The end is near for Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and Bashar al Assad of Syria. They may last weeks or even months, but their regimes will never again be able to claim that they are factors for stability, and they are unlikely to risk the kinds of reforms that might satisfy at least some critics and enable them to remain on office. The regimes have suffered mortal wounds, as Saleh himself likely has.
The problem lies in what comes next. Libya at least has an interim National Transitional Council, recognized as a legitimate authority by some major countries. Syria has the beginnings of something similar, a “follow up” “consultative” group growing out of a meeting in Antalya, Turkey two weeks ago. In my way of thinking, it is important that the exile Syrians somehow maintain the momentum of that group and begin to lay concrete plans for how to govern in the aftermath of Assad’s fall, despite the obvious difficulty of coordinating their efforts with the protest leaders inside Syria. It is vital that Syria not succumb to sectarian and ethnic chaos if the revolution there succeeds. Protecting the Alawi and other privileged minorities from the wrath of people who have suffered under the Assad regime is not going to be easy.
Yemen is especially problematic.
The revolution there has several dimensions: students and youth (the “protesters”), political parties (the “opposition,” aka the Joint Meeting Parties), and tribes (especially it seems the al-Ahmar), not to mention a northern (Houthi) insurgency and southern secessionists. In addition, the Americans will be pressing for an “orderly” transition, in order to enable a continuing effort against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The Saudis, who were remarkably inept at exerting their considerable influence to get Saleh out, will nevertheless be big players if they choose to bankroll one competitor or another.
The competing visions of these often disparate and only occasionally harmonious forces will make transition particularly problematic in Yemen, where declining oil production, water shortages and shrinkage of the economy are creating the ideal conditions for state collapse. I am all in favor of the Europeans playing the major role post-war in Libya, and likely Syria as well, and I’d like to see some indication that they are preparing seriously.
But the Europeans are not much of a factor in Yemen. The Americans will feel they can’t afford to ignore Anwar al-Awlaki’s home base, or leave the matter entirely to the ineptitude of the Saudis. It is time for them to begin planning, if they haven’t already done so, for a major post-war effort to support whatever minimal state can be made to emerge from Yemen’s chaos.
Here are the basic categories of things they need to worry about:
The fixes will come only in the long term. Yemen is going to be a problem for a long time. And it is hard for me to see how the Americans escape at least some responsibility for the post-conflict reconstruction, if they continue to worry about containing Yemen’s terrorist potential.
A war criminal can die, while the ideology that made him a hero survives. That…
We are witnessing a new variation on Milan Kundera’s famous *The Joke*: “Optimism is opium…
It is high time to get on with the serious business of governing, which includes…
Belgrade talks the talk, takes the EU money, and does nearly nothing. It is time…
Allowing the powers that be in the region to reach their own equilibrium, with US…
Trump has promised an agreement with Iran that can't be reached while Iran and Oman…