Libya is turning into a long term problem

Steve Metz in a piece published yesterday in The New Republic looks at scenarios for Libya, assuming a protracted struggle between a continuing rebellion and a regime that fails to fully suppress it. None of the scenarios are attractive:  his models are northern and southern Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Afghanistan and Somalia. All are expensive, one way or another, to American interests and ultimately to our bank accounts.

Of course it is also possible that Gaddafi will succeed in repressing the rebellion. That too would be a long-term mess: the US and Europe at the least would maintain sanctions, even as some of the Europeans (Italy in particular) try to bypass them. China would also certainly be tempted to return to business as usual and gain an upper hand on Libya’s oil supplies. Libya might not want to return to its terrorist or WMD past, but it could certainly be tempted to return to making trouble in its neighborhood, which includes Chad and Sudan.

Secretary of State Clinton this morning on NPR was at pains to emphasize that the only viable way of taking action on Libya is with multilateral support.  This is certainly preferable, but what if it isn’t available, or isn’t available in a time frame that would enable it to be effective?

The usual American approach to defending its interests is “multilaterally when we can, unilaterally when we must.”  Taking the option of unilateral action off the table is not wise–several UN Security Council members will lean heavily in the direction of authorizing stronger action if they believe it will prevent the Americans from acting on their own.

That said, should we?  If we consider American interests pre-rebellion in Libya, they don’t look substantial enough to warrant the more vigorous types of military intervention.  But we are not going to be able to return to the status quo ante in Libya.  If Steve Metz’s scenarios, or a complete victory for Gaddafi, are in the cards, we certainly need to consider whether some of the less costly, non-military options, non-military options not yet being pursued are worthwhile.

On the military options, no fly zone (NFZ) advocates haven’t convinced me that it is worth the considerable enforcement burden it imposes on the United States.  Destroying Gaddafi’s air force on the ground would be easier, cheaper and send a stronger message.  The Administration is said this morning to be considering a “no drive” option for Gaddafi’s tanks and other heavy weapons.  Something along those lines is likely needed if Benghazi is to be saved from Gaddafi’s revenge.  More vigorous enforcement of existing sanctions, including by naval blockade, should certainly be on the agenda.

Not doing anything more is also an option, one we have so far adopted.  It too has consequences.  It looks as if they include a messy and expensive outcome in Libya, one that will keep us busy for years to come.  I hope those who have advocated for it will be ready and willing to pay its costs when the time comes.