Whose side are we on?

While Admiral Mullen has been raising questions about whose side Pakistan is on in the Afghanistan war, it is fair to ask whose side we are on in Yemen and Bahrain.  Are we pressing for serious political change in these two very different but profoundly autocratic societies?  Or are we willing to back President Saleh because he helps us against Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa because Bahrain hosts the Fifth Fleet and helps us in other ways to counter Iran?

I don’t mean this as a rhetorical question.  The jury is still out.  The killing in Yemen today of Anwar al Awlaki, an American-born terrorism suspect, provides us with an opportunity to choose.  While there are surely other targets in Yemen, whack-a-mole is not a winning strategy over the long term.  We need to consider seriously whether our national security interests are better served by continuing our heavy emphasis on the drone war there, which requires that we help Saleh stay in power and tolerate a consequently chaotic Yemen, or by trying to push Yemen towards political change, with the hope that will eventually bring stability and stronger governance.

In Bahrain, the Administration has chosen to proceed with a substantial arms sale, which certainly implies trust and support for the king.  But it does not preclude a renewed effort in favor of political reform.  The Sunni monarchy has chosen to pursue a very tough line against its mostly Shia reform movement.  Yesterday its courts condemned doctors who had treated protesters to long prison sentences.  Will we use the leverage provided by the arms sale to get the King to move in the direction of political reform, or will we subordinate our interest in supporting reform to what Arabs like to call “the security file”?

These are the tough questions that should be on the minds of our diplomats today in Sanaa and Manama.  I suspect the sheer bureaucratic weight of the Pentagon will tip their judgment in favor of the more immediate security interests.  So I’ll push in the other direction:  with Awlaki gone, shouldn’t we take the opportunity to reassess and rebalance our approach, get Saleh to step down and start a serious process of political change?  Shouldn’t we make it clear that our ability to continue arms sales to Bahrain depends on the government there being perceived as legitimate by Shia as well as Sunni?

Getting the balance right with people who help us with security but mistreat their own populations is difficult.  But the lesson of the Arab spring is that tilting too far towards accepting autocracy, as we did for decades in the Middle East, does not ensure long-term stability.  Tilting the other way will not be easy or risk free, but it might well be more effective and less burdensome in the long term.