Flood of Afpak reports begins

Clear a shelf:  the flood of reports on Afghanistan and Pakistan has only just begun.  Earlier in the fall (it would be nice if they put dates on these reports!), the self-appointed Afghanistan Study Group (wish I had trademarked “study group” when I was executive director of the Iraq Study Group) has already recommended winding down and eventually out the military effort, while somehow increasing economic assistance and regional cooperation: A New Way Forward | Report of the Afghanistan Study Group.

Now the Council on Foreign Relations (Sandy Berger and Rich Armitage chairing) weigh in with a lukewarm endorsement of the current military and civilian “surge” approach, but only if it starts to show results by the time of the President’s December policy review.  Absent that, they too advocate a drawdown and narrowing of the military effort to the fight against al Qaeda:  U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan – Council on Foreign Relations.

At least two more due out soon.  Center for American Progress should have a report out within a couple of weeks that focuses at least in part on the defects of the Karzai government and raises questions about whether it is worth supporting (as all the reports do, in one way or another).  Century Foundation has got Tom Pickering and Lakhdar Brahimi working on another report that focuses at least in part on the prospects for “reconciling” some of the Taliban.  Brahimi, remember, was the UN Special Representative who wanted to bring the Taliban into the political  process, a move the Americans blocked.

The Administration has already let it be understood that the December presidential review is not expected to produce any dramatic policy moves, and Gates/Clinton have been anxious to let the Taliban and al Qaeda know that they expect the U.S. to still be militarily active in Afghanistan and Pakistan until 2014, when Karzai claims the Afghans will take over.  But at the very least the reports already out suggest that there are profound doubts about the legitimacy, capability, honesty and efficacy of the Karzai government.

The CFR report defines a desirable end-state in Afghanistan this way:  “An acceptable end state in Afghanistan would be one in which the Afghan people are secure and strong enough to prevent the rise of new terrorist safe havens inside Afghanistan and avert a return to civil war without relying upon U.S. or international military forces.”  Can that be achieved with Karzai?