Month: October 2011

IREX short term research travel grants

2012-2013 FELLOWSHIP OPPORTUNITIES

Individual Advanced Research Opportunities Program (IARO)

Short Term Travel Grants Program (STG)

 IREX is pleased to announce that applications are now being accepted for the 2012-2013 Individual Advanced Research Opportunities Program and Short Term Travel Grants Program.

These research support programs offer US scholars and professionals the opportunity to conduct policy-relevant research in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Researchers are also able to increase their understanding of current regional issues, develop and sustain international networks, and directly contribute to the formation of US public policy by conducting research on topics vital to the academic and policy-making communities. The fellowships provide logistical support, international airfare, a living/housing stipend, visa support, emergency evacuation insurance, and, in many countries, field office support.

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 The Individual Advanced Research Opportunities Program (IARO) provides students, scholars and professionals with support to conduct policy-relevant field research in the countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

**Eligibility: Master’s students, predoctoral students, postdoctoral scholars, and professionals with advanced degrees are eligible. Applicants must be US citizens.

** Information and application: http://www.irex.org/project/individual-advanced-research-opportunities-iaro

**Deadline:  5 p.m. EST on November 16, 2011

**Contact: By email at iaro@irex.org or by telephone at 202-628-8188

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 The Short-Term Travel Grants Program (STG) is a short-term, flexible program for postdoctoral scholars and professionals to conduct targeted, policy-relevant research in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

**Eligibility: Postdoctoral scholars and professionals with advanced degrees are eligible. Applicants must be US citizens.

** Information and application: http://www.irex.org/project/short-term-travel-grants-stg

**Deadline:  5 p.m. EST on February 1, 2012

**Contact: By email at stg@irex.org or by telephone at 202-628-8188

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Countries Eligible for Research:

Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan

 IARO and STG are funded by the US Department of State Title VIII Program.

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Elections in conflict zones

Post-conflict zones are prone to violent outbreaks. Competition for power in any form, elections included, runs the risk of reigniting violence.

These issues were discussed at a Carnegie Endowment event yesterday featuring Susanne Mueller, Benjamin Reilly, and Francesc Vendrell, with Thomas Carothers as moderator.

Election timing is one delicate matter that can spoil democratic progress. Though traditionally the inclination has been to hold elections quickly, thereby restoring legitimacy to the new government in a timely manner, recent scholarship has revealed important flaws in this approach. Premature elections often result in relapses of violent conflict, Ben Reilly points out, because previously repressed parties and factions feel indignant about the time constraints placed on their campaign preparation. Reilly thus worries that, because the civil war is only just ending in Libya, elections scheduled for only eight months from now could trigger a violent backlash.

One way to mitigate the issue of timing, Reilly argues, is by phasing elections in gradually. While the tendency is to hold national and sub-national elections simultaneously, experiments with gradualism in East Timor and Kosovo have cast doubt over this policy. By holding sub-national and municipal elections before those at the national level, both governments and populations can ease their way into the democratic process. Equally so, sequencing can allow national parties more time to organize and campaign, at least creating the perception of a fairer process.

Another virtue of delaying elections is the additional time gained to decide upon the proper voting system, which is often selected out of expediency rather than concern for long-term viability. As Reilly insists, the electoral system is a pivotal factor influencing the government’s ability to guide policy after elections. Too often inclusivity wins out over efficiency, leading state-building groups to favor proportional representation arrangements over those inviting the formation of larger, more centralized parties.

Inclusivity, of course, is crucial, especially in environments where key groups have been marginalized for decades. Blowback from the exclusion of low-level Baath officials in Iraq provides one among many clear examples.

But if, in Reilly’s words, we “reify factions” to the extent that inclusivity undermines functionality, the purpose for creating a democratic government in the first place can be jeopardized. Lebanon’s post-Ta’if environment illustrates clearly the pitfalls of highly factionalized and decentralized governmental frameworks forged in the pursuit of inclusivity. And, as Reilly argues, an overly-representative arrangement in Libya will undoubtedly lead to tribalization, potentially producing another version of the Qaddafi regime.

Technical analysis of this sort, however, is only so useful. Susanne Mueller reminds us that even the most finely tuned electoral apparatus is not averse to exogenous political factors unique to individual countries. Political cleavages, as Mueller reiterates, are capable of derailing the electoral process in the short and medium term regardless of the electoral framework in place. When players in the democratic process perceive there to be no returns on further participation, they may resort to violence in an attempt to solidify some gains.

Elections in Kenya, Mueller’s area of expertise, offer a useful illustration of this reality. Members of parliament employed gangs before and during the 2007 presidential election to scare-off supporters of the president, no doubt a reaction to vote tampering by the governing coalition and the failure of non-violent protests to effect change.

Perhaps the broader point then, as panelist Francesc Vendrell offers, is that scholars must be cautious when generalizing about electoral models in post-conflict countries. Political science can offer useful guidelines, but these must be flexible. Placing too much trust in one model can lead to myopic analysis. Political realities in Libya are different from those in Egypt, so it is unwise to simply assume, for example, that delayed elections in each will be favorable. Egypt’s military has, for better or worse, maintained a monopoly on force and deployed units to maintain relative order, which at least creates the potential for peaceful elections in the near term. Libya, on the other hand, must reconstitute its armed forces entirely, rendering the prospects for orderly and transparent voting dim in the near term.

These distinctions must be central to any decision concerning election timing and voting systems, an assertion upon which yesterday’s panelists expressed clear agreement.

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Violence, or no violence?

As the regime of Bashar al Assad continues its bloody crackdown in Syria, at least some protesters are tempted to respond violently, especially those who have defected from the army. There is no question in my mind about their right to self-defense. The question is whether it is good strategy to resort to violence and whether the United States should encourage or discourage it.

Simon Henderson argues in The New Republic that the United States should not discourage it. He sees no reason to take the option off the table. He would also leave open the possibility of foreign military intervention, which the Obama Administration has so far ruled out.

Elliott Abrams takes a more nuanced view in a Council on Foreign Relations paper:

The United States should encourage defections but should not encourage violence in any form. Yet if a military opposition comes into existence and fights the regime, U.S. policymakers will not want to see that opposition crushed. Thus, the United States should not discourage other governments from assisting the rebels if they wish to do so. Nor should it try to stop other groups—for example, Sunni tribes living on both sides of the Syria-Iraq border areas—from assisting brethren inside Syria.

We took an approach of this sort with Bosnia in 1993-95: we turned a blind eye to arming of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats to fight against the Bosnian Serb Army and its ample support from Belgrade.

I side with the Administration on this issue in Syria. Violence by the demonstrators will consolidate the security forces in support of the regime, reduce the likelihood of defections, and strike fear into minority populations, especially if there is cross-border Sunni cooperation in providing arms.  The threat of military intervention (by NATO, the U.S., Turkey or someone else) is not credible. No UN Security Council resolution will pass authorizing it; U.S. action in its absence is theoretically possible but highly unlikely. The Arab League is far less antagonistic to Bashar than it was to Qaddafi.  The Russians haven’t even allowed a resolution condemning the regime’s violence. Moscow’s naval base at Latakia is too valuable for them to risk another Libya-type air war that would likely put in place a regime unfriendly to the Russian presence on the Mediterranean.

Lest anyone wonder, I agree wholeheartedly with Elliott that the U.S. would benefit from seeing the back of Bashar al Assad.  He puts it well:

The end of the Assad regime would be a great gain for the United States. The regime is a bloody dictatorship that is host to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups, Iran’s only Arab ally, the route through which Iran arms Hezbollah, and a permanent threat to Lebanon’s sovereignty and internal peace. Moreover, by doing its best to assist jihadis seeking to fight Americans in Iraq, it was complicit in the deaths of many Americans soldiers and the wounding of far more. As the regime fights its own populace and clings to power, effective sanctions and vigorous diplomacy can help shorten its life and lay the foundations for a determined effort to build a democratic state in its place.

But violence on the demonstrators’ part has no place in a strategy aimed at weakening the regime, which has advantages in firepower and ruthlessness that simply cannot be overcome in today’s international environment.  It isn’t fair, and it isn’t moral, to ask the Syrian National Council to foreswear the use of violence against a regime that is showing little restraint. But it is realistic and necessary.

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Better done well than quickly

Sunday’s Tunisian elections for 217 members of a constituent assembly (that’s one that will write a constitution) went off well, with very high turnout (reportedly 90%!) and order in the streets.  This is a marvelous start to the democratic era in Tunisia, one that sets a fine example and a hopeful precedent.

Some will worry that a moderate Islamist party (Ennahda) apparently won a plurality of votes, perhaps as many as 40 per cent.  It is not surprising when a revolution that deposed an avowed secularist leads to an Islamist win.  Get used to it.  It is likely to happen in Egypt and Libya as well.  The key here is the process, not the result.  The official count has not yet been tallied, but Ennahda claims to have done its own tally based on counts posted at polling stations.  That is a credit both to Ennahda‘s organization and to the transparency of the electoral process.  The opposition is accepting the results:

The PDP respects the democratic game. The people gave their trust to those it considers worthy of that trust. We congratulate the winner and we will be in the ranks of the opposition.

Ennahda is negotiating to form a coalition with two secularist parties.  They would be wise to do so, if only to distribute the risk.  This next year is not going to be an easy one for Tunisia.  The economy is on a steep downward path.  Preparation of a new constitution will not be easy.  New elections are expected next year, or in early 2013.  Ennahda is not getting a blank check but rather a limited mandate to manage the constitutional process well.

Sunday’s elections were postponed from July.  The Tunisians have used the extra time well.  Let’s hope they can exploit the next year to prepare a constitution worthy of following on from these smooth-running elections. That would require a broad consultative process allowing Tunisians of all stripes to participate. Like the elections, the constitution-making process is better done well than quickly.

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Or else what?

On Twitter, I mocked the Administration’s renewed effort to get Pakistan to act against the Taliban, suggesting that it amounted to doing the same thing over and over expecting to get a different result (one definition of madness).  But here on the blog I should be a bit more analytical.

SecState Clinton was in Islamabad last week with a high powered delegation. The Guardian reported:

US officials are demanding that Pakistan either deliver the Haqqani network to peace talks, kill its leaders, or pave the way for the Americans to eliminate them.

The question is, or else what?  what is America’s leverage? If the Pakistanis don’t do these things, what will the United States do? In the negotiation business, this is called “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA).  I reviewed America’s broad policy options in July, leading to the conclusion that this is the damndest problem. 

But there are “courses of action” for the United States:

1.  Amp up drone attacks, aiming deeper into Pakistan.  Hard to do without Islamabad’s cooperation, sure to create a negative reaction in Pakistan.

2.  Reduce assistance to the Pakistani military. Drives them into the arms of the Chinese and reduces further the likelihood of cooperation on drone attacks.

3.  Help the Pakistan civilian government to gain better control over the military and intelligence service.  The civilians are less reserved in denouncing the drone attacks than the military, which isn’t going to like this idea and won’t sit still while it goes on.

4.  Align the United States more with India (and Afghanistan) against Pakistan.  Also drives Pakistan into the arms of the Chinese.

I was tempted to add a fifth:  target the Inter Services Intelligence headquarters, or other elements of the Pakistani government that support the Taliban, but that is pretty near unthinkable unless we really are prepared to go to war with Pakistan.  It is the kind of thing we’ve done elsewhere and may not remain unthinkable forever.  Maybe this is what Karzai was referring to when he said Afghanistan would be on Pakistan’s side in a war with the United States.

Pakistan’s “BATNA,” which gives it leverage over the U.S., includes blocking or delaying military supplies to American troops in Afghanistan.  As Jackie Northam notes this morning on NPR, Hillary Clinton’s post-Islamabad stops in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan presumably aimed at strengthening the “northern distribution network” supply route, thus reducing vulnerability to a Pakistani squeeze on Afghanistan supplies.

So, yes, there are things we can do, but they’ve got distinct downsides.  For the moment, I remain wanting a thorough reassessment of our relationship with Pakistan, taking into account whatever we learned last week in Islamabad.  It will likely come out in the direction of no. 3 above, but let’s try the reassessment and see.

 

 

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Next week’s “peace picks”

Relatively slim pickings this week, at least in numbers.  Not sure why.

1. In the Eye of the Storm:  Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Domestic Realignment, Brookings, October 25, 2:30-3:30 pm

During the campaign for the 2011 national election, Turkey’s governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) gave little weight to foreign policy issues, focusing its platform instead on a variety of domestic issues. After the party’s victory in June, several regional challenges have thrust foreign policy back to the top of the AKP’s agenda. Turkey currently faces deteriorating relations with Syria, worsening dynamics with Iraq over the Kurdish issue, and new strains in Turkish-Iranian relations following the decision to deploy a European missile defense system in Turkey. In addition, after last month’s United Nations report on the 2010 Israeli commando raid on the Turkish aid ship Mavi Marmara, Turkish-Israeli relations have sunk to new lows.
On October 25, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings will host a discussion exploring Turkish foreign policy and assessing the impact of domestic developments and the shifting civilian-military power balance on Turkey’s international relations. Panelists include Ümit Boyner, chair of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD), and Soli Özel of Kadir Has University. Brookings President Strobe Talbott will provide introductory remarks and Senior Fellow and CUSE Director Fiona Hill will moderate the discussion.

Introduction

Strobe Talbott

President, The Brookings Institution

Moderator

Fiona Hill

Director, Center on the United States and Europe

Panelists

Ümit Boyner

Chair
Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD)

Soli Özel

Professor
Kadir Has University, Istanbul

2.  A Roadmap for Effective Economic Reconstruction in Conflict-Affected Areas, USIP, October 26, 9 am-1 pm

The event will include two panels which will address structural as well as programmatic aspects of economic reconstruction, including: risk-aversion in donor institutions, inter-agency and international collaboration and cooperation, monitoring and evaluation, and the role of entrepreneurship and public/private partnerships.

Panelists will glean lessons from relevant case-studies and begin to chart the roadmap to peace and prosperity that World Bank President Robert Zoellick called for with the launch of the 2011 World Development Report.

Speakers

  • Fred Tipson, Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow
    U.S. Institute of Peace
  • Basel Saleh, Assistant Professor of Economics
    Radford University
  • Jomana Amara, Assistant Professor of Economics
    Naval Postgraduate School
  • Sharon Morris, Director of the Conflict Management Group
    Mercy Corps
  • Robert Aten, Senior International Economics
    Ret. U. S. Agency for International Development
  • Gary Milante, World Development Report Core Team Member
    World Bank
  • Graciana del Castillo, Co-founding Partner
    Macroeconomic Advisory Group
  • John Simon, Founding Partner
    Total Impact Advisors
  • Del Fitchett
    Independent Economics Consultant
  • Raymond Gilpin, Director of the Center for Sustainable Economies
    U.S. Institute of Peace
3.  Ends and Means:  American Security Strategy and Defense Budgets, AEI, October 27, 9-10 am
With congressional super committee deliberations underway and the November 23 deadline for this work fast approaching, defense spending has taken a central place in public debate. Additional defense spending cuts, even if not the equivalent of the sequestration “nuclear option,” would push America’s armed forces closer to what General Martin Dempsey has called a “high-risk” scenario. Amid these pressures, ensuring that budgeting is more than an accounting practice—and, instead, considers our strategic needs—has become more important than ever for leaders on Capitol Hill. In this keynote address, Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA), ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, will reflect on the state of America’s armed forces, including strategic goals; force posture; and, in this environment of fiscal strain, funding needs.
4.  EU Washington Forum, Sofitel, October 27 and 28
I guess this is by invitation, as I don’t find a program on line.  That shouldn’t stop the brave hearted.   Here is one from more than a month ago:  Draft Program Sept 20
PS:  Two more I should have caught:
5. Elections in Conflict-Prone Contexts, Carnegie, October 25, 12-2 pm
Thomas Carothers, Susanne Mueller, Benjamin Reilly, Francesc Vendrell
Supporting elections in contexts of civil conflict entails daunting challenges for the United States and other international actors. While elections are an almost inevitable part of peace building processes, if badly managed they can provoke or intensify violent conflict.

The Carnegie Endowment and the North-South Institute will host a discussion on the complexities of electoral support in conflict contexts and examine two compelling case studies—the recent elections in Afghanistan and Kenya. The event will also mark the launch of a new book by the North-South Institute, Elections in Dangerous Places.

6. Into the Syrian Revolution, SAIS (Bernstein-Offit 500), October 26, 12:30-2 pm

Radwan Ziadeh, director of the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies, and Ammar Abdulhamid, founder of the Tharwa Foundation and a human rights activist, will discuss this topic. For more information and to RSVP, contact katarina@jhu.edu.

 

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