground.

Jeffrey Stacey

U.S. Department of State

International Engagement Officer

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

32. Erin McCandless / *The New School Graduate Program of International Affairs*

Thank for creating this opportunity for such a diverse array of actors to contribute to such a critical topic.

Upon reviewing the quality comments of many and reflecting on the questions of both the first and second phase, I want to add my voice to those who have underscored the need to have a stronger focus on the development and use of national capacities. This suggests an adjustment of our questions. For example:

- How can civilian response interoperability between multilateral and bilateral actors be improved in ways that serve the development of a nationally owned vision and strategy? That build national capacities at all levels to carry this forward?

Maintaining a focus on improving interoperability between multilateral and bilateral actors is of obvious import. But this needs to be solidly linked to context assessment, and assessment of individual and institutional capacities within a particular context. Multilateral and bilateral interoperability must be geared towards engagement with national actors, not simply internationals coming together to cohere systems. Considering the use of strategic frameworks and tools, the emergent UN Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) is an important move forward in terms of UN integration around the notion of peace consolidation. Yet, without solid links with bilateral actors and without a concrete strategy for how the integrated mission planning process will support the national vision and plan, there is a visible disconnect between the intention and delivery of nationally owned peacebuilding. How bilaterals will engage in and cohere with the UN's peace consolidation efforts as integration becomes stronger is clearly another challenge. The development and use of strategic frameworks such as the ISF need also to be squarely linked to planning (and benchmarking) of UN (and conceivably wider international) withdrawal. This of course should be premised on rigorous assessment of national capacities to undertake ongoing requirements needed to sustain peace. Again, national actors need clearly be central to this process.

The next two questions suggest the need to find ways to enhance international capacities to deliver. Yet, I think we need to be more direct about this, asking:

- Do international civilian actors know how to build capacities? What skills are needed, and what training/capacity building processes must be put in place so that multilateral and bilateral actors can work coherently and effectively to transfer skills?

Capacity development is *in itself* a skill, separate from other political, economic, human rights and other expertise that the international civilian actors might have. This builds upon but is also different than the important distinction Bernardo and Enrique (Interpeace) make between hardware (more substantive) and software (relationship oriented) skills. It is also not simply a matter of language or contextual knowledge that can be supported by working with national actors. Minimally, supporting capacity development requires that international actors understand the political and historical context as well as the myriad ways people learn and institutions function. It is about using different skills and strategies that allow for learning to take place, about understanding the limitations of our own (international) actions and abilities

in particular contexts and knowing where, when and how to identify, tap into and build upon or catalyze local skills and capacities.

With immense focus of UNDP and other agencies on capacity building over the decades, have best (and worst) practice been sufficiently examined (probably) and shared (probably not), and most importantly, used to develop capacity building and training programs for international civilian actors going into missions (highly unlikely)? Do recruiters know how to assess this? Do mission leaders know how to address this? This should be a priority.

When I arrived in Liberia as a Civil Affairs officer in 2004, our ‘orientation’ was of a minimalist and practical nature – where and how we find things in the Mission, basic security measures, and perhaps a one hour session on the political context. We were sent off (with our vastly different backgrounds, experience and skill sets) to “restore state authority” – with exceedingly little guidance and support for how we should undertake such a task in some very hot environments. Since this time the development of the Civil Affairs mandate and identification of priority tasks has gained much clarity through the hard work of many. But my point here is more about the need for multilateral and bilateral actors to have a much stronger concern on *how* to build capacity - the processes required, and skills required, within particular contexts, to do this. And in particular, ensuring that the mission leadership and chiefs of particular sections and agencies understand this and have a commitment to it – even if they don’t have these skills themselves.

As several contributors focusing on the mobilization of US civilian response are identifying the dangers of ill-equipped actors moving to Afghanistan and other fragile environments, the need to gather and seriously institute lessons from these experiences goes without saying. The danger of potentially doing a lot of harm through speedy deployment should absolutely be sacrificed for quality recruitment and training (with these issues cared for). Critically, bilaterals coming into these contexts should be working to support multilateral efforts to build national capacities, and national ownership of the process. This will be a challenge for all as it shifts notions of accountability, and demands that personal, institutional, and national interests are put aside in the interest of a collective vision to support national actors in building peace.

Thank you.

Erin McCandless

The New School Graduate Program of International Affairs

Journal of Peacebuilding and Development

33. *Andrew Tomlinson / Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO)*

34. *Camilla Campisi / Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO)*

Dear Friends

Thank you for providing this opportunity for input and discussion. At this late stage, we just wanted to reinforce a few key points:

- *A key end objective for international peace and stability operations should be to build LOCAL capacity:* this appears to be obvious, but if diligently applied this has significant implications for the skills required from the civilians deployed to the field, the activities that they are asked to carry out, and the way their work is measured and evaluated. Using an analogy, you're not sending in mechanics to fix broken cars: you're sending in people to train locals to be mechanics. Thus, in addition to having an understanding and competence around technical peacebuilding issues, civilian staff also need teaching skills, they need local language skills, their job descriptions need to be written in terms of skill transference, and they need to be evaluated on the basis of how well they have trained people in those skills.
- *Local capacity is much more than government capacity:* if the exercise is to be effective, it is the capacity of the society as a whole that needs to be built, not just of national government – i.e. including civil society, the private sector, local and municipal government, etc. This has implications at every stage – for example, it is important that initial needs assessments include assessments of the capacity of actors beyond the national government and that the views of civil society and other local actors are taken into account in creating national strategies for peacebuilding.
- *Capacities for peace should include reconciliation and political dialogue:* in conflict-affected societies, the devastation is not just material. Relationships at all levels have broken and divisions within society have been exacerbated. Peacebuilding is about people, and from the earliest involvement of the international community, attention must be paid to building societal capacity around issues such as healing, reconciliation, and increasing space for political dialogue. It was not for nothing that the 5 year PBC review referred to Peacebuilding as a political process. Any focus on building capacity at the local level needs to center on supporting reconciliation and political dialogue.
- *Coordinating civilian deployment between actors is important:* much of the current UN peacebuilding architecture is predicated on recognition of the need for the work of different international and national actors to be coordinated and aligned behind a common set of objectives. This need will be particularly acute in the context of civilian deployment: a situation where several donor countries and multilateral actors are simultaneously deploying civilians into fragile situations with differing objectives and rules of engagement could present a significant challenge. Given the gaps in response that continue to exist in international peace and stability interventions, it is important for bi-lateral and multi-lateral actors to coordinate their efforts in order to meet the most urgent needs at the local level.

12/3/2010

Summary of Responses

Andrew Tomlinson and Camilla Campisi, Quaker United Nations Office, New York

35. Moudjib Djinadou / African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

Dear All,

- How can civilian response interoperability between multilateral and bilateral actors be improved in the field (e.g., through possibly secondments or joint standards)? And what are the potential practical benefits from enhanced partnership?

Multidimensional character of UNPKOs has appeared to be increasingly demanding in terms of specific expertise, which often are not available among most UN personnel: - Civil Affairs require experts in the field of governance, institutional support, and even negotiations, whereas background of most civil affairs officers is not that specific; - Information analysis requires intelligence specialty and practice in various context, whether it is military, police, international affairs, and even regional economy/trade; - Even QIPs administration is better administered by experts in small projects management.

Hiring these specialists at national or international level, even for temporary performance including training purposes go a long way in providing the much-needed knowledge, grounded on practical experience that is so often missing.

- How can international actors more effectively draw on the skills of women and experts from the Global South for peacebuilding and stability operations? What are the best practices for leveraging highly specialized or context-specific skills (e.g. languages) from the region?

Language skills often matter most, because, with the exception of mechanical translation and interpretation, they entail most valuable knowledge of the local/regional/national context. There is no way any interaction between the UN and local counterparts would be truly effective when clear and immediate comprehension between the 2 parties is missing. In countries of Arabic language such as Sudan, this is all the more patent, as interlocutors at national or local level do not see any urgency in practising international languages of extended consumption such as English. - identifying credible national actors – or professionals of national origin/descent, who have indisputable knowledge of the context is key. Recruiting national staff with previous experience in the national administration, the police and the army (retired high ranked officers) has proven productive...

- What are 1 or 2 lessons or recommendations that you can share on enhancing international civilian capacities and practical forms of cooperation among multilateral and bilateral actors?

Discussions are currently underway in Darfur on using US expertise for planning purposes with respect to specific projects related to security on road axes connecting the three main towns of Darfur. In that respect, it is envisaged that US experts would be collocated with UNAMID, or physically deployed in premises close enough to UNAMID HQ in El Fasher to allow smooth interaction on a permanent basis. Besides the practical aspects of bringing the project to fruition, the collaboration is also expected to provide for on-the-job training.

12/3/2010

Summary of Responses

Moudjib Djinadou,
Chief, Joint Mission Analysis Centre, UNAMID